Filed 3/12/18 In re D.M. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



In re D.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

P.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.


E069146

(Super.Ct.No. RIJ1501239)

O P I N I O N


APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Harry (Skip) A. Staley, Judge. (Retired judge of the Kern Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Richard L. Knight, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, and James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman, and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant, P.M. (mother), challenges the court’s orders (1) refusing to return her daughter, D.M., to her care or reinstate reunification services, and (2) terminating her parental rights over D.M. Mother contends the court erred in denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 because she showed a change of circumstances, and that a return to her care or renewed reunification services promoted D.M.’s best interests. Alternatively, mother argues, the court should have applied the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption. We reject both challenges and affirm the orders.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
A. Detention
In October 2015, two-month-old D.M. came to the attention of plaintiff and respondent, Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS), when mother was arrested for elder abuse and child endangerment. Mother and maternal grandmother had an argument during which mother screamed, threw things, kicked the wall, slammed doors, and struck maternal grandmother on her upper arm with a closed fist. Maternal grandmother was holding D.M. when mother struck her, and she almost dropped D.M. Mother also threatened to “‘throw [D.M.] at the wall’” if maternal grandmother called law enforcement, and when the officer arrived, maternal grandmother did not answer the officer’s knock because mother was holding her back. Mother told maternal grandmother she would “‘come back and kill’” her if she answered the door. The apartment manager gave the responding officer access to the apartment. The officer described maternal grandmother as crying and fearful; she had some redness and swelling on her upper arm but refused medical attention. Maternal grandmother said mother was “out of control.” Mother appeared to be angry and agitated.
Mother had been living with maternal grandmother for the last few months. They had another fight the week before during which mother threw a shoe and her phone, hitting maternal grandmother in the head with the shoe. Maternal grandmother reported that mother is bipolar and schizophrenic and had not taken her medication in three or four years. Mother had been placed on a “5150 hold” multiple times, and maternal grandmother believed she had used methamphetamine and heroin. Mother told maternal grandmother on a daily basis that she hated her and wished she would die, and she threatened to kill her. Mother had been “so stressed out” since D.M.’s birth. She could not handle D.M.’s crying and did not interact much with the baby, and maternal grandmother had to tell her when to feed D.M.
Mother had her own history as a minor in the dependency system. In 2002, the juvenile court had declared 14-year-old mother a juvenile dependent. Mother had been receiving treatment at a psychiatric hospital and she was due for discharge, but maternal grandmother refused to pick her up. Maternal grandmother reportedly feared for her life because mother had threatened her or become violent with her on multiple occasions, and maternal grandmother did not feel capable of caring for mother. Maternal grandmother waived reunification services. After the court terminated maternal grandfather’s reunification services, it established a planned permanent living arrangement for mother. The court terminated dependency jurisdiction when mother was 17 years old (in 2005) and declared her a ward of the juvenile court under section 602. The wardship was based on mother’s assault of another minor in her group home; the victim required 14 stitches on her head and six staples on her neck after mother cut her with glass. The court committed mother to the California Youth Authority.
Mother denied being bipolar or schizophrenic and said she had last been placed on a section 5150 hold in 2009 and had last used drugs in 2009. She also denied striking maternal grandmother and threatening to kill her. Besides the charges for elder abuse and child endangerment, mother also had warrants out of San Bernardino County in 2014 for possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of a controlled substance.
DPSS filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), alleging mother had assaulted maternal grandmother while maternal grandmother was holding D.M.; mother had ongoing altercations with maternal grandmother in D.M.’s presence; mother had untreated mental health issues; and mother was incarcerated and unable to care for D.M. The court found a prima facie case for detaining D.M. from mother. DPSS placed D.M. with a foster family.
B. Jurisdiction/Disposition
DPSS looked further into mother’s history as a juvenile dependent. Her dependency records indicated that, as a juvenile, she had been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and as bipolar, and doctors had prescribed various psychotropic medications, including Lithium, Wellbutrin, and Depakote. She had cycled through at least 11 different group homes due to her escalating behavior. She had threatened and assaulted group home staff and peers, set fires, made suicidal threats, destroyed property, and refused to take her prescribed psychotropic medications. The records also detailed mother’s multiple psychiatric holds.
Mother reported that a doctor told her she no longer needed psychotropic medications, and thus she no longer took them or saw a psychiatrist regularly. Mother said she had only experimented with methamphetamine once and had completed a court-ordered drug treatment program six months ago. She professed to love D.M. and wanted “‘to be there for her and take care of her.’” She thought there would have been no need for DPSS’s intervention if she had not been living with maternal grandmother. Maternal grandmother was extremely fearful of potential retaliation by mother and had obtained a restraining order against her.
In November 2015, the court found the allegations of the petition to be true and adjudged D.M. a dependent of the court. The court ordered reunification services for mother, including counseling, a psychological evaluation and evaluation for psychotropic medication, parenting and anger management classes, a substance abuse treatment program, and random drug testing. It also ordered weekly visitation and authorized DPSS to allow more.
C. Reunification Period
Mother was released from custody in March 2016, approximately three and a half months through the six-month review period. She had been convicted of child endangerment and elder abuse and was on formal probation. She was attending a 52-week domestic violence program as part of her probation terms.
Dr. Edward J. Ryan conducted mother’s psychological evaluation. She cooperated “only minimally” with the process. She used her phone a great deal during the evaluation, and she was very tense and evasive. The doctor questioned the accuracy of her reporting. In terms of psychiatric hospitalizations, she said she had been hospitalized 10 or more times, but she denied any of those being section 5150 holds. She said her last hospitalization was one year ago for an evaluation of her medications, but at the same time, she claimed to have stopped taking medication at age 11 or 12. She also reported that the group homes in which she had lived did not provide therapy, which the doctor found difficult to believe because therapy is a typical component of group homes. She minimized her drug use—saying she had “‘tried’” drugs—and did not mention that she had relatively recent drug charges in San Bernardino County. Dr. Ryan concluded her insight and judgment were poor. She had difficulty setting boundaries and controlling her emotions, resulting in frustration and dysfunctional decisions. She tended to do the minimum required to “‘get by’” and was overwhelmed easily. She was guarded and did not trust people, probably as a result of her dysfunctional home and family life. She had not learned how to establish a support system and appeared to use aggression as a major coping mechanism. Given that she was denying her attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and bipolar diagnoses, and that she was not honest and forthcoming with her history, it was difficult for him “to make a differential diagnosis at the present time,” and “the prognosis of a medication regimen being accurate [was] remote.” Dr. Ryan felt mother presented a complicated case. He believed she had the cognitive ability to benefit from services but questioned whether she actually wanted to benefit, as opposed to “going through the motions of complying with services.” He was not optimistic she would benefit from services, and at the same time, he did not want to say she would not benefit. He recommended that the court place strict time limits on services and look for substantive proof of benefit in her actions and responsiveness.
Mother had started her outpatient substance abuse and parenting program, but she had missed two weeks because she went out of town to visit an ill relative. She tested positive for methamphetamine and did not tell the social worker, who found out from mother’s therapist in her program. The therapist said mother was in denial about her drug use and did not want the therapist to report the test to DPSS. Mother said she did not tell the social worker because she “did not want to get in trouble.” Mother asked the social worker not to request a progress report from her program, as she would “not have a good report.” The progress report indicated mother had tested positive for methamphetamine twice, had tested negative three times, and had refused to test twice. She had missed 11 sessions of the program. Mother’s “[p]arent [p]artner” in the program stopped working with her because she resisted any help the parent partner offered and verbally abused the parent partner on several occasions.
As to visitation, mother cancelled a visit for lack of transportation, and the foster parent cancelled two visits because D.M. was sick, but mother otherwise had supervised visits with D.M. twice per week for two hours. She was affectionate with D.M. and very happy to see her, but she sometimes struggled with D.M. and was rude and defensive when the foster parent tried to help. For instance, the foster parent instructed mother to support D.M. while she sat on the floor. Mother did not, and D.M. fell backwards, hit her head on the floor, and began to cry. When D.M. reached for the foster parent to console her, mother refused to give her to the foster parent and told the child to stop looking at the foster parent. In another case, D.M. choked on food and mother froze. The foster parent grabbed D.M. and removed the food from her mouth. D.M. was crying and obviously scared, but mother did not respond. Mother testified at the six-month review hearing that D.M. recognized her at visits; she would wave when she saw mother, reach for her, and say “mama.” Mother held and kissed D.M. and brought her snacks, toys, and clothes.
Mother claimed that what happened between her and maternal grandmother was a “misunderstanding.” The social worker opined that mother lacked insight into the issues necessitating dependency jurisdiction, and mother had never taken responsibility for assaulting maternal grandmother. After receiving the progress report from mother’s substance abuse and parenting program, DPSS recommended terminating reunification services.
D.M. had been with her foster family for approximately eight months by the time of the six-month review and was very bonded to the family. She was thriving and “a happy baby girl.”
In June 2016, at the six-month review hearing, the court terminated mother’s reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26. The court reduced mother’s visitation to one visit per month.
D. Mother’s Section 388 Petition and the Section 366.26 Hearing
In October 2016, the adult son and daughter-in-law of D.M.’s foster parents became her new foster parents. The new foster parents wanted to adopt D.M. The move had not caused D.M. stress because she had already bonded with the extended family of her former foster parents. She referred to her prospective adoptive parents as “mama and dada.” The former foster parents wanted to remain “grandparents” to D.M. and would continue to provide childcare on a daily basis.
Also in October 2016, mother filed a section 388 petition asking the court to vacate the section 366.26 hearing and return D.M. to her care with family maintenance services or, in the alternative, reinstate family reunification services. Mother had completed a parenting class, continued her outpatient substance abuse program, drug tested negative four times, attended 12-step meetings, attended anger management and individual counseling, and completed the “Rehabilitation Intervention Support and Education (RISE) Program.” At this point, mother had been in her substance abuse program since March 2016 and would complete it in November 2016. She had also found a job and housing. Mother had been visiting D.M. and continued to bring D.M. snacks and treats. She characterized their bond as strong. The foster parent reported the visits went well. The court ordered a hearing on mother’s petition.
The court continued the section 366.26 hearing a number of times. In the meantime, mother continued to visit D.M. monthly. The visits went well, except that the prospective adoptive parent could not leave the room, otherwise D.M. would become anxious and try to follow. Mother brought her fiancé to one visit. She was in a substance abuse aftercare program, but DPSS had no updated information about her mental health or any psychotropic medications.
In February 2017, mother’s aftercare program reported she had made “some progress toward lifestyle changes” and “may benefit” from continuing individual therapy on a weekly basis. She was scheduled to complete her aftercare treatment in June 2017.
In May 2017, DPSS spoke to mother’s therapist in her aftercare program. The program had discharged mother that month because she had stopped attending in April 2017. Additionally, the therapist said mother had “made little to no progress or change in behavior in the program.” Mother regressed to old behaviors, and when she did appear for the program, her attendance was inconsistent. The therapist believed mother “made no positive progress and she could not in good conscience recommend that her child be returned to her.”
D.M. was very happy and stable in the prospective adoptive parents’ home. She was strongly bonded to the family. She easily sought out the prospective adoptive parents and their two teen daughters when she needed something or simply wanted affection. The whole family loved her and considered her a daughter and sister. Their extended family members also considered D.M. to be part of the family.
In August 2017, the court held a combined hearing on mother’s section 388 petition and selection and implementation of a permanent plan. At this point, D.M. was nearly two years old. Mother testified about what she learned in her parenting classes and how she was able to apply those lessons somewhat during visits. She had been clean for 14 months by then. After she completed her substance abuse program, she attended the aftercare program for four months but stopped because of her work schedule. She felt she had a support system in her fiancé, her best friend, and maternal grandmother. She completed a six-month anger management program and had learned different coping skills instead of acting on her anger. She continued individual therapy after completing her program and was seeing her therapist once a month. She was also seeing a psychiatrist. She had been working full time at Primerica for five months and was in the process of becoming a licensed life insurance agent. She also had stable housing with her fiancé, who was unemployed but received disability benefits. She believed she had a bond with D.M., who called her “mommy” at visits. She and D.M. would exchange hugs, and D.M. would sometimes kiss her as well. Mother brought snacks and gifts for D.M., and they played with toys and took pictures.
The court denied mother’s section 388 petition. It saw “progress and arguably positive changes on the issue of substance abuse,” but it did “not see significant changes to the point of finding a change of circumstances for purposes of the [section] 388 hearing.” Additionally, it observed the evidence was “somewhat inconsistent” on the “mental health issues.” The court noted the concerns of mother’s therapist that she was regressing to old behaviors and had attended the aftercare program inconsistently. The court explained: “[W]hen you have someone who has significant mental health issues as she did, that person is coming into court on their own to address the Court and indicating that they are dealing with those issues successfully is not necessarily the most convincing evidence that the Court would hope to have.” The court further found it was not in D.M.’s best interests to resume mother’s services; D.M. was in a stable environment with a stable future.
As to selecting and implementing a permanent plan, mother asked the court not to terminate parental rights and instead apply the beneficial parental relationship exception. The court concluded mother undoubtedly loved D.M. and felt attached to her, but that “parent/child bond and relationship . . . clearly [did] not outweigh the benefits of permanency that come with adoption.” The court terminated parental rights and found D.M. adoptable.
III. DISCUSSION
Mother contends the court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition and erred in finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply. We disagree on both counts.
A. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the Section 388 Petition
Section 388 permits the court to modify an order if the parent shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) a “change of circumstance or new evidence,” and (2) the modification would promote the child’s best interests. (§ 388, subds. (a)(1), (d); In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 685.) When a parent files a petition after the court has terminated reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing, in determining the best interests of the child, the court must recognize the focus of the case has shifted from the parents’ interest in the care, custody, and companionship of the child to the needs of the child for permanency and stability. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527.) The child’s best interests “are not to further delay permanency and stability in favor of rewarding” the parent for his or her “hard work and efforts to reunify.” (In re J.C., supra, at p. 527.) “A petition which alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent, who has repeatedly failed to reunify with the child, might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child’s best interests.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.)
We review the court’s order denying the section 388 petition for abuse of discretion. (In re Amber M., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 685.) “‘“The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.”’” (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319.)
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s petition. When the court terminated mother’s reunification services, she was attending a substance abuse and parenting program, participating in a domestic violence program, and regularly having good visits with D.M. She was not consistently drug testing clean, however, and Dr. Ryan’s psychological evaluation of mother was cause for concern. He found her to be evasive and dishonest and was not optimistic that she would actually benefit from services, as opposed to merely going through the motions of complying with them. Later, mother’s evidence in support of her petition showed that she had completed several components of the case plan that she had started during the reunification period, and she continued to have good visits with D.M. She had also found a job and housing, and had drug tested clean for 14 months. But despite mother’s testimony about what she had learned in her programs and how she had benefitted from them, her therapist in the aftercare program had a different view. The therapist felt mother had progressed little or not at all, and she had regressed to old behaviors. The therapist “could not in good conscience recommend that her child be returned to her.” The therapist’s comments evoked Dr. Ryan’s earlier concerns that mother would merely go through the motions of services. The court found mother’s self-serving testimony on her progress lacking in credibility, noting: “[W]hen you have someone who has significant mental health issues as she did, that person is coming into court on their own to address the Court and indicating that they are dealing with those issues successfully is not necessarily the most convincing evidence that the Court would hope to have.” The court was entitled to reject mother’s testimony, and the evidence from the therapist suggested mother’s circumstances had not truly changed in terms of her mental health challenges. This weighing of credibility was the trial court’s province, and we may not reweigh credibility on appeal. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) In short, while mother was progressing particularly in the area of substance abuse, the court did not err in finding she had not shown changed circumstances overall.
Moreover, even assuming mother had shown changed circumstances, the court correctly concluded a renewal of mother’s reunification services or a return to mother’s care did not promote D.M.’s best interests. At the time of the court’s ruling, D.M. was nearly two years old and had lived with mother for only the first two months of her life. She had lived with the prospective adoptive parents for approximately 10 months, but they had been in her life since the beginning of this matter, because they were the son and daughter-in-law of her first set of foster parents. D.M. identified her prospective adoptive parents as “mama” and “dada” and was thriving in their care. During visits with mother, D.M. still became anxious when the prospective adoptive parents left, and D.M. looked to her foster parents for comfort when she was upset, not mother. The stability and permanency D.M. experienced in the prospective adoptive parents’ care promoted D.M.’s best interests, not further delaying that permanency and stability to reward mother for her belated efforts at reunification. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 49 [“[B]ecause the court had found [the mother]’s circumstances were changing, rather than changed, it was entitled to conclude that granting the parents’ requests for further reunification services or long-term foster care was not in Casey’s best interests given Casey’s strong and immediate need for stability.”].)
In concluding the court erred, mother relies on several factors set forth in In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 532. In re Kimberly F. identified a nonexhaustive list of factors for evaluating a section 388 petition, including: “(1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been.” (Ibid.) But the same court that decided In re Kimberly F. later declined to apply these factors, because they did not account for our Supreme Court’s analysis shifting the focus of the case to the dependent child’s need for permanency and stability, after the court has terminated reunification services. (In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.) “As stated by one treatise, ‘In such circumstances, the approach of the court in the case of . . . Kimberly F. . . . may not be appropriate since it fails to give full consideration to this shift in focus.’” (Ibid., quoting Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2014) § 2.140[5], p. 2-473.) Accordingly, we find mother’s analysis, which similarly fails to fully consider the shift in focus, unpersuasive.
In sum, “[t]he denial of a section 388 motion rarely merits reversal as an abuse of discretion.” (In re Amber M., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 685-686.) This is not one of those rare cases meriting reversal.
B. The Court Did Not Err in Concluding the Beneficial Parent-child Relationship Exception Did Not Apply
The Legislature has designated adoption as the preferred permanent plan when possible. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) If the court finds a dependent child likely to be adopted, it must terminate parental rights and select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds one of several exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re L.Y.L., supra, at p. 947.) “[I]t is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
The beneficial parent-child relationship exception requires the court to find “a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child” because the parent has “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) “[T]he court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
“Parent-child relationships do not necessarily conform to a particular pattern. The juvenile court should be concerned not with finding a certain type of parental relationship but with the interests of the particular child or children before it, and whether there is a compelling reason not to terminate parental rights.” (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) But “a parental relationship is necessary for the exception to apply, not merely a friendly or familiar one. [Citations.] ‘While friendships are important, a child needs at least one parent. Where a biological parent . . . is incapable of functioning in that role, the child should be given every opportunity to bond with an individual who will assume the role of a parent.’ [Citation.] Thus, a child should not be deprived of an adoptive parent when the natural parent has maintained a relationship that may be beneficial to some degree but does not meet the child’s need for a parent.” (Ibid.)
Courts must examine the exception on a case-by-case basis and consider the myriad of variables affecting the parent-child bond, including “[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs . . . .” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) “The juvenile court may reject the parent’s claim simply by finding that the relationship maintained during visitation does not benefit the child significantly enough to outweigh the strong preference for adoption.” (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.)
The parent bears the burden of showing the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies. (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297.) We review the court’s determination on whether a beneficial parent-child relationship exists for substantial evidence. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314.) We review for abuse of discretion the court’s determination on whether the relationship provides a compelling reason for finding termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (Id. at p. 1315.)
Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the parent-child relationship was not a compelling reason to forgo adoption. Mother has not demonstrated “that severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive” D.M. “of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed.” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466.) It is true mother maintained regular visitation and contact with D.M., and mother and D.M. enjoyed a positive and affectionate relationship. But this relationship was established entirely though supervised twice-weekly and then monthly visits. There was no evidence that D.M. experienced distress at separating from mother at the end of visits. At best, the emotional attachment between mother and D.M. was that of a “‘friendly visitor’” or “loving adult” with a child, rather than that of parent and child. (In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1316; In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 468.) D.M. was two months old when she was removed from mother’s care and was approximately two years old when the court selected adoption as her permanent plan. She had thus been in foster care almost all her life. In contrast to mother’s friendly relationship with D.M., the prospective adoptive parents were D.M.’s de facto parents, on whom she relied for “physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) It “make[s] no sense to forgo adoption in order to preserve parental rights in the absence of a real parental relationship.” (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) Ample evidence supported the court’s determination that mother’s loving attachment to D.M. did “not outweigh the benefits of permanency that come with adoption.”
IV. DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS
J.


We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

McKINSTER
J.