In re Hannah W.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 8/12/13  In re Hannah W. CA2/7

 

 

 

 

 

 

>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

> 

 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115>.

 

 

 

IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

DIVISION
SEVEN

 

 
>

In re HANNAH W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.	B245937       (Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,               Plaintiff and Respondent,               v.   JENNIFER W.,               Defendant and Appellant.	Super. Ct. No. CK90173)

 

            APPEAL from a judgment of
the Superior Court of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Los Angeles
County, Elizabeth Kim, Juvenile Court Referee.  Affirmed.

            Neale B. Gold, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

            John Krattli, County Counsel, James
M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Jeanette Cauble, Senior Deputy County
Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

 

_______________________

Jennifer W. appeals the
court’s decision to continue dependency court jurisdiction over her daughter,
Hannah W.href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"
title="">[1]  We affirm.

FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Hannah W. came to the attention of the href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">Department of Children and Family Services
in September 2011 after Jennifer W. hit her with a wooden back scratcher,
leaving bruises and red marks.  Jennifer
W. told DCFS that she hit her daughter, who had recently turned three years
old, multiple times with the back scratcher on the hands and legs because she
defecated in her pull-up training diapers. 
Visual inspection of Hannah W. revealed marks on her forearms, left
hand, right knee, right calf, mid-back, and lower back. 

Jennifer W. acknowledged having disciplined Hannah W.
in this manner before, but said she usually put her in time out or made her go
to sleep.  She claimed to be shocked when
she saw the bruises on her daughter, as she had not bruised in the past when
hit with the wooden back scratcher. 
Hannah W.’s father told DCFS that a year ago he had seen marks and
bruises on Hannah W., as well as a deep scratch on her neck that he did not
believe Hannah W. could have inflicted on herself.  He did not call the child abuse hotline
because he thought that Jennifer W. would not permit him to see Hannah W.
if he did.  He had seen Jennifer W.
punish Hannah W. by “popping” her on the wrist or legs, and he was concerned
that she would have been more aggressive in the punishment if he had not been
present, as Jennifer W. knew that he did not believe in spanking. 

DCFS detained Hannah W. and filed a dependency
petition alleging that Hannah W. fell within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions
(a) and (b).  Within days of Hannah W.’s
detention, Jennifer W. enrolled in parenting education, anger management
training, and individual counseling.  She
also began undergoing drug tests.  She
pleaded no contest to the allegations of the petition, and Hannah W. was
declared a dependent child of the court under section 300, subdivisions (a) and
(b).  The juvenile court ordered family
reunification services. 

Hannah W. and her mother had monitored visitation at
the start.  Early on, while Jennifer W.
was appropriate during visits, Hannah W. had a difficult time warming up to her
mother and expressed anger at her. 
Later, Hannah W.’s caregiver reported that Hannah W. managed well during
visits, but that afterwards, she typically shut down or threw a tantrum.  Jennifer W. was observed to try her best to
engage Hannah W. during visits, and interactions were successful until
Hannah W. had a tantrum, which tended to occur when she was being
redirected or did not get her way. 

Jennifer W. was enrolled in href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">individual therapy, completed her
parenting classes, and completed her anger management program.  Jennifer W. participated freely in the
parenting training, attempting to apply the skills she learned in class when
she met with Hannah W. for visits. 
Jennifer W. told DCFS that she had learned a lot in the parenting class,
now understood why Hannah W. was removed from her care, and felt confident that
she would be able to parent her daughter more effectively when they were
reunified.  The facilitator of the anger
management classes told DCFS that she was confident that Jennifer W. had a
better grasp of her anger and that she was able to develop appropriate ways to
identify and cope with her anger, as well as adequate problem solving skills.  All of Jennifer W.’s drug tests were
negative.

The court gave DCFS discretion to permit overnight
visits for Hannah W. with Jennifer W.  By
March 2012 Jennifer W.’s visits were unmonitored, four times per week, for two
to five hours each.  In March 2012 the
court ordered further liberalization of visitation, and for several months
Hannah W. spent weekends with her mother. 
Jennifer W. initially had difficulty handling Hannah W.’s tantrums
and emotional outbursts; the foster parent assisted her in redirecting Hannah
W., and Jennifer W.’s ability to handle the tantrums improved. 

In April 2012 Hannah W. began individual therapy and
in May 2012 Hannah W. and Jennifer W. began conjoint counseling.  Hannah W. was ordered placed in
Jennifer W.’s home on May 14, 2012. 
Family preservation services began in July 2012.  DCFS reported in November 2012 that the
services were helping:  “Previously
Hanna[h W.] would tantrum uncontrollably for an hour and now mother is able
to redirect Hanna[h W.] within a 15 minute span and control the situation.  Mother indicated that she feels that the
services are working and mother is also able to better redirect Hanna[h W.]
during periods when she is tantruming.” 
Additionally, “since the child was returned to home of parent mother,
and started receiving therapeutic sessions with her mother,” the social worker
had “observed that the child is able to communicate better and that the
relationship between mother and child is much more relaxed as they continue to
work together to improve bonding as well as Hanna[h W.’s] tantrums.” 

Jennifer W. was eager to gain full custody of her
daughter, fully compliant with the case plan, and willing to participate in
services.  Although Jennifer W. wanted
juvenile court jurisdiction to be terminated, DCFS opposed termination because
the family preservation services being provided were so central to the
improvement in the family’s situation: 
the teaching and demonstration components of the services “continue[] to
play a central role of helping mother learn to put her parenting skills in
practice when Hanna[h W.] has tantrums.” 
DCFS believed four months of family preservation services to be
insufficient to ensure stability in the progress made. 

The court conducted a contested section 364 review
hearing on November 27, 2012.  Jennifer
W. testified that Hannah W. rarely had tantrums, and when she cried because she
did not get her way, Jennifer W. would “put her on punishment
and . . . make her go to her room.”  Jennifer W. testified that for misbehavior
Hannah W., then four years old, was sent to her room for “an hour or two” “in
solitary” without books or toys. 
Jennifer W. acknowledged that she had been told that time outs should
last “a couple of minutes” but that her parenting instructor did not say that
was a requirement, nor had her counselor or the family preservation staff said
anything about her practice.  Jennifer W.
told the court that during a family preservation worker visit, Hannah W. spent
the entire hour-long visit in her room, lying on her bed, without toys or
books, as punishment for acting out. 
Hannah W. had calmed down within 5 to 10 minutes but she was left in her
room for the remainder of the visit nonetheless.  Jennifer W. monitored Hannah W. in her room
when she was being punished. 

The court expressed its alarm at this information
about Jennifer W.’s discipline practices: 
“I’m also concerned because the mother testified that when a relative
was caring for Hanna[h W.], that the relative stated that if Hanna[h W.] were
to have a tantrum, that a few minutes would be enough for a time-out for a
child of this age and that the mother has elected to extend that for an hour or
two, taking away everything in the room and mak[ing] the child sit in isolation
on her bed for hours at a time.  So it
appears as if even if the mother is receiving instruction, she may not either
be receptive to or she’s electing to ignore it.”  The court declined to terminate jurisdiction
and found that the conditions that warranted initial jurisdiction were likely
to exist if supervision were withdrawn. 
Jennifer W. appeals.

DISCUSSION

I.                  
Sufficiency of the Evidence

Jennifer W. appeals the juvenile court’s decision to
continue jurisdiction over the child under section 364, claiming that there was
insufficient evidence to establish that Hannah W. was at any risk of physical
abuse or that Jennifer W. would use any controlled substances.  We review the juvenile court’s ruling
continuing jurisdiction for sufficiency of the evidence (In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 172) and conclude that
sufficient evidence supports the court’s decision.  

Jennifer W. acknowledges that the central issues in
the case were “Jennifer’s excessive discipline of Hannah and her history of
drug abuse.”  She argues that there was
no evidence that since the court had taken jurisdiction she had used drugs or
“acted inappropriately with Hannah, much less physically abused her.”  Jennifer W. is accurate in her assertion that
no evidence in the record exists to demonstrate that Jennifer W. had any drug
abuse issues during jurisdiction:  all
her drug tests were negative and there were no indicia that she was using
controlled substances.  It is also
correct that Jennifer W. has made significant efforts to learn parenting
techniques and has made progress.

Excessive discipline, however, remains at the center
of the case.  While there was no evidence
that Jennifer W. continued to strike Hannah W., Jennifer W. now disciplined her
four year-old daughter by making her sit on her bed alone in her room, without
toys or books, for one to two hours when she misbehaved.  Jennifer W. was aware that time outs for
children Hannah W.’s age should last only a few minutes, and Hannah W. calmed
down within 5 to 10 minutes after being sent to time out, but she nonetheless
extended this isolation punishment, which she even called “solitary,” for hours
at a time.  In light of this evidence of
ongoing excessive punishment even with the provision of services and the court
supervision, sufficient evidence existed to demonstrate that “the conditions
still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under
Section 300, or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is
withdrawn.”  (§ 364, subd.
(c).) 

Contrary to Jennifer W.’s
assertion, this case is not like In re
N.S., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th
167.  In that case, all the evidence
indicated that the father had addressed the inability to manage his stress and
anger that had led to jurisdiction.  (>Id. at pp. 172-173.)  He had not had any anger outbursts during the
period of jurisdiction, he had completed all case plan requirements, and he was
making a concerted effort to integrate information learned in therapy into his
life.  (Id. at p. 173.)  The
father’s therapist found no factors indicating that the minor would be at risk
if in her father’s care.  (>Ibid.) 
Because there was no evidence that the conditions that caused the court
to assume jurisdiction over the child still existed or would exist if
jurisdiction terminated, the juvenile court should have terminated jurisdiction.  (Ibid.)  Because the evidence in the instant case
shows that Jennifer W. had not fully addressed the issue of excessive
punishment that prompted the initial assertion of jurisdiction, the decision in
In re N.S. does not support her
argument for termination of jurisdiction. 


>II.               
Constitutional and Policy
Arguments

Jennifer W. argues that legislative intent and the href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution required the juvenile court to terminate jurisdiction here.  As



Jennifer W. notes, “the purpose of dependency
proceedings is to provide maximum safety and protection for children who are
currently being physically, sexually or emotionally abused, neglected or
exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional
well-being of children who are at risk of that harm, while not disrupting the
family unnecessarily or intruding inappropriately into family life.”  (In re
Kaylee H. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 92, 109.) 
Continuing jurisdiction based on the evidence of ongoing risk to Hannah
W. comports with that legislative policy.

Similarly, our conclusion
that the evidence supported continuing jurisdiction over Hannah W. is
dispositive with respect to Jennifer W.’s argument that the extension of jurisdiction
violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  As Jennifer W.’s continued use of excessive
discipline demonstrated that Hannah W. remained at risk, state intervention is
constitutionally authorized and therefore does not impermissibly infringe on
the family’s liberty interests.  (>Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57,
68-69 [“so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (>i.e., is fit), there will normally be no
reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to
further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions
concerning the rearing of that parent’s children”]; In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1238 [“In a dependency
proceeding, the state is empowered to intervene because a parent’s inadequacy
puts a child at risk”].)  Jennifer W. has
not established any constitutional violation in the continuation of juvenile
court jurisdiction here.

DISPOSITION

            The judgment is affirmed. 

 

 

                                                                                    ZELON,
J.

We
concur:

 

 

            PERLUSS, P. J.                                             WOODS,
J.