Filed 4/13/18 In re C.M. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----




In re C. M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. C084061


THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C. M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Super. Ct. No. JV138109)



C. M. (minor) appeals from the juvenile court’s adjudication finding true various firearm and drug violations. He contends: (1) the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop because the officer unlawfully prolonged the stop; (2) the court erred by admitting his custodial confession because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights; and (3) he asks us to review the sealed records from an in camera Pitchess hearing to determine whether the trial court erred when, after reviewing the records, it found no discoverable information.
We reject minor’s contentions and affirm.
To avoid duplication, we explain the relevant facts as we discuss each contention.
DISCUSSION
I
Denial Of Motion To Suppress
Minor moved to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 700.1. He contends the trial court’s denial of his motion and its admission of the evidence violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the officer prolonged the stop unlawfully. We disagree. The officer had reasonable cause to prolong the detention as long as he did.
Craig Lorge is a state park ranger and peace officer. At a hearing on minor’s motion to suppress, he testified as follows: Over five years of employment as a ranger, he conducted 15 to 20 arrests involving marijuana and issued between 50 and 75 citations involving marijuana. He is familiar with the look and smell of marijuana.
On June 19, 2016, Officer Lorge was on duty at the Folsom Lake State Recreation Area. Sitting in a marked patrol vehicle, he saw a car drive into the parking lot and park. He noticed all of the car’s windows were tinted, a violation of the Vehicle Code. After about five or 10 minutes, the car backed out and headed to the park’s east end, which is a dead end. Officer Lorge thought the car’s behavior was odd, parking as it did for a time and then moving to a different area in the park. He followed the car and saw it run a stop sign, a second violation of the Vehicle Code. He also noticed the vehicle had blacked-out paper plates, a third violation of the Vehicle Code. He relayed this information to his dispatch at 4:11 p.m.
Officer Lorge stopped the car. He parked a few car lengths behind it. He smelled marijuana as he approached. He spoke with the driver, who identified herself as Maria. She did not have a driver’s license, vehicle registration, or insurance. As Officer Lorge spoke with her, he noticed people in the backseat. The tint on the windows prevented him from seeing inside, a situation he believed potentially threatened his safety. He asked Maria to roll down the windows so he could see in back. He continued to smell marijuana as he spoke with her. He asked her and the front passenger to find any information that could verify the owner of the car. They said they could find information online.
Officer Lorge returned to his car. He ran Maria’s name through his dispatch and learned she had a suspended license. He began writing a citation, and on the citation he wrote 4:20 p.m. As he wrote the citation, he noticed minor, one of the occupants in the car’s backseat, poke his head out the window and look back at him. Officer Lorge was not comfortable with the way minor was observing him, and he wondered what minor was doing. It was not common to see that kind of behavior during a vehicle stop, and Officer Lorge felt it was a “red flag” that something was going on.
Officer Lorge went back to the car to see if Maria had found any proof of ownership. He continued to smell marijuana, so he asked if there was marijuana in the car. The occupants said they had used marijuana earlier. Then minor said he had a joint. He handed Officer Lorge a spent joint less than an inch in length.
Officer Lorge called for backup. To him, the smell of marijuana seemed stronger than the odor of just one joint. It was more pungent and present than the odor of marijuana that had been smoked sometime earlier. He wanted another officer there because he was planning to search the vehicle, so he waited for one to arrive.
After backup arrived, Officer Lorge searched Maria, minor, and the vehicle. Inside a backpack minor said was his, Officer Lorge found a jar containing 2.8 ounces of marijuana and some plastic baggies. Possessing the marijuana was a violation of the Health and Safety Code.
Officer Lorge looked at the other passenger in the backseat, minor’s sister, and he noticed she was clutching a purse. He saw her fidget with it when he started searching the vehicle, and now she clutched it with both hands and looked very nervous. He thought her behavior was odd. He asked her for the purse. He interpreted her body language to indicate she did not want him to look inside the purse, but she gave it to him. Inside, he found a loaded .22-caliber revolver. Minor’s sister broke down sobbing and told Officer Lorge that minor gave her the purse and she was sorry.
At that point, Officer Lorge placed minor in his car and read him his Miranda rights. He did this at 4:53 p.m., 42 minutes after he first contacted dispatch. He formally arrested minor at 5:36 p.m. Minor was 15 years old.
Minor moved to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop. The court denied the motion. It found the Vehicle Code violations justified Officer Lorge initially stopping the car. From that point, the incident became an unfolding investigation. Each new discovery gave Officer Lorge reasonable cause to continue his investigation for the length of time he did. The court also determined minor had no standing to contest the search of the purse because it was not in his possession. Even if he had standing, his sister’s conduct gave Officer Lorge reasonable cause to search the purse.
Minor contends Officer Lorge unlawfully prolonged the initial traffic stop without a reasonable suspicion of unrelated criminal activity. He claims his detention should have ended after he gave Officer Lorge the spent marijuana joint. He asserts Officer Lorge completed the mission of the traffic stop when he confirmed the source of the marijuana odor. He argues the officer’s actions calling for backup, continuing the detention, and searching the vehicle, its occupants, and their personal property were based solely upon a hunch and, aside from “a vague notion” the marijuana smelled pungent and present, were not based on any independent reasonable suspicion the occupants of the car were involved in further criminal activity.
We disagree. Officer Lorge had reasonable cause to continue the detention and search the vehicle and its occupants.
When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, “we defer to the trial court’s factual findings where supported by substantial evidence, but exercise independent judgment to determine whether, on the facts found, the search was reasonable under Fourth Amendment standards.” (People v. Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 102.)
“A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. ‘[A] relatively brief encounter,’ a routine traffic stop is ‘more analogous to a so-called “Terry stop” . . . than to a formal arrest.’ Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117, 119 S. Ct. 484, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984), in turn citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). See also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009). Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’--to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, [Illinois v. ]Caballes, 543 U.S., [405] at 407 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, and attend to related safety concerns, infra, at ___, ___, 191 L. Ed. 2d, at 499-500. See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1985); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion) (‘The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.’). Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.’ Ibid. See also Caballes, 543 U.S., at 407, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are--or reasonably should have been--completed. See Sharpe, 470 U.S., at 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605 (in determining the reasonable duration of a stop, ‘it [is] appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued [the] investigation’).” (Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. ___ [191 L.Ed.2d 492, 498].)
“An officer . . . may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But . . . he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” (Rodriguez v. United States, supra, 575 U. S. at p. ___ [191 L.Ed.2d at p. 499], italics added.) The unrelated checks an officer may conduct during a traffic stop “include those incidental to traffic enforcement, such as validating a license and registration, searching for outstanding warrants, and checking for proof of insurance.” (People v. Espino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 756.) “If the police develop reasonable suspicion of some other criminal activity during a traffic stop of lawful duration, they may expand the scope of the detention to investigate that activity.” (Ibid., italics added.) “An investigative stop can grow out of a traffic stop so long as the officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to expand his investigation, even if his suspicions were unrelated to the traffic offense that served as the basis of the stop.” (U.S. v. Gomez Serena (8th Cir. 2004) 368 F.3d 1037, 1041.)
“Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause, and can arise from less reliable information than that required for probable cause. (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083.) To be reasonable, an officer’s suspicion must be supported by some specific, articulable facts reasonably consistent with criminal activity. (Ibid.) The officer’s subjective suspicion must be objectively reasonable. (Ibid.) “ ‘[A]n investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith.’ ” (People v. Espino, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 757.)
Officer Lorge had reasonable suspicion to continue detaining minor. When he returned to the car to see if Maria had proof of ownership, he smelled the odor of marijuana too strongly to have originated from the spent joint minor gave him. He based his belief in part on his extensive experience investigating marijuana crimes. He also based his belief on minor’s behavior moments before when minor stuck his head out of the car window and observed him, an uncommon behavior in normal traffic stops. These circumstances supported Officer Lorge’s reasonable suspicion that additional criminal activity might be afoot and justified his detaining minor longer and commencing an investigative stop.
As the investigative stop progressed, Officer Lorge found additional evidence that justified continuing the investigation and ultimately resulted in minor’s arrest. Officer Lorge requested backup to help search the car, and after backup arrived, he removed and searched each of the car’s four occupants and searched the vehicle. He found minor in possession of an amount of marijuana and plastic baggies that violated state law. This gave Officer Lorge additional cause to continue the investigation. He noticed minor’s sister nervously clutching her purse. Upon opening it, he discovered a gun that minor’s sister said through her tears belonged to minor. At this point, Officer Lorge reasonably detained minor in his patrol car. All this additional investigation occurred from approximately 4:20 p.m. to 4:53 p.m., a period of only 33 minutes. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude Officer Lorge had sufficient cause to detain and investigate minor and the other occupants of the car after the purposes of the traffic stop were met. Because we reach this conclusion, we need not address whether minor had standing to contest the search of his sister’s purse.
II
Waiver Of Miranda Rights
After hearing his Miranda rights and during the ride to juvenile hall, minor admitted he purchased the gun found at the scene and carried it in his pocket before putting it in his sister’s purse. He contends the trial court erred when it admitted his custodial statement at trial because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. We disagree. Minor implicitly waived his rights.
At trial, Officer Lorge stated he gave minor his Miranda advisements after placing him in the patrol car. After each line, he asked minor if he understood. Asked if minor responded that he understood the admonitions, Officer Lorge replied, “Yes.” Officer Lorge paused after each question and the two had eye contact. There was “likely nodding.” Minor did not verbally respond to the advisements, but Officer Lorge said minor was engaged. From his body language and eye contact, minor appeared to Officer Lorge to understand the advisements, although he was “kind of speechless” and in “kind of a catatonic shock of what’s happening which is common with people who are in the back of police cars or handcuffed.”
Officer Lorge asked minor about the gun, but minor did not answer. During the 25- to 30-minute drive to juvenile hall, Officer Lorge continued to ask minor questions about the gun in a normal tone, but minor did not answer. Minor did not ask for a lawyer or say he did not want to speak with Officer Lorge. It was Officer Lorge’s practice and procedure not to ask questions after giving a suspect a Miranda advisement if he did not have some acknowledgement the suspect understood the advisement or if he had the impression the suspect wanted a lawyer. Officer Lorge did not make any promises to minor or do anything coercive to get him to talk.
Ultimately, at some point on the way to and at juvenile hall, minor told Officer Lorge he purchased the gun from someone for $200. He kept the gun in his right pocket before putting it into his sister’s purse.
The trial court denied minor’s motion to exclude the evidence of his admissions under Miranda. It found minor knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
Minor asserts that given his state of mind and the totality of the circumstances surrounding Officer Lorge’s interrogation of him, the trial court erroneously concluded he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. We disagree.
We defer to the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts where supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 918.) Considering those facts and any undisputed facts, we independently determine whether Officer Lorge obtained the challenged statement in violation of minor’s Miranda rights. (Weaver, at p. 918.)
“Even absent the accused’s invocation of the right to remain silent, the accused’s statement during a custodial interrogation is inadmissible at trial unless the prosecution can establish that the accused ‘in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived [Miranda] rights’ when making the statement. [North Carolina v. ]Butler, 411 U.S., [369,] at 373, 99 S. Ct. 1755, 60 L. Ed. 2d 286. The waiver inquiry ‘has two distinct dimensions’: waiver must be ‘voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,’ and ‘made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.’ [Moran v. ]Burbine, supra, [475 U.S. 412,] at 421, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410.” (Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 382-383 [176 L.Ed.2d 1098, 1111].)
The prosecution “does not need to show that a waiver of Miranda rights was express. An ‘implicit waiver’ of the ‘right to remain silent’ is sufficient to admit a suspect’s statement into evidence. Butler, supra, at 376, 99 S. Ct. 1755, 60 L. Ed. 2d 286. [A] waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through ‘the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.’ ” (Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 384 [176 L.Ed.2d at p. 1112].)
“If the State establishes that a Miranda warning was given and the accused made an uncoerced statement, this showing, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate ‘a valid waiver’ of Miranda rights. Miranda, supra, at 475, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694. The prosecution must make the additional showing that the accused understood these rights. [Citations.] Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.” (Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 384 [176 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1112-1113].)
“When a juvenile’s waiver is at issue, consideration must be given to factors such as ‘the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.’ ” (People v. Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 375.)
We conclude the trial court did not err when it admitted minor’s statement. The evidence establishes minor understood the admonitions and his admissions to Officer Lorge were uncoerced.
Minor understood the Miranda admonitions. He responded to Officer Lorge that he understood them. His eye contact, body language, and nodding also indicated he understood them. There was no evidence he was unable to understand his Miranda rights for any reason. Furthermore, minor confirmed he understood them by exercising them. A suspect may exercise his Miranda rights simply by remaining silent. (See Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 386 [176 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1113-1114].) Minor remained silent for most of his contact with Officer Lorge.
Minor’s admissions to Officer Lorge were voluntary. Officer Lorge did not compel minor to speak or use any kind of threat or promise. There was no evidence minor was in any kind of physical or mental distress. Although he may have been under the influence of marijuana, “absent state coercion, defendant cannot complain that any self-induced intoxication rendered his statements involuntary.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 411.)
Although minor was a juvenile, his actions demonstrated a criminal maturity. Knowing he possessed and concealed a substantial amount of marijuana and a loaded revolver, he confessed to smoking a marijuana joint likely to end Officer Lorge’s investigation. He also was mature enough to understand and exercise his right to remain silent.
We are not concerned about the time that passed from the reading of minor’s rights to his ultimate admission. Minor did not admit to possessing the gun for 60 to 90 minutes after he heard his rights, but this amount of time did not render the admonitions invalid or stale. In Berghuis, officers read the defendant his Miranda rights and interrogated him for about three hours during which time he was mostly silent, before he answered an incriminating question. (Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 374-376 [176 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1106-1107].) The United States Supreme Court held the defendant implicitly waived his Miranda rights. (Berghuis, at pp. 385-387 [176 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1113-1115].) Minor’s admission here after less than 90 minutes, where there was no evidence of coercion or harassment, was an implicit waiver of his right to remain silent.
III
Review Of Personnel Records
Before trial, minor filed a Pitchess motion to discover any complaints of misconduct against Officer Lorge filed in his personnel records. The trial court held an in camera hearing and found no discoverable information. Pursuant to People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1229-1232, minor asks us to review the Pitchess hearing’s sealed materials to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it found no discoverable information. We have reviewed the sealed materials and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found no discoverable information.
DISPOSITION
The adjudication is affirmed.



/s/
Robie, J.



We concur:



/s/
Raye, P. J.



/s/
Duarte, J.