Filed 5/3/17 In re C.C. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR


In re C.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY',
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.L.,
Defendant and Respondent;
M.R.,
Objector and Appellant.

A149479

(Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. OJ13021094)


I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2013, C.C. was removed from the care of her mother (mother) after she tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. In June 2016, the juvenile court dismissed this dependency case and granted sole legal and physical custody of C.C. to her father, J.L. (father). This appeal was filed by C.C.’s maternal grandmother, M.R. (grandmother), who contends the juvenile court erred by terminating its dependency jurisdiction prematurely and by failing to guarantee grandmother visitation with C.C. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Background
This is the third time we have been asked to review a juvenile court order in this case. In 2014, father filed a writ petition seeking review of an order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to select a permanent plan for C.C., with a goal of adoption by grandmother. (In re C.C. (Dec. 4, 2014, A142870) [nonpub. opn.] (C.C. I).) We granted that petition, ordered the juvenile court to vacate the section 366.26 hearing, found that father qualified as a presumed father, and ordered the juvenile court to provide him with six months of reasonable reunification services.
In 2016, grandmother filed an appeal from an order placing C.C. in the home of father with family maintenance services. (In re C.C. (May 2, 2017, A147563) [nonpub. opn.] (C.C. II). We affirmed that placement order, rejecting grandmother’s contention that the juvenile court violated “mandatory permanency deadlines” by facilitating reunification between father and his daughter.
C.C. I and C.C. II contain detailed accounts of the factual and procedural background of this case, which we need not repeat here. The present appeal, which was filed before we issued our decision in C.C. II, pertains solely to proceedings that were conducted after C.C. was placed in father’s home.
B. Family Maintenance Review and Dismissal of the Dependency
In July 2016, the Alameda County Social Services Agency (the Agency) prepared a status report in anticipation of a family maintenance review hearing. The Agency recommended that the court dismiss this dependency and grant father sole custody of C.C., reporting that father had complied with all of the requirements of his case plan, there was no risk of detriment to C.C., and no reason to continue the dependency. The Agency also recommended that the court deny visitation to mother, who had not had any contact with the Agency for more than two years. The Agency did not make a recommendation about visitation for grandmother, although it discussed that issue.
The Agency reported that grandmother had not visited with C.C. during this reporting period. The social worker was told that grandmother had spent several months in Mexico caring for a sick relative. Then, on June 16, 2016, grandmother contacted the social worker to request every weekend overnight visits with C.C. The social worker advised grandmother to contact father directly. On June 20, the social worker met with father to discuss the matter. Father said grandmother was welcome to visit C.C. in his home and that he had invited grandmother to a party, but she declined to attend. Father was concerned about overnight visits in grandmother’s home for two reasons. First, he did not want to disrupt C.C.’s transition by confusing her about where she lived. Second, his three children are “full siblings,” and his older children were often upset that grandmother favored C.C. and showed no interest in bonding with them. On June 28, father called the social worker to report that grandmother had shown up at his home and demanded a visit with C.C. She called him names and threatened to take him to court in front of the children, so he asked her to leave. Father told the social worker that grandmother also made a remark about the children visiting mother, an idea father did not support. Father agreed that C.C. should spend time with grandmother, but he wanted visits to happen in his home.
On July 19, 2016, the juvenile court began conducting its status review. After admitting the agency report into evidence, the court stated “[i]t was a pleasure to read this report,” and then congratulated father for “doing so great.” C.C.’s counsel confirmed to the court that the child was doing very well, and that “everything [was] great with her.” Three other issues were addressed at the hearing. First, grandmother’s counsel stated that the dependency should not be dismissed while grandmother’s appeal in C.C. II was pending, but provided no argument or authority for this position. Second, C.C.’s counsel requested that the court order visitation for grandmother, opining it was in the child’s best interests to continue her relationship with the person she had lived with for a good part of her life. Grandmother’s counsel concurred and objected to the Agency’s proposed custody order because it did not provide visitation for grandmother. C.C.’s counsel proposed mediation to resolve visitation issues. Through counsel, grandmother and father agreed to participate. Finally, counsel for mother argued the fact that mother had absented herself from the proceedings did not justify denying her joint legal custody or any right to visitation. After the matters were submitted, the court stated it was not inclined to grant mother visitation, but that it would dismiss the dependency if not for the objections to the custody order. The court asked the parties to address those issues in mediation and continued the review hearing for that purpose.
On August 8, 2016, father, grandmother, the social worker, and C.C.’s counsel signed a mediated agreement (the August 8 agreement), which included the following terms: grandmother would begin having visits with C.C. and her two siblings, which would be monitored by father or his mother; visits would occur at least twice a month, with grandmother and father making arrangements via text or telephone; mother would have no contact with the children; visits would progress to being unsupervised once C.C. and her siblings were comfortable with that change; if C.C. was comfortable with supervised visits but the siblings were not, then C.C.’s visits would become unsupervised at that time; overnight visits would be permitted once C.C. and the siblings indicated they were comfortable with overnight visits; father and grandmother would not make negative comments about each other in front of the children or discuss their concerns about the children when the children were present.
The continued review hearing was held on August 15, 2016. Agency counsel reported that mediation had been completed and the court took a recess to review the August 8 agreement. Then the Agency renewed its request to dismiss the case, submitted an order granting father full custody of C.C., and reported there were no other changes to the Agency recommendations. Grandmother’s counsel stated he was pleased with the mediation and grandmother was comfortable with the August 8 agreement. However, grandmother and mother both objected to dismissing the case before grandmother’s appeal in C.C. II was resolved. Mother also renewed her objection to the recommendation to deny her visitation. After the matter was submitted, the court ruled that it would dismiss the dependency; if grandmother prevailed in the pending appeal, the dependency would be resumed; and it would sign the custody orders prepared by the Agency, including the order denying mother visitation. At the request of grandmother’s counsel, the court agreed to adopt the August 8 agreement “as an order of the Court.”
III. DISCUSSION
Preliminarily, we reject the Agency’s contention that grandmother does not have standing to pursue this appeal. “[W]hether one has standing in a particular case generally revolves around the question whether that person has rights that may suffer some injury, actual or threatened.” (Clifford S. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 747, 751.) Thus, for example, a de facto parent with no right to reunification services does not have standing to challenge the failure of the court to order such services. (Id. at p. 752.) However, “a de facto parent has an interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of the child. [Citation.]” (In re Joel H. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1196.) And that interest is injuriously affected when a court order has the effect of permanently removing the child from the custody of the de facto parent. (Ibid.; see also In re Aaron R. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 697, 702 703 [grandmother had standing to appeal denial of section 388 petition to modify placement order].)
Grandmother frames the issues on appeal as follows: “This appeal presents the question whether the juvenile court erred when it terminated its dependency jurisdiction over [C.C.] after making a custody order in favor of [father] while [grandmother’s] challenge to the placement order was pending, and without providing for visitation for [grandmother].” This assertion conflates two distinct issues: (1) whether the dependency case could be dismissed while the appeal was pending; and (2) whether the custody order must be reversed because it did not provide visitation for grandmother.
Grandmother does not advance a cognizable legal argument or cite any pertinent authority to support her claim that the court erred by dismissing the dependency case before CC II was decided. “ ‘We are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived.’ [Citations.]” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.) Thus, this claim of error is waived.
Grandmother also advances the argument that the juvenile court erred by dismissing this case without ordering visitation for her, but her analysis is factually flawed and unsupported by pertinent authority. As discussed, at the final session of the review hearing, the court agreed to adopt the August 8 agreement as an order of the court. Consistent with that ruling, the judge signed and filed the August 8 agreement. Thus, as a factual matter, the record shows that the court did order visitation for grandmother.
Apparently, grandmother is contending that the juvenile court erred because it did not expressly incorporate the August 8 order into the custody orders it signed when it dismissed C.C.’s dependency. However, grandmother provides no authority suggesting the court was required to do that. Instead, she relies on section 361.2, subdivision (i), which requires the court to consider whether visitation with a grandparent would be in the best interest of a child who is removed from the custody of his or her parents. That statute had no application here, where C.C. was placed in the custody of her parent. Furthermore, as just discussed, the court did consider the issue of visitation with grandmother. It did not, however, find that visitation was in the best interest of C.C., as grandmother contends in her appellate briefs.
Taking a different approach, grandmother asserts that the juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to protect her relationship with C.C. after implicitly recognizing that this relationship was beneficial to C.C. The record shows that before dismissing the dependency case, the juvenile court denied a request to terminate grandmother’s de facto parent status, and approved a mediated agreement to provide grandmother with visitation. These circumstances are inconsistent with grandmother’s premise that the juvenile court ignored C.C.’s relationship with grandmother or otherwise abused its discretion.
The premise of this appeal is that the August 8 agreement is meaningless or unenforceable unless it is expressly incorporated into the custody orders. But grandmother fails to establish this premise is true. Instead, she misconstrues section 827, which limits the dissemination of confidential records in a juvenile court case file. Grandmother contends section 827 will preclude her from proving that the juvenile court approved the August 8 order. However, section 827, subdivision (a)(1)(L), states that a juvenile court case file may be inspected by “[a] judge, commissioner, or other hearing officer assigned to a family law case with issues concerning custody or visitation, or both, involving the minor . . . .” Thus, if a dispute about the August 8 agreement should arise in the future, the family court will be in a position to address it.
Finally, grandmother envisions “daunting paperwork burdens” and other problems in family court if father “refuses in the future to allow visits.” And she anticipates that “she is highly unlikely to obtain standing in family court to try to enforce visitation rights not referenced in the custody order.” These theories are grounded in speculation and unsupported by legal authority. They afford no basis for reversing this judgment and further delaying the finality to which C.C. is entitled.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
 





_________________________
RUVOLO, P. J.


We concur:


_________________________
REARDON, J.


_________________________
STREETER, J.
























A149479, In re C.C.