Filed 6/23/17 In re B.F. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



In re B.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.F.,

Defendant and Appellant.


E066829

(Super.Ct.No. RIJ1600041)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Roger A. Luebs, Judge. Affirmed.
Helen S. Irza and Connie Kan, under appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant B.F. (minor) became upset and threatened to build a bomb and blow up his middle school. Minor was subsequently placed on informal probation pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2. After minor successfully completed informal probation, the juvenile court dismissed the petition and sealed minor’s juvenile court records in accordance with sections 654 and 786. The juvenile court, however, denied minor’s request to seal his school records. Minor’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court abused its discretion in refusing to seal his school records pertaining to the dismissed petition. We find no abuse, and affirm the judgment.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 13, 2016, minor and another student were at their middle school when they made statements in class that they were going to “bomb” and “shoot up” the school. A witness heard minor state, “ ‘Damn! I hate this school. I’m going to just make a bomb and just blow up this school. I’m going to bulldoze this place.” When confronted, minor claimed that he was “ ‘just kidding.’ ” Another student who witnessed the incident claimed that the threats made him feel afraid. Minor said that he was “ ‘only joking’ ” when he made the threats and that he was trying to make his classmates laugh.
Minor was subsequently arrested, and on January 14, 2016, a section 602 petition was filed alleging minor made criminal threats in violation of Penal Code section 422. Minor was released the following day under a home supervision agreement.
On March 9, 2016, the juvenile court found that minor was complying with his home supervision agreement, that he was doing well in school, and that he was participating in counseling. The court concluded minor had minimal rehabilitation needs, and therefore found unusual circumstances supported placing minor on informal supervision under section 654.2 for six months. Minor was thereafter placed on informal probation on various terms and conditions, including completing 20 hours of community service, doing well in school, and continuing with counseling.
By the six-month review hearing, minor had obeyed all the terms and conditions of his informal probation. He had completed 21 hours of community service and had continued his counseling services. He had also improved his behavior and grades at school. The probation officer noted that minor’s performance on probation was “Outstanding,” that he had “abstained from delinquent behavior,” and was “doing well in the community, in school, and at home.”
On September 9, 2016, the juvenile court found that minor successfully completed informal probation and that minor continued to show positive growth and rehabilitation. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition under sections 654 and 786 and ordered minor’s juvenile record sealed. However, the court refused to exercise its discretion to seal minor’s school records pertaining to the incident. The court explained, “ . . . I would not think that sealing those school records would be appropriate at this time. I think it’s important for the school to have those records available given his age and the fact he’s going to be in school for a few more years at least, and obviously those discipline records are important for managing the safety of the other kids and the minor at school.”
III
DISCUSSION
Minor argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his request to seal his school records relating to the dismissed petition. We disagree.
Section 786, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part: If a minor “satisfactorily completes . . . a term of probation for any offense, the court shall order the petition dismissed. The court shall order sealed all records pertaining to that dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court, and in the custody of law enforcement agencies, the probation department, or the Department of Justice. . . .” (§ 786, subd. (a).)
The statute further provides that the sealing of records held by an entity is not limited to the court or law enforcement public agencies. Section 786, subdivision (e)(2), provides: “An individual who has a record that is eligible to be sealed under this section may ask the court to order the sealing of a record pertaining to the case that is in the custody of a public agency other than a law enforcement agency, the probation department, or the Department of Justice, and the court may grant the request and order that the public agency record be sealed if the court determines that sealing the additional record will promote the successful reentry and rehabilitation of the individual.” (Italics added.)
By its express language, the statute allows judicial discretion as to whether records held by a public agency and related to a dismissed petition should be sealed. In addition, by the statute’s plain language, a public school is a “public agency” within the meaning of section 786, subdivision (e)(2). (See Gov. Code, § 53050 [“The term ‘public agency,’ as used in this article, means a district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the state, but does not include the state or a county, city and county, or city.”]; Hovd v. Hayward Unified Sch. Dist. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 470, 472 [vocational skills center was not “public agency” within meaning of Government Code section 53051 requiring public agencies to file certain information with Secretary of State and county clerk, since it was a subdivision of a district].)
We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the issue of whether the juvenile court erred in denying minor’s request pursuant to subdivision (e)(2) of section 786. (In re J.W. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 663, 668 [appellate court reviews trial court’s denial of a petition under section 781 to seal juvenile records for abuse of discretion]; V.C. v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1469 [appellate court reviews trial court’s decision to grant or deny a section 782 motion to dismiss a juvenile petition under the abuse of discretion standard], disapproved on another point in In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 414-415.) “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) If the record shows that a trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion, then we must remand for an informed exercise of the power. (Cf. People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944 [discretion to strike recidivist finding].) The court does not have the discretion to issue an order not authorized by law or to find facts for which there is no substantial evidence. (In re K.F. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 655, 661.)
“ ‘[T]he purpose of the juvenile justice system is “(1) to serve the ‘best interests’ of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the ward and ‘enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and community,’ and (2) to ‘provide for the protection and safety of the public . . . .’ ” ’ ” (In re Fuhrman, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 417; § 202, subd. (b) [public safety is a consideration coequal to rehabilitation].) The purpose of sealing is to protect minors from future prejudice resulting from their juvenile records. (In re Jeffrey T. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1020.) Further, the juvenile delinquency system is not concerned merely with punishing juvenile offenders; rather, it is concerned with rehabilitating them. (In re J.W., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 667.)
Minor argues the juvenile court exceeded its discretionary power by considering factors that were not statutorily authorized. Specifically, minor claims “Basing its decision on safety considerations constituted legal error because the controlling statute, section 786, subdivision (e)(2), mandates the juvenile court to consider only whether sealing school records will promote the minor’s successful reentry and rehabilitation.” Minor believes the court’s ruling was not authorized by law as it was not permitted to consider public safety as a consideration for minor’s rehabilitation and successful reentry into society. Minor is mistaken.
There is no indication here that the juvenile court misapplied the law relating to sealing minor’s juvenile records in the custody of the school district. There is also no indication in the record that the court misunderstood its discretion in denying minor’s request to seal his school records pertaining to the dismissed petition. The court observed that the offense took place at minor’s school, and therefore the school might have disciplinary records documenting minor’s offense. However, the court explained that it did not believe it appropriate to order the school to seal those records. The court deemed it important for the school to keep those records given minor’s age, and that he would continue to be a student in the school district for a few more years. The court also found that such records were important for managing school safety. In requesting that the court nonetheless order sealing of the school records, minor pointed out that both his behavior and grades at school had improved and urged the court to seal his school records. The court acknowledged that minor had successfully completed counseling and the required community service, and that minor was participating in prosocial activities such as baseball. The court, however, declined to exercise its discretion to seal the school records.
On this record, contrary to minor’s suggestion, we cannot find that the juvenile court’s refusal to seal minor’s school records was irrational and arbitrary as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Part of minor’s successful rehabilitation and reentry in society depends upon his continued success at school. A student’s success in school is promoted when a school is aware of the student’s academic and disciplinary background, especially in this case where the incident involved criminal threats towards a school. It is important for the school to maintain records documenting what happened in order to continue fostering a positive learning environment for minor and help him avoid potential pitfalls. Moreover, minor’s continued success at school is, in part, promoted when the school is able to properly ensure the safety and well-being of all students. Less than one year had passed since minor uttered the criminal threats.
Minor overstates the speculative prejudice he would suffer absent sealing of the school’s records. He overlooks that his disciplinary record at school is confidential. Moreover, the court specifically stated that it would not be sealing the school records “at this time.” Hence, the court did not foreclose the possibility of sealing minor’s school records pertaining to the dismissed petition in the future, such as when minor applies to colleges, vocational schools, or employment. Thus, minor is not subject to public humiliation or stigmatization. Nor has he shown that as a result of the school record, he would be subject to retributive actions by the school. The school is entitled to maintain disciplinary records to ensure school safety. Indeed, the juvenile justice system is not solely concerned with the reformation and rehabilitation of the juvenile delinquent, but also concerned with public safety. (In re Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 417; § 202, subd. (b) [public safety is a consideration coequal to rehabilitation]; In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329 [“relevant policies of juvenile court law require that the court consider ‘the broadest range of information’ in determining how best to rehabilitate a minor and afford him adequate care”]; In re Carl N. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 423, 432-433 [juvenile court must consider both rehabilitation of the minor and protection of the community].) The juvenile court’s refusal to seal minor’s school records pertaining to the dismissed petition “at this time” implicitly demonstrated its understanding of the necessary balance between minor’s rehabilitation and public safety.
In re J.W., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th 663, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s denial of a petition to seal juvenile records, noting that the petitioner’s most recent crimes—attempted robbery and battery—were serious offenses and that insufficient time had elapsed since he had committed those offenses. (Id. at pp. 667-668.) The court determined the petitioner was not yet rehabilitated, but left open the possibility of sealing the records after more time had passed, acknowledging that “the passage of time works in his favor, and if appellant furthers his rehabilitation, he will in the future have the opportunity to ask the trial court to seal his records.” (Id. at p. 670.) Similarly, here, in light of the seriousness of minor’s offense and the short period of time that had elapsed since the incident and termination from probation (a mere eight months), there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s determination that minor was not sufficiently rehabilitated, and that it would not serve his best interests or the interests of the public to seal his school records “at this time.”
We find the juvenile court’s discretionary decision was authorized by law and not arbitrary, capricious, patently absurd, or beyond the bounds of reason.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:



MILLER
Acting P. J.



SLOUGH
J.