In re Elizabeth P.

Filed 10/25/06 In re Elizabeth P. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from an orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Lori Schroeder, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.

Michael A. Salazar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Cory, Assistant County Counsel, and O. Raquel Ramirez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________

Elissa P. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] petition without a hearing. In that petition, mother sought a home of parent order for her daughter, E.P., or, alternatively, reinstatement of family reunification services with liberalized visits. According to mother, she established a prima facie case and was entitled to a hearing. Mother also appeals from the juvenile court’s subsequent order terminating her parental rights to E.P pursuant to section 366.26. Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that the sibling exception to terminating parental rights did not apply.

We find no error and affirm.

FACTS

The minors

This dependency case involves three of mother’s children. E.P. was born in August 2000 and her brothers J.P. and M.P. were born, respectively, in February 1998 and November 2001. E.P., J.P. and M.P. (collectively minors) each have a different father.[2]

Background

Mother has a history of depression, self-mutilation and suicidal attempts and ideation. She was hospitalized in February 2002 due to her mental instability. In 2003, while pregnant with twins, mother said that she had the devil inside of her. She denied that she was referring to the twins.

While mother had custody of the minors, they all lived in the home of the minors’ maternal grandmother (grandmother) and maternal grandfather (grandfather). On numerous occasions, the home was found to be unsafe due to the presence of the following: trash, dangerous objects, clutter that blocked the walkways and created a fire hazard, poisonous chemicals within the reach of the minors, a strong odor of mold and mildew, and food that had been left out or not refrigerated. Mother often left the minors home alone unsupervised.

Mother, grandmother and grandfather were given the Westside Children’s Center Nest Program services, family preservation services, and Department of Children and Family Services (Department) voluntary family maintenance services. These services were terminated due to lack of compliance.

Detention and the section 300 petition

The minors were detained on September 11, 2003. The Department filed a section 300 petition on their behalf and alleged: Mother exhibited numerous mental and emotional problems. Those problems periodically interfered with her ability to provide regular care for the minors. On at least one occasion, mother left the minors home alone without adult supervision. Finally, the family home was filthy and unsanitary. Mother placed the minors at risk of harm.

At the detention hearing on September 16, 2003, the juvenile court found that the Department had made a prima facie case that the minors were persons described by section 300, subdivision (b).

The minors’ initial placement with their maternal uncle was unsuccessful. Eventually, at the end of 2003, E.P. was placed in the home of her paternal grandmother, Guadalupe S. (Guadalupe), and J.P. and M.P. were placed in foster care. The juvenile court ordered that sibling visits between the minors occur not less than three times per month.

Initial visitation and case plan compliance

In October and November 2003, the Department could not locate mother to discuss transportation funding, the juvenile court-ordered case plan, or the progress of mother’s juvenile court ordered psychological evaluation. Mother did not visit the minors, or communicate with them.

Mother’s psychological evaluation was completed on November 25, 2003. Dr. Suzanne M. Dupée, the psychiatrist, found some of mother’s thought processes unusual and difficult to understand. Dr. Dupée stated, “I have grave concerns about this mother’s ability to parent her three children and let alone her due to be born twins. She has shown poor judgment in the past and there has been a series of ongoing neglect.” Dr. Dupée concluded: “At the present time, I would highly recommend that the [minors] not be reunified with . . . mother and, in fact, that her twins should be removed from her custody, as there is a very high chance of neglect in the future. However, monitored visits with [the minors] should continue as her children most likely have an attachment to her. I would have grave reservations about unmonitored visits, as [mother] presents as a high flight risk and has shown herself to be very evasive with authorities in the past.”

Mother was ordered to participate in individual counseling and complete a parent education class. Due to E.P.’s and M.P.’s ages at the time the case was filed, mother was advised that she had only six months to complete her rehabilitation and counseling programs.

The February 23, 2004 hearing: The suitable placement order

At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that substantial danger existed to the minors, and that the only way to protect them was removal from mother. The juvenile court ordered that the minors be suitably placed.

The September 14, 2004 review hearing

In its status review report, the Department reported, inter alia: E.P.’s placement with Guadalupe was stable and happy. Guadalupe wanted to adopt E.P. if she was not returned to mother. Though mother was provided with referrals for counseling and parenting programs, there was no evidence that she completed any of the court ordered programs. Between December 2003 and March 2004, mother did not attend any of the scheduled bi-monthly monitored visits with the minors. From April 2004 to September 2004, mother managed approximately one visit a month. Mother and grandmother stated that they did not want counseling. After September 9, 2004, mother failed to provide the Department with updated information regarding her enrollment or participation in, or completion of, programs that she was required to complete pursuant to the case plan.

The Department recommended that the juvenile court terminate mother’s reunification services.

Mother filed a number of documents with the juvenile court on the day of the hearing. A letter from the Jeffrey Foundation indicated that mother had attended five counseling sessions between March 2, 2004, and April 13, 2004. Another letter from the Jeffrey Foundation indicated that mother had enrolled in and completed Level I of the Parent Education Workshop series from March 23 to May 18, 2004.

The juvenile court continued the matter to enable the Department to verify mother’s compliance with the case plan. In addition, the juvenile court ordered an updated report from mother’s therapist.

The February 7, 2005 review hearing: Termination of reunification services

At the hearing, the juvenile court received into evidence numerous documents pertaining to mother’s progress with the case plan, and heard testimony from the social worker and mother. According to the Department, mother completed only eight of the required 24 classes necessary to receive full credit for the parenting program at the Jeffrey Foundation. Further, it was noted that mother had completed only six individual counseling sessions with her therapist since her initial enrollment in September 2004.

Mother’s counsel argued that mother was not provided with reasonable reunification services by the Department because its services were not tailored to her special developmental needs. Based on that, mother’s counsel asked for six more months of reunification services.

Without making a finding as to whether mother had special developmental needs,[3] the juvenile court stated that even special needs parents are “not excused from the statutory requirement of a reunification plan.” The juvenile court noted that it was “not convinced at all that mother didn’t know what she was supposed to do.” Additionally, the juvenile court found that the Department provided “reasonable efforts at reunification and reasonable services in this case.” Mother’s reunification services were terminated.

The January 12, 2006 section 388 petition

Mother filed a section 388 petition as to all the minors. She sought to modify the juvenile court’s February 23, 2004, suitable placement order, and the February 7, 2005, orders terminating family reunification services with monitored visitation. Mother requested either a home-of-parent order with family preservation services, or, alternatively, the reinstatement of reunification services with liberalized visits.

For the hearing, the Department reported: Mother had been “fairly consistent” in visiting M.P and J.P weekly. According to Guadalupe, mother had not seen E.P. in more than a month. E.P. was on target developmentally and was not in any type of therapy or counseling. A prospective adoptive family had been found for J.P. and M.P.

The petition was denied.

The March 23, 2006 section 388 petition

Mother filed a second section 388 petition, once again seeking modification of the juvenile court’s February 23, 2004, suitable placement order, and the February 7, 2005, order terminating family reunification services with monitored visitation. As before, mother requested a home-of-parent order with family preservation services. In the alternative, she once again sought reinstatement of reunification services with liberalized visits.

Mother identified the following changes in circumstances: (1) She completed a parenting program through the Jeffrey Foundation; (2) she completed a parenting program through South Bay Human Services; (3) she regularly attended individual counseling with South Bay Services and made substantial progress with respect to issues related to the dependency case; (4) she completed a 20-week parenting course through Westside Children’s Center; (5) she visited the minors regularly and the visits went well; (6) the minors enjoyed the visits; (7) the minors were bonded with mother; and (8) she had a stable home and is ready for custody.

Due to these changes, mother argued that a modification would be in the best interests of the minors because they enjoy being with her, J.P. and M.P. have special developmental needs that she can fulfill, and she can provide a home that all the minors can live in together.

The juvenile court denied mother a hearing on the grounds that her section 388 petition failed to identify a change of circumstances. Further, the juvenile court stated that mother failed to show that it was in E.P.’s best interests to be removed from Guadalupe.

Termination of mother’s parental rights to E.P.

At the March 7, 2006 section 366.26 hearing, mother’s counsel argued, inter alia, that the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) exception to the termination of parental rights applied because “if the court were to terminate parental rights with respect to [E.P.], that would interfere with . . . her relationship with her siblings, [J.P.] and [M.P.], in that they are not being adopted.” It was noted that Guadalupe was committed to adopting E.P.

The juvenile court found that the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) exception was not warranted by the evidence. The juvenile court terminated mother’s parental rights to E.P.

This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. The March 23, 2006 section 388 petition.

Mother contends that the juvenile court erred when it summarily denied her March 23, 2006 section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing. Mother and the Department both urge us to apply an abuse of discretion standard of review. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415.)[4] After reviewing the record, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.

A. Relevant law.

Section 388 provides that any parent may petition the juvenile court to modify or set aside a previous order upon a showing of changed circumstances or new evidence. “The petition shall be verified and . . . shall set forth in concise language any change of circumstance or new evidence which are alleged to require the change of order.” (§ 388, subd. (a).)

A section 388 petition must be liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing to consider a modification request. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1432(a).) To obtain a hearing, a parent must make a prima facie showing. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310.) “‘”A ‘prima facie’ showing refers to those facts which will sustain a favorable decision if the evidence submitted in support of the allegations by the petitioner is credited. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’” (In re Aaron R. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 697, 705.) A hearing is required if the parent presents evidence that granting the petition would promote the best interest of the child. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 461.) But if the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interest of the child, then a hearing need not be ordered. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806-807.)

To avail herself of a hearing, a parent must provide the juvenile court with concrete supporting facts. In other words, “[t]he petition may not be conclusory. ‘[S]pecific allegations describing the evidence constituting the proffered changed circumstances or new evidence’ is required. [Citation.] Successful petitions have included declarations or other attachments which demonstrate the showing the petitioner will make at a hearing of the change in circumstances or new evidence.” (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250; see also In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593 [“If a petitioner could get by with general, conclusory allegations, there would be no need for an initial determination by the juvenile court about whether an evidentiary hearing was warranted”].)

B. Change of circumstances.

Mother’s discussion regarding her purported change of circumstances is one page in length. Rather than argue the merits of her appeal, mother simply repeats the allegations of her March 23, 2006 section 388 petition. The opening brief avers: “In her petition, [mother] alleged she had completed a parenting program through The Jeffrey Foundation on May 18, 2004 . . . , completed another parenting program through South Bay Human Services on May 12, 2005 . . . , completed yet another 20-week parenting course through Westside Children’s Center in May of 2005 . . . , and enrolled in another 20-week parenting education and prevention program on February 1, 2006 at Westside Children’s Center . . . . She was enrolled in individual counseling with South Bay Human Services since February 8, 2005 . . . , and had attended regularly . . . and was an active participant.”

Having received no assistance from mother, we are called upon to independently analyze whether she proffered a prima facie case of changed circumstances. First, we take snapshots of the circumstances that existed in February 2004 and February 2005, the months that the juvenile court, respectively, entered its suitable placement order and terminated family reunification services. Then we conclude that mother failed to demonstrate changed circumstances.

1. The facts as of February 23, 2004; the changes since.

In late 2003, mother did not visit or communicate with the minors. She was evaluated by Dr. Dupée, who recommended that the minors not be reunified with mother. At the time, mother had a history of living in an unsanitary house that was cluttered with dangerous objects and poisons. There was a tenant in the family home that terrorized mother’s family, but mother and grandmother refused to call the police for protection. In mid-2001, J.P. was found wandering in an alley by himself. On June 22, 2002, law enforcement personnel found E.P. walking in the street without supervision. Mother had a history of neglecting the minors and leaving them unsupervised. When she was given voluntary services, those services were terminated for lack of compliance. According to the detention report filed by the Department, detention was required because “[t]here is a substantial danger to the physical health of the [minors] or the [minors are] suffering severe emotional damage, and there are no reasonable means by which the [minors’] physical or emotional health may be protected without removing [them].”

The section 388 petition did not address many of the issues that led to the suitable placement order, such as mother’s failure to supervise the minors or provide them with a safe and sanitary home. Though the petition stated that she “learned parenting skills” and “now possesses the knowledge and skills which qualify her as an effective parent who can protect her children and meet their needs,” these statements are mere conclusions that do not suffice. She averred that she “has a stable home,” but she was silent as to safety and cleanliness issues. Mother provided letters and certificates demonstrating that she either completed or was enrolled in parenting programs and individual counseling. These documents did not fill in the information gap regarding the existence of positive changes. Significantly, mother’s visitations with the minors remained monitored.

2. The facts as of February 7, 2005; the changes since.

The interim review report for February 7, 2005, recommended termination of family reunification services because mother failed to comply with court orders requiring her to complete parenting education and individual counseling. It was noted that mother was unemployed. Her immediate goal was to obtain full-time employment. Reportedly, she visited the minors more consistently.

On February 7, 2005, the juvenile court reviewed the file, summarizing it as follows. The review report for September 14, 2004, indicated that mother refused to be evaluated by Regional Center, she was a no-show for several meetings with the social worker, and she told Dr. Dupée she had no intention of cooperating with the case plan. Mother was resistant to services. For example, she left phone numbers with the Department, but she could not be reached at those numbers. Mother did not start individual counseling in earnest until September 2004, and did not complete it. The juvenile court terminated family reunification services based on the foregoing facts, as well as the observation that there was substantial evidence that mother still posed a danger to the minors.

In the interim between February 7, 2005, and March 7, 2006, mother did not progress beyond monitored visits. Further, mother demonstrated deficiencies in her parenting skills during weekly visits with J.P. and M.P. in November and December 2005. She was occasionally late, and she tended to favor M.P. over J.P. despite encouragement from the monitors for her to play with them equally.

Once again, mother’s section 388 petition did not show a change of circumstances. She averred that she had a job and had completed various parenting programs. But she still had not completed individual counseling. Also, there was no evidence that she ameliorated the reasons for the minors’ detention, and that she therefore no longer posed a danger to their well-being. It cannot be ignored that mother’s completion of parenting programs in 2004 and 2005 was deemed insufficient to warrant granting mother’s January 12, 2006 section 388 petition. No appeal was taken from the denial of that preceding section 388 petition. This was with good reason. While mother’s circumstances may have been “changing,” they had not yet “changed.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 49.)

C. E.P.’s best interests.

According to mother, a juvenile court should, among other things, consider three factors in determining the best interests of a minor. Those factors are: “(1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 532.)

In our view, mother’s March 23, 2006 section 388 petition failed to make a prima facie case that it would be in E.P.’s best interests to be removed from Guadalupe and for reunification services to be reinstated.

1. The seriousness of the problem.

Mother informs us that “the problem which initially brought this matter into dependency court were the allegations that [she] had exhibited numerous mental and emotional problems, she had left the [minors] unsupervised[,] and the home was in a filthy and unsanitary condition.” These problems are serious because they deprived the minors of a suitable home.

To prove that those conditions have not continued, she refers to a letter from Westside Regional Center pertaining to a July 2005 request for services, and her psychological evaluation by Victor C. Sanchez, Ph.D. (Sanchez). The letter from Westside Regional Center notified mother that she was not eligible to receive services through them because she was “not substantially handicapped by mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, autism or other conditions similar to mental retardation.” In his psychological evaluation of mother, Dr. Sanchez stated: “[Mother] appears to exhibit no clear symptoms suggestive of any kind of major emotional/behavioral disturbance.”

The evidence adverted to by mother does not establish whether she still has problems with maintaining a safe and sanitary home. As for Sanchez’s evaluation, he did not offer an opinion regarding mother’s past problems, or the possible continuation of those problems.

2. E.P.’s bonds to Guadalupe and mother.

In her opening brief, mother cites relevant case law regarding a minor’s bond to parents and foster parents, and she states that one reason for the March 23, 2006 section 388 petition was to preserve E.P.’s sibling relationship with M.P. and J.P. But mother did not discuss her bond with E.P., or E.P.’s bond with Guadalupe. We turn to the allegations.

Mother’s March 23, 2006 section 388 petition does not state that she and the minors (particularly, for our purposes, E.P.) were bonded. Instead, it averred that the requested modifications were in the minors’ best interests because: (a) mother learned parenting skills in various programs; (b) the minors enjoyed being with mother during their visits; (c) mother acquired a stable home and obtained a full time job at Knott’s Berry Farm; (d) the minors have special developmental needs that mother can fulfill; (e) mother can provide a home for all the minors; and (f) mother is fit to have custody of the minors. Other than alleging that the minors enjoyed being with mother during visits, the allegations regarding the best interests of the minors revolved around facts merely suggesting that mother had changed.

These allegations were deficient.

E.P. lived with mother from August 2000 to approximately November 2003. Since that time she lived with Guadalupe. Because E.P. has been in Guadalupe’s custody for a significant period, the following law applies: “When custody continues over a significant period, the child’s need for continuity and stability assumes an increasingly important role. [Citation.] That need often will dictate the conclusion that maintenance of the current arrangement would be in the best interests of that child.” (In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 464.) “Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts [from reunification] to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.” (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.) The rebuttable presumption is that continuing with the already devised permanent plan is in E.P.’s best interests. (In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 464.)

Simply put, mother’s March 23, 2006 section 388 petition did not rebut the presumption that it would be in E.P.’s best interests to remain with Guadalupe. Mother wanted custody of E.P., as well as M.P. and J.P., even though mother had not progressed to unmonitored visits. Moreover, in August 2005, the Department reported that E.P.’s placement with Guadalupe was stable and continued to meet E.P.’s needs. E.P. was doing well in foster care, and the staff at her school stated that she appeared to be a bright and well-mannered girl. Finally, as previously noted, Guadalupe was committed to adopting E.P. The rebuttable presumption and inferences from the record establish the E.P. was bonded with Guadalupe. Because there is no evidence E.P. was bonded with mother, it would strain credulity for us to conclude that modification of the prior orders would be in E.P.’s best interests.

3. Continuation or amelioration of mother’s problems.

Though mother’s petition generally states that she learned parenting skills, it does not address her past problems and the degree to which they were ameliorated. This lends additional support to the juvenile court’s ruling.

II. Termination of parental rights.

Mother contends that the juvenile court erred when it ruled that the substantial sibling relationship exception to the termination of parental rights does not apply. We review the juvenile court’s order under the substantial evidence test. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 948.)

A. Relevant law.

Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) provides, in relevant part: “A finding . . . that the court has continued to remove the child from the custody of the parent or guardian and has terminated reunification services, shall constitute a sufficient basis for termination of parental rights unless the court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: . . . (E) There would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.”

To prevail, “the parent must show the existence of a significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the child. Many siblings have a relationship with each other, but would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on termination, there is no substantial interference with that relationship.” (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.)

B. Application of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E).

To show that the exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) applies, mother states: “During [E.P.’s] most formative years, she resided with her big brother, [J.P.], and then after her baby brother [M.P.] was born, until November 2003, when the [minors] were separated. They lived together on a day to day basis, shared significant common experiences, and enjoyed a close bond. In August of 2005, it was reported they were having weekly family visits and the respective caretakers reported the [minors] looked forward to the weekly visits . . . . In January of 2006, it was reported [the minors] had weekly sibling visitation.”

Missing from this brief discussion is evidence of particular common experiences, E.P.’s reactions and words regarding living apart from J.P. and M.P., or any hint that she wants to live with them. As a result, mother did not advert to any evidence from which we can infer that it would be detrimental to E.P. for mother’s parental rights to be terminated. This flaw is fatal.

In our view, substantial evidence demonstrated that E.P.’s relationship with M.P. and J.P. was not so significant that maintaining the status quo would be better for her than the permanent plan of adoption.

For our purposes, In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 942 is instructive. The court stated: “The record reflects [minor] and [brother] had similar experiences while living in the same foster home, were physically abused by [mother] and [stepfather] and had been through the dependency process together. The social worker believed [minor] loved [brother] and they were very close. [Minor] said she would be sad if [brother] lived with [mother] and would miss him and worry about his safety. [Minor] and [brother] had a relationship and had lived together most of their lives. However, there was no evidence [minor], other than being sad, would suffer detriment if the relationship ended. We conclude [mother] has not sustained her burden of proof that termination of her parental rights to [minor] would substantially interfere with [minor’s] sibling relationship with [brother].” (Id. at p. 952.)

There is less evidence of a bond between E.P. and her siblings than there was between the minor and her brother in In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 942.

E.P. did not live in the same home as her siblings since November 2003. She was three-years old at the time of her detention, and her only contact with J.P. and M.P. since has been during court-ordered visits. She and her two brothers had very different formative experiences during the time they were under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. E.P. was in the care of Guadalupe, and on target developmentally. In the meantime, J.P. and M.P. experienced a difficult and unstable childhood. They had special needs and endured six different foster placements. Both M.P. and J.P. had mental health and minor medical issues, and M.P. may have suffered sexual abuse. There is no indication that the minors shared significant common experiences, or that they have close and strong bonds. Absent that, E.P.’s long-term emotional interests lie with being adopted by Guadalupe so that E.P. has the sense of security and belonging that every minor deserves. This is confirmed by the realities of the dependency process. “[A]s children age, they become more difficult to place for adoption. [Citation.] Waiting, therefore, would not be in [the minor’s] best interests, because it could permanently foreclose her from being adopted. [Citation.]” (In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 253-254.) Mother failed to reunify with the minors, or even move past monitored visitation. Therefore, the current plan for E.P. presents her best opportunity for finding emotional and physical stability.DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

_______________________________, Acting P. J.

DOI TODD

_______________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

Publication Courtesy of California attorney directory.

Analysis and review provided by Oceanside Property line attorney.

[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

[2] E.P.’s father, Israel S., died in 2001. This appeal only pertains to E.P., but we discuss certain facts related to J.P. and M.P. because E.P.’s bond with them is one of the issues on appeal.

[3] When mother submitted to an evaluation on July 7, 2005, she was found to “exhibit no clear symptoms suggestive of any kind of major emotional/behavioral disturbance.”

[4] In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1416 suggested that the abuse of discretion standard does not apply when the issue is “the right to procedural due process to permit a full and fair hearing on the merits.” The implication is that review should be de novo. Under either an abuse of discretion or de novo review, our analysis would remain the same. But because the parties argue an abuse of discretion standard, that is the only standard of review we apply.