Filed 4/21/17 In re E.V. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re E.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. H043109
(Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 3-15-JV-41037D)


THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E.V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Minor E.V. admitted stealing or possessing several cars that did not belong to him, among other crimes, over a period of one year. At issue here is a victim restitution order entered by the juvenile court to compensate a victim of one of those car thefts. The restitution amount included lost wages incurred by the car owner’s daughter when she drove the recovered car to Southern California to have it repaired by the owner’s mechanic. Minor argues that the juvenile court’s restitution order must be reversed because the lost wages were caused by the decision to repair the car in Southern California rather than by minor’s criminal conduct. For the reasons stated here, we find no abuse of discretion and therefore must affirm the restitution order.
I. JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS
Seven Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petitions were filed concerning minor between January and December 2015. The restitution order is related to Petition D, but we provide a brief summary of the petitions preceding Petition D for context.
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petition A alleged attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211–212.5, subd. (c)), based on minor and two others stealing spray paint from a hardware store. Minor admitted the Petition A allegation and was placed on probation with electronic monitoring using an ankle monitor. Minor cut off the ankle monitor a short time later and was arrested when he was discovered in the passenger seat of a stolen car stopped by the police. Petition B alleged that minor took that car without permission (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). The juvenile court ordered minor back into the electronic monitoring program, and minor cut off the ankle monitor two days later. Minor eventually voluntarily surrendered. After minor admitted the Petition B allegation, he was placed on probation, once again with electronic monitoring. Petition C alleged various probation violations, including a positive drug test for marijuana and cutting off the ankle monitor.
The conduct leading to the restitution order at issue here occurred two days after he cut off his ankle monitor for the third time. A police officer following a car in Gilroy discovered through a records check that the car had been reported stolen. When the officer attempted to stop the car, minor (who was driving) led the officer on a short car chase. Minor crashed the car into a curb and fled on foot. Minor refused to stop running and took a fighting stance when an officer caught up with him. Minor was Tased and detained. A police officer discovered homemade keys in the car when it was searched after minor’s arrest.
The car that minor crashed was owned by Theresa G., who lives in Southern California. Her daughter Mariyah G. was using the car while attending graduate school in Santa Clara County.
Petition D alleged theft or unauthorized use of a car without permission (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); reckless driving while fleeing police (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)); resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)); possessing burglary tools (Pen. Code, § 466); and driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)). Minor admitted the first four counts, and the fifth count was dismissed at the prosecution’s request. Minor was placed on probation and the matter was set for a contested victim restitution hearing.
B. RESTITUTION ORDER
The car owner submitted a detailed restitution memo the same month that her daughter Mariyah recovered the car in Gilroy. The owner requested over $6,000 in victim restitution for car repairs, the replacement value of personal items in the car, and Mariyah’s lost wages. The memo states that Mariyah had three part-time jobs: working at a juice bar ($15 per hour); working with autistic clients ($35 per hour); and babysitting ($20 per hour). The claim included Mariyah’s lost wages for the three days the car was missing and for 10 additional days when Mariyah drove the car to the “family mechanic in Burbank, CA to have [the] car evaluated and repaired.” For those 13 total days of lost wages, the memo requested $195 per day (consisting of two hours at the juice bar, three hours with autistic clients, and three hours of babysitting), for a total of $2,535 in lost wages.
Among the attachments to the memo were two receipts from a mechanic in Burbank. One receipt noted that the mechanic replaced two tires and performed a four-wheel alignment. June 18, 2015 is written as both the “Received Date” and “Promised Date.” Another receipt provides an estimate for other repairs, which also has June 18, 2015 written as both the “Received Date” and “Promised Date.”
The restitution hearing occurred six months after Petition D was filed. Mariyah testified that after picking up the car in Gilroy, she drove it to Burbank. She described that the car had to be at the mechanic’s shop for “like a week or so, because he had to figure out what all was wrong with it, if there were any other damages and then fix what was messed up, and I had to make an appointment.” Mariyah testified that she did not take the car to a local mechanic because she did not “know any mechanics here that I would trust with fixing my car.” She also explained that the car was stolen just before a school break, meaning that she would have had more time to work during that period. She estimated that during school breaks, she worked 15 to 20 hours per week at the juice bar, 15 hours per week with her autistic clients, and four or five times a week babysitting. Mariyah could not remember the precise dates that she was in Southern California. She testified that she drove back the same day she received the estimate from the mechanic (the estimate is dated June 18). But she also testified that she drove back “like, the 21st or the 20th, because I got back a couple of days before school started.”
During the hearing, minor’s counsel apparently noticed that Mariyah was consulting notes. Minor’s counsel was allowed to inspect the document, which was a letter from Theresa summarizing information from her restitution memo and providing prepared responses to potential questions. For example, the letter states: “If they ask you to go over information about where you [are] working (either now or at the time of the theft), you can say ... The general lost wage information is included on ... the June 23, 2015 memo from my mother ... . I don’t feel comfortable disclosing this information (while on the stand) with the defendant present, who is a criminal.” (Underscoring and first ellipsis in original.) The juvenile court admitted the letter into evidence and allowed minor’s counsel to ask Mariyah about it. Minor’s counsel asked multiple times whether Theresa “was telling you how to testify to the Judge.” Mariyah repeatedly denied that her mother had told her what to say. Mariyah explained that the letter was meant to help her remember “when this happened, what time period she’s talking about. I don’t remember back to June, because I have a busy schedule; I have a lot of things going on in my life, so I don’t remember specific dates and what happened.”
The juvenile court granted the full amount of victim restitution requested, including Mariyah’s lost wages, for a total of $6,089.71. The court found that minor had not rebutted the prosecutor’s prima facie showing.
II. DISCUSSION
Minor’s primary challenge to the restitution order is that he should not be liable for the 10 days of Mariyah’s lost wages she incurred after picking up the car in Gilroy because they were caused by her unforeseeable decision to have the car repaired in Southern California. Minor also makes a number of arguments that effectively attack the sufficiency of the evidence presented to support the restitution order.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 authorizes the juvenile court to award restitution to victims of crimes committed by juveniles. Victim restitution “shall be imposed in the amount of losses, as determined.” (Id., subd. (h)(1).) Absent compelling and extraordinary reasons, the juvenile court must order restitution in a “dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor’s conduct,” including “[w]ages and profits lost due to an injury incurred by the victim.” (Id., subd. (h)(1), (h)(1)(C).) The standard of proof at a restitution hearing is preponderance of the evidence, not reasonable doubt. (People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1319 (Holmberg).)
We review a juvenile court’s restitution award for abuse of discretion. (In re K.F. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 655, 661.) If there is a factual and rational basis for the award, there is no abuse of discretion. (Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320.) To the extent minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion because the award is unsupported by the evidence, we review for substantial evidence. (In re K.F., supra, at p. 661.)
B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Minor’s evidentiary arguments are divided between attacks on Mariyah’s credibility and attacks on the substantive evidence presented.
1. Mariyah’s Credibility
Minor argues that Mariyah’s testimony was unreliable because she was improperly coached by her mother through the letter Mariyah consulted while testifying. He also contends that Mariyah might have had an ulterior motive for driving to Southern California for the repairs because the trip happened to coincide with a school break. The problem with those arguments is that the juvenile court implicitly found Mariyah credible by awarding the full amount of claimed restitution, and we cannot “substitute our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)
In any event, the juvenile court’s decision that Mariyah’s testimony was credible is supported by the record. Mariyah steadfastly maintained that her mother did not tell her to testify in any particular manner. As for Mariyah’s motivation for driving to Southern California, Mariyah explained that she did so because she did not know any local mechanics she could trust to fix her mother’s car.
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Decision
Minor makes several arguments that, in effect, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented about restitution. We “review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact” could find that the amount of restitution claimed was supported by a preponderance of evidence. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)
Minor argues that the juvenile court should not have relied on the restitution memo submitted by Theresa because it was “not supported by documentation of Mariyah G.’s wages, occupations, and hours.” The restitution memo contained a prima facie showing of the losses claimed by Mariyah, which minor had the burden to rebut. (See Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320 [“ ‘ “When the probation report includes information on the amount of the victim’s loss and a recommendation as to the amount of restitution, the defendant must come forward with contrary information to challenge that amount.” ’ ”].) Minor’s counsel never asked Mariyah to verify the hourly wage she earned at each job, leaving Theresa’s restitution memo as the only evidence before the juvenile court. As for the number of hours she worked at each job, Mariyah’s testimony was generally consistent with the information contained in the restitution memo. She testified that she worked at the juice bar 15 to 20 hours per week, which was consistent with the 10 hours per week claimed in the restitution memo (assuming two hours per day, five days per week). She testified that she worked with autistic clients “about 15 hours a week,” which also was consistent with the 15 hours per week claimed in the restitution memo (assuming three hours per day, five days per week). While Mariyah could not recall the exact number of hours per day she babysat, she testified that she did so four or five times per week during school breaks.
Minor argues that Mariyah’s testimony was unreliable because she “could not confirm any specific schedule.” But Mariyah explained that she did not have a set schedule for any of her jobs during the period in question because she had informed her employers that she was unavailable due to her car having been stolen. Mariyah testified: “If I didn’t tell them beforehand that my car was stolen, that I had to go get it fixed, they would have scheduled me to work.”
Minor points to inconsistencies between Theresa’s restitution memo and Mariyah’s testimony about how long she was in Southern California and about the date Mariyah returned to Northern California. The restitution memo claims lost wages through June 20; minor notes Mariyah testified she drove back as early as June 18. But Mariyah also testified that she drove back on the “21st or the 20th,” which is consistent with the restitution memo. Though Mariyah’s testimony did not precisely track the restitution memo, the restitution hearing occurred six months after the events she was asked to recount. Indeed, Mariyah expressly testified that she had difficulty remembering specific dates because she had a busy schedule. Based on that testimony, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the restitution memo—which was submitted within days of Mariyah’s return to Northern California—contained a more reliable description of specific dates than testimony occurring six months later.
Minor attacks Mariyah’s testimony that the car was with the mechanic for a week. He argues that the “mechanic’s receipt [attached to the restitution memo] proves that the car was both ‘received’ and ‘promised’ to be released on June 18, 2015.” Minor’s counsel never mentioned the receipt before the juvenile court, so there was no opportunity to receive testimony clarifying the issue. To the extent the juvenile court was even aware of the discrepancy, conflicting evidence alone does not compel reversal if substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s decision. (See People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 882–883 [“Defendant disputes the trial court’s resolution of the conflicting ... evidence, ... but, as with other types of factual findings, ‘ “[o]n appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise …” ’ of the trial courts power to ‘ “judge credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences” ’ and its ‘ “findings—whether express or implied—must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ”].) The juvenile court’s decision was supported by Mariyah’s testimony, and the mechanic’s receipt did not conclusively establish that her testimony was inaccurate.
Minor argues that the juvenile court’s order must be reversed because the juvenile court based its overall award of lost wages only on evidence of Mariyah’s juice bar job. That argument interprets the juvenile court’s discussion at the hearing too narrowly. The juvenile court reasoned: “I don’t want to dwell too much on all of the evidence, but just for example, in terms of the juice bar, she testified she tends to average about 15 to 20 hours a week. If you look at the numbers she has in there, that’s consistent with that.” The court expressly stated it was referring to the juice bar evidence as an example. Because the court awarded the total dollar amount detailed in the restitution memo, the only reasonable inference is that the court awarded lost wages for all three jobs according to Mariyah’s estimates.
We conclude that Theresa’s documentary evidence coupled with Mariyah’s testimony provide substantial evidence to support the restitution order.
C. CAUSATION
Minor argues that, even assuming adequate evidentiary support, he is not responsible for Mariyah’s lost wages because he was not a substantial factor in bringing about those losses, and driving the car to Southern California for repairs was an unforeseeable intervening decision that broke the chain of causation between the offense and Mariyah’s losses.
1. Legal Standards
A victim in a delinquency case is entitled to “all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor’s conduct.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd. (h)(1).) Where the defendant is an adult, this court has determined that “tort principles of causation apply to victim restitution claims.” (Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321.) Minor’s claim involves two causation concepts: cause-in-fact and intervening causation.
The prosecutor had the burden to show that minor was a cause-in-fact of Mariyah’s lost wages. (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 968 (Rutherford).) Stated differently, the prosecutor had to show that minor was a substantial factor in bringing about Mariyah’s lost wages. (Id. at p. 969.) “The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.” (Id. at p. 978.)
Even if his conduct was a cause-in-fact of the lost wages, minor would not be responsible for those damages if Mariyah’s decision to have the car repaired in Southern California was an unforeseeable intervening cause of her lost wages. (Akins v. County of Sonoma (1967) 67 Cal.2d 185, 199.) Minor had the burden to show not only that repairing the car in Southern California was unforeseeable, but also that the lost wages were of a type that was unforeseeable. If either the decision to drive south or the type of damages incurred was foreseeable, minor is liable for Mariyah’s lost wages. (Ibid.) “ ‘An independent intervening act is a superseding cause relieving the actor of liability for his negligence only if the intervening act is highly unusual or extraordinary and hence not reasonably foreseeable.’ ” (Lombardo v. Huysentruyt (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 656, 666 (Lombardo).) Minor had the burden in the juvenile court to prove unforeseeability. (Maupin v. Widling (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 568, 578.) The question of foreseeability in this context is one for the trier of fact when, as here, the underlying facts are disputed. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 572, fn. 6 (Ballard); accord Lombardo, at p. 666 [“Causation is generally a question of fact for the jury, unless reasonable minds could not dispute the absence of causation.”].)
2. Minor Was A Cause-in-fact of Mariyah’s Lost Wages
Minor argues he was not a substantial factor in causing Mariyah’s lost wages because the “damage sustained to the vehicle did not render it inoperable,” meaning that “the car could have been used for work.” This argument ignores the fundamental fact—conceded by minor—that after it was recovered, the car required extensive repairs, including tires, wheel alignment, passenger doors, bumper, and complete repainting. As a direct result of minor stealing and crashing the car, Mariyah had to miss work at some point for lack of transportation while it was being repaired. Minor’s conduct was therefore more than a negligible or theoretical contribution to Mariyah’s lost wages. (Rutherford, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 978.) The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that minor was a substantial factor in causing those damages.
3. Foreseeability of Mariyah’s Actions and Damages
The more nuanced question is whether Mariyah’s decision to drive to Southern California, and the lost wages she incurred as a result, were so highly unusual or extraordinary as to sever the causal link to minor’s culpability.
a. Repairs in Southern California Were Reasonably Foreseeable
Minor argues that driving the car to Southern California instead of having it repaired locally was an unforeseeable consequence of his misconduct. We acknowledge that driving to Southern California for repairs may be atypical victim behavior after recovery of a stolen car, but that is not the applicable standard. When considered in context, a rational trier of fact could find Mariyah’s response reasonable and foreseeable. Mariyah provided plausible reasons for her decision to drive to Southern California: she did not know any local mechanics she trusted to fix the car, and the car’s owner had a trusted mechanic in Southern California. The juvenile court could rationally conclude that it was reasonably foreseeable for a victim who was using her mother’s car while attending school in a different city to travel to the car owner’s mechanic when it required significant repairs.
The juvenile court apparently decided that Mariyah’s decision to drive south, and the wages she lost due to the trip, were reasonably foreseeable. Whether we would reach the same factual conclusion is irrelevant. Because the decision was not “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377), we may not substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court.
b. The Amount of Lost Wages Was Reasonably Foreseeable
The Supreme Court has long maintained that the affirmative defense of intervening causation will not succeed—regardless of the nature of the intervening cause—where it “caused injury of a type that was foreseeable.” (Akins, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 199; accord Ballard, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 587; Cole v. Town of Los Gatos (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749, 770.) Here, it is reasonable to conclude that missing work is a foreseeable consequence of having one’s car stolen and damaged. Mariyah did not seek reimbursement for any travel expenses associated with her trip to Southern California, such as gasoline and meals. And the number of days for which Mariyah claimed lost wages (3 days while the car was missing and 10 days while waiting for it to be repaired) is not so beyond the realm of possibility that no rational judge could find that length of time foreseeable.
Defendant relies on People v. Thygesen (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 988, but we find that case distinguishable. Thygesen rented a cement mixer from an equipment rental yard (Bonner), never returned it, and eventually pleaded guilty to stealing it. At the restitution hearing, the trial court awarded Bonner the monthly rental cost of the cement mixer multiplied by the 13 months that had passed since Thygesen took it. No evidence was presented regarding the condition of the mixer or how often it had been rented before it was stolen. (Id. at pp. 990–991.) The Court of Appeal reversed the restitution award, finding it was not supported by the evidence. The court reasoned that despite lacking any evidence other than the rental rate for the mixer, “the trial court made an award based on the speculative proposition that the mixer would have been rented out every week for 13 months.” (Id. at p. 995.) The court continued: “Logic dictates that had the mixer been that valuable, Bonner would have replaced it in a heartbeat. The fact that Bonner did not do so leads to the suspicion that the mixer was not all that profitable or essential to the business.” (Ibid.)
Thygesen did not involve a claim of intervening causation. Unlike the victim in Thygesen who claimed lost rental income despite never replacing the cement mixer, here Mariyah took the car to be repaired almost immediately after it was recovered. And the 13 days of lost wages claimed by Mariyah is reasonable, in contrast to the duration of speculative rental income requested by Bonner.
Minor posits that Mariyah “could have obtained those repairs/estimates locally, while earning her wages by renting a car or taking the light-rail.” (Footnotes omitted.) That argument is irrelevant to whether lost wages were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of minor’s misconduct. And even if Mariyah had chosen to have her car repaired locally, minor would still have been responsible for any associated time away from work, plus the cost of a rental car to use while her mother’s car was being repaired.
We find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s implicit decision that Mariyah’s lost wages were a foreseeable type of injury.
III. DISPOSITION
The restitution order is affirmed.

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Grover, J.




WE CONCUR:



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Rushing, P. J.




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Premo, J.