Filed 1/9/19 In re Eric B. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

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Eric B. (the minor) was detained at birth due primarily to mother’s substance abuse. Mother’s parental rights to two other children had been previously terminated. Father is a registered sex offender with mental health issues. Prior to the minor’s birth, the parents had attempted to make arrangements to have L.A., the fiancée of mother’s cousin, be the minor’s guardian. The paperwork, however, was not completed before the minor was born. The minor was placed in a foster home and the Sacramento County Department of Child, Family and Adult Services (the Department) began assessment of L.A.’s home for placement.

The juvenile court took jurisdiction and bypassed parents for reunification services at disposition. The Department ultimately recommended against placement of the minor with L.A. Hearing on the matter took place concurrently with the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.[1] The juvenile court found continued placement with his current caretakers was in the minor’s best interests. The juvenile court then found the minor adoptable, that no exception to adoption applied, and terminated parental rights. Mother appealed.

Mother’s sole contention in this appeal is that the juvenile court erred in failing to order the minor placed with L.A., who mother claims is a nonrelated extended family member. We do not address the merits of mother’s argument because she lacks standing to raise arguments regarding the minor’s placement.

Although mother argued in the juvenile court in favor of placing the minor with L.A., “the mere fact that a parent takes a position on a matter at issue in a juvenile dependency case that affects his or her child does not constitute a sufficient reason to establish standing to challenge an adverse ruling on it.” (In re Carissa G. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 731, 736; accord, In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 239.) A parent has standing to appeal a juvenile court’s order only if she is aggrieved, that is if her own “rights or interests are injuriously affected by the decision in an immediate and substantial way, and not as a nominal or remote consequence of the decision.” (In re K.C., supra, at p. 236.)

Although parents have “an interest in their children’s ‘companionship, care, custody and management,’ ” “after reunification services are terminated or bypassed . . . , ‘the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child [is] no longer paramount. Rather, at this point “the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability . . . .” ’ ” (In re K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 236.) For this reason, “[a] parent’s appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights confers standing to appeal an order concerning the dependent child’s placement only if the placement order’s reversal advances the parent’s argument against terminating parental rights.” (Id. at p. 238, italics added; see In re A.K. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 492, 499 [a parent whose reunification services have been terminated lacks standing to challenge relative placement issues on appeal, because “decisions concerning placement of the child do not affect the parent’s interest in reunification, where the parent is no longer able to reunify with the child”].)

Here, mother objected to the termination of her parental rights, arguing in the juvenile court that she had a beneficial relationship with the minor that overcame the benefits of adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) She has made no showing, however, that reversal of the placement order she now contests would advance that, or any other, argument against terminating her parental rights. Accordingly, we dismiss her appeal for lack of standing.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

BUTZ , Acting P. J.

We concur:

MURRAY , J.

HOCH , J.