In re Estaban G.
Filed 9/7/06 In re Estaban G. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
| In re ESTEBAN G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
| THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ESTEBAN G., Defendant and Appellant. | D048028 (Super. Ct. No. J210174) |
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Donna L. Crandall, Judge, and the Superior Court of San Diego County, Theodore M. Weathers, Judge. Affirmed.
The juvenile court in Orange County declared Esteban G. a ward (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after entering true findings he committed hit and run causing property damage (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)) and drove without a driver's license. (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)). The case was transferred for disposition from Orange County to San Diego County. The San Diego County juvenile court placed Esteban on probation. Esteban contends sufficient evidence does not support the true finding he committed hit and run.
FACTS
Around 2:50 a.m. on July 17, 2005, Albert Fusco was watching television when he heard tires screeching outside. He looked out the window and saw a BMW hit a parked Subaru. Fusco ran outside and saw the BMW pull into a driveway several doors down the street. Fusco walked to the BMW and saw a male wearing a blue baseball cap, who he later identified as Esteban, sitting in the driver's seat. An African-American male was sitting in the passenger seat. The tenant of the apartment where the BMW was parked came outside, asked Fusco not to call police, and offered to pay for the damage to the Subaru. Within five or 10 minutes, Orange County Sheriff Deputy Edward Manhart arrived. Fusco identified Esteban as the driver of the BMW when it hit the Subaru who left without leaving notice. The People presented a document that reflected Esteban did not have a driver's license.
A witness called by the defense testified that she was with Esteban at the time of the collision. She stated Esteban had not left the apartment the entire night before police arrived.
DISCUSSION
Contending that the record lacks sufficient evidence that he was driving the BMW when it collided with the Subaru, Esteban recognizes that Fusco identified him as the person in the driver's seat when he approached the car, but points out that Fusco also told Deputy Manhart that after the collision "the car drove for a few feet, and then the driver and passenger switched places." We affirm a judgment supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) Substantial evidence is evidence of legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value. (People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 505.) Here, Fusco testified that he identified the driver of the BMW, who was wearing a blue baseball cap, at Deputy Manhart's request after Deputy Manhart arrived. Deputy Manhart testified that Fusco identified Esteban as the driver of the BMW at the time of the collision. The testimony of a single witness who is believed by the trier of fact is sufficient to support a true finding. (See People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616, 623.)
Regarding Deputy Manhart's testimony at the conclusion of cross-examination that Fusco told him the driver and passenger changed places after the collision, the testimony was given after the prosecution asked the officer what Fusco told him about the accident. Deputy Manhart responded:
"He said that he was upstairs in his condo and he heard the car, the BMW, moving back and forth, and he saw the BMW collide with the Subaru.
"And he said he came downstairs and approached the driver and was standing approximately two feet away from him. And at that point he told me that with his military training, that he could have taken him to the ground, and he just decided to let him go.
"So the car drove a couple of feet down, and he said the driver got out and the passenger switched places, and they drove and parked in front of 317."
No additional questions were asked regarding the testimony that the driver and passenger changed places after the collision. Esteban argues that the conclusion that he was driving the BMW at the time of the collision is speculation and the testimony that the driver and passenger changed places before Fusco identified Esteban as the person in the driver's seat when he approached the BMW creates an inference that Esteban was not driving the car at the time of the collision, and that where the evidence gives equal support to two inconsistent inferences, neither is established. (See People v. Brown (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 596, 600.)
We must review the entire record most favorably to the judgment below and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the fact finder could reasonably deduce from the evidence. Inferences may constitute substantial evidence, but the inferences must be the product of logic and reason rather than of speculation or conjecture. (Louis & Diederich, Inc. Cambridge European Imports, Inc. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1574, 1584-1585.) The testimony that the driver and passenger changed places creates an unanswered question, but the evidence as a whole, including Fusco's identification of Esteban as the driver, is direct evidence not calling for an inference, and permits a reasonable trier of fact to conclude Esteban was driving the BMW when it collided with the Subaru. (See Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319; In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 808-809.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court orders are affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
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