In re Darrin H.

Filed 9/29/06 In re Darrin H. CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

The juvenile court found true allegations that appellant Darrin H. had committed two counts of robbery and single counts of carjacking, receiving stolen property, possession of a controlled substance, wanton driving while in flight from a pursuing police officer, and fleeing the scene of an accident. It also found that he personally used a firearm during the commission of the two robberies. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (f); Pen. Code, §§ 211, 215, 496, 12022.53, subd. (b); Veh. Code, §§ 2800.2, 20002, subd. (a).) He was committed to the California Youth Authority (CYA)^[1] for an eight-year term of confinement. He was also ordered to pay almost $4,500 in restitution. Darrin appeals the disposition order, (1) challenging the sufficiency of evidence of carjacking and robbery; (2) contending that insufficient evidence of probable benefit supports his CYA commitment; and (3) asserting that the restitution order must be reduced because some relocation expenses claimed and ordered to be paid were not properly verified. We reverse the restitution order in part with instructions for the juvenile court to allow law enforcement or mental health verification of the necessity of relocation expenses, but otherwise affirm the restitution order and the disposition order.

I. FACTS

Appellant Darrin H. was born in December 1988. His parents separated in 1994. Darrin remained with his mother in her Oakland home and had little ongoing contact with his father. In March 1999, he came to the attention of Oakland police on suspicion of battery. (See Pen. Code, § 242.) In June 2001, Darrin was suspected of taking or driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent, but there was insufficient evidence to prosecute the matter. (See Veh. Code, § 10851.)

Darrin’s half-brother was killed in a drive-by shooting in March 2002. The minor was very close to his brother, who “kept him out of trouble.” Before this time, Darrin had experimented with marijuana. After his brother’s death, he began to “act out,” using marijuana regularly to help him cope with the anger he felt. In September 2002, Darrin was suspected of selling narcotics, but the matter was dropped for insufficient evidence. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 11352.) In March 2003, Darrin’s grandfather died and Darrin began drinking alcohol.

On the evening of July 19, 2003, uniformed Oakland Police Officer Joseph Foreman was on patrol near 29th Street and Martin Luther King Way. He saw a white Plymouth Turismo without license plates. Officer Foreman recognized the driver as a person who had been involved with narcotics dealers in the past. He turned on the emergency lights of his marked police car, but the Plymouth did not stop. The Plymouth continued for a distance, followed by Officer Foreman. When the car finally stopped, the driver--later identified as 14-year-old Darrin H.--fled on foot with Officer Foreman in pursuit. Another Oakland police officer apprehended Darrin nearby based on Officer Foreman’s radioed description of him.

Darrin resisted being handcuffed at his arrest and threatened the arresting officers, saying “[Y]ou’re gonna regret this.” He spat in one police officer’s face. He did not have a driver’s license. A search of Darrin’s vehicle glove box for registration revealed a baggie containing a white rock--suspected to be cocaine base.

On July 22, 2003, a petition was filed alleging that Darrin possessed a controlled substance, and threatened and resisted a police officer. He was also alleged to have committed misdemeanor battery on a police officer. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); Pen. Code, §§ 69, 148, subd. (a), 243, subd. (b); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) On July 23, 2003, the juvenile court approved Darrin’s continued detention at juvenile hall. On July 30, 2003, Darrin admitted the misdemeanor battery charge and the remaining allegations were dismissed on the prosecution’s motion. He was released with an electronic monitor on July 31, 2003, pending disposition.

At the August 20, 2003 disposition hearing, Darrin was formally adjudged to be a ward of the court. The juvenile court ordered him to be released to his mother on probation, subject to various conditions, including daily school attendance and submission to random drug tests. In September and October 2003, Darrin tested positive for use of marijuana, heroin and cocaine. He failed to appear for a third drug test. Between September 12 and November 3, 2003, Darrin missed 83 days of school. He also failed to maintain contact with his probation officer.

A supplemental petition was filed on November 3, 2003, alleging Darrin’s failure to attend school or to remain free of drugs according to the conditions of his probation. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777a.) The probation officer recommended that Darrin be detained for his own protection. The minor did not appear at the November 20, 2003 and December 1, 2003 hearings on the petition. A bench warrant was issued for his arrest.

About 12:30 a.m. on December 10, 2003, Thomas Holt stopped at a gas station at Market Street and West MacArthur Boulevard in Oakland to fuel his Ford Expedition. As he got back into his vehicle, a Black male pressed a black semiautomatic pistol against Holt’s neck, grabbed him and forced him from the vehicle. The man grabbed Holt’s car keys, entered the vehicle and pointed the gun at Holt, telling him to run. Holt fled, watching the man drive off in his Ford. He also saw a gray car follow the Ford. Three young men were in the gray car.

A report was made to Oakland police, including Holt’s description of the gunman and two of the three men in the gray car. Holt’s vehicle was later seen nearby with people in or near it. When police approached the Ford, three young men fled from it. The police searched the area for the suspects.

During the neighborhood search, twice, the sound of gunshots was heard. Police received a report that the gunshots had come from an apartment in the 2900 block of Martin Luther King Way. The occupants of the apartment were detained, a black revolver was recovered hidden under a bed and one of the men found there--Aorrell Burrell--matched Holt’s description of the carjacker. Burrell told police that the gun was his. Holt identified Burrell as the carjacker in a field lineup. During a field show-up, Holt also identified a second man found at the apartment as a passenger in the gray car. Burrell and the second man were arrested.

Darrin was found hiding in some bushes near the freeway. He was arrested without incident. He had marijuana in his possession at the time of his arrest. In a field identification, Holt positively identified Darrin as the driver of the gray car. The following day, a magistrate found probable cause to detain Darrin on suspicion of carjacking.

On December 12, 2003, a subsequent petition was filed, alleging that Darrin had committed carjacking and robbery while armed with a firearm. (See Pen. Code, §§ 211, 215, 12022, subd. (a)(1); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) Darrin’s mother told a probation officer that her son smokes marijuana daily. The minor was ordered to be detained at juvenile hall. The bench warrant for Darrin’s arrest was recalled.

On December 24, 2003, Darrin admitted that he had violated the conditions of his probation as alleged in the November 2003 supplemental petition. The juvenile court amended the December 2003 subsequent petition to add an allegation of receiving stolen property. (See Pen. Code, § 496.) Darrin admitted this new allegation and the remaining allegations of robbery, carjacking and firearm use were dismissed on the prosecutor’s motion. At the January 9, 2004 disposition hearing, Darrin was ordered to be placed at camp. He was placed at Camp Sweeney on January 23, 2004. He escaped from camp a week later.

On February 6, 2004, a subsequent petition alleged that Darrin escaped from Camp Sweeney. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 871.) A warrant was issued for his arrest. On March 31, 2004, Darrin was admitted to Highland Hospital in critical condition with a gunshot wound in his chest. As a result of this wound, his right lung was punctured, a rib was fractured, his liver was lacerated, and a kidney was bruised. Darrin saw a young cousin shot and killed during this incident.

On April 1, 2004, Darrin was formally arrested while still in the hospital. He remained hospitalized for three weeks. On his release from the hospital, he was detained at juvenile hall. A bullet remained lodged in his body. Darrin experienced residual pain from the gunshot wound and sometimes had migraine headaches. He took pain medication. His liver damage precluded Darrin from drinking alcohol after the shooting.

On June 10, 2004, Darrin admitted that he escaped from camp. At the June 24, 2004 disposition hearing, he was ordered to be placed in a group home. He was actually placed in a group home in Riverside County on August 17, 2004. He was transferred to another group home in Whitewater on November 30, 2004, when the Riverside group home closed. On December 13, 2004, the juvenile court reviewed the matter and found that Darrin was making satisfactory progress.

Darrin completed the Whitewater program and returned to his mother’s home in Oakland in February 2005. He was enrolled at Oakland Technical High School. On March 1, 2005, the probation officer sought modification of the court’s placement order from the group home placement to probation with continued supervision. The recommendation noted that Darrin had tested positive for marijuana. Conditions of probation were recommended, including standard drug conditions such as random drug testing. Darrin failed to appear at three court dates for hearing on the request for modification. The matter was dropped on April 8, 2005. Darrin’s mother told the probation officer that Darrin was doing well in school and that they missed the court hearing because she was ill.

On April 14, 2005, the probation officer again sought modification of the juvenile court’s placement order. Five days later, the probation officer learned that Darrin had not attended more than a few days of school since his February 2005 enrollment. He had been dropped from enrollment because of poor attendance. On April 27, 2005, Darrin appeared at a hearing on the request for modification. The juvenile court approved the grant of probation, with specific terms of probation. Darrin was to live at his mother’s home.

On May 2, 2005, Darrin’s mother saw her son, but then he disappeared. On May 16, 2005, Darrin did not keep an appointment with his probation officer. His mother advised the probation officer that she had not seen Darrin for two weeks. On May 20, 2005, a supplemental petition was filed alleging that Darrin’s whereabouts were unknown. The petition noted that Darrin’s mother had moved to Fremont, in an attempt to give her son a fresh start away from the dangers of his old Oakland neighborhood. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777a.) A warrant was issued for Darrin’s arrest that day. On August 9, 2005, a hearing on the supplemental petition occurred in Darrin’s absence, with Darrin represented by counsel. No finding was made on the allegations of the supplemental petition.

On August 25, 2005, Darrin was arrested by Oakland police on the outstanding warrant--he committed no new criminal offense. The probation department recommended that Darrin be detained. At an August 26, 2005 hearing, Darrin admitted the truth of the allegation set out in the May 2005 supplemental petition. He was ordered to be detained in juvenile hall. As Darrin appeared to approach the age of majority,^[2] the probation officer recommended placement in his mother’s home with formal probation, standard drug conditions and emancipation services. On September 12, 2005, the juvenile court approved this plan and Darrin was released from juvenile hall to his mother’s custody.

About 8:45 p.m. on October 2, 2005, two young Black men in black hooded sweatshirts approached Marlene Gilmore near 34th Avenue and East 14th Street in Oakland as she got out of her gray Toyota to walk to her home. One man pointed a black semiautomatic pistol four inches from her head. He demanded her possessions; she gave him everything she carried--her purse, her jacket, her keys and her shopping bag. The armed man tossed the car keys to his companion, who entered the car and started it. The armed man got in the Toyota and sped off. Gilmore described both perpetrators as thin Black men in their 20’s--one about five feet four inches tall and the other one about five feet eight inches tall. She reported that her purse contained $120 in cash and a cell phone.

About 7:00 a.m. on October 3, 2005, David Proffitt stood across the street from the West Oakland BART station when he saw three Black men drive up in a gray, silver or brown Toyota. One of the Toyota’s passengers--dressed in a dark hooded sweatshirt--got out of the back seat of the car, approached Proffitt and pointed a dark semiautomatic handgun in his face. The gunman demanded his possessions. He took Proffitt’s wallet, containing $1,200 in cash and various credit cards and documents. He also took a shoulder bag containing a portable CD player and other items. The gunman returned to the back seat of the Toyota, which left the scene of the robbery.

About this time, Oakland police received a report that Darrin had been spotted several times in a West Oakland drug area armed with guns. On October 4, 2005, uniformed Oakland Police Officers Jason Anderson and Marcus Midyet were on patrol in a marked car near 14th and Center Streets. At 1:30 p.m., they saw a gold Buick moving at a high rate of speed. Officer Midyet yelled at the driver--whom he recognized as Darrin--to stop. Darrin continued to drive away. When asked for his name, Darrin replied: “You know me Midyet, Darrin from Ghost Town,” a nickname for a specific part of Oakland around 31st Street and Martin Luther King Way.

The officers initiated a traffic stop for speeding and to determine if Darrin was armed with a firearm. Darrin pulled over and Officer Midyet got out of the patrol car. When Midyet ordered Darrin to turn off the engine of his car, he did not comply, speeding off into oncoming traffic instead. Officers Anderson and Midyet pursued him in their patrol car, with lights and sirens on. Darrin struck a brown Lincoln, bending the rim of one of the Buick’s tires, causing the tire to blow out. Darrin continued to accelerate his vehicle into oncoming traffic, but he had little control over the vehicle. He soon stopped the car near 14th and Linden Streets, fleeing on foot.

About 2:30 p.m., an Oakland police search revealed Darrin hiding under a house. He was handcuffed and arrested for felony evading and for hit and run. Darrin was found in possession of an eighth of an ounce of rock cocaine, a cell phone and $101 in cash. He was also arrested for possession of drugs.

According to police, Darrin also had a Toyota key and car remote control in his possession.^[3] Police suspected the items might have belonged to the vehicle that had been stolen from Gilmore at gunpoint two days earlier. When asked about the key, Darrin said that it belonged to his sister’s car.^[4] He could not tell police where the car was parked and the police learned from his mother that he did not have a sister. The key fit the stolen Toyota, which police found that evening in the Ghost Town area near 31st Street and Martin Luther King Way when they used the remote.

Darrin was arrested on suspicion of carjacking and armed robbery, as the Toyota may have been used in the Proffitt armed robbery. On October 6, 2005, Proffitt viewed a photograph lineup and identified Darrin as the man who looked like the one who had pointed a gun at him and robbed him. Later that day, Gilmore was also shown a photograph lineup containing Darrin’s photograph but she was unable to make an identification of the young men who stole her car and her purse. Her vehicle was inspected for fingerprints, but no clear identifiable ones were found.

On October 6, 2005, a subsequent petition was filed alleging that Darrin had committed felony possession of a controlled substance for sale, misdemeanor flight from an accident and felony flight from a police officer. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5; Veh. Code, §§ 2800.2, 20002, subd. (a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) At an October 7, 2005 hearing on the petition, Darrin was ordered to be detained at juvenile hall. On October 11, 2005, the substance suspected to be rock cocaine tested positive for cocaine base, weighing 4.54 grams.

On October 20, 2005, the subsequent petition was amended to add receiving stolen property, carjacking while using a firearm, and two counts of robbery while using a firearm. (See Pen. Code, §§ 211, 215, 496, 12022.53, subd. (b).) The following day, Darrin was ordered to be detained at juvenile hall.

In January 2006, a jurisdiction hearing was conducted. Darrin moved to preclude the prosecution from admitting any evidence of statements elicited from him after his arrest, alleging violations of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. He sought to suppress evidence of his postarrest statements about the Toyota car key. The juvenile court denied the motion.

At the hearing, Gilmore, Proffitt and an eyewitness to the Proffitt robbery testified, as did Officers Anderson and Midyet. Gilmore was unable to identify Darrin in court. Proffitt testified about his photograph identification of Darrin and made an in-court identification of the minor. Officer Midyet testified that Darrin later admitted that he had possessed drugs, stating that he smoked crack cocaine. The officer noticed that Darrin did not have the physical characteristics of someone who actually smoked crack. Testifying as an expert witness in narcotics, Officer Midyet opined that the cocaine was possessed for sale, based on the amount of narcotics found and his sense that Darrin did not use cocaine. At the close of the prosecution’s case, Darrin moved to dismiss the Gilmore carjacking and robbery allegations, without success. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 701.1.)

Darrin and his mother also testified at the jurisdiction hearing. His mother testified that in the days before his October 4, 2005 arrest, Darrin was on probation. One condition of probation was an 8:00 p.m. curfew and he was with her each evening, she told the juvenile court.

Testifying in his own defense, Darrin admitted that he sped off from Oakland police on October 4, 2005, because he had drugs in his possession. However, he denied any involvement in the Gilmore and Proffitt robberies or the Gilmore carjacking. He told the juvenile court that he was asleep at his grandfather’s house at the time that Proffitt was robbed. The police planted the Toyota key and the car remote on him when they arrested him. Finally, Darrin insisted that the drugs that were found on him were for his own use, not for sale.

On January 27, 2006, the juvenile court found that Darrin was a person described by section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. It found true allegations that Darrin committed flight from a pursuing peace officer, misdemeanor flight from the scene of a vehicle accident, receiving stolen property, carjacking and two robberies involving the personal use of a firearm. (See Pen. Code, §§ 211, 215, 496, 12022.53, subd. (b); Veh. Code, §§ 2800.2, 20002, subd. (a).) It also found true an allegation that Darrin possessed a controlled substance--a lesser included offense of the allegation of possession for sale.^[5] (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11351.5.)

On February 10, 2006, at the disposition hearing, Darrin’s counsel argued against a CYA commitment. Despite this, the juvenile court committed Darrin to CYA for an eight-year term of confinement. On that date, Darrin was also ordered to pay restitution to Gilmore and Proffitt in an amount to be determined later. Proffitt submitted a restitution claim for $1,495. Gilmore sought $2,932.06 in restitution. On February 24, 2006, Darrin was ordered to pay restitution to these two parties in the amounts sought.

II. CARJACKING AND ROBBERY

First, Darrin challenges the sufficiency of evidence of the Gilmore carjacking and robbery. He contends on appeal that Gilmore’s weak identification, the lack of sufficiently detailed evidence of a modus operandi to link the Proffitt and Gilmore robberies, and the slight circumstantial evidence--his possession of the Toyota key--were insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that he committed these two offenses. The juvenile court denied his motion to dismiss these allegations on sufficiency of evidence grounds. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 701.1.) When it found that the allegation that Darrin had possessed stolen property--the key to Gilmore’s car--was true, the juvenile court specifically rejected his claim that the police planted the key on him. It also found Darrin to be an incredible witness. It then found the allegations of the Gilmore carjacking and robbery and the related firearm use allegations to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.

On appeal, Darrin challenges the sufficiency of evidence in support of the juvenile court’s findings that he committed the Gilmore carjacking and robbery. When a claim of insufficient evidence is made on appeal, our review is limited. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether there is substantial evidence--reasonable, credible, of solid value--from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the required finding beyond a reasonable doubt. The juvenile court, not our court, must be convinced that the minor committed the alleged acts. If the circumstances and reasonable inferences justify the trier of fact’s findings, our opinion that this evidence might also reasonably be reconciled with another finding does not warrant reversal of the juvenile court’s judgment. (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298.) A judgment may be based on circumstantial evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Palmore (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1298-1299.)

Darrin asserts that Gilmore’s weak identification evidence and the circumstantial evidence of the key was the only evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding linking him to this robbery and carjacking. Our review of the record shows much more evidence in support of the juvenile court finding than these two facts. Although Gilmore was unable to make a positive identification of Darrin either from a photograph lineup or in court, she offered a partial description of the perpetrators. She described two young Black men in dark hooded sweatshirts, the taller of whom she estimated was five feet eight inches tall. Darrin was five feet 10 inches tall--close to the height of the person Gilmore described. This circumstantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings. Darrin was repeatedly seen dressed in a dark hooded sweatshirt--another bit of circumstantial evidence that tends to support these juvenile court findings. (See In re Jerry M., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.)

Darrin was positively identified as the perpetrator of the Proffitt robbery--an offense that occurred approximately 10 hours after the Gilmore incident. He robbed Proffitt approximately five miles away from where the Gilmore carjacking occurred.^[6] Proffitt and an eyewitness to that robbery described Darrin as dressed in a manner similar to that of the perpetrators of the Gilmore offenses--in a dark hooded sweatshirt that concealed part of his head. The vehicle Darrin used to perpetrate the Proffitt robbery was described by the victim and an eyewitness as one that looked similar to Gilmore’s Toyota. In the Proffitt robbery, Darrin used a handgun--a weapon consistent with the black semiautomatic weapon used by the gunman in the Gilmore carjacking. In both incidents, the perpetrator pointed the gun at the victims’ head in order to secure their compliance with his demands. Again, all of these facts tends to support the juvenile court’s findings that Darrin committed the Gilmore carjacking and robbery. (See In re Jerry M., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.)

Darrin argues that this evidence does not constitute evidence of a modus operandi, citing a lack of distinctive marks and differences between the Proffitt and Gilmore offenses. Whether or not the combination of facts rises to the level of a modus operandi, these facts nevertheless constitute circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could properly draw an inference that would tend to support the juvenile court’s findings related to Darrin’s involvement in the Gilmore carjacking and robbery. (See In re Jerry M., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.) All relevant evidence--evidence relevant to credibility and that having any tendency to prove a fact in dispute--is admissible in a juvenile court proceeding. (See Evid. Code, §§ 210, 351.)

Darrin also attempts to downplay evidence of his possession of Gilmore’s car key, but we disagree with his assessment of the strength that this evidence lends to the prosecution’s case. Although he denied possessing this evidence, the juvenile court judge specifically found that he did. The fact of possession of the key was essential to the juvenile court’s finding that he had committed receiving stolen property--specifically, the key.^[7] Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact to make. We have no authority to substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court on matters of credibility. (See People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596; People v. Pace (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 795, 798.)

The possession of this car key is also more significant than Darrin would allow. He possessed Gilmore’s car key and her car remote control less than 48 hours after the carjacking. The conscious possession of recently stolen property coupled with corroborating evidence of guilt allows a finder of fact to draw an inference of guilt. (See People v. Williams (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1171.) Darrin’s lies to police about the car key constitute corroborating evidence of his culpability. He made false statements to police on October 4, 2005, when he attempted to explain why he had the Toyota car key in his possession two days after the Gilmore carjacking and robbery.

Deliberately false statements made to police about matters within a minor’s knowledge and that materially relate to his or her involvement in criminal activity can form strong evidence of a consciousness of guilt. (See People v. Williams, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1167-1168.) The trier of fact may properly draw an inference of wrongdoing from a minor’s false statement about facts surrounding the underlying offense. (See id. at pp. 1168, 1171.) It may properly consider this evidence and the minor’s prior history when determining the minor’s credibility. (See ibid.)

Darrin also argues in his reply brief that the evidence of his flight from police was innocent and did not warrant an inference of guilt. We disagree. Flight may constitute evidence allowing an inference of a consciousness of guilt if the circumstances surrounding flight from a crime scene logically permits an inference that the flight was motivated by guilty knowledge. (See People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 470, cert. den. sub nom. Lucas v. California (1996) 519 U.S. 838; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 694, cert. den. sub nom. Turner v. California (1991) 498 U.S. 1053.) The motive behind Darrin’s desperate flight from police in the Buick, his flight on foot when the vehicle became dysfunctional and his attempt to conceal himself from police became clearer when the need to avoid being linked to a carjacking and robbery--both involving the use of firearm--is taken into account. The juvenile court was not required to accept Darrin’s claim that he fled to avoid being caught with drugs in his possession. It was entitled to reject this alternative interpretation of the evidence in favor of a different inference suggesting avoidance of the more serious consequences of carjacking and armed robbery. (See, e.g., People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 471; People v. Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 694-695.)

In sum, we find that the record on appeal demonstrates that the juvenile court had much more than a weak identification and a car key to support its finding that Darrin committed the Gilmore robbery and carjacking. Considering all the circumstantial evidence in the record on appeal and the inferences that could properly be drawn from them, we find that substantial evidence supports these two findings.

III. CYA COMMITMENT

Next, Darrin contends that there is insufficient evidence of probable benefit to supports his CYA commitment. A juvenile court ward may not be committed to CYA unless the juvenile court is fully satisfied that the mental and physical conditions and qualifications of the ward render it probable that he or she will benefit from the reformatory discipline or other treatment provided at CYA. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 734.) Darrin argues that the juvenile court failed to make this finding, but the record on appeal belies this claim. At the February 2006 disposition hearing, the juvenile court found that Darrin’s mental and physical condition and qualifications rendered it probable that he would benefit from the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by CYA.

Darrin’s claim of error on appeal is--in essence--a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting the juvenile court’s probable benefit finding. (See In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396; In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 734.) We review the overriding decision whether to commit a minor to CYA for an abuse of discretion. (In re Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396.) If the record demonstrates that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Darrin would probably benefit from a CYA commitment, then the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in making the commitment and we must uphold its decision. (See In re Pedro M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556.)

Darrin argues that the juvenile court’s finding is suspect because it was motivated not by any benefit that might come to him from a CYA commitment, but by its determination to punish him. We disagree with his implied conclusion that punishment does not have a beneficial rehabilitative effect. State law requires that the punishment inherent in a CYA commitment further the ward’s rehabilitation. (See In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1396; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (b).) The purpose of the guidance received during a CYA commitment is to enable the ward to return to the outside world after completion of the term of commitment as a law-abiding and productive person. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (b).)

Darrin also contends that CYA is not equipped to meet his special educational needs and his need for substance abuse treatment. Again, we disagree. By law, CYA programs must offer juvenile court wards care, treatment and guidance appropriate to their circumstances, necessarily benefiting them. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (b); see also In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 145, 153 [counseling].)

At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court considered various factors when it determined to commit Darrin to CYA. It cited his level of criminal sophistication;^[8] the danger he posed to the public; his failure to change his behavior after being placed in lesser commitments; the lack of other commitment alternatives that might benefit Darrin; the availability of job training and remedial education; and the minor’s need for a secure, fenced confinement. The evidence in this long record of escalating delinquent conduct supports each of these facts. That he had escaped from a camp within a week of his placement there provides specific support for his need for a more secure placement such as CYA. A documented need for a locked facility supports a CYA commitment order. (See In re Jose R. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 55, 61.)

In this case, the probation department explored the possibility of less restrictive placements, but the minor was rejected from three other possible placements. CYA had found the minor suitable for placement and the juvenile court knew this before it ordered the commitment. At CYA, Darrin could continue his education, participate in victim impact classes and attend group counseling sessions. All of these factors tend to support the juvenile court’s finding that Darrin would enjoy a probable benefit from a CYA commitment.

Substantial evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that Darrin would probably benefit from the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided at CYA. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 734; In re Pedro M., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 555-556.) Thus, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by committing Darrin to CYA. (See In re George M. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 376, 379; see also In re Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1396-1397 [CYA commitment proper when minor has lengthy drug history, evidence of gang involvement, criminal record, behavioral problems, probation violations and unauthorized absences from prior placements].)

IV. RESTITUTION

Finally, Darrin contends that the restitution order was erroneous because some of the expenses claimed were not properly verified. Specifically, he argues that Gilmore’s claim of $844 for storage during the time she moved to a temporary residence was not proven because there was no proof of her need to relocate her home. When a victim suffered an economic loss as the result of a juvenile court ward’s conduct, the juvenile court must require the minor to make restitution in an amount established by court order. This amount may be ordered based on the loss claimed by the victim or any other court showing. If the amount is not known at the time of disposition, the restitution order must include a provision that the amount shall be determined later. The court must order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons not to do so. (See Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).)

The minor has a right to a judicial hearing to dispute the amount of restitution to be ordered. (See Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(1).) Economic losses eligible for restitution include relocation expenses incurred by an adult victim who moved away from the minor. (See id., § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(I).) These expenses must be verified by law enforcement personnel as necessary for the victim’s personal safety or by a mental health treatment provider as necessary for the victim’s emotional well-being. (See ibid.)

On February 10, 2006, Darrin was ordered to pay restitution to Gilmore in an amount to be determined later. Gilmore sought almost $3,000 in restitution, including $844 for temporary storage of her belongings while she relocated her home away from the scene of the carjacking and robbery. On February 24, 2006, Darrin objected to the claim of restitution, arguing inter alia that the legal requirements for restitution set out in statute had not been met. The juvenile court relied on its own observation of Gilmore, whom he characterized as clearly frightened by the incident. It was satisfied from the evidence presented at the jurisdiction hearing that Gilmore moved because of the carjacking and robbery. He was ordered to pay the full amount of restitution that Gilmore sought.

On appeal, Darrin argues that the trial court did not obtain the necessary verification for the $844 in relocation expenses that Gilmore claimed. He raised this issue in the juvenile court, properly preserving it for our consideration on appeal. (See People v. O’Neal (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 817, 820; see also People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 352-355.) Considering the merits of this issue, we find as a matter of law that the evidence before the juvenile court did not meet the statutory requirements to support its full restitution order. (See Pen. Code, 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(I).) When the Legislature requires a specific basis for determining a loss subject to restitution, the court must determine the loss on that basis. (See People v. Ortiz (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 791, 800 fn. 6.) The statutory language specifically requires verification of the necessity of the relocation by a law enforcement official or a mental health treatment provider. (See Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(I).) We note that the statute does not require some other restitution losses to be verified by extrinsic evidence. (See, e.g., id., § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(B), (G).) When we interpret the statutory language at issue by contrast with these other provisions, it becomes clear that the Legislature considered the verification requirement to be significant. (See People v. Sinohui (2002) 28 Cal.4th 205, 213; Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 978.) As the relocation expenses claimed by Gilmore were not verified as necessary according to the terms of the restitution statute, the disputed part of the restitution order must be reversed.

Darrin contends that the remedy for this error is to reduce the restitution award by $844. We disagree. We find that the better remedy is a remand to the juvenile court to allow an opportunity for a further hearing to verify Gilmore’s claimed relocation expenses in a manner consistent with the statute. If this hearing is not ordered or the evidence adduced at that hearing does not meet the statutory requirements, the juvenile court must revise its restitution order accordingly.

The restitution order is reversed in part and remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the disposition order and the remaining aspects of the restitution order are affirmed.

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Reardon, Acting P.J.

We concur:

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Sepulveda, J.

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Rivera, J.

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^[1] In July 2005, the CYA was renamed the Division of Juvenile Facilities within the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1710, subd. (a); see Gov. Code, §§ 12838, 12838.5.)

^[2] At this time, it appears that the juvenile court and probation officer believed that Darrin was a year older than he actually was.

^[3] Later, Darrin disputed this, telling the juvenile court that he had not possessed the Toyota key or the remote when he was arrested. He testified that the police planted this evidence on him.

^[4] At the jurisdiction hearing, Darrin denied making this statement.

^[5] The juvenile court suspected that Darrin possessed the drugs for sale, but could not make this finding beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, it found true a lesser included allegation that Darrin had possessed a controlled substance.

^[6] We may take judicial notice of matters not reasonably subject to dispute and capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (h), 459, subd. (a).)

^[7] Darrin does not challenge the finding that he committed receiving stolen property by having Gilmore’s car key in his possession, nor does he challenge the sufficiency of evidence of the finding that he robbed Proffitt.

^[8] The juvenile court found that Darrin was not the kind of unsophisticated, mildly delinquent minor who might be unsuitable for CYA commitment. (See, e.g., In re Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 577; In re Tyrone O., supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at pp. 153-154.)