In re Daniel G.

Filed 2/28/07 In re Daniel G. CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

This is the second appeal by S.T. (Mother) that challenges the termination of her parental rights as to her son, Daniel G. (Daniel).^[1] In an unpublished opinion, we reversed a prior judgment terminating Mothers parental rights. (In re Daniel G. (Sept. 20, 2005, A107951).)^[2] We remanded the case to the juvenile court for a new Welfare and Institutions Code^[3]section 366.26 hearing. On remand, the juvenile court terminated Mothers parental rights and ordered a permanent plan of adoption for Daniel. Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the beneficial relationship ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) and sibling relationship ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E)) exceptions. She also contends that the juvenile court erred in denying her request for a continuance. Finally, Mother urges that the juvenile courts order should be reversed because the proceedings were fundamentally unfair. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Initial Dependency Proceedings and First Appeal

The facts are fully stated in our previous opinion and need not be repeated here. Following our reversal of the first order terminating Mothers parental rights, the juvenile court set a second section 366.26 hearing and ordered that Mother have one hour of supervised visitation per month; similar visitation was ordered for Daniels half-siblings. Mother filed a petition for extraordinary relief ( 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 38.1), arguing that the juvenile court had abused its discretion in setting a subsequent section 366.26 hearing on remand. Mother urged that she was entitled to further reunification services. Alternatively, she requested long-term foster care for Daniel and extensive visitation. After noting our concern about the limited visitation provided to Mother, we denied the petition in an unpublished opinion (S.T. v. Superior Court (Feb. 8, 2006, A112294)), and directed the juvenile court to hold the section 366.26 scheduled for March 14, 2006. In denying the petition, we clarified that we remanded the case for a new section 366.26 hearing and for consideration of all permanency planning options, including adoption. (S.T. v. Superior Court,, supra, A112294.)

B. Proceedings on Remand

1. Bonding Study

In anticipation of the new section 366.26 hearing, respondent Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (CFS) submitted a bonding study prepared by Rosemary Bower, Ph.D., which examined Daniels relationships with Mother and his half-siblings, as well as his relationship with Valerie C., the prospective adoptive parent with whom Daniel had been placed with since October 2004. Dr. Bowers study included a review of over 200 pages of CFSs case notes, several telephone conversations with the social worker, as well as several interviews and observations.

As part of the bonding study, Dr. Bower observed a visit between Daniel, Mother, and his half-siblings at a playroom at CFS. Mother and Daniels two half-siblings arrived 20 minutes late. Dr. Bower reported that Daniel was accepting of his siblings, but he did not try to engage them, as she had seen him do with other children in a prior observation at his regular daycare center. Mother tried to get Daniel to interact with her. Dr. Bower made the following observations about Daniels interaction with Mother and his half-siblings: He rather passively let himself be hugged and kissed. He did not run up to greet her, nor put out his arms to embrace her nor his siblings. . . . He did not seem afraid or angry. Rather he seemed to tolerate [Mother] and his siblings effort to engage him. Dr. Bower reported that, according to Mother and a CFS worker present at the visit, this had been a typical visit between Daniel and his half-siblings. Dr. Bower noted that Daniel did not appear to be affected by his half-siblings departure.

After the half-siblings left the playroom, Dr. Bower observed Mother and Daniel. According to Dr. Bower, Mother tried to engage Daniel, but he was not very responsive. Dr. Bower reported that Daniel tolerated, but did not initiate interactions with [Mother]. Mother seemed unable to play with him, or really talk to him. Daniel did not protest when the visit was over. When Daniel saw Ms. C. standing outside of the playroom, he ran to her and hugged her.

Dr. Bower individually met with Mother, after everyone else had left the room. Dr. Bower reported that Mother said, I want my baby back, and complained that CFS had not provided her with services to get her baby back.

Dr. Bower concluded that Daniel seems to be bonded with his adoptive mother: he listens to her, does what she tells him, spontaneously hugs her and leans against her, talks to her, [and] shows joy when he sees her . . . . In contrast, Daniel [did] not seem to be bonded to his biological mother: he did not show pleasure when he saw her [and] he did not protest when she left the room. He was passive in accepting her hugs and kisses. He did not say more than a few words to her during . . . the meeting. [Mother did] not seem to know how to engage Daniel.

Dr. Bower further commented that she was certain Mother would like Daniel back. Dr. Bower noted that if Daniel were returned to Mother, he would be living at his maternal grandmothers house with his two half-siblings, while Mother stayed at her boyfriends house. Additionally, Dr. Bower reported that she was struck by the total disregard [Mother] had for her two older children during the visit she observed. [Mother] did not talk to them, ask them if they would like to do something or not. Mother told Dr. Bower that she intended to take a parenting class; Dr. Bower thought the class would be beneficial.

Dr. Bowers report concluded with answers to nine questions, which had been presented by county counsel. Specially, Dr. Bower stated: (1) Mother did not occupy a parental role in Daniels life; (2) Daniel may have been emotionally injured by the loss of his mother and his siblings from age two to age three. However, Daniel was currently a well-functioning, happy, verbal, friendly little boy, who seemed to have recovered from any trauma he may have suffered; (3) Daniel appeared to love Ms. C. and was bonded to her; (4) The severance of Daniels parental relationship with Mother would not deprive Daniel of a substantial, positive, emotional attachment such that he would greatly harmed; Daniels bonding with Mother was, at best, similar to a neighbor. It did not seem likely that Daniel would miss Mother; (5) Maintaining Daniels relationship with Mother would not promote his well-being to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being he would gain in a permanent, adoptive home with Ms. C.; (6) Daniel was mildly interested in his siblings; he was much more affectionate and interactive with the children at his daycare center; (7) Daniel would not suffer detriment if his relationships with his siblings were ended; although continued sibling contact, if possible, might be beneficial; (8) Daniel has not suffered any obvious detriment from having had no contact with his siblings from approximately September 2004 through November 2005; and (9) Any detriment Daniel would suffer from the severance of his sibling relationships would be far outweighed by the benefits of having a permanent, adoptive home with Ms. C.

2. Corrected Section 366.26 Report and Addendum

CFSs corrected report for the section 366.26 hearing stated that it had been difficult to contact Mother regarding visitation with Daniel. Mother had given the maternal grandmothers address as her residence. However, CFS later learned that Mother did not live at that residence, but appeared to be living at her boyfriends home. Mother told CFS that her boyfriend, John C., had had a recent case involving child protective services due to domestic violence with the mother of his children. However, Mother maintained that John C. had been nice to her. Mother stated that she would move in with her grandmother if Daniel were returned to her care.

CFS further noted that Daniels half-siblings were living with their maternal grandmother. During a visit with Daniel and his siblings, Mother told a CFS parent aide that she stayed with the children during the day, but left at night. Mothers older children then spoke up and said, Mommy, you fibbed. You always say youre coming over[,] but you dont.

CFS also reported that Mother stated she had used drugs for 17 years. Mother also said, I am mentally disturbed because my baby is gone. When asked why she had not taken her other two children back into her care, Mother stated, I wont take them unless I get my baby back. I havent been right since my baby was taken. We are all three mentally disturbedthey ask where their brother is. When it was suggested that she should take her other children back into her care to prove she could parent her children, Mother stated, I dont want to live if I dont get Daniel.  When asked if she had thoughts about hurting herself, Mother stated, I mean if I dont get my baby Ill be no good to the other two.

CFSs corrected report for the section 366.26 hearing also contained a lengthy review of Mothers criminal history, which had not been previously provided to the juvenile court. The report described 11 incidents since 1993, which involved various police contacts and arrests. Of particular significance is an incident that occurred while Mothers first appeal was pending. Specifically, on May 12, 2005, a search warrant was served at Mothers residence regarding stolen credit cards. Although Mother was not a suspect, her bedroom was searched. The search revealed a marijuana roach, and a baggie with a crystal substance that appeared to be methamphetamine. Two glass tubes were found next to the bed. In a videotaped confession, Mother admitted to possessing crystal methamphetamine. She stated that she had been using drugs since she was 14 years old. She said that she had taken drugs two hours before her arrest. Mother further stated that usually she used one 1/4 gram to two 1/4 grams of methamphetamine per week; she had used 1/4 ounce of methamphetamine in a week before. She had been purchasing methamphetamine from the same dealer for approximately six months to a year. She admitted that the pipes found in her bedroom belonged to her and her boyfriend, John C.^[4]

CFS reported that after his first renewed visit with Mother, Daniel came home, stood in a corner and urinated. As Daniel was toilet-trained, CFS noted that this appeared to be an emotional response to the renewed contact with Mother and his half-siblings. Ms. C. told CFS that Daniel seemed grumpy since the renewed contact with his family began in November 2005. CFS further reported that since the renewed visits with his biological family, Daniel had become possessive of Ms. C.; Daniel often announced this is my mommy, when other children at his daycare center tried to talk to Ms. C.

CFS recommended that the juvenile court terminate parental rights so that Daniel could be adopted by his prospective adoptive mother, Ms. C. In making its recommendation, CFS concluded that Mother continued to be involved in a drug-oriented lifestyle, which was not conducive to child-rearing. CFS further concluded that Mother was clearly in need of mental health and drug treatment, in a protected setting. CFS further noted that Mother was able to be a friendly visitor to Daniel, but was unable provide him with the guidance, support, and role-modeling needed to contribute to his overall well-being.

CFSs addendum to the corrected section 366.26 report attached the case notes of CFS workers who had supervised Daniels renewed visits with Mother and his half-siblings from November 2005 through May 2006. The initial visits reflect a general indifference by Daniel toward his biological family. However, as the visits progressed, Daniel began to develop more of a connection with his biological family; he even became quite upset when a scheduled visit with his half-siblings did not occur.

The case notes further reflect that on March 7, 2006, Mother told the CFS parent aide that she had been clean for seven months and one week.

3. Section 388 Petitions

On March 14, 2006, Mother filed a section 388 petition requesting that the June 2004 order terminating reunification services and setting the first section 366.26 hearing be changed in light of this courts reversal of the order terminating her parental rights. Mother requested that Daniel be returned to her care, with or without family maintenance services. That same day, county counsel also filed a section 388 petition asking the juvenile court to terminate Mothers parental rights based on the bonding study, which concluded that severance of Daniels relationship with Mother would not deprive him of a substantial, positive relationship such that he would be greatly harmed.

4. Request for a Continuance

On April 14, 2006, Mothers newly appointed counsel^[5]requested a three-week continuance of the section 366.26 hearing then scheduled for April 17, 2006. The juvenile court granted the continuance and the section 366.26 hearing was continued to May 22, 2006. However, on May 19, 2006, Mothers counsel requested an additional 90-day continuance to familiarize herself with the case, to obtain a further bonding study, and to allow the parties to participate in mediation. In support of the motion, Mothers counsel submitted a declaration from Ms. W., Daniels former foster parent, which had been signed on May 18, 2006. In her declaration, Ms. W. stated Daniel had been in her care about a year and half ago, just prior to his placement with Ms. C. Ms. W. stated that Mother had been dedicated to her sobriety. She further stated that Mother always had been gracious, polite and responsible. According to Ms. W., the CFS social worker never asked about Daniels visits with Mother. Ms. W. stated that if such an inquiry had been made, she would have told CFS the visits were great and that . . . Daniel adored [Mother] and never wanted to leave her. Ms. W. reported that at the end of each visit, Daniel was always happy and . . . did not want to leave [Mother]. At the conclusion of the visits, Daniel always cried and held onto Mother. Ms. W. further stated that due to her work schedule, she was unable to attend the hearing scheduled for May 22, 2006.

5. Second Section 366.26 Hearing

The contested section 366.26 hearing was held on May 22, 2006. The juvenile court denied the request for a continuance, and proceeded with a combined section 388 and section 366.26 hearing.^[6]

Paula Hollowell, the CFS social worker assigned to Daniels case, testified that Ms. C. had an approved home study and was committed to adopting Daniel. Assuming parental rights were terminated, Ms. Hollowell did not foresee any obstacles or uncertainties regarding Ms. C.s adoption of Daniel. Ms. Hollowell further stated that the State of California had revoked the foster care license of Daniels former foster parent, Ms. W., on March 20, 2006. According to Ms. Hollowell, Ms. W. had improperly shared information with Mother regarding Daniels permanent placement.

Dr. Bower testified that she believed her 40-minute observation of Daniel and his biological family was sufficient. Dr. Bower acknowledged that the recent case notes reflected that Daniel had become a bit more responsive to Mother, and had demonstrated more interaction with his siblings. According to Dr. Bower, the recent visits did not establish a great . . . change in Daniels overall connection to his biological family. As such, she stood by her recommendation that adoption was a preferable plan for Daniel. Dr. Bower opined that if Daniel and Mother previously had enjoyed a good relationship, she would have expected him to have had a closer relationship with her, even considering the fact that there had been a lengthy separation and minimal visitation.

Dr. Bower further opined that Daniel quite desperately needed to have stability in his life. When asked whether it would better for Daniel to continue his sibling relationships, she answered, The best for Daniel is to know that he belongs to Ms. [C.]. Dr. Bower, however, thought it would be good for Daniel to have some postadoption contact with his half-siblings; she thought the frequency of the visits should be no more than four times a year.

Ms. C. expressed her desire to adopt Daniel. She further

testified that she was amenable to Daniel having contact with his half-siblings. However, she did not want the sibling visitation to be required by court order. Rather, Ms. C. stated that she would prefer that CFS social workers facilitated such visitation.

After hearing argument and considering the evidence, the juvenile court denied Mothers section 388 petition.^[7] The juvenile court found that Daniel was a very adoptable child. The court determined that Mother had not established the existence of the beneficial relationship exception ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) or the sibling relationship exception ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E)). The court further found that while there was some benefit from Daniel seeing Mother, that incidental benefit [did] not outweigh the strong need for Daniel to have the permanency and stability with adoption. With regard to the sibling relationship exception, the court stated that it would be good for Daniel to know his half-siblings in the future. However, the court found that the benefit to Daniel of having a relationship with his siblings did not outweigh the permanency and stability of adoption. The juvenile court then terminated Mothers parental rights.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Juvenile Court Properly Terminated Mothers Parental Rights and Selected Adoption as the Permanent Plan for Daniel

The purpose of the California dependency system is to protect children from harm and preserve families when safe for the child. ( 300.2) (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) In juvenile dependency proceedings, when reunification efforts fail, as they have in this case, the court must terminate reunification efforts and set the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249 [] [(Cynthia D.)].) The first choice for permanency, if possible, must be to terminate parental rights and order that the child be placed for adoption . . . . [] We thus see that if the child is adoptable . . . adoption is the norm. Indeed, the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the . . . circumstances [specified in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A-E)] provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. . . . The statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption. (Celine R. [(2003)] 31 Cal.4th [45,] 53. (In re Hector A. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 783, 790-791.)

On appeal from an order pursuant to section 366.26 terminating parental rights, the question is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in deciding to terminate parental rights. (In re Baby Girl M. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1536.) We find no such abuse of discretion.

1. Beneficial Relationship Exception

Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) provides an exception to termination when [t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. The parents have the burden of proving the applicability of the exception. (In re Jamie R. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 766, 773; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 574.)

The Autumn H. court recognized that [i]nteraction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) applies only when the relationship with the natural parent promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. (In re Autumn H., supra, at p. 575.) Only if severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed [is] the preference for adoption . . . overcome [so that] the natural parents rights are not terminated. (Ibid.) The existence of this relationship is determined by [t]he age of the child, the portion of the childs life spent in the parents custody, the positive or negative effect of interaction between parent and child, and the childs particular needs. (Id. at p. 576.)

Relying on In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, Mother contends that the court erred in not applying the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception here. Amber M., however, is distinguishable. In Amber M., the court found a common theme running through the evidence that the beneficial parental relationship outweighed the benefit of adoption. (Id. at p. 690.) There, the oldest of the three children, who was seven at the time of the section 366.26 hearing, had been in the mothers care for most of her life while her brother, nearly five, had been in the mothers care for more than half of his life. It was undisputed that the older two children had a strong parental bond with the mother; that the youngest child, nearly three, was strongly attached to her; and that the mother was devoted to them and did virtually all that was asked of her to regain custody. (In re Amber M., supra, at pp. 689-690.) In addition, a psychologist who conducted a bonding study of the mother and the eldest child concluded that it would be detrimental to sever the relationship. (Id. at p. 689.) Given the mothers unusually strong factual showing, the appellate court held that the juvenile court erred in declining to apply the exception. (Id. at pp. 690-691.)

Here, there is no comparable compelling evidence. When we initially addressed Mothers relationship with Daniel, we found the type of extraordinary circumstances that mandated preservation of her parental rights. (In re Daniel G., supra, A107951.) The same cannot be said at this time. Although we are mindful of Mothers obvious love for Daniel and her involuntary separation from him, which occurred for more than one year while her first appeal was pending, and the limited visitation ordered by the juvenile court on remand, Mother has not shown that severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive Daniel of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that he would be greatly harmed. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466.)

Contrary to Mothers contention, the basis for terminating her parental rights is not the fact that she was unable to reestablish her relationship with Daniel following the long involuntary separation from him, but rather is Daniels obvious need for stability and permanency. While Mother may have done everything she could to reestablish her relationship with Daniel, the record reflects that Mother failed to resolve the issues in her life that had led to Daniels initial and subsequent removals. By Mothers own admissions, she had continued to use methamphetamine throughout the dependency proceedings, and until approximately nine months before the second 366.26 hearing. In addition to the recurrent drug use, Mother does not have stable housing, and has not consistently parented her two older children on a full-time basis. Mothers contention that she cannot parent her two older children until she regains custody of Daniel is not well taken. Although we are mindful of the emotional toll that the dependency proceedings and the appellate process has taken, [c]hildhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310.)

By the time of the section 366.26 hearing, Daniel had been out of Mothers care for two years. In that time, Mother had been unable to live a consistently drug-free and stable life. In sum, Daniels need for a stable environment outweighed any benefit to him from continuing his relationship with Mother. The court did not err in finding that the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception did not apply. For these same reasons, the trial court did not err in denying Mothers section 388 petition.

2. Sibling Relationship Exception

Mother urges application of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E), which provides for an exception to the termination of parental rights where [t]here would be substantial interference with a childs sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the childs best interest, including the childs long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption. (See also In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947-948.)

Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E), the court must first determine whether termination of parental rights would substantially interfere with a sibling relationship; and if so, the court must then weigh the childs best interest in continuing that relationship against the benefit of adoption. (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 951-952.) The parent bears the burden of showing the existence of a significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the child. (See id. at p. 952.)

Here, CFSs corrected report and addendum for the section 366.26 hearing included the adoption assessment and case notes, which acknowledged a growing relationship between Daniel and his half-siblings. Additionally, at the section 366.26 hearing, Dr. Bower and the juvenile court recognized that postadoption contact between Daniel and his half-siblings would be beneficial. Ms. C. stated that she would be amenable to continued sibling visits if CFS social workers were able to facilitate such visitation.

While the record indicates that Daniel had a growing relationship with his half-siblings, there is no evidence that this relationship was a significant one. Specifically, Daniel, who was just 18 months old when he was placed in foster care, had not lived with his half-siblings on a consistent basis while he was in Mothers care.^[8] Rather, the record reflects, that Daniels older half-siblings had resided with their maternal grandmother throughout the dependency proceedings. Even assuming that the record established a significant sibling relationship between Daniel and his half-siblings, it does not support applying the statutory exception to the rule that the court must terminate parental rights and choose adoption when reunification efforts have failed. (See In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.) Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.) [T]he sibling relationship exception permits the trial court to consider possible detriment to the child being considered for adoption, but not a sibling of that child. . . . Nothing in [section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E)] suggests the Legislature intended to permit a court to not choose an adoption that is in the adoptive childs best interest because of the possible effect the adoption may have on a sibling. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 54.) Mother had the burden of showing a strong sibling relationship among the children and a detriment to her younger child being considered for adoption. (In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017.) Mother failed to show that adoption would be detrimental to Daniel because there would be a substantial interference with his sibling relationship with his older half-siblings. To the contrary, the record demonstrated that although the children knew each other, and that continued sibling visitation was recommended, the benefits of the permanence of adoption for Daniel far outweighed any interference with the sibling relationship that might occur.

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying the Continuance

Mother claims that the juvenile court erred in denying her request for a continuance of the combined section 388 and section 366.26 hearing. She contends that she was prejudiced by the denial of her motion to continue the combined hearing because her newly appointed counsel had been unable to locate an additional bonding expert and had been unable to meet all of the potential witnesses prior to the hearing. She further asserts that the prejudice was compounded by the fact that CFS presented testimony that challenged the declaration of Daniels former foster parent, Ms. W., that had been attached to the motion seeking a continuance. Mother argues that there was no compelling reason to deny her request for a continuance because Daniel was in a stable foster care placement and no harm would have resulted had the combined hearing been delayed.

Section 352, in general, governs continuances during dependency proceedings. This section provides that continuances shall be granted only on a showing of good cause and shall not be granted if it is contrary to the minors best interests. [T]he court shall give substantial weight to a minors need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements. ( 352, subd. (a).) Continuances are discouraged [citation] . . . . (In re Ninfa S. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 808, 810-811; Jeff M. v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1242; In re Emily L. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 734, 743.) We reverse an order denying a continuance only on a showing of an abuse of discretion. (In re Gerald J. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1187.) We find no such abuse of discretion.

For several reasons, Mother has not met her burden of showing good cause. First, the juvenile court granted a three-week continuance following the appointment of Mothers new counsel. By the time of the continued section 366.26 hearing, Mothers counsel had had more than a month to review the reports and to prepare for the hearing. Second, Mother provides no authority supporting her assertion that a second bonding study was required. Furthermore, the record reflects that Mothers counsel had ample opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Bower regarding the bonding study. Third, Ms. W.s testimony would have been of limited evidentiary value, as it would have been limited to events occurring prior to the first order terminating Mothers parental rights.

We disagree with Mothers contention that Daniel would have suffered no harm from a short continuance. The juvenile court granted Mothers request for a brief three-week continuance following the appointment of her new counsel. However, three days before the scheduled section 366.26 hearing, Mothers counsel sought an additional 90-day continuance. While this may not seem a long period to an adult, three months can be a lifetime to a young child. (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310.) Continuances are discouraged, particularly because stability and permanence for a child should be resolved expeditiously. (In re Ninfa S., supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 810-811; Jeff M. v. Superior Court, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1242; In re Emily L., supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 743.) The record establishes that Daniel had been in foster care for two years, and was in desperate need of stability and permanency.

Finally, contrary to Mothers assertion, we find the juvenile courts denial of the continuance did not violate her due process right to be heard in a meaningful manner. Mother had the benefit of appointed counsel to represent her interests at the combined section 388 and permanency planning hearing. Her attorney advocated on her behalf, cross-examining the bonding expert and social worker, and arguing against termination of Mothers parental rights. Mother was afforded her constitutional due process right to be heard and her statutory due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. There is no error.

C. Other Due Process Claims

Citing Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th 242, Mother argues that she was not provided with a level playing field, because she was given token assistance in reestablishing her relationship with Daniel. She claims this minimal assistance violated her state and federal due process rights. In support of this claim, Mother relies on Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745 (Santosky).

In Santosky, supra, 455 U.S. 745, the United Stated Supreme Court held that in light of the fundamental liberty interest at stake in terminating parental rights, and the irreparable harm caused by an erroneous decision to terminate such rights, due process requires a heightened standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence in a proceeding to terminate parental rights. (Id. at pp. 758-759, 769.) The court further explained that [w]hen the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. (Id. at pp. 753-754, fn. omitted.)

Relying on these general principles, Mother argues that the heightened standard was not met in her case. Mother, however, ignores that our Supreme Court in Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th 242, fully explored the implications of Santosky and found that the California statutory scheme for termination of parental rights is fundamentally different than the New York scheme at issue in Santoksy. (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 250-256.) Considered in the context of the entire process for terminating parental rights under the dependency statutes, the procedure specified in section 366.26 for terminating parental rights comports with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the precise and demanding substantive and procedural requirements the petitioning agency must have satisfied before it can propose termination are carefully calculated to constrain judicial discretion, diminish the risk of erroneous findings of parental inadequacy and detriment to the child, and otherwise protect the legitimate interests of the parents. At this late stage in the process the evidence of detriment is already so clear and convincing that more cannot be required without prejudice to the interests of the adoptable child, with which the state must now align itself. Thus the proof by a preponderance standard is sufficient at this point. [] We conclude that the standard of proof for termination of parental rights under the child dependency statutes comports with the requirements of due process. (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 256.)

Since the California statutory scheme meets due process standards, Mother has failed to show any federal due process violation. Moreover, we find no violation of Mothers state due process rights. We are cognizant of the difficulties Mother faced in reestablishing her relationship with Daniel. However, by the time of the second section 366.26 hearing, reunification services had long since been terminated and the focus had been shifted to the needs of Daniel for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.)

III. DISPOSITION

The May 22, 2006 order terminating parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan is affirmed.

_________________________

Reardon, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Ruvolo, P.J.

_________________________

Sepulveda, J.

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^[1]Daniels father, Daniel G., Sr., had been a party to the first appeal. However, he has not appealed the second order terminating his parental rights. Because Daniel G., Sr. is not a party to the instant appeal, our discussion of the facts and legal analysis will focus on Mothers parental rights.

^[2]We take judicial notice of the record in case No. A107951. We also take judicial notice of the record in case No. A112294, which was a writ petition filed under California Rules of Court, former rule 38.1.

^[3]All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

^[4]CFSs corrected section 366.26 report states that Mother was arrested for violating Health and Safety Code sections 11377 and 11364. The disposition of these offenses is not reflected in the record.

^[5]Mothers counsel had been appointed on April 10, 2006, following Mothers successful motion pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

^[6]At county counsels request, the juvenile court dismissed CFSs section 388 petition.

^[7]The juvenile court also denied a section 388 petition by Daniels half-siblings. However, the record before us does not include this petition.

^[8]Mothers counsel argues that we cannot consider whether Daniel had lived with his half-siblings because there is no citation in the record supporting this allegation. This contention is without merit. We are fully aware of the facts of the underlying dependency proceedings, and have taken judicial notice of the record in Mothers prior cases before this court. The record is replete with references supporting the assertion that Daniel had not lived with his half-siblings on a consistent basis.