In re D.F.
Filed 5/22/13 In re D.F. CA2/8
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
EIGHT
In re D.F. et al., Persons
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B243686
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. CK 87202)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DONOVAN F.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from
an order of the Superior Court
of
County, Marilyn K. Martinez, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Jesse
McGowan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
John F.
Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and
Stephen D. Watson, Associate County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * * * * *
Donovan F.
(father) appeals from the juvenile court’s exit order for monitored visitation
between him and his two children, son D.F. and daughter L.F. Father contends that the court erred in
requiring his weekly visits to be monitored because the evidence did not
support a need for monitoring, and besides that, the court undermined its order
for weekly visits by requiring a monitor when none was consistently
available. Additionally, father asserts
the court erred when it failed to specify a minimum duration for each
visit. We affirm.
factual and
procedural background
L.L. is the
mother of D.F. and L.F. Mother and
father never married and have been separated for some years. Father has always yelled at and been verbally
abusive towards her. In 2005, mother
obtained a restraining order against father as a result of his vandalism,
threats, intimidation, and stalking. In
2007, the children’s babysitter obtained a restraining order against father as
a result of his threats of death or great bodily harm and fleeing with the
children. In 2010, mother again obtained
a restraining order against father as a result of his threats of great bodily
harm, vandalism, intimidation, and stalking.
The
children came to the attention of the Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) on February 23, 2011, when a referral
alleged emotional abuse by father. D.F.
was nine years old at the time, and L.F. was seven years old. During a custody exchange at a police
station, mother ran into the station visibly shaken and asked for help. Mother was carrying L.F., who was
crying. She ran back outside where
father was holding D.F., who was also crying.
The police asked father if assistance was needed; father said no and
began to yell. The police then invited
father to go inside the station lobby to further discuss the issue, but father
became belligerent and continued to yell.
The children told the police that they did not want to visit their
father because of his yelling. D.F. in
particular said that father’s yelling frightened him and made him afraid for
mother. Father calmed down and the
children went with him for their visit.
Father had family court ordered visits with them two weekends a month.
During
mother’s interview with DCFS, she reported that L.F. had nightmares and anxiety
and wet herself. D.F. also wet
himself. The children would shake and
wet themselves when father yelled. The
children’s dentist told mother both children were grinding their teeth. Father was very controlling towards her and
always questioned where she was going when she left the children with him. When she did not answer and walked away, he
followed her, threatening her and yelling at her. Father had threatened to “kick her a‑‑â€
more than once. He had never hit her or
the children, however. He broke her
window and kicked her car door before.
She had been trying to arrange a way to exchange the children without
seeing him; for example, father might pick them up from school on Friday and
return them to school on Monday. She
thought that if father did not see her, he might not yell as much. Father refused these requests and insisted
mother be present at the exchange.
Father said
he did not agree with mother’s choice in men, and they therefore argue. He felt he had the right to yell if he did
not agree with mother. He said mother
refused his visits and did not follow the court order. He knew the children got upset over his
yelling. He wanted to be part of the
children’s therapy “to talk about the mother’s part in this problem.†At the same time, father became upset when
the social worker requested that he attend a team decisionmaking meeting. He said he would not agree to services, he
was a good father, his family did not want DCFS’s help, and he did not want his
children attending counseling. Father
yelled at the social worker and would not calm down.
D.F. and
L.F. told the social worker that they wanted to take a break from visits with
father until father got help for his anger.
Every time their parents saw each other, father yelled at mother and
threatened her, no matter where they were.
Father also used to break things.
D.F. and L.F. had nightmares from father’s yelling and said they were
scared for mother’s safety during the visit exchanges. D.F. sometimes had “accidents†because he got
so scared. Father was angry because
mother had a new boyfriend; father told mother he would “cut his head off†or
“rip his head off†if mother kept seeing him.
During visits, father did not yell at or hit D.F. and L.F.
The
children’s babysitter reported that father had always been aggressive and a
“bully†and has “harassed†mother and “terrorized†the children for years. She obtained a restraining order against
father in 2007 because he would show up at the daycare and threaten her. Father had yelled and caused a scene at the
family’s church, the school, the daycare, and the police department. She reported that, over the past year, D.F. began
to wet himself because he was anxious over father’s behavior. The day after the children visits with
father, they seemed depressed and sad. A
second babysitter reported that she had heard father threaten to kill mother or
others in front of the children. She was
fearful father would hurt himself or the children to seek revenge on
mother. She thought he was unpredictable
and explosive.
A
psychologist who evaluated the children, Dr. Charles Barr, found that they had
been exposed to father’s rage numerous times and they were very frightened by
it. Dr. Barr felt that further exposure
to father’s behavior would further traumatize them and increase the likelihood
of dysfunction later in their lives. Dr.
Barr felt that their visits with father were doing more harm than good and
should be cancelled until father received treatment for his anger, or at the
least, visits should be monitored.
DCFS filed
a petition on March 30, 2011,
alleging that father’s behavior endangered the children and placed them at risk
of physical and emotional harm under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b), and (c).
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] The court found a prima facie case for
detaining the children from father. The
children were to remain with mother at a confidential address. The court ordered monitored visits for
father.
In the
jurisdiction/disposition report, mother related a number of incidents in the
past when father became extremely angry.
In 2002, D.F. was born premature and was in the hospital for three
months. Security had to escort father
out of the hospital several times during that period because of his violent
behavior towards nurses. In 2005, when
mother was out of town, father showed up at her home and forcefully took the
children from their babysitter after yelling at and threatening her. Mother heard the incident over the phone as
it took place. In 2007, father picked up
the children for his visit and then followed mother to a church event. He followed her around the event, yelling at
her and anyone who was talking to her.
Eventually, a church friend of mother’s interceded and was able to
convince father to leave. Father left
the children with mother. He sped out of
the church parking lot and almost hit children walking through the lot. The whole scene lasted approximately an
hour. In 2008, father came to mother’s
home in the middle of the night obviously intoxicated. He broke the gate to her courtyard entry way
and kicked in the front door when mother would not let him in. The noise woke up D.F. Mother called 911, and father left when he
realized she had the police on the phone.
In 2009, as mother and the children were coming home from a church
retreat in the mountains, father called and was angry because he could not
reach them all weekend while they were at the retreat. He was yelling and said he was heading for
mother’s house. Mother took the children
to a park instead of going home. When
she eventually returned home after a few hours at the park, she found the gate
to her courtyard broken, her garage trashed, and a tree torn down in the
courtyard. Mother moved in 2009 and did
not tell father her new address because he would repeatedly threaten to show up
at all hours of the night, and several times she hurriedly packed the children
up and fled in the middle of the night.
In 2010,
mother took the children to Disneyland with some family
and friends, including a male friend.
Father became angry when he heard her male friend went, and he told
mother he was going to kill any men she had around the children. A few days later, father phoned the male
friend at work and threatened to kill him.
On Christmas Eve in 2010, when father called to speak to the children,
he became angry when he heard people in the background. He told the children to put mother on the
phone and proceeded to yell at her. She
hung up and he kept calling back. The
next day when they met to exchange the children, father tried to explain his
behavior and grew angry again. Mother
tried to drive away, and father kicked her car, hit the driver’s side window
with his elbow, and hit the driver’s side mirror and knocked it off. The children were in father’s car and
witnessed all of this. They were crying
and screaming.
D.F. told
DCFS that father was a very angry person who yells at people all the time. He described one incident when father yelled
at a grocery store cashier in front of the children and caused a scene. D.F. said he and L.F. were “afraid and
embarrassed.†He said father thought he
had reasons for yelling, but they usually made no sense to D.F., and he was
afraid of father. He also reported the
incident when father got angry and kicked down mother’s door. He always felt worried and, in particular, he
was sometimes worried that father would hurt someone or hit and damage mother’s
car again. He said he sometimes wet
himself because of his worry and because he was afraid of father, and he ground
his teeth. Mother reported that D.F.
also had “number two†accidents during the day.
L.F. said she still had nightmares and was very anxious when she thought
about father, and she also ground her teeth.
Every time she saw father, she was scared.
DCFS’s
report noted that father had a criminal history, including convictions for
carrying a loaded firearm in a public place in 1995, disorderly conduct and
soliciting a lewd act in 1999, and vandalism in 2008. Father denied that he was violent or had a
problem with anger and he became upset with mother only when she disobeyed the
court order for visitation and did not bring the children for their visits. He felt that he was the victim in that mother
had decided to exclude him from the family.
During one visit monitored by DCFS, father became angry when the
children told him they were going on vacation with mother and her male friend. Father raised his voice and began ranting to
the monitor about it. The children
became upset. It took father
approximately 10 minutes to calm down.
During another visit, father became upset with the monitor when the two
were talking about the case, and he began yelling at her in front of the
children and other people at the park.
There were school supplies on the table father had brought for the
children, and he swept all the supplies off the table and onto the ground in
his anger. The monitor was forced to end
the visit early. Father cursed at the
monitor and made comments about her work ethic.
The monitor told father that she would no longer monitor visits for
him. There had been several previous
occasions when he had become very upset with her on the phone and yelled at her
to the point that she felt physically ill.
At the
adjudication hearing on October 27, 2011, both children testified in
chambers. During D.F.’s testimony, the
court was advised by staff that father was “in and out of his seat, stomping
around, [and] asking to talk to his attorney.â€
The court told father that he needed to remain in his seat and be silent
during the proceedings, and once the attorneys were finished questioning D.F.,
the court would send his attorney out to speak with him. Father “stomped out of the courtroom†after
that.
The court
sustained the petition and declared the children dependents of the court. The sustained allegations under section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b), read as follows:
“The children, [D.F.] and [L.F.]’s father, Donavon [sic] F[.], has a history of engaging in violent verbal
altercations and causing physical damage to property in the children’s
presence. On a prior occasion, the
father vandalized the mother’s car, breaking the car’s mirror. On a prior occasion, the father broke the
children’s home’s door down while the children were at home. On prior occasions, the father has repeatedly
threatened to hurt the mother and the children in the children’s presence. The children are afraid of the father due to
the father’s conduct towards the children’s mother. Such violent conduct on the part of the
father against the mother endangers the children’s physical health and safety
and places the children at risk of physical harm, and danger.†The sustained allegations under section 300,
subdivision (c), read as follows: “The
children [D.F. and L.F.]’s father, Donavon [sic]
F[.] emotionally abused the child[ren] by engaging in loud verbal altercations
and physically damaging property with the children’s [mother] in the
child[ren]’s presence. On prior
occasions, the father has threatened to kill the mother in the child[ren]’s
presence. The father’s conduct towards
the mother resulted in the child[ren] exhibiting [e]ncopresis [or nightmares],
anxiety, [and] Bruxism (clenching/grinding of teeth). Such emotional abuse of the child[ren] on the
part of the father places the child[ren] at substantial risk of suffering
serious emotional damage as evidenced by anxiety and sadness.â€
The court
ordered father to participate in a domestic violence program that included
anger management as well as individual
therapy with a licensed therapist.
It ordered monitored visits for father in the DCFS office upon
verification that he was attending an anger management program. The court set a six-month review hearing for
April 26, 2012.
In the
status report for the six-month review hearing, DCFS noted that the children
had attended therapy since May 2011.
Their therapist reported in October 2011 that they were being treated
for symptoms of adjustment disorder with anxiety. Both children expressed a desire in
discontinuing visits with father while he exhibited anger management
problems. They both expressed fear and
concern about being in father’s presence.
They had been meeting with their therapist on a weekly basis and were
making progress towards set goals.
Mother reported that the children exhibited unusual behavior leading up
to visits with father, including arguing and being unable to sleep. Mother had started telling the children about
visits on the day of the visits so that they would not experience these
behaviors. When they returned from
visits with father, the children were quiet and did not want to talk about
visits. The children were reportedly
experiencing relief from their symptoms due to the sporadic nature of their
visits with father. The children stopped
therapy in December 2011.
Father had
participated in 14 classes for anger management and was completing his assigned
homework. Father’s progress report noted
that father’s participation was satisfactory.
The facilitator reported that he was receptive and highly focused during
the sessions. The progress report
contained a checkbox for “no further participation recommended,†and one for
“continued participation recommended.â€
Neither box was checked.
Father had
three visits with the children since the adjudication hearing. The first was monitored by maternal
grandfather and no negative incidents were reported. The children said they had a great time. The second was monitored by the children’s
adult half sister. She reported father
was appropriate and the children had a good time.
Mother was
ready for the case to be closed and for the children to continue to have
monitored visits with father. The
children were happy therapy was over because they thought it was “boring.†L.F. stated she would like to have more
visits with father “when she wants to.â€
D.F. stated he likes to visit with father. DCFS felt that the risk of abuse or neglect
was still high if the children were to reunify with father because he was only
in partial compliance with the case plan -- he had not completed a domestic
violence program, he had not started individual therapy with a licensed
therapist, and he only was in partial compliance with his anger management
program. DCFS initially recommended that
family reunification services for father continue for another six months. It changed its recommendation to a
termination of family reunification services for father and a termination of
court jurisdiction, with a family law order granting sole legal and physical
custody to mother and monitored visitation for father until he could prove to a
family law court that he had completed pending court ordered programs. DCFS changed its recommendation because of
father’s minimal participation and visitation efforts since the October 2011
adjudication hearing. DCFS recommended
that visitation occur once a week for two hours in a neutral setting.
At the
review hearing, father requested a contested hearing on the exit order, given
DCFS’s recommendation. Father wanted to
have twice monthly, unmonitored overnight visits. The court set the contested review hearing
for June 1, 2012. Before the contested
hearing, father and the children had one more monitored visit that went
well. Father testified at the contested
hearing that his anger management class was one-on-one, and he had learned,
“Even if you’re right, there still needs to be some form of control.†He further stated: “As far as arguing in front of the kids, that
is never good . . . .
As I stated, I’m passionate with my children. But as I stated, in anger management class I
learned that even though I’m right and should want to talk to my kids all week
and every night and every day, I don’t have a right to get angry and argue in
front of my children and create that kind of environment. So, on that case, I was wrong and know that
just can’t happen.†Father felt “there
[was] no need to apply†what he had learned in his class during his visits with
the children. Father stopped after the
14th class and felt that he had gone “way past†what the court had asked of
him. He stopped because even before he
started counseling, he knew his behavior was not a good thing. He said, “I don’t need a stranger to tell me
arguing with their mother in front of the children is a bad thing. I don’t think any intelligent person needs a
therapist to explain that would not be good for their children. But as I stated, I found it to be useful and
got a lot out of it and just continued on.â€
The court
terminated jurisdiction. The court found
that father had not verified he made substantial progress in addressing the
issue that brought the children before the court. It noted that 14 sessions of his anger
management program was clearly “good,†but at the same time, father thought he
did not need anyone to tell him that arguing with mother was not a good
thing. The court felt the most
significant evidence was the facilitator’s progress report, which said father’s
progress was satisfactory, but it did not check the box for “no further
participation recommended.†It also felt
it was significant there was no narrative of father’s progress from the
facilitator.
The court
granted full legal and physical custody to mother. It ordered that father should have monitored
visits at least once a week. It
specifically noted that it was not placing a limit on the number of visits,
only setting a minimum number. The court
also noted that maternal grandfather and adult half sister, both of whom had
previously monitored, were approved monitors.
Because both of them were not readily available, the court ordered that
mother and father could mutually agree on any other monitor. Mother suggested two paternal relatives who
resided in Los Angeles County to be monitors.
If the parents could not agree on a monitor, the court ordered a
professional monitor to be used. The
parents would share the cost of a professional monitor once a month, and any
further private monitoring for the month was to be funded solely by father.
As the
court was making its findings, father had an outburst, stating, “You’ll all be
happy if I just move back east,†and “You want to keep my kids, keep them. I’m a good father. Only reason I’m here is you all fighting
against me to see my own kids. [¶] . . . Keep them. Bullsh‑‑.†The court asked father to step out, which he
did with the assistance of the courtroom deputies. Father filed a timely
discussion
Monitored Visits
Father argues
that the court was wrong to require monitoring altogether. He contends monitoring was unnecessary. We do not agree the court erred.
“‘When a
juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a dependent child, it is
empowered to make ‘exit orders’ regarding custody and visitation. [Citations.]
Such orders become part of any family court proceeding concerning the
same child and will remain in effect until they are terminated or modified by
the family court. [Citation.]’†(In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th
796, 799; see also § 362.4.)
“‘[T]he juvenile court, which has been intimately involved in the
protection of the child, is best situated to make custody determinations based
on the best interests of the child without any preferences or
presumptions.’†(In re
Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 206.)
We review a
juvenile court’s decision to terminate dependency jurisdiction and issue an
exit order for abuse of discretion and may not disturb the order unless the
court made an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (Bridget A.
v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 300.) We also review the juvenile court’s
visitation orders for abuse of discretion.
(In re Julie M. (1999) 69
Cal.App.4th 41, 48.) We “‘must consider
all the evidence, draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all evidentiary
conflicts, in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.]
The precise test is whether any rational trier of fact could conclude
that the trial court order advanced the best interests of the child.’†(In re Robert L. (1993) 21
Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.) Father contends
the court based its order for supervised visits on the implied factual finding
that unsupervised visits would subject the children to a risk of harm, and we
should therefore apply the substantial evidence standard of review appropriate
for factual findings. Regardless of
which standard we apply, we hold that the court did not err.
Father had
a long history of angry outbursts.
Mother detailed incidents dating back to 2002, when D.F. was born. These outburst always included yelling at
others, usually mother, and sometimes included destruction of property. These outbursts often occurred in front of
the children, who had grown afraid of him and evidenced symptoms of anxiety by
the time DCFS filed the petition in this matter. Even after the court detained the children
based on father’s behavior, he continued to have outbursts during his monitored
visits with them. One such outburst
directed at his monitor led her to declare that she would no longer monitor
visits for him. Father also had an
outburst in court during the adjudication hearing. Still, father asserts that because he attended
14 sessions of anger management and had four incident-free, monitored visits in
six months, and because the children enjoyed their visits and showed no more
symptoms of anxiety by June 2012, the court erred in ordering monitored visits. But as the court noted, there was very little
information from his anger management facilitator, other than his communication
that father’s participation was satisfactory.
The facilitator did not include a narrative on father’s progress and did
not indicate whether father needed to continue in his anger management
program. Moreover, father’s testimony
about what he learned in anger management was not entirely positive. Father learned that even when he was “right,†he needed to control his anger. But he also said he did not need a “strangerâ€
to tell him arguing in front of the children was bad, suggesting that he did
not believe he needed anger management assistance. Further, he did not feel he needed to apply
what he learned in his visits with the children. This was manifestly not the case, as there
were numerous instances when he became angry with mother or others in front of
the children. And, if there was any
doubt about whether father had come to grips with his anger management problem,
that was dispelled when he ended the contested review hearing by cursing at the
court and being escorted out of the courtroom.
Father also
contends that the order for supervised visits was an abuse of discretion
because it was not a rational way of addressing “the negative effects of a
contentious custody dispute.†We
disagree. Father’s notion that this
matter amounts to nothing more than a “contentious custody dispute†is
insupportable. The evidence showed not
just that he argued with mother about visitation, but that he has a much
broader problem with anger. First, even
with mother, he was angry not about visitation alone. His anger often related to mother’s male
friends or the children being around her male friends. He told mother he would cut off the head of
any man she was seeing. The children
knew of this threat. He became angry
when the children went to Disneyland and were going on vacation with her
friend. Regarding the vacation in
particular, he found out about the trip from the children and became angry
about it during their visit. Second, his
anger was not always directed at mother.
He caused a scene at the grocery store by yelling at a cashier in front
of the children. He yelled at the police
officer who attempted to intervene at one custody exchange. He yelled at the children’s babysitter, who
obtained a restraining order against him.
Having a monitor plainly addresses father’s anger. The monitor eliminates the need for the parents
to have contact in exchanging the children, thereby eliminating the risk that
father will become angry with mother in front of the children. Additionally, the monitor may ensure that
father does not question the children about mother’s love life or other topics
that set him off, and when he does by chance become angry, the monitor may help
diffuse the situation, as she did when father found out about the
vacation. Further, the monitor is there
to observe and report on father’s interactions with the children and his
progress, which may ultimately be to father’s benefit if the visit goes
positively.
“[T]here
are situations in which a juvenile court may reasonably determine that
continued supervision of the minor as a dependent child is not necessary for
the child’s protection, and at the same time conclude that conditions on visitation
are necessary to minimize, if not eliminate, the danger that visits might
subject the minor to the same risk of physical abuse or emotional harm that
previously led to the dependency adjudication.â€
(In re Chantal S., supra,
13 Cal.4th at p. 204.) In such
situations, section 362.4 authorizes the juvenile court to issue appropriate
orders regarding visitation. (
This is one of those situations.
Sufficient evidence supported the court’s determination that, at that
time, unmonitored visits were not in the best interests of the children, and
therefore the court’s determination also was not an abuse of discretion. Father is free to file appropriate papers
before the family law court when he has sufficient evidence that he has
completed an anger management program, including individual therapy, as the
juvenile court ordered. (In re
John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 973; In re Roger S.
(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 25, 30 [§ 362.4 authorizes court to make visitation
orders that will be transferred to a family court file and remain in effect
until modified or terminated by that court].)
Weekly Visits by Requiring Monitoring
Father
contends that the court abused its discretion because no rational court would
make an order for weekly visits and then impose a monitoring requirement that
“almost certainly†made weekly visits impossible. Father argues this was so because the two
pre-approved monitors, maternal grandfather and an adult half sister, were not
available consistently, and father could not afford a private monitor. We disagree with father’s premise that the
monitoring requirement somehow undermined the order for weekly visits.
Father
would have us believe that the court ordered only two options ‑‑
one of the pre-approved monitors, or a private monitor. But that was not the case. The court recognized the two pre-approved
monitors might not be available. For
that reason, it ordered that mother and father could also mutually agree on any
other monitor. This person did not have
to be a private monitor, and mother even suggested two of father’s relatives
who lived in the county. There was no
evidence mother would fail to consent to monitors other than her two
relatives. Far from undermining its
order for weekly visits, the court was attempting to make weekly visits
possible. It did not abuse its
discretion.
a Minimum Duration for Visits
Father lastly
contends that the court should have specified a minimum duration for his
visits, and in not doing so, it has allowed mother to effectively veto any
meaningful visitation. We disagree.
“The
juvenile court has the sole power to determine whether visitation will occur
and may not delegate its power to grant or deny
visitation . . . .
The court may, however, delegate discretion to determine the time, place
and manner of the visits. Only when the
court delegates the discretion to determine whether any visitation will occur
does the court improperly delegate its
authority . . . .†(In
re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008-1009.)
The court’s
order does not run afoul of these principles.
The court ordered that visits should occur weekly. It did not abdicate its authority to
determine whether any visitation should occur at all. Moreover, even though the court could have
delegated the “time, place and manner of the visits,†on its face, the order
did not delegate authority to mother to determine the duration of visits. By saying nothing about the issue, the court
impliedly left the issue to both
parents. There is no basis in the order
for mother to assert that she may unilaterally determine the duration of
visits.
Father
relies on In re T.H. (2010) 190
Cal.App.4th 1119. That case is
distinguishable. The mother in that case
objected to the father having any visitation at all. (Id.
at p. 1123.) The exit order
provided for supervised visitation, “but only upon the ‘agreement of the
parents.’†(Ibid.) The court of appeal
reversed the visitation order, noting that “[a]s the custodial parent of the
children, mother could conceivably agree to only one visit a year or less
without violating the letter of the court’s order. This is more than simply a delegation of the
authority to set the ‘time, place and manner’ of the visitation ‑‑
it effectively delegates to mother the power to determine whether visitation
will occur at all.†(
Mother here has never objected to father having visitation altogether
and has instead consistently provided for visitation, even when she felt
terrorized by father. More importantly,
the order here did not permit mother to withhold her consent to visits in the
manner of the In re T.H. order. The court did not abuse its discretion.
disposition
The order is affirmed.
FLIER,
J.
WE CONCUR:
RUBIN, Acting P. J.
GRIMES, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All
further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
