In re Ethan M.

Filed 8/3/07 In re Ethan M. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Shasta)

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Derek N., father of the minors, appeals from orders entered at the six-month review hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code,  366.21, subd. (e), 395.)^[1]Appellant contends the court abused its discretion in terminating his reunification services and there was no substantial evidence of detriment to support the courts order suspending his visitation. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellants two sons, ages 10 months and five years, were removed from parental custody in February 2006 following appellants arrest for possession of drug paraphernalia and injuring the older minor.^[2] Appellant had a history of mental illness, anger control problems and suicidal ideation.

According to the minors foster mother, the minors were afraid of appellant and were hesitant about visiting with him. Appellant continued to display anger management issues after his release from custody but did begin some services before the jurisdictional hearing. The court ordered reunification services for appellant but did not order visitation.

By October 2006, appellant had completed parenting and assessments for further services but was having difficulty following through with the services, in part, because he denied any substance abuse problems and minimized his anger issues. Appellant did not visit the minors, who continued to express fear of him. Meanwhile, the mother was making progress in services and had overnight visits. She also had developed a plan to protect herself and the minors from appellant due to his history of instability and violence.

Appellant also participated in a psychological evaluation which was incomplete due to appellants agitation but yielded enough information for the psychologist to conclude that appellants thought processes were disorganized and at times he bordered on delusional thinking. Because appellants mental health issues were not being addressed properly, he was likely to act out. Appellant was unable to modulate his anger and deal rationally with his fears during testing and generally was hostile and oppositional. The examiner concluded appellant suffered from a psychotic disorder exacerbated by substance abuse and needed medication management and substance abuse and anger management treatment to stabilize him, followed by general counseling to deal with his other issues. If appellant could become stable for 9 to 12 months, slow and limited reunification experiences with the minors could then be considered. Appellant also attended some therapy sessions but did not participate in them and believed that it was his business if he wanted to use drugs. The social worker recommended termination of services because it was not safe for the minors to make further attempts at reunification with appellant.

By January 2007, the minors were returned to the mother and adjusted well to being with her. They were working in therapy to overcome the trauma experienced as a result of the domestic violence they experienced while living with appellant. Appellant still was not participating in any part of his plan and the social worker was concerned that contact between appellant and the minors could be dangerous to them.

In early January, appellant was arrested following a domestic violence incident in which he confronted the mother with the minors present, trapped her in the home, disabled the telephones and threatened to commit suicide. Appellant admitted current drug use.

At the review hearing, appellant testified about what services he had done, asked for another chance to reunify and sought supervised visitation. He said he saw the minors in January 2007 and had no problems at the visits. Appellant felt the minors were not afraid of him but just did not understand why he is the way he is. The court adopted the recommended findings and orders returning the minors to the mother under a family maintenance program, terminating appellants services and suspending his visitation with the minors.

DISCUSSION

I.

Appellant contends the court abused its discretion in terminating his reunification services because he was motivated to change and needed help to do so. Appellant argues it was in the best interests of the minors to offer him services since the minors had reunified with the mother and there would be ongoing contact between them.

Absent circumstances justifying denial of reunification services, when a dependent child is removed from the home, the juvenile court must order reunification services for the parents. ( 361.5, subds. (a), (b).) [T]he purpose of reunification services is to facilitate the return of a dependent child to parental custody. (In re Jodi B. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1322, 1326.)

Services for a sibling group with one child under the age of three at the time of removal may be limited to six months. ( 361.5, subd. (a)(3).) However, services may be terminated at any time depending on the circumstances of the case, including lack of parental interest in making the necessary changes in conduct and attitude to allow reunification or in meaningful participation in the service plan adopted by the juvenile court. (In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1242-1243.) Consequently, the juvenile court may exercise its discretion to terminate services for one parent who is not participating in services while continuing to order services for the other parent even where the non-reunifying parent may have some future contact with the child. (In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 565-566.)

The juvenile court adopted a plan designed to assist appellant to reunify by addressing his mental health, substance abuse and domestic violence problems. Although appellant began to engage in services prior to the disposition hearing and completed a parenting class, a domestic violence assessment and a substance abuse assessment, he repeatedly demonstrated resistance to full participation in services and was unwilling to acknowledge that his behavior had a negative impact on his relationship with his children. The psychological assessment projected that, even with participation in services, reunification efforts could not be considered for almost a year after he had demonstrated stability. Appellants conduct toward his family just prior to the review hearing underscored the need for appellant to modify his behavior and validity of the psychological assessment. The juvenile court could conclude that, despite having access to services for almost a year, appellant had made no progress and offering further services to him would be futile despite his testimony that he needed help and wanted a second chance to reunify.

While it is possible that appellant may have contact with the minors in the future if the mother is successful in family maintenance services, it is by no means certain. In any case, neither the court nor the Department is required to expend time and money to assist appellant to resolve his problems when he has shown no real interest in doing so. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in terminating appellants services.

II.

Appellant contends that suspending visitation was not in the minors best interest and there was no substantial evidence of detriment to them in visiting him.

The juvenile court denied appellant visitation at the disposition hearing. As far as can be determined from the record, appellant had no formal visitation during the reunification period and, based upon his testimony, his visitation consisted of seeing the minors while they were visiting the paternal grandmother. Thus, to the extent that the current order suspending visitation is merely a continuation of the prior order, appellant has forfeited the right to challenge it by failing to appeal the disposition orders. (In re Daniel K. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 661, 667; John F. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 400, 404-405.)

Assuming arguendo that the current order is distinct from the prior one, appellant still does not prevail.

The juvenile court may deny a parent visitation or otherwise craft appropriate orders for limited parent-child contact if visitation would be harmful to the childs well-being since [n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child. ( 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).)

The evidence was clear that visitation would jeopardize the safety of the minors. Left untreated, appellant was subject to agitation and unpredictable outbursts of violence and anger. This was most apparent in the confrontation which occurred just prior to the review hearing in which appellant entered the home of the mother and the minors, trapped them in the home, made it impossible for them to call for help by disabling the telephones, and threatened suicide. The older minor had previously and continuously expressed fear of appellant who had behaved similarly in the past. Appellant had made no effort to accept treatment for his mental health or substance abuse problems and minimized the minors fear of him insisting that they did not understand the way he was.

The court was not required to gamble with the minors safety on the strength of appellants testimony about minimal unauthorized contact with the minors, which, fortuitously, had been uneventful. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile courts order continuing the suspended visitation. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.)

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.

We concur:

SCOTLAND, P.J.

MORRISON , J.

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^[1] Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

^[2] The minors half sibling was also removed at this time but is not a subject of this appeal.