In re Clarissa B.

Filed 10/17/06 In re Clarissa B. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Marilyn H. Mackel, Commissioner. Dismissed.

Robert B., in pro. per.; and Michael A. Salazar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________

Robert B., the father of now eight-year-old Clarissa B., appeals from the juvenile court’s June 26, 2006 order denying Robert B.’s petition for modification pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388,[1] terminating the parental rights of Robert B. and Delia R. (Clarissa’s mother) pursuant to section 366.26 and ordering Clarissa placed for adoption. At the time of the June 26, 2006 hearing Robert B. was in custody in the Orange County jail, awaiting trial on charges of murder and robbery. Robert B. participated in the hearing by telephone. Robert B. has apparently been in custody throughout the four years these dependency proceedings have been pending.

In July 2002 the juvenile court sustained a dependency petition concerning Clarissa and her four siblings, finding, in part, that Delia R.’s abuse of alcohol endangered the children’s physical and emotional health and safety and that on prior occasions the children were exposed to acts of domestic violence between Delia R. and Robert B. that endangered the children’s physical and emotional health and safety and placed the children at risk of serious emotional damage and physical abuse. Family reunification services for Robert B. were terminated at the 12-month review hearing in May 2003. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) In January 2004 the court terminated reunification services for Delia R. (§ 366.22) and set a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26 for May 2004. The parents were provided with appropriate notice of the need to file a writ petition to review that order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 38 & 38.1.)

Clarissa and her siblings were placed in the foster home of Agnes B. and her husband. Agnes B. has expressed an interest in adopting all the children, and adoption planning was proceeding for Clarissa’s siblings by the time of the contested section 366.26 hearing for Clarissa in June 2006. As of that date, Clarissa had lived with Agnes B. for approximately two and one-half years.

Robert B.’s petition for modification, filed on June 23, 2006, requested the court grant him additional reunification services “at least until completion of criminal action in Orange County.” Robert B. alleged as changed circumstances the fact that he had now completed various parenting, domestic violence and substance abuse courses. He alleged the proposed modification would be in Clarissa’s best interest because he loves her and wishes to retain that bond and have regular visitation or custody.

The contested permanency planning hearing, continued many times over the course of more than two years, was finally held on June 26, 2006. After hearing testimony from Robert B., as well as argument from counsel, the juvenile court denied the section 388 petition, finding the best interests of Clarissa would not be promoted by the proposed change of order. The court also found there was not a sufficient change in circumstances “given the father’s continuous situation of long-term incarceration and reunification services have been terminated over a year ago.” Proceeding to the section 366.26 hearing, the court found by clear and convincing evidence Clarissa is likely to be adopted and further found it would be detrimental for her to be returned to the custody of her parents. Accordingly, the court terminated Robert B. and Delia R.’s parental rights and transferred the care, custody and control of Clarissa to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services for the purposes of adoption planning and placement.

We appointed counsel to represent Robert B. on appeal.

After examining the record and communicating with his client, counsel advised this court in writing pursuant to In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952 that there are no arguable issues. We notified Robert B. on September 26, 2006 that he had 30 days within which personally to submit any contentions he wished us to consider and that failure to do so would result in dismissal of this appeal as abandoned.

On October 3, 2006 Robert B. filed a short (17-line), handwritten letter in which he again requests additional family reunification services. Robert B. insists he is innocent of the pending criminal charges and asserts he loves his child and has completed various parenting, domestic violence and substance abuse classes. Robert B.’s letter brief does not identify any legally cognizable error in the juvenile court’s order.

Section 388 provides that, if circumstances have changed such that it would be in the child’s best interest for an order to be modified, the juvenile court should modify the order. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 526.) “It is not enough for a parent to show just a genuine change of circumstances under the statute. The parent must show that the undoing of the prior order would be in the best interests of the child.” (Id. at p. 529.)

A ruling on a petition filed under section 388 is “committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and the trial court’s ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established. . . . ‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) Robert B. provides absolutely no basis for us to set aside the juvenile court’s conclusion that providing him with a new period of reunification services while he is awaiting trial on serious criminal charges, with its concomitant delay in permanency for Clarissa, would not be in the child’s best interests. (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 [juvenile court’s denial of § 388 petition properly affirmed unless appellate court finds “‘”. . . under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the [juvenile] court’s action, no judge could reasonably have made the order [in question].” [Citations.]’”].)

Similarly, the express purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is “to provide stable, permanent homes” for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) If, as here, the court has previously decided to end parent-child reunification services, the legislative preference is for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1); see In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307 [once reunification efforts have been found unsuccessful, the state has a “compelling” interest in “providing stable, permanent homes for children who have been removed from parental custody” and the court then must “concentrate its efforts . . . on the child’s placement and well-being, rather than on a parent’s challenge to a custody order”].) Thus, when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence the child is likely to be adopted, the statute mandates judicial termination of parental rights unless the parent opposing termination can demonstrate that one of five enumerated exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 [“if the child is adoptable . . . adoption is the norm. Indeed, the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child”]; see In re Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 392 [when child adoptable and declining to apply one of the statutory exceptions would not cause detriment to the child, the decision to terminate parental rights is relatively automatic].) Robert B. neither challenges the juvenile court’s finding on adoptability nor provides any evidence he falls within one of the enumerated exceptions to the legislative determination that parental rights should be terminated in a case such as this.

In view of Robert B.’s failure to identify any cognizable legal error, the appeal is dismissed. (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994 [appellant must raise claims of reversible error or other defect in the appealed-from judgment or order and must present argument and authority on each point made; if he or she does not do so, the court in its discretion may deem the appeal abandoned and order its dismissal].)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

WOODS, J.

ZELON, J.

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[1] Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.