Filed 11/13/18 In re G.J. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Erin K. Alexander, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Dennis Moore and Dennis Moore for Defendant and Appellant M.J.

Maryann M. Goode, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant Minors.

Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, and Svetlana Kauper, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I

INTRODUCTION

Due to work obligations, M.J. (Mother) allowed her boyfriend to watch her two-year-old son G.J. and five-year-old son Ga.J. While in her boyfriend’s care, G.J. suffered numerous serious injuries and Mother failed to protect him. As a result, the children were removed from Mother’s care, and Mother was offered reunification services. On appeal, Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings removing the children from her care.[1] The minors have also appealed. On appeal, the minors argue that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order granting Mother reunification services absent “competent testimony” and best interest of the children. Counsel for the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) responds that there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders, and agrees with the minors that the court erred in granting Mother reunification services. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

II

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mother has two sons: Ga.J. and G.J. Currently, Mother is 23, Ga.J. is six, and G.J. is three and a half years old. The family lived together with the maternal grandmother in Big Bear City, California. Mother worked for a local supermarket, and she began dating a coworker, M.R., in early 2016. M.R. became a live-in boyfriend in July 2016. Sometimes Mother asked M.R. to babysit her sons while she worked. On May 29, 2017, due to work obligations, Mother left her sons with M.R. Later that day, G.J. was transported to Big Bear Community Hospital. G.J. was unconscious and, subsequently, he was airlifted to Loma Linda University Children’s Hospital (Loma Linda).

On May 30, 2017, CFS received a referral alleging physical abuse and general neglect of G.J. and investigated the allegations. M.R. reported that he had run a waist high bath for G.J., placed the child in the water with toys, and left him alone. Ga.J. was left alone playing in the bedroom across the hallway from the bathroom. M.R. was in the kitchen washing dishes and making hotdogs for the children, but he went back and forth to check on the children. After the food was ready, M.R. gave a hotdog to Ga.J. and G.J., who was still taking a bath in the bathtub. M.R. went back to the kitchen, but he could “hear [the children] talking back and forth to each other.” When he went to check on G.J. again, M.R. discovered the child “with a funny look on his face and blue lips” choking on the hotdog. G.J. was unresponsive, so M.R. picked up the child, placed him over his shoulder, and hit the child on the back trying to dislodge the hotdog. When the child’s body “went limp,” M.R. called 911. The 911 operator “ ‘walked [M.R.] through’ ” the lifesaving measures to revive G.J., and M.R. began chest compressions on the child. M.R. also stated that while performing CPR, he had pushed on G.J.’s chest “but maybe too low because it caused [the child] to have a bowel movement and urinate on himself.” The paramedics soon arrived, took over, and removed more of the hotdog from G.J.’s mouth. M.R. called Mother, and she rushed home from work. Mother left with G.J. in an ambulance. G.J. was unconscious and in critical condition.

After G.J. was airlifted to Loma Linda, Dr. Park performed a bronchoscopy and laryngoscopy on G.J. Dr. Park found no further foreign objects in G.J., and diagnosed G.J. with aspiration of a foreign body and acute respiratory failure. The medical reports indicated that G.J. had suffered a massive stroke and acute respiratory failure, with damage to the occipital lobe and vision center. G.J. remained hospitalized for about three weeks.

Dr. Young, a forensic medical examiner at Loma Linda, conducted a physical examination of G.J. Dr. Young noted various suspicious bruises on G.J.’s head, ears, mouth, chin, stomach, back, knees, penis, and anus, as well as internal injuries on G.J.’s liver, kidney, and pancreas. Dr. Young suspected non-accidental trauma to G.J. In reviewing the admission records, Dr. Young also noted that at the time of G.J.’s admission, the family gave two different accounts of the incident. A physical examination of G.J. was also performed and found “The extensive forehead bruising, penis bruising, rhabdomyolysis and oral injuries” to be consistent with physical abuse. There were also concerns for delay in seeking medical care because G.J. presented with severe hypothermia upon arrival at the hospital and the child had a torn upper frenulum with damage to the tongue and scarring on the lower lips. There was also a concern that G.J.’s vision was affected as well because the child was unable to track and was either partially or fully blind. A referral to an ophthalmologist for retinal hemorrhages was recommended. The social worker opined that the injuries were “indicative of both physical and sexual abuse.”

The social worker interviewed Mother, the maternal grandmother, M.R., and Ga.J. Mother refused to believe that her boyfriend purposefully caused the injuries to her son, and believed the injuries could have been sustained through chest compressions or medical intervention. Mother denied spanking her boys, claiming she usually gave them a time out or took things away from them. She denied any controlled substance usage in her home. Mother also stated that the only people who babysat the boys were the maternal grandmother, the maternal aunt, a friend, and M.R. Mother asserted that M.R. only watched the children infrequently and that M.R. was not allowed to discipline the boys. As to G.J.’s injuries, Mother blamed the paramedics for the bruises on his head and the hospital for his anal injuries because they were “putting something in [G.J.’s] anus.” She also claimed that the scratches on G.J.’s penis occurred because the child squeezed it too hard, and the other body injuries could have been caused when G.J. climbed a shelf five months before the choking incident.

The maternal grandmother reported that she was not home at the time of the incident on May 29, 2017. However, M.R. stated that he had kept the boys in the bedroom because the maternal grandmother was asleep on the couch in the living room. The maternal grandmother also denied any physical discipline in the home and claimed that she did not know how G.J. had sustained his injuries.

M.R. also denied hitting or physically disciplining the children. He claimed that he left the discipline to Mother. M.R. reported that Mother would spank the boys on the butt with an open hand, but she was not abusive. During the interview, M.R. disclosed that he smoked marijuana on a daily basis to help him relax and that Mother knew he had smoked earlier in the morning on May 29. He also reported that earlier in the morning on May 29, the couple had gotten into an argument over infidelity issues with Mother screaming at him and flushing a ring he had given Mother down the toilet.

Ga.J. reported that his brother had choked on a hotdog and that M.R. never hit them, but Mother hit them on the butt and his grandmother hit them with a spoon. Whether Ga.J. was telling the whole truth appeared questionable to the social worker. Ga.J. later reported that M.R. had smacked G.J. in the head.

The social worker also interviewed the children’s biological fathers. Neither father lived nearby. Ga.J.’s father reported that he had a history of substance abuse and was living in Oregon. G.J.’s father stated he had a brief relationship with Mother for six months which ended before G.J. was born. G.J.’s father lived eight hours away in Loomis, California, but he said he loved his son and was willing to do whatever was necessary to secure custody. Background checks revealed both fathers had criminal histories. Mother did not have a criminal history, but she had one referral for general neglect in August 2016. The referral was evaluated out with few details provided.

On June 1, 2017, CFS filed petitions on behalf of the boys pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[2] section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b) (failure to protect), (d) (sexual abuse), (e) (severe physical abuse to a child under the age of five), (g) (no provision for support), (i) (cruelty to child), and (j) (abuse of sibling). Both petitions alleged that while under Mother’s custody G.J. had sustained several injuries; Mother’s live-in boyfriend had physically abused G.J. resulting in several non-accidental injuries including, but not limited to: bruising to the scalp, forehead, behind both ears, stomach, back, penis and scrotum areas; a torn frenulum—the fold of skin between the gum and the lip; puncture marks on the child’s right palm; abrasions on his anus; blood underneath his thumb nail; dried blood in the corner of his mouth; busted lip; internal injuries to the liver, kidney, and pancreas; and what appeared to be an adult bite mark to the child’s right hand. Due to the location of some of the injuries, sexual abuse was suspected. The petitions further alleged that Ga.J.’s father and G.J.’s father suffered substance abuse problems and were unable to provide for their sons. The petitions were amended on June 2, 2017, and October 19, 2017, with some corrections and additions.

The detention hearing was held on June 2, 2017. The juvenile court formally detained the boys and ordered CFS to provide services to Mother pending the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing. Ga.J. was placed in foster care while G.J. remained hospitalized. The court also provided Mother with weekly visits, over minors’ counsel’s objection, but the children were not to have any contact with M.R.

During a subsequent interview, Mother disclosed some concerning relationship problems between M.R. and her sons. She reported that M.R. would get frustrated when G.J. cried and that M.R. would not console or comfort the boys when they were upset. Rather, M.R. would walk out of the room. Mother also noticed that G.J. did not want to be in the same room with M.R. unless she was present. G.J. would cry and want Mother to pick him up to walk past M.R. Nonetheless, Mother appeared to be in denial that M.R. caused G.J.’s injuries, which caused the social worker to conclude that Mother was not protective and would not shield the children from future abuse.

Ga.J. participated in a forensic interview and physical examination on June 2, 2017. During the interview Ga.J. presented as friendly, shy, distracted, nervous, and guarded. The evaluator noted that when questioned about physical abuse, Ga.J. would change the topic and start talking about something else. Ga.J. also tried to avoid talking about the hotdog incident because he did not want to get in trouble. Eventually, Ga.J. reported that M.R. had spanked his brother on the butt with a red triangle toy. Ga.J.’s physical examination revealed some non-specific skin findings including scars, bruises, and abrasions on his body which could be indicative of physical abuse, especially given G.J.’s case.

G.J. remained hospitalized at Health Bridge Children’s Hospital for rehabilitation services. G.J. did not appear to have suffered any developmental delays. He was able to hold his head up and was able to give simple responses to questions. However, he still needed to work on crawling and rolling over. G.J. was also not able to track with his eyes, which concerned the doctors that he might have suffered partial vision loss. During his hospital stay, G.J. appeared to be well bonded to his mother, and his mother’s presence seemed to help his recovery process.

By August 2017, G.J. had made great progress. Medical staff reported that G.J.’s language skills were above average for his age, his vision had improved, and he was walking with assistance. However, G.J. would need a wheelchair. Due to his progress, G.J. was released into a special needs foster home on August 15, 2017. G.J.’s caretaker reported that G.J. continued to make progress with physical therapy and that he was seeing a physical therapist twice a week to work on his fine and gross motor skills.

The contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was continued numerous times. The hearings were continued, in part, because Mother’s retained trial counsel fell ill and needed more time to prepare. Pending the outcome of the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, Mother participated in services and supervised visits with the children once a week for two hours.

Mother’s visits with her boys were described as appropriate. It was also reported that Ga.J. appeared to be bonded with his mother and that G.J. had a “strong attachment” to his mother. It was further noted that G.J. was “inconsolable” when visits with his mother were over and that G.J. had a positive and emotional response when his mother was present, which helped with G.J.’s recovery process.

Mother participated in a psychological evaluation on September 2, 2017, with Dr. John Kinsman. Dr. Kinsman found Mother presented as “guarded” and “defensive” and to be “overtly cooperative.” She attempted to present herself in a favorable light and tended to present herself as being relatively free of common shortcomings to which most individuals would admit. Although Dr. Kinsman saw no direct correlation between Mother’s parenting style and G.J.’s injuries, he noted that Mother “may at times expose others to risk when she takes on responsibilities in excess of her abilities.” Nonetheless, Dr. Kinsman opined that nothing in the test results indicated Mother would directly threaten her children’s safety. Dr. Kinsman believed Mother could benefit from services such as psychotherapy and parenting classes to enhance her insight and her parenting skills. Dr. Kinsman also found that it was likely that services over a period of six months would prevent re-abuse of the children.

Subsequently, Mother began attending therapy sessions on a weekly basis and parenting classes. She completed a parenting program on October 4, 2017. She also completed a CPR class for children and a nurturing program. Mother’s therapist reported that Mother was cooperative, she was working on her treatment goals, and her prognosis was good. Mother submitted several declarations attesting to her good character, her good parenting skills, and the love she had for her children.

Furthermore, Mother obtained a temporary restraining order against M.R., but maintained that “she [would] never know what happened that day.” She nevertheless wished to take precautions for herself and her children. In her request for the restraining order filed on October 10, 2017, Mother indicated that there were “allegations” of physical and sexual abuse made against her former boyfriend. Mother also cited the juvenile court as the reason for seeking a protective order, noting “The Juvenile Dependency Judge recommended I get a restraining order.” In addition, Mother asserted that, although she was pregnant with his baby, she had separated from M.R. and did not intend to reconcile with him.

CFS acknowledged that Mother loved her children and noted the strong attachment between Mother and G.J. during visits. However, CFS was still concerned because Mother refused to believe her boyfriend had caused G.J.’s injuries. She also refused to believe the medical evidence and reports in this case. Consequently, CFS requested the juvenile court to bypass Mother’s services pursuant to section 361.5.

The contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was eventually held on January 4, 2018. At that time, Mother testified that soon after the incident in May 2017, she had broken up with M.R. in June 2017 and that she had filed a request for a restraining order against him in October 2017. During her testimony, Mother also spoke about the “stair” incident and the “shelving” incident. She explained that in April 2017, G.J. had fallen down the stairs while in the care of M.R. and that due to the fall, G.J. had suffered a torn frenulum, needed stitches on his bottom lip, and there was a scar on his left eyebrow. The “shelving” incident occurred sometime over the winter months when M.R. was watching the children. Mother explained that during the “shelving” incident, G.J., who was a climber, had climbed up a shelving unit and the shelf fell on G.J. while M.R. was making the bed. Mother believed that M.R.’s failure to properly supervise the children resulted in harm, but she did not believe he had purposefully harmed them or had sexually abused G.J. Nonetheless, she was still concerned, had read the medical records, and knew M.R. had failed his polygraph test. Mother assured the juvenile court that she had separated from M.R., even though she had recently given birth to the couple’s first child together and admitted that she did not leave him until two weeks after the incident. She also noted that there was a possibility that M.R. had caused G.J.’s injuries, but could not state with certainty he did what was alleged. Mother further averred that M.R. tried to commit suicide two weeks after the May 29, 2017 incident in her presence and acknowledged that she did not tell the social worker about the suicide attempt.

Following Mother’s testimony, the court heard closing arguments from the parties. CFS’s counsel asked the juvenile court to sustain the petitions, noting G.J. had suffered severe physical abuse, and his mother knew or should have known about the abuse. CFS’s counsel also stated that Mother knew that M.R. used marijuana daily and that she knew about the two prior incidents resulting in injuries to G.J. CFS’s counsel further pointed out the Children’s Assessment Center report, which clearly concluded G.J. was physically abused, and asserted that Mother knew the child showed fear around M.R. The minors’ trial counsel set forth the bruises and injuries G.J. had sustained, noting the injuries were not simply a result of feeding the child a hotdog in the bathtub and that Mother was in denial. Both CFS’s counsel and the minors’ trial attorney asked the court to bypass services.

On January 5, 2018, the juvenile court issued its decision. Regarding G.J., the court sustained the child’s petition under section 300, subdivision (b), for failure to protect and subdivision (e) for severe physical abuse of a child under the age of five as modified. The juvenile court dismissed the sexual abuse allegations under section 300, subdivision (d), the physical abuse allegations under section 300, subdivision (a), and the cruelty to children allegations under section 300, subdivision (i). Regarding Ga.J., the court sustained the petition under section 300, subdivision (b), for Mother’s failure to protect, subdivision (g) for his father’s failure to provide support, and subdivision (j) for abuse of sibling.

In making its findings, the juvenile court stated: “I do struggle with mother’s credibility regarding several of these issues. I will note that in the original detention report she denied ever spanking the minors even though [M.R.] acknowledged that mom spanked the minors. It seemed pretty clear to me that she was trying to present herself in the situation in the best light. She denied any drug use in the home even though [M.R.] admitted to using marijuana daily. And she has not been forthcoming with the social worker particularly about major instances. I find very striking the suicide attempt which I think plays into some of the issues that have occurred here. [¶] So I didn’t find her to be particularly credible about what she knew or should have known in the home . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] But of particular concern to this Court is I do believe that mother’s quite in tune to her children’s behaviors and reactions. I do think that she knows her children well, and I think that she was well aware that [G.J.] exhibited fear of [M.R.]. . . . [¶] So I think that those factors are consistent with the information that the mom knew or should have known that he was being physically abused.”

Finding clear and convincing evidence of harm, the court removed the children from parental custody and provided Mother with supervised weekly visits. The court also ordered reunification services to Mother and G.J.’s father. In making its findings, the court explained: “The issue then as counsel has laid out from the county is that the bypass provisions in [section] 361.5[, subdivision ](b)(5) indicates that the Court shall not order services unless by a preponderance of the evidence based on competent testimony I find that services are likely to prevent reabuse or continued neglect or that failure to try reunification would be detrimental. And I have struggled with what the appropriate decision is in this case. I have grave concerns that the mother fails to recognize the physical abuse. I put a great amount of stock and agree with the county’s argument that after 26 therapy sessions, it would appear to be very difficult to make a finding that additional therapy would get us to a different place. [¶] This Court finds that it is that the mother knew or should have known, so the issue I see if there was ever to be a successful reunification is mother is going to need to accept some responsibility for having left the child with someone where there were these significant signs of abuse. We are not even close to that posture yet. The mother again I think wants to present her family in a very positive light. She wants to be looked at as a very good mother. That’s important to her. I think she has minimized the issues in the home. Her statements over time have been inconsistent. [¶] And I don’t know that I can see whether that is going to change. The balance I am making, though, is I do have a mother who has been out of the relationship for six and a half months. There has been no contact. And is there any hope that the position of mother could change with additional services and is there a preponderance of the evidence that additional services are likely to prevent reabuse? And I am willing to find that there is a finding that additional services could prevent reabuse and I am going to give the mother an opportunity and services for the following reasons. Mother’s engaged in multiple services. She hasn’t made the progress that’s going to need to be made yet, but she is clearly open to services as she has engaged in them continually throughout the case. [¶] I will also note that I think there is evidence of the bond in this case. I have two children that lived consistently with the mother from the time of birth. They had never been removed until this incident had occurred, and although I was hopeful there would be additional evidence presented regarding bond, I will note that the reports do reflect a bond. And as to the little one, it’s in the jurisdictional/dispositional report, mother was at his bedside from the beginning of this throughout all of his rehabilitation, indicates that the social worker noted [G.J.] has a strong attachment to his mother. He is inconsolable when visits are over. [Ga.J.] is bonded to his mother. Visits are going well and appears to be appropriate. [¶] So I am going to find there is sufficient evidence to establish that services are in the child’s best interest.” Since G.J. was under the age of three at the time of the initial removal, the court warned Mother that services could be limited to six months.

On January 10, 2018, Mother filed a timely notice to appeal challenging the jurisdictional findings and the removal of the children. On February 27, 2018, minors filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the court’s order of reunification services to Mother.

III

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdictional Findings

Mother argues there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (e) and (b). Specifically, she asserts that there was no evidence to suggest G.J. was being abused by M.R. or anyone else prior to May 29, 2017, and that there was no evidence the children were at any risk of neglect or abuse. We disagree.

“ ‘ “A dependency proceeding under section 300 is essentially a bifurcated proceeding.” [Citation.] First, the court must determine whether the minor is within any of the descriptions set out in section 300 and therefore subject to its jurisdiction.’ [Citation.] ‘ “The petitioner in a dependency proceeding must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child who is the subject of a petition comes under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The basic question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.’ ” (In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237, 243-244.)

When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence, that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022.) We review the entire record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings, resolving all conflicts and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings. (Ibid.) Those inferences “must be reasonable and logical; ‘inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding.’ ” (In re B.T. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 685, 691.) “We do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or resolve evidentiary conflicts. The appellant has the burden to demonstrate there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or orders.” (In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 135-136.)

The juvenile court asserts jurisdiction over the children, not the parents. If sufficient evidence supported jurisdiction based on one parent’s conduct, it was proper for the court to assert jurisdiction, irrespective of the other parent’s conduct. (§ 302, subd. (a); In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 482.) Similarly, if substantial evidence supports findings related to any of the asserted bases for jurisdiction, we will affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 (Alexis E.).)

Section 300, subdivision (e), authorizes a juvenile court to take jurisdiction of a minor under the age of five who “has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent, or by any person known by the parent, if the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the person was physically abusing the child.” (§ 300, subd. (e).) The social services agency is required to prove three things to establish jurisdiction under subdivision (e): “(1) there is a minor under the age of five; (2) who has suffered severe physical abuse as defined in section 300, subdivision (e); (3) by a parent or any person known to the parent if the parent knew or reasonably should have known that the person was physically abusing the minor.” (In re E.H. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 659, 668 (E.H.).) The statute “does not require the parent’s actual or constructive knowledge that the [child] in fact suffered severe physical abuse within the statutory definition. Indeed, several of the listed injuries, such as bleeding (internal), internal swelling, and bone fracture, may not be visible; they may be discovered only after medical examination or testing.” (In re Joshua H. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1729.)

Correspondingly, a child is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under subdivision (b) of section 300 when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . .” (§ 300, subd. (b).) “The child shall continue to be a dependent child pursuant to [subdivision (b) of section 300] only so long as is necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).)

As the California Supreme Court has observed, “section 300 does not require that a child actually be abused or neglected before the juvenile court can assume jurisdiction.” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).) “ ‘The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; see § 300.2 [the purpose of dependency law].) The focus of section 300 is to avert harm to the child. (In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 535-536.) The purpose of section 300 is “to limit court intervention to situations in which children are threatened with serious physical or emotional harm” as a result of their parent’s conduct. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 303.)

Here, there is no dispute that G.J. suffered severe physical abuse. Mother, however, claims that she had no reason to believe M.R. physically abused G.J. when she left the children in his care. The record belies Mother’s contention. The evidence, as set out above, shows that Mother knew or should have known G.J. was being physically abused by M.R. The medical reports showed that G.J. had multiple bruises and injuries prior to his admission to Loma Linda. Except for a scratch on his shin, Mother denied seeing any bruises on the child prior to the incident. She nonetheless had an explanation as to why G.J. had bruising on his penis and scrotum. She stated that G.J. had caused his penis injuries by scratching his penis and squeezing his scrotum. This suggests that Mother saw penile bruising prior to the May 29 incident but did not question the origin of the injuries.

Furthermore, Mother knew that M.R. smoked marijuana daily and that M.R. became frustrated when the children whined and cried. Mother knew that M.R. would not comfort the children but instead would walk out of the room. She also knew that G.J. was fearful of M.R. before the May 29 choking incident. In fact, sometimes Mother would have to pick up the child to walk past M.R. Ga.J. also reported that M.R. smacked G.J.’s head when G.J. got in trouble. Moreover, although M.R. babysat the children occasionally, there were at least two other occasions when G.J. suffered injuries while in M.R.’s care. At the jurisdictional hearing, Mother described the two incidents—the stair incident and the shelf incident. Both these incidents occurred prior to the May 29 choking incident. In addition, Mother provided contradictory statements concerning her home life to paint herself in a favorable light, as noted by the juvenile court, and failed to disclose that she and M.R. had argued about infidelity issues on the morning of the May 29 choking incident.

Despite the overwhelming medical evidence in this case, prior incidents resulting in injuries to G.J. while in M.R.’s care, and Mother’s knowledge of G.J.’s fear in M.R.’s presence, Mother continued to be in denial that M.R. had caused the severe injuries to G.J. The juvenile court could reasonably infer a consciousness of guilt from Mother’s denials, from Mother’s contradictory statements concerning her home life, as noted by the court, as well as from her intransigent refusal to recognize it was M.R. who had caused G.J.’s injuries that almost killed her son.

We are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the court’s determinations. (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) The juvenile court found Mother’s explanations and excuses incredible. The court also concluded that Mother was “clearly on notice” the children were being abused prior to the May 29 choking incident. Clear and convincing evidence supports that judgment.

Having found substantial evidence to support a finding of jurisdiction based on section 300, subdivision (e), we need not address Mother’s contention that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of jurisdiction based on section 300, subdivision (b). (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773 [“ ‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ ”]; accord, In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492; D.M. v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1127; Alexis E., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 451; Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 72; In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875.)

Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings.

B. Dispositional Findings and Orders

Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred in removing the children from her custody because there was insufficient evidence to show that the children would be in substantial danger if returned to her care, and there were reasonable means available to protect the children without removing them from her care. We disagree.

In dependency proceedings, if a child is not returned to the original custodial parent’s home at the dispositional phase, section 361, subdivision (c)(1), as relevant here, requires the juvenile court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the” child if he or she were returned home, and “there are no reasonable means by which” to protect the child absent removal from the parent’s physical custody. (See In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282, 288.)

“The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. [Citations.]” (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136, overruled on other grounds in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.) The court may consider past events in determining whether there is a danger to the child and need not wait until the child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child. (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 163, 165 [where parent had not grasped danger of incident in which parent almost ran over child’s foot while driving and was in denial regarding reported incidents of physical abuse, substantial evidence supported juvenile court’s decision to remove child from parent’s custody].)

While the juvenile court must find clear and convincing evidence, we determine whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion. (In re Javier G. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 453, 462-463.)

Mother argues that by the time of the dispositional hearing, the issues leading to the initial detention of the children had been addressed, and the risks to them ameliorated. She points out that by the January 4, 2018 dispositional hearing, she had ended her relationship with M.R. and had a permanent restraining order against him.

The juvenile court weighed these facts against the social worker’s reports that Mother continued to deny that physical abuse occurred while in M.R.’s care. The juvenile court found that Mother knew the children were being abused prior to the May 29 choking incident, yet Mother failed to take any actions to protect the children. G.J.’s injuries were severe and Mother knew G.J. was fearful of M.R. Forensic evidence showed that G.J.’s injuries resulted at different times and were not caused from the hotdog incident. The physicians suspected G.J.’s injuries were non-accidental and resulted from physical abuse. Moreover, since jurisdiction had been established pursuant to section 300, subdivision (e), prima facie evidence showed that the children could not safely be returned to Mother’s care. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1) [“The fact that a minor has been adjudicated a dependent child of the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of Section 300 shall constitute prima facie evidence that the minor cannot be safely left in the physical custody of the parent or guardian with whom the minor resided at the time of injury”].) In short, there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court in finding clear and convincing evidence that the children would be in substantial danger if returned to Mother’s care.

There is also substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that there were no reasonable means available to protect the children without removing them from Mother’s care. Mother still did not understand the nature of the risk and continued to defend M.R. There were also concerns regarding Mother’s relationship with M.R., since she had just given birth to the couple’s first child together. Accordingly, Mother has failed to demonstrate that the juvenile court erred in removing the children from Mother’s care.

C. Reunification Services

CFS and the minors argue that substantial evidence failed to support the juvenile court’s order granting Mother reunification services.

“We affirm an order denying [or granting] reunification services if the order is supported by substantial evidence.” (In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 839.) “ ‘In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact. All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict, if possible.’ ” (Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 600 (Francisco G.).)

Section 361.5, subdivision (b), “sets forth a number of circumstances in which reunification services may be bypassed altogether. These bypass provisions represent the Legislature’s recognition that it may be fruitless to provide reunification services under certain circumstances.” (Francisco G., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 597.) “Section 361.5, subdivision (b) symbolizes the Legislature’s recognition of the fact that it may be fruitless to provide reunification services under certain circumstances.” (Deborah S. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 741, 750.)

“Family reunification services play a critical role in dependency proceedings.” (Tyrone W. v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 839, 845.) Even when jurisdiction is amply justified, as it is here at the early stages of dependency, family reunification is the desired goal. Toward that end, parents are offered reunification services. “As a general rule, reunification services are offered to parents whose children are removed from their custody in an effort to eliminate the conditions leading to loss of custody and facilitate reunification of parent and child. This furthers the goal of preservation of family, whenever possible.” (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 478; see § 361.5, subd. (a); In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1227.) However, when it is shown “by clear and convincing evidence that a dependent minor falls under subdivision (e) of section 300, the general rule favoring reunification services no longer applies; it is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of governmental resources.” (Raymond C. v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 159, 164.) Section 361.5, subdivision (b), “sets forth a number of circumstances in which reunification services may be bypassed altogether.” (Francisco G., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 597.)

A juvenile court may deny reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5), when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence “[t]hat the child was brought within the jurisdiction of the court under subdivision (e) of Section 300 because of the conduct of that parent or guardian.” As previously explained, the parent need not have actual or constructive knowledge that the child in fact suffered severe physical abuse in order to fall within the statutory definition. (E.H., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 669-670.) “Section 300, subdivision (e), and subdivision (b)(5) of section 361.5 . . . do not require identification of the perpetrator. [Citation.] Read together, those provisions permit denial of reunification services to either parent on a showing that a parent or someone known by a parent physically abused a minor. [Citation.] Thus, ‘conduct’ as it is used in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) refers to the parent in the household who knew or should have known of the abuse, whether or not that parent was the actual abuser.” (In re Kenneth M. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 16, 21.) Here, the juvenile court found that G.J. was brought within the court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (e) (severe physical abuse). And, as explained above, ante, II.A., which outlines the extensive physical abuse suffered by G.J., substantial evidence supports this finding.

Thus, under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5), the court is barred form ordering family reunification services, unless at least one of two exceptions to family reunification services bypass applied. “[T]he court shall not order reunification in any situation described in paragraph (5) of subdivision (b) unless it finds that, based on competent testimony, those services are likely to prevent reabuse or continued neglect of the child or that failure to try reunification will be detrimental to the child because the child is closely and positively attached to that parent.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c).) When a juvenile court bypasses family reunification services due to finding a child suffered “ ‘severe physical abuse,’ ” the focus of the proceedings turns to the child’s need for permanence and stability, and not on family reunification. (In re A.M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1074-1075.) In such a case, the legislative presumption is for services not to be provided to the parent. (Ibid.)

In this case, the juvenile court did not bypass Mother’s reunification services, finding that “additional services could prevent reabuse” and that “services are in the [children’s] best interest.” Although, despite participating in services, as the court noted, Mother was not making sufficient progress, we cannot say the juvenile court erred in granting Mother services. By the time of the dispositional hearing, Mother had been participating in weekly therapy sessions and had completed a parenting program. She had also completed a CPR class for children and a nurturing program. Mother’s therapist reported that Mother was cooperative, she was working on her treatment goals, and her prognosis was good. Mother provided several declarations attesting to her good character, her good parenting skills, and the love she had for her children. Furthermore, Mother’s psychological evaluator, Dr. Kinsman, opined that nothing in Mother’s test results indicated Mother would directly threaten her children’s safety, and found that it was likely that services would prevent re-abuse of the children.

Moreover, as the court noted, the record shows that the children were bonded to Mother and had lived with Mother their entire lives from the time of birth until the instant proceedings. In addition, Mother’s visits with her children were appropriate and Mother had been at G.J.’s bedside throughout his rehabilitation. The social worker reported that Ga.J. was bonded to his mother and that G.J. had a “strong attachment” to his mother and was “inconsolable” when visits with his mother ended. The social worker also reported that G.J. had a positive and emotional response when his mother was present which helped with G.J.’s recovery process. Additionally, although CFS was still concerned with Mother’s relationship with M.R., the court found that Mother had had no contact with M.R. for six and a half months. The record shows that Mother had separated from M.R. two weeks after the May 29 incident and had obtained a restraining order against M.R.

Considering the totality of Mother’s effort, including steps she took during the pendency of the dispositional hearing, the children’s attachment to their mother, and viewing the record in the light most favorable to the court’s ruling, we cannot say the court erred in finding that the bypass provision did not apply. While we agree with the minors and CFS that Mother’s reliability on M.R.’s version of the events was troubling and Mother had not made sufficient progress after six months of services, we will not overturn the juvenile court’s determination that services were in the best interest of the children.

Reunification services are the “ ‘ “first priority when child dependency proceedings are commenced” ’ ” (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 98) because they “implement ‘the law’s strong preference for maintaining the family relationships.’ ” (In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1787). “ ‘It is difficult, if not impossible, to exaggerate the importance of reunification in the dependency system.’ ” (In re Albert T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 207, 217.) “ ‘[T]he primary focus of the trial court must be to save troubled families.’ ” (Id. at p. 218.)

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in providing Mother with reunification services.

IV

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

SLOUGH

J.