Filed 1/24/18 In re Emmanuel R. CA4/3






NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


In re EMMANUEL R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.


THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

EMMANUEL R.,

Defendant and Appellant.


G053848

(Super. Ct. No. 16DL1053)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Douglas Hatchimonji, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert F. Somers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Following minor Emmanuel R.’s admission he violated Health and Safety Code section 11364, subdivision (a), by possessing a methamphetamine pipe, the juvenile court declared him a ward, placed him on supervised probation, and released him to his parents. Minor challenges the court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence which occurred before minor’s admission. He also claims the court wrongfully imposed a maximum term of confinement. The court did not err in denying minor’s motion, and did not impose a maximum term of confinement. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

FACTS

As minor walked down the sidewalk across from the City of La Habra Police Department (LHPD), Officer Daniel Uberin drove up to him in a marked police vehicle. Without activating the vehicle’s sirens or lights, the officer parked on the street within a few feet of minor and got out of the car. He asked minor how he was doing. Minor responded he was “doing good” and on the way to a friend’s house. The tone of the exchange was that of a normal conversation.
Officer Uberin asked minor, who had stopped on the sidewalk, for his name and date of birth. After minor provided the information, the officer told him he was going to run a warrant check on his name and asked minor “if he would have a seat on the curb line while [he] did so.” Minor sat down on the curb. While standing a few feet away, Officer Uberin relayed minor’s information to dispatch. In addition, following LHPD standard protocol, he requested a backup officer.
Within a few minutes, dispatch notified Officer Uberin there were no active warrants relating to minor. Around the same time, Officer Leclercq arrived on scene and parked his marked police vehicle along the curb.
While the two officers stood in the street in front of minor, Officer Uberin asked minor if he was carrying anything illegal. Minor volunteered he had a “‘shit pipe’ in his pocket.” Knowing, based on training and experience, that minor was referring to a methamphetamine pipe, Officer Uberin asked minor for permission to do a pat-down search. Minor assented, so the officer asked minor to place his hands behind his back and interlace his fingers. He complied and the officer patted him down, finding a methamphetamine pipe in his pocket. The officers placed minor under arrest.
Prior to trial, minor moved to suppress all evidence relating to the methamphetamine pipe and all statements he made to police. He argued they were the product of an unlawful detention and search. The juvenile court denied the motion. Minor, thereafter, admitted to committing the offense alleged. The court declared him a continued ward of the court and placed him on supervised probation. Minor timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Minor claims the court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the totality of the circumstances show the discovery of the methamphetamine pipe resulted from an unconstitutional detention by police officers. He also claims the juvenile court wrongfully set a maximum term of confinement because he was not removed from the custody of his parents. The court did not err in denying the suppression motion. And there is no need to modify the court’s dispositional order because it did not specify a maximum term of confinement as minor contends.

Motion to Suppress
A juvenile court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence is reviewable on appeal from the final judgment, even if the judgment results from the minor’s admission of the allegations of the petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 800, subd. (a).) “In reviewing a . . . ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the . . . court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] And in determining whether, on the facts so found, the search was reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we exercise our independent judgment.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 120; see In re Cody S. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 86, 90.) Minor does not challenge the court’s factual findings, so our review is de novo.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires courts to exclude evidence obtained from unreasonable government searches and seizures. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 125.) “Police contacts with individuals may be placed into three broad categories ranging from the least to the most intrusive: consensual encounters that result in no restraint of liberty whatsoever; detentions, which are seizures of an individual that are strictly limited in duration, scope, and purpose; and formal arrests or comparable restraints on an individual’s liberty.” (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821 (In re Manuel G.).) Whereas consensual encounters do not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny, detentions do. (Ibid.; Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434 (Bostick).)
There is no bright-line distinction between a consensual encounter and a detention; we look to the totality of the circumstances of a particular encounter to make the determination. (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 145.) “Circumstances establishing a seizure might include any of the following: the presence of several officers, an officer’s display of a weapon, some physical touching of the person, or the use of language or of a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. [Citations.] The officer’s uncommunicated state of mind and the individual citizen’s subjective belief are irrelevant in assessing whether a seizure triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny has occurred.” (In re Manuel G., at p. 821; People v. Garry (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1106.) The key question is whether a reasonable person would feel he or she “‘was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’” (In re Manuel G., at p. 821.)
Here, even taking into account that minor was 16 years old when the encounter at issue occurred, the circumstances evidence a consensual encounter. When Officer Uberin approached defendant, he did not activate his lights or siren. (People v. Perez (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1492, 1496), he did not draw his gun, he did not order minor to stop, and he did not use force, or threaten use of force. The officer simply asked minor how he was doing. In response, minor voluntarily stopped and engaged in conversation with the officer. As Officer Uberin testified, the tone of the exchange was like that of “a normal conversation on the street.”
Nothing that occurred after the initial contact transformed the encounter, which lasted approximately five minutes, into a detention. Officer Uberin asked minor for his name and birthdate, which minor voluntarily gave. (Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 437 [asking for and examining identification does not constitute a detention]; People v. Leath (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 344, 350 [same].) Then the officer asked if minor would sit down on the curb while he checked for warrants. Minor “said something to the effect of okay or sure,” and sat down. He then voluntarily chose to answer the officer’s subsequent question about whether he was carrying anything illegal. And, it was minor’s response to that question that triggered the pat-down search—itself another act to which minor gave his consent.
“‘“[T]here is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a police [officer] from addressing questions to anyone on the streets”’” (People v. Bennett (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 396, 401-402) so long as the person “‘remains free to disregard the questions and walk away’” (id. at p. 402). We glean nothing from the record suggesting the officers’ tone or actions would have led a reasonable 16-year old to believe he or she was not free to leave.
Minor emphasizes that the officers were armed, wearing uniforms and standing in front of him when they performed the warrant check and asked if he had anything illegal on him. But, unless undercover, officers out on patrol are usually armed and in uniform. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 346 [police officer uniform, badge and weapon generally “‘have little weight in the analysis’” for determining whether detention occurred].) Further, it was minor who, under no pressure, voluntarily complied with the officer’s request to sit on the curb. While the officers’ location may have made it more difficult for him to walk into the street, there was nothing preventing him from getting up and continuing down the sidewalk to his friend’s house in the same manner as when Officer Uberin originally approached him.
The location of the encounter across from the police station likewise does not alter our conclusion. Minor was there independently of any police action, and he voluntarily stopped when first approached. (Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 437 [location of defendant on a bus not a factor in detention analysis because he was there independent of police action]; In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1237-1238 [no detention of person on motorcycle because he voluntarily pulled over before police “displayed any gesture of authority, such as using overhead lights or a siren”].)
Minor relies on In re J.G. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 402 (In re J.G.), claiming the show of authority by police officers there was even less than in this case, yet the court found a detention had occurred. Not so. Although some of the actions and inquiries of the officers in In re J.G. were nearly identical to ones in this case, the In re J.G. court found those particular actions and inquiries did not amount to a detention. (Id. at pp. 411-412.) Additional circumstances, not present in this case, led to the conclusion minor had been detained. Those circumstances included the prolonged nature of the interaction with police, a strong showing of authority by the four uniformed officers involved, which included the handing of a rifle from one officer to another, and the continued accusatory questioning of the minor after a warrant check and a pat-down search of the minor’s person revealed nothing. (Id. at pp. 411-413.)
“While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.” (I.N.S. v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210, 216.) Here, nothing about the circumstances converted the ordinary consensual encounter into a detention. The denial of minor’s motion to suppress was, therefore, proper.

Maximum Term of Confinement
Minor claims the court unwarrantedly specified a maximum term of confinement. However, no such term was specified in the court’s dispositional order.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c), generally requires a juvenile court to specify a maximum term of confinement that cannot exceed the time of confinement allowable for an adult convicted of the same offense. But this requirement does not apply when a minor is not removed from the physical custody of his parents. (In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 541; In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 573–574.) In the latter type of situation, if a court specifies a maximum term of confinement, it is unauthorized. Although it would technically have no legal effect, case law dictates it should nevertheless be stricken in those circumstances. (In re Matthew A., at p. 541.)
Here, the dispositional order indicates continued wardship, supervised probation, a $50 restitution fine, and continued terms and conditions of probation. No maximum term of confinement is specified. Accordingly, there was no error.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.



IKOLA, J.

WE CONCUR:



MOORE, ACTING P. J.



THOMPSON, J.