Filed 5/11/17 In re E.C. CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re E.C., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES
AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
G054356
(Super. Ct. No. 16DP1000)
O P I N I O N
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Caryl Lee,
Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Diana W. Prince, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
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Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Auerlio Torre,
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for Minor.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
We affirm the juvenile court’s order asserting jurisdiction over E.C. (the
minor), now one year old. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings
that there was a substantial risk the minor would suffer serious physical harm or illness as
a result of the inability of her mother, A.C. (mother), to care for the minor, and that
mother had left the minor without care or support. Although mother left the minor in the
care of an unrelated adult, that adult’s unwillingness to cooperate with the social services
agency, and later refusal to be considered as a caregiver for the minor due to her own
health problems, support the juvenile court’s findings.
This case presents the unfortunate situation where mother herself is
currently a dependent child of the Los Angeles County Juvenile Court. She is struggling
to resolve her own emotional problems while raising a newborn. We commend mother
for attempting to find a caretaker for the minor when mother felt unable to provide for
her, and we encourage mother to fully utilize the services offered by both the Los
Angeles County and Orange County social services agencies in order to reunite with the
minor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mother was declared a dependent child of the Los Angeles County Juvenile
Court in April 2010; the minor’s maternal grandmother’s then-boyfriend had physically
and sexually abused mother. Jurisdiction was terminated and mother was released into
the custody and care of the maternal grandmother, who was ordered not to allow any
contact between her boyfriend and mother. The juvenile court again exercised its
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jurisdiction over mother a few months later when the maternal grandmother allowed her
then-boyfriend to have contact with mother, which resulted in further sexual abuse.
Mother was later subjected to a psychiatric hold, had behavioral problems, attempted to
commit suicide, abused alcohol and drugs, and made multiple attempts at running away.
A few months before the minor’s birth, mother was placed at a shelter in Orange County.
When the minor was five months of age, L.G., the mother of the maternal
grandmother’s current boyfriend, M.M., was allowed to take the minor from the shelter
for an extended visit. As soon as L.G. left with the minor, mother left the shelter and
failed to return. L.G. returned the minor to the shelter several days later. Because the
minor could not stay at the shelter without mother, the Orange County Social Services
Agency (SSA) took the minor into protective custody.1
SSA filed a juvenile dependency petition, alleging the minor came within
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.) The juvenile court detained the minor; she was placed in foster care.
The minor’s alleged father was unaware of mother’s whereabouts, and was
not able to care for the minor; he also questioned his paternity, and had not sought

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Mother contends that SSA forced L.G. to return the minor to the shelter.
As is relevant to this issue, SSA’s reports stated: (1) “[T]he child was due to return to
[the] Shelter on Monday, September 5, 2016. The child’s family members returned the
child to [the] Shelter on September 7, 2016”; (2) the lead social worker at the shelter
“stated the child was brought back to the shelter today by the maternal family. The
mother has been AWOL’ed since Sunday 9/4/16. She reported the child cannot stay at
the facility without the mother”; (3) the minor “was on a weekend pass with the maternal
grandmother’s boyfriend . . . and was taken back to the shelter on September 7, 2016, by
the child’s maternal family. The child is not allowed to stay at the shelter in her mother’s
absence”; (4) mother told the social worker that L.G. returned the minor to the shelter
because the social workers at the shelter told her to do so; and (5) in explaining why L.G.
and M.M. were not appropriate for placement of the minor, SSA noted they “were seen as
uncooperative with Social Services in returning the child after the mother went AWOL.”
The evidence does not support mother’s interpretation of what prompted L.G. and M.M.
to return the minor to the shelter.
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visitation with the minor.
2
The alleged father also had a history of substance abuse and
of criminal activity. Shortly before the jurisdiction hearing, the paternal grandmother
advised SSA that the alleged father was incarcerated; if he was released, he would likely
be placed under house arrest.
Mother told SSA, “she was willing to complete any and all services and
expressed that she was unsure . . . if she wanted to reunify with her child. She offered
that she needs time to get her life stabilized and preferred the baby be with family, until
she was ready to care for her.”
At the hearing, mother denied that she had abandoned the minor or failed to
make arrangements for the minor’s care. The day before the minor was returned to the
shelter, mother, L.G., and M.M. had all signed an appointment of short-term guardian
form. The appointment named L.G. and M.M. as the minor’s short-term guardians and
health care agents, effective immediately, and continuing until the appointment was
revoked in writing or as required by law, or if a permanent legal guardianship was
ordered. Mother claimed that L.G. and M.M. would have continued to care for the
minor, but the shelter insisted that they return the minor. Mother testified that she
intended that L.G. “get legal guardianship for my daughter until I get myself straight.”
Mother further testified that she and L.G. had discussed L.G. being the minor’s legal
guardian until mother turned 18 (at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, mother was not
yet 17). Mother believed L.G. and M.M. could provide a safe home for the minor
because they had looked out for mother and provided “advice and stuff like that” to her,
although she had never lived with them.
Before the jurisdiction hearing, a social worker contacted L.G. to inquire
about the minor being placed in her home. L.G. was “not happy” that all the adults living
in her home would have to be “Live-Scanned” before such a placement could occur.

2
The alleged father is not a party to this appeal, and will only be
mentioned as necessary for an understanding of the facts of the case.
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Several days later, when SSA contacted L.G. about the minor’s placement, L.G.
explained that she would be unable to accept placement of the minor due to L.G.’s health
problems.
Mother testified that she had been in drug treatment while living in the
shelter, and had stayed clean for about two weeks after leaving. Mother then started
using “crystal meth” and marijuana; she stopped crystal meth about two weeks before the
jurisdiction hearing, but had continued smoking marijuana. Mother had stopped taking
her antidepressant medication when she left the shelter, but was willing to take it again.
Mother admitted at the jurisdiction hearing that she was absent without
leave from placement in her own dependency matter in Los Angeles County, and that she
had violated the prohibition of unmonitored contact with the maternal grandmother.
Mother admitted that she was not currently able to care for the minor. She
wanted to give custody to L.G. “[b]ecause I feel she’s the right person for my daughter to
be with.” Mother testified that the maternal grandmother would also be an appropriate
caregiver for the minor.
After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations of the
petition, as amended, to be true by a preponderance of the evidence, and found that the
minor came within the court’s jurisdiction, pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and
(g). The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that it would be
detrimental to vest custody of the minor with mother. Reunification services were
ordered for mother, and a review hearing was set.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues the juvenile court erred in finding that the minor was within
its jurisdiction, pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). We review the
jurisdiction order to determine whether the findings were supported by substantial
evidence. (In re A.J. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1103.) “‘In making this
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determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the
findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are
the province of the trial court.’” (Ibid.) We conclude there was substantial evidence to
support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings.
I.
SECTION 300, SUBDIVISION (b)(1)
“A juvenile court may determine a child is subject to the court’s jurisdiction
[pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)] if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that ‘[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious
physical harm or illness,’ as a result of a parent’s failure or inability to adequately
supervise or protect the child, a parent’s failure to provide the child with adequate food,
clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or a parent’s inability to care for the child due to
the parents’ mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. [Citation.]”
(In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 829.)
Whether a minor comes within section 300, subdivision (b) requires proof
by a preponderance of the evidence “of three elements: (1) neglectful conduct by the
parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or
illness’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” (In re Rocco M.
(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.) “The third element ‘effectively requires a showing that
at the time of the jurisdiction hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical
harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will
reoccur). [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (In re David M., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 829.)
At the time of the jurisdiction hearing, mother admitted she was using
drugs, and was not receiving treatment for her mental and emotional problems. She
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further admitted she was not then capable of taking care of the minor. Absent anything
further, our analysis would end here.
Mother argues, however, that she had made appropriate arrangements for
the minor’s care. “‘A parent’s right to care, custody and management of a child is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the federal Constitution that will not be
disturbed except in extreme cases where a parent acts in a manner incompatible with
parenthood. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] . . . Thus, the constitutional right of parents to make
decisions regarding their children’s upbringing precludes the state from intervening, in
the absence of clear and convincing evidence of a need to protect the child from severe
neglect or physical abuse. [Citations.]” (In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684,
696.) A parent’s freedom to make decisions for his or her child generally allows the
parent to leave a child with other caretakers. “[T]he need to establish dependency has not
been shown merely because the custodial parent relies on the temporary custodial
assistance of suitable third parties. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 697.) “[T]he fact that a child
has been left with other caretakers will not warrant a finding of dependency if the child
receives good care.” (In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.)
The question thus becomes whether L.G. and M.M. were suitable third
parties to provide temporary custodial assistance. Clearly, at the time of the jurisdiction
hearing, L.G. was not a suitable caretaker, as she had refused to allow SSA to make
necessary safety checks on the adults living in her home, and had ultimately advised SSA
that she would not be able to take custody of the minor due to L.G.’s own health
problems.3
Placement of the minor with either L.G. or M.M. was problematic because
M.M. was the current boyfriend of the maternal grandmother. The maternal grandmother
was subject to an order limiting her contact with mother (due to the maternal

3
Mother argues that L.G. and M.M. would have continued to care for the
minor but for SSA’s interference. Mother fails to address the issue of L.G.’s health
problems.
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grandmother’s failure to protect mother from physical and sexual abuse at the hands of a
former boyfriend). The maternal grandmother’s history would put the minor at a
substantial risk of injury if they were in contact, and the maternal grandmother’s
relationship to L.G. and M.M. made such contact highly likely.
II.
SECTION 300, SUBDIVISION (g)
As relevant to this case, section 300, subdivision (g) provides: “The child
has been left without any provision for support . . . or a relative or other adult custodian
with whom the child resides or has been left is unwilling or unable to provide care or
support for the child, the whereabouts of the parent are unknown, and reasonable efforts
to locate the parent have been unsuccessful.”
“Whether a parent can arrange for care is to be determined as of the date of
the jurisdictional hearing.” (In re J.O. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 139, 153; see In re
Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1134 [“The basic question under section 300 is
whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of
harm.”].)
In this case, there is no question that mother could not arrange for the
minor’s care at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. Mother left the shelter at which she
and the minor had been living together, which caused that placement to be terminated.
The adult with whom mother had left the minor returned the minor to the shelter. Mother
admitted she was currently unable to care for the minor. L.G. had removed herself from
consideration as a caretaker. The alleged father had not established his paternity, and was
either incarcerated or had recently been released to house arrest at the time of the
jurisdiction hearing. And the maternal grandmother’s history of failing to prevent the
sexual and physical abuse of mother by the maternal grandmother’s then-boyfriend made
her an inappropriate caretaker for the minor.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
FYBEL, J.
WE CONCUR:
ARONSON, ACTING P. J.
IKOLA, J.