In re Daniel N.
Filed 11/6/13 In re Daniel N. CA2/3
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
In re DANIEL N., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B244556
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. NJ26668)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DANIEL N.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, John C. Lawson II, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Kevin D. Sheehy, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General,
Steven D. Matthews and Timothy M. Weiner, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
The minor and appellant
Daniel N. contends on appeal that he met the requirements for deferred entry of
judgment (DEJ) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 790 et seq.,
but the juvenile court failed to determine his eligibility for DEJ and instead
ordered him to juvenile hall. The People
concede that the court erred and that the matter must be remanded for
compliance with section 790 et seq. We
agree that the judgment must be reversed and the matter remanded for a
determination of Daniel’s suitability for DEJ.
Daniel also requests that we review
the sealed record of the juvenile court’s Pitchess
to determine whether the court abused its discretion by failing to order
disclosure. We find that the juvenile
court complied with its obligations under Pitchess
and did not abuse its discretion.
FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Factual background.
On February
11, 2012, Los Angeles Police Officers Francisco Macias and Jeff Bruner saw Daniel
walking in an alley. As they approached
Daniel, he threw a lighter onto the ground.
Officer Bruner saw a gun in Daniel’s sweatshirt. Daniel had a loaded .25 caliber semiautomatic
pistol. Daniel testified and admitted he
had a gun.
II. Procedural background.
On April
11, 2012, a petition was filed under section 602 alleging one count of
§ 29610.) After the juvenile court
denied Daniel’s motion to suppress evidence, he admitted count 1.
At the disposition hearing on October 1, 2012, Daniel’s counsel asked for
DEJ under section 790. The People
requested camp. The court denied the
request for DEJ, declared the crime to be a felony with a maximum term of
confinement of three years, declared Daniel a ward of court, and placed him in juvenile
hall for 45 days after which he would have 45 days of house arrest and then
home on probation.
DISCUSSION
I. The juvenile court failed to comply
with section 790 et seq.
Daniel contends that the matter must
be remanded for a determination of his suitability for DEJ under section 790 et
seq. The People concede, and we agree.
Under section 790, “in lieu of
jurisdictional and dispositional hearings, a minor may admit the allegations
contained in a section 602 petition and waive time for the pronouncement of
judgment. Entry of judgment is deferred.
After the successful completion of a
term of probation, on the motion of the prosecution and with a positive
recommendation from the probation department, the court is required to dismiss
the charges. The arrest upon which
judgment was deferred is deemed never to have occurred, and any records of the
juvenile court proceeding are sealed. (§§ 791,
subd. (a)(3), 793, subd. (c).)†(Martha
C. v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 556, 558.)
Section 790, subdivision (a)
therefore makes a minor eligible for DEJ if the following six circumstances
apply: “(1) The minor has not
previously been declared to be a ward of the court for the commission of a
felony offense[;] [¶] (2) The offense charged is not one of the offenses
enumerated in subdivision (b) of Section 707[;] [¶] (3) The minor has not
previously been committed to the custody of the Youth Authority[;] [¶] (4) The
minor’s record does not indicate that probation has ever been revoked without
being completed[;] [¶] (5) The minor is at least 14 years of age at the
time of the hearing[;] [and] [¶] (6) The minor is eligible for probation
pursuant to Section 1203.06 of the Penal Code.â€
Section 790, subdivision (b), also requires the prosecutor to determine
whether these circumstances apply and to inform the court. (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.800(b);
In re C.W. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 654, 659; In re Luis B. (2006)
142 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1122.)
If a minor meets the requirements
for DEJ, the juvenile court may either refer the matter to the probation
department, which shall investigate whether the minor would benefit from
education, treatment or rehabilitation and report its findings to the court, or
the court may summarily grant DEJ. (§ 791,
subd. (b).) If the matter is referred to
the probation department, then the court, after receiving the department’s
report, has the ultimate discretion to grant DEJ. (In re
Luis B., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123.) But the prosecuting attorney’s initial duty
to assess the minor’s eligibility for DEJ and the court’s duty, if the minor is
found eligible, either to summarily grant DEJ or to conduct a suitability
hearing are mandatory. (
Daniel met all six circumstances. He had no prior record; hence, he had never
before been declared a ward of court for committing a felony, he had never been
committed to Youth Authority, and probation had never been revoked without
being completed. He was 17 at the time
of the hearing. A violation of Penal
Code section 29610 is not an offense enumerated in section 707. Although Daniel satisfied the criteria in
section 790, the record does not show that the prosecutor complied with the
section by submitting a statement of his eligibility. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.800(b)(1); § 790,
subd. (b).) Rather, the record
merely shows that the prosecutor requested camp.
The matter must therefore be
remanded so that the juvenile court can comply with the procedures outlined in
section 790 et seq.
II. Pitchess.
The minor sought discovery of peace officer personnel
records under Pitchess, supra, 11
Cal.3d 531. He sought, as to Officers
Bruner and Macias, information related to complaints regarding “misconduct
amounting to moral turpitude,†including acts of aggression, violence or
excessive force, racial or ethnic bias, coercive conduct, fabrication of
seizure, false arrest, perjury, dishonesty, writing false or misleading
reports, and planting evidence.
On July 26, 2012, the juvenile court found good cause
for an in camera review of the officers’ records related to complaints
regarding “false testimony, false arrest, planting of evidence, of perjury, and
illegal search.†The court conducted an
in camera review that same day and found no relevant records for disclosure. Daniel requests that we review the sealed
transcript of the trial court’s Pitchess
review to determine whether the court abused its discretion by failing to order
disclosure. (See generally,
[describing procedure a court must follow in conducting an in camera hearing
under Pitchess].)
Trial courts are vested with broad discretion when
ruling on motions to discover peace officer records (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 827; Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1086), and
we review a court’s ruling for abuse (People
v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1228; People
v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330). We have reviewed the sealed transcript of the
in camera hearing conducted on July 26, 2012. The transcript constitutes an adequate record
of the trial court’s review of any documents provided to it and reveals no
abuse of discretion.
The judgment, findings and dispositional orders are
reversed. The matter is remanded for
further proceedings in compliance with section 790 et seq. and California Rules
of Court, rule 5.800.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ALDRICH,
J.
We concur:
CROSKEY,
Acting P. J.
KITCHING,
J.
further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).
