Filed 4/21/17 In re D.E. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO


In re D.E., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.E.,

Defendant and Appellant.


E066803

(Super.Ct.No. RIJ1200547)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Roger A. Luebs, Judge. Reversed.
Jan B. Norman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Lynne G. McGinnis and Allison V. Hawley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 5, 2012, the Riverside County District Attorney filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (the First Petition) alleging that on June 3, 2012, defendant and appellant D.E. (Minor) committed assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a); count 1); resisted a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 69; count 2); defaced property with graffiti (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)(A); count 3); and on March 15, 2012, disturbed the peace (Pen. Code, § 415.5, subd. (a); count 4). The First Petition further alleged with respect to count 1, that Minor inflicted great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).)
On June 6, 2012, the district attorney filed another petition alleging a different occasion of disturbing the peace on April 20, 2012 (the Second Petition). (Pen. Code, § 415.5, subd. (a).)
On June 7, 2012, the district attorney filed a first amended petition that superseded the First Petition. On June 21 a second amended petition, which superseded the June 7 petition, alleged the same charges and added an allegation of battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d) (the Amended First Petition)).
The same day, Minor admitted the allegations of battery and resisting an officer. The juvenile court found a factual basis for the admission, sustained the Amended First Petition, declared Minor a ward of the court, and placed him on probation. On the People’s motion, the court dismissed the Second Petition and the remaining allegations from the Amended First Petition filed on June 21.
On October 6, 2015, the juvenile court terminated Minor’s wardship and dismissed the Amended First Petition. On September 7, 2016, the court denied Minor’s petition to seal the Second Petition. Minor filed his appeal on September 8, 2016.
DISCUSSION
Minor claims that the court erred in failing to recognize its discretion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 (section 786) to order the sealing of records pertaining to Minor’s Second Petition.
Under section 786, subdivision (a), when a ward of the juvenile court completes an informal program of supervision or probation for an offense, the juvenile court must dismiss the petition for that offense and order all records pertaining to that petition sealed. Section 786, subdivision (c)(1) defines “satisfactory completion” of an informal program or supervision or probation as “no new findings of wardship or conviction for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” and substantial compliance with the orders of supervision or probation. Subdivision (e)(1) of section 786 further states that, in its order dismissing “the instant petition” and ordering the record sealed, the juvenile court “may . . . include an order to seal a record relating to, or to dismiss, any prior petition” if the petition “appear[s] to the satisfaction of the court to meet the sealing criteria otherwise described in this section.”
“In construing a statute, our role is to ascertain the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.] In determining intent, we must look first to the words of the statute because they are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.] If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute governs.” (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1056.) In other words, if there is “no ambiguity or uncertainty in the language, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said,” and it is not necessary to “resort to legislative history to determine the statute’s true meaning.” (People v. Cochran (2002) 28 Cal.4th 396, 400-401.) The unambiguous language of section 786 requires the court to seal records pertaining to a “dismissed petition” based upon first finding that a minor has satisfactorily completed probation for an offense alleged in the petition. Otherwise, a minor retains his or her ability to request sealing of juvenile records at a later date. (See, Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781 ; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.830.)
In this case, the juvenile court stated, “Minor did not complete a term of probation with respect to that Petition, or did not complete [Penal Code section]654 with respect to that Petition, so by its term the statute does not apply to the [Second] Petition.” Minor argues that the court erred in this finding because the court did have discretion to seal the Second Petition under section 786. We agree with Minor.
As provided in detail ante, in June 2012 two petitions and two amendments were filed against Minor. The First Petition initially filed on June 5, 2012, charged Minor with assault, resisting a police officer, graffiti, and disturbing the peace on March 15, 2012. The Second Petition, filed June 6, 2012, charged Minor with disturbing the peace on April 20, 2012. The First Petition was amended twice—on June 7 and on June 21, 2012; one count of battery was added. On June 21, 2012, pursuant to an agreement, Minor admitted the counts of resisting arrest and battery on the Amended First Petition filed on June 21, 2012. Thereafter, according to the terms of this agreement, the remaining charges on the Amended First Petition, and the Second Petition were dismissed. On October 6, 2015, the juvenile court terminated Minor’s wardship, found that Minor successfully completed the term of probation, and dismissed the Amended First Petition. Therefore, as part of the packaged disposition, Minor satisfied the section 786 criteria for sealing the Second Petition when he satisfied the section 786 criteria for sealing the Amended First Petition.
Notwithstanding, the People argue that section 786 is not applicable to the Second Petition “[b]ecause there is nothing in the record to suggest that appellant satisfactorily completed probation on the [Second] Petition.” In support of its argument, the People rely on In re Y.A. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 523; however, it is not applicable.
In In re Y.A., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 523, the first petition against the minor was filed in April 2013. The petition was sustained and the minor was placed on probation. Almost one year later, in February 2014, a second petition was filed against the minor. This subsequent petition was sustained and the minor was placed on probation. In May 2015 the juvenile court terminated probation and sealed the record of the February 2014 petition. On appeal, the minor argued that the court should have terminated probation and sealed the record on the April 2013 petition. (Id. at pp. 525-526.) The appellate court rejected the minor’s argument on the ground that the former version of section 786 did not apply to the sealing of prior petitions. (Y.A., at p. 527.) Y.A. is not applicable in the instant case because Minor did not seek to seal an unrelated prior petition that was filed approximately a year prior. Instead, as provided ante, the Second Petition was part of the agreement wherein Minor admitted the allegations in the Amended First Petition. As part of this agreement, the juvenile court dismissed the Second Petition. Therefore, Minor’s successful completion of probation on the June 21, 2012, Amended First Petition incorporated the dismissed charge in the Second Petition.
The People also argue that section 786 does not apply to the Second Petition because “[s]ection 786 should not be interpreted to require a juvenile court to consider sealing a minor’s entire juvenile record based on findings that relate only to the most recently filed petition. Doing so would compel this court to include language omitted from the statute[.] In addition, such an interpretation would allow minors to continue to commit crimes, one after another, with the knowledge that they would only need to successfully complete probation on one case to have their entire record sealed.” The People’s argument is not persuasive. First, as explained ante, Minor is not seeking to seal his entire juvenile record. He simply moved to seal a petition that was considered and dismissed in conjunction with the petition wherein he admitted two of the allegations. The Second Petition was dismissed as part of the agreement wherein Minor admitted these allegations. This application of section 786 is limited to the specific facts of this case.
Our interpretation of section 786, as applicable to the facts of this case, furthers the underlying goals of the juvenile court system. The purpose of sealing is to protect minors from “future prejudice resulting from their juvenile records.” (In re Jeffrey T. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1020.) The juvenile delinquency system is not concerned merely with punishing juvenile offenders; rather, it is concerned with rehabilitating them. (In re J.W. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 663, 667.) Sealing the Second Petition will help with Minor’s rehabilitation and protect him from future prejudice as a result of the filing of the Second Petition.
Based on the foregoing, we remand the matter to allow the juvenile court to exercise its discretion and rule on Minor’s request to seal the Second Petition.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition to seal Minor’s June 6, 2012, petition is reversed; the matter is remanded to the juvenile court to exercise its discretion and rule on Minor’s request to seal his June 6, 2012, petition.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


MILLER
J.


We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

McKINSTER
J.