In re Christopher B.
Filed 3/21/06 In re Christopher B. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
| In re CHRISTOPHER B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | B183531 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK53855) |
| LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HUMBERTO B., et al., Defendants and Appellants. |
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Steven L. Berman, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Law Offices of Lawrence V. Harrison and Lawrence V. Harrison for Defendant and Appellant Humberto B.
Sharon S. Rollo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Maria B.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Cory, Assistant County Counsel, Arezoo Pichvai, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance on behalf of Minor.
Appellants Humberto B. (Father) and Maria B. (Mother) appeal from an order denying a continuance of their Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing,[1] an order summarily denying Mother's section 388 petition, and the order pursuant to section 366.26 terminating parental rights as to minor Christopher B. They argue that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to continue the section 366.26 hearing to allow Mother's section 388 petition to be heard and in thereafter denying Mother's section 388 petition without a hearing. They further assert that substantial evidence did not support either the juvenile court's finding that Christopher was likely to be adopted or its conclusion that the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception to termination of parental rights did not apply.
Though we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the section 388 petition and declining to continue the section 366.26 hearing, we find that the juvenile court denied Mother and Father their due process right to present evidence at the section 366.26 hearing in support of their contention that section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) applied to preclude the termination of their parental rights. For that reason, we reverse the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 30, 2003, Mother and Father brought 11-month-old Christopher to the Children's Hospital emergency room because he was crying excessively and unable to bear weight on his leg. A skeletal survey showed that Christopher was suffering from five fractures--one new fracture on his right arm and four old fractures on his hips and right leg. Examining physicians opined that such injuries are caused only by a â€
