In re C.E.





















Filed 4/26/13 In re C.E. CA2/4

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>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115>.









IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION
FOUR






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In re C.E., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.	B240840 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PJ41998)
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C.E., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from
an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Benjamin R. Campos,
Commissioner. Affirmed.

Cynthia L.
Barnes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney
General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________________________

Appellant C.E. appeals from an order terminating juvenile
court jurisdiction. He contends he was
subject to the transition jurisdiction of the juvenile court as he had
satisfied the statutory criteria required under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 450, subdivision (a).href="#_ftn1"
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] He argues this entitled him to a hearing
pursuant to section 452. Appellant
contends the trial court erred in not providing this hearing, and the order
terminating juvenile court jurisdiction should be reversed. We find appellant’s circumstances fail to
meet the statutory criteria under section 450, subdivision (a)(1)(A). Therefore, he is not subject to the juvenile
court’s transition jurisdiction and is not entitled to a hearing under section
452. We affirm the court’s order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

Appellant
was ordered into suitable placement in December 2009 and placed at the Leroy
Haynes Center. In May 2010, appellant
(born January 15, 1994) admitted to one count of assault by means likely to
produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and the allegation
that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (Pen. Code, §
12022.7, subd. (a)). As a result, the
court ordered appellant into a long-term camp community placement. After a violation of appellant’s probation,
the previous order was terminated, and he was ordered to be placed at the
Dorothy Kirby Center. Appellant made
progress in his rehabilitation programs and both he and his mother were in
support of reunification services. The
tentative plan was for appellant to be reunified with his mother with the
assistance of various services.

In August
2011, the probation officer’s report recommended that appellant remain a ward
of the court but that the previous “order of suitable placement” be terminated
and that appellant be placed at home on probation with his mother. The court terminated the previous suitable
placement order, and appellant was placed at home with his mother. In February 2012, the probation department
reported that appellant had turned 18 years old and was doing well at home with
his mother. The report recommended that
jurisdiction be terminated. The court
followed this recommendation and terminated its jurisdiction over
appellant. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I

Appellant
contends he met the statutory criteria laid out in section 450, placing him
within the transition jurisdiction of the juvenile court. As a result, he argues he was denied a
hearing required by section 452 before the court could terminate transition
jurisdiction.

Assembly
Bill No. 212 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.), known as the “California Fostering
Connections to Success Act,” became law in October 2011. (Stats. 2011, ch. 459.) It made a series of changes to the Welfare
and Institutions Code relating to public social services. It specifically provided for transition
jurisdiction in the juvenile courts over youths transitioning out of foster
care. The bill laid out specific
guidelines for who would qualify for this transition jurisdiction. It created section 450, which provides that a
nonminor must satisfy all of the criteria listed in order to be within the
transition jurisdiction of the juvenile court.


One of the
criteria listed in section 450 requires the nonminor to have been removed from
the physical custody of his parents, declared a ward of the juvenile court, and
ordered into foster care placement. (§
450, subd. (a)(2)(A).) Appellant
contends, and respondent agrees, that he meets the criteria set forth in
subdivision (a)(2)(A) of section 450.
However, the two parties disagree over whether appellant satisfies the
criteria set out in the preceding provision, subdivision (a)(1)(A). That provision requires the nonminor to be “a
ward in foster care placement who was a ward subject to an order for foster
care placement on the day he . . . attained 18 years of age
and on and after January 1, 2012, has not attained 19 years of age.”href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] (§ 450, subd. (a)(1)(A).) It is undisputed that appellant met the age
requirement included in this provision.
However, appellant was not in a “foster care placement” when the court
terminated jurisdiction. Although
appellant had been living in a camp community placement and then the Dorothy
Kirby Center, he was returned to his home to live with his mother more than six
months prior to the juvenile court’s termination and continued to reside there
up to the termination. We conclude
appellant failed to satisfy this requirement of section 450 and was not within
the transition jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Therefore, he was not entitled to a hearing
pursuant to section 452, which specifically relates to a juvenile court’s
termination of transition
jurisdiction.

In his
reply brief, appellant discusses the Legislature’s intended meaning of the
phrase “subject to an order for foster care placement” as it is used in section
450, subdivision (a)(1)(A). His argument
centers around whether one must be living in foster care placement on the date
of his or her 18th birthday in order to satisfy this requirement. The full provision states that the nonminor
must be “a ward in foster care placement who was a ward subject to an order for
foster care placement on the day he . . . attained 18 years
of age” in foster care placement in order to satisfy that criterion. The phrase “who was a ward subject to an
order for foster care placement” does not bear on this appeal because appellant
does not come within the first clause of the provision.

DISPOSITION

The
juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction is affirmed.



NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS





EPSTEIN, P. J.

We concur:





WILLHITE,
J. SUZUKAWA,
J.