Filed 6/20/17 In re Hector C. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



In re HECTOR H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

HECTOR H.,

Defendant and Appellant.
D070373


(Super. Ct. No. J235108)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Browder A. Willis, Judge. Affirmed.
Daniel Yeager, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton, Heidi Salerno and Elizabeth Renner, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Hector H. appeals from a juvenile court disposition order committing him to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). He contends the court abused its discretion in committing him to the DJJ without adequate consideration of reasonable alternatives and without making necessary findings about his special educational needs under California Rules of Court, rule 5.651(b)(2), and seeks remand to allow for further assessment of his educational needs. Hector further contends the court erred in ordering restitution because he did not cause the victim's loss. We conclude the disposition order was not an abuse of the juvenile court's discretion and the restitution order was proper. We therefore affirm both orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Hector's history of delinquency began in 2014, at the age of 13, when he committed battery on a disabled female minor after school and then vandalized the home of another minor who had informed school officials of Hector's conduct. In May 2014, Hector admitted to misdemeanor battery and vandalism, and the court declared him a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and committed him to the Short Term Offender Program (STOP). Thereafter, Hector committed multiple probation violations, several of which involved leaving his placement.
Hector admitted to additional misdemeanor charges in 2015, including resisting an officer, falsely identifying himself to an officer, escaping from a juvenile facility, and knowingly receiving a stolen vehicle. The juvenile court addressed Hector's various probation violations and offenses by placing him in the following programs or facilities: Turning Hearts Center, Reflections North, Community Unit, Youth Day Center, the 56-day Behavior Modification Program, Breaking Cycles, and Campo Juvenile Ranch Facility. The court also ordered home supervision on several occasions and supervision by the Juvenile Gang Suppression Unit (JGSU).
Hector was in custody between August 26, 2015, and November 19, 2015, and during that time he was involved in three assaults (among a total of 10 violent incidents), and was placed in administrative segregation due to the severity of the assaults, which appeared to be gang-related. In late December 2015, while housed at Camp Barrett, Hector attacked a rival gang member and resisted a probation officer who attempted to stop the attack, causing the officer to hit his head on the floor. After the assault, Hector was moved to the East Mesa Juvenile Detention Facility, where he assaulted another rival gang member a few days later. In February 2016, Hector admitted to felony assault and misdemeanor resisting an officer.
The probation department had previously submitted a social study evaluating Hector. The social study noted Hector's history of nine school suspensions for offenses such as "stolen property," bullying, and fighting. The social study indicated Hector had an individualized educational plan (IEP), qualified for special education services as a result of a " 'Visual Processing and Attention' " learning disability, and participated in special education classes. Hector also had received counseling for two years, as recommended by his IEP.
Shortly before the disposition hearing, the probation department filed a supplemental report, recommending Hector be committed to the DJJ. The report described screening Hector's case with the JGSU, who concluded the DJJ was the most suitable placement for Hector due to his gang entrenchment, history of violence and the nature of his current offenses. The DJJ screening officer also considered Hector's case and indicated he would qualify for placement at DJJ; would undergo a medical, mental health, substance abuse, educational, dental and sexual offender screening upon intake; and would be placed in the facility that best suits his needs, with access to evidence-based programming addressing, among other things, victim awareness, gang involvement, and anger management. In addition, the screening officer for the Youthful Offender Unit (YOU) program concluded Hector was not suitable for YOU and would benefit from services provided by the DJJ.
The probation office's DJJ recommendation was based on the severity of Hector's continued violent behavior ; his blatant disregard for prior rehabilitative opportunities; his admitted association with the Diablos gang; his admissions that he would do anything for the gang, including participation in gang fights to support his "homies;" and his statement that he could see himself going to "county or to the pen." The probation officer further referenced Hector's lack of remorse for injuring a probation officer at Camp Barrett and reported that when she asked Hector what he would do if given the opportunity for a new life, he had told her he "would 'just do this all over again.' " She also quoted Hector as describing the environment at YOU as follows: "The homies are chillin right now and we have enemies in there. But if they fight then I'll hop in." The probation officer opined that removing Hector from his comfort zone and fellow gang members may curb his behaviors. In addition, the probation office's report touted the benefits available to Hector at DJJ, including the mental health and educational services, and gang curriculum through the IMPACT program, which the DJJ characterized as showing promising results in reducing gang-related violence. The report also attached program information describing the DJJ's educational intake assessment, which includes a review of a minor's most recent IEP, and referring to the availability of a "full continuum of Special Education programming" at each DJJ site, including counseling services if required by an IEP.
Hector filed a motion for alternative disposition, seeking placement in either YOU or Camp Barrett, and attached a report by psychologist Richard J. Jordan, who had evaluated Hector. In his report, Dr. Jordan opined the "primary factor influencing the minor's poor choices appears to be his gang identification" and characterized his assaultive behaviors as resulting less from poor impulse control than from Hector's conscious decision to follow gang rules and mores. Dr. Jordan noted Hector's IEP several times in the report and also referred to Hector's participation in special education classes. Hector's test results revealed he had a below-average composite IQ of 79, comprised of a very low nonverbal score and an average-range verbal score. Dr. Jordan surmised the weak nonverbal score could relate to his visual processing deficits, as described in his IEP, and stated that although Hector's test results "do not clearly point toward a learning disability, the determination of this is deferred to the more thorough assessment process of the minor's IEP." Dr. Jordan recommended Hector continue therapy, with anger management and "psychoeducation related to gang lifestyle;" participate in substance abuse testing and treatment; undergo a psychotropic medication evaluation; and obtain continuing academic support through his IEP.
The juvenile court held a contested disposition hearing in March 2016. The court stated it had reviewed the probation report and the psychological evaluation and heard testimony from Hector and his mother and grandmother. Following arguments of counsel, the juvenile court adopted the probation department's recommendation and ordered Hector committed to the DJJ.
In making its ruling, the court explained that Hector's prior comments regarding his behavior and how he chose to live his life, along with his escalating pattern of criminal behavior, were of major concern to the court. The court described the final choice as between YOU and the DJJ, noting it had eliminated Camp Barrett from consideration, and determined the DJJ would be the better option because it would remove Hector from the Diablos and give him the opportunity to get his high school education. The court further stated its belief that the DJJ's IMPACT program and psychological and educational component would be a "better fit" for Hector, helping him move "from this entrenched position to a more productive position." At the conclusion of the hearing, the court expressed its hope that Hector would be able to finish high school while at the DJJ.
In the dispositional order, the court stated it had "considered all of the facts and circumstances of this case, including the entire court file." The court's review of Hector's file is further evident from its underlining of various portions of the latest probation report and Hector's psychological evaluation, including notations in the paragraph directly below Dr. Jordan's recommendation that Hector obtain continuing academic support through his IEP. However, the court indicated in its minute order and in the commitment order (form JV-732) that Hector "is not an individual with exceptional needs." In a letter to the court dated April 18, 2016, the DJJ sought clarification regarding the discrepancy between the court's finding that Hector was not "an individual with exceptional needs" and references in Hector's psychological evaluation and a probation report to his IEP and his prior receipt of special education services. In response, the juvenile court amended Hector's commitment order, nunc pro tunc to the March 2, 2016 hearing date, to designate him as an individual with exceptional needs.
DISCUSSION
I. Hector's DJJ Commitment
Hector contends the juvenile court erred in deciding he would benefit from a DJJ commitment without adequate consideration of less restrictive alternatives.
A. Legal Principles
To determine the proper disposition for a minor, the juvenile court must consider public safety, victim redress, and the minor's best interests. (§ 202, subd. (d).) The court must also take into account: (1) the minor's age, (2) the circumstances and gravity of the minor's offense, and (3) any prior history of delinquency. (§ 725.5.) In addition, the disposition may incorporate punishment, where consistent with the minor's rehabilitation and not imposed for purposes of retribution, including commitment to the Division of Juvenile Facilities, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (§ 202, subds. (b) & (e).) However, before a juvenile ward may be committed to the DJJ, the court must be fully satisfied that the mental and physical qualifications of the juvenile are such as to render it probable that he or she will be benefited by the commitment. (§ 734.)
Although juvenile law contemplates a progressively more restrictive placement scheme, beginning with home placement under supervision and culminating in commitment to the DJJ, the court may consider commitment without prior recourse to other less restrictive placements. (In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1159 (Nicole H.).) The court's commitment decision will be upheld when the evidence demonstrates a probable benefit to the minor from the commitment and the ineffectiveness or inappropriateness of less restrictive alternatives. (In re M.S. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250.) The juvenile court is not required to expressly state on the record its reasons for rejecting less restrictive placements, but the record must contain some evidence that the court appropriately considered and rejected reasonable alternative placements. (Nicole H., at p. 1159.)
We review a juvenile court's commitment decision for abuse of discretion. (In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396 (Angela M.).) In doing so, we will affirm if there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's findings, indulging all reasonable inferences in support of its decision. (In re Calvin S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 522, 527-528.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is "reasonable, credible, and of solid value," sufficient to allow a reasonable trier of fact to have made the requisite findings. (In re Joseph H. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 517, 538 (Joseph H.).) If one of the juvenile court's findings is not supported by substantial evidence, we will reverse for error if "it appears reasonably probable that, absent the error, the appellant would have obtained a more favorable result." (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 876 (Jonathan B.); see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).)
B. Analysis
Here, there is ample evidence to support the juvenile court's findings that Hector would receive a probable benefit from commitment to the DJJ. The probation department, JGSU, DJJ screening officer and YOU screening officer all opined DJJ was the best option for Hector. Hector exhibited a close affiliation with a local gang and his conduct showed an escalating pattern of violent attacks. Both the probation department and the court recognized that one of Hector's biggest problems was his gang affiliation and removal from environments populated by local gang members would be beneficial. The record reveals the DJJ could provide a program specifically targeting gang involvement as well as suitable education and counseling opportunities.
The record also evidences the juvenile court's consideration of less restrictive alternatives. Hector filed a motion for alternative disposition seeking placement at either YOU or Camp Barrett. Hector's probation officer had screened Camp Barrett as a placement option only a few months earlier in connection with a prior disposition, but the screening officer had deemed it inappropriate for Hector, and the screening officer for YOU had reached a similar conclusion on two separate occasions. The court's comments at Hector's disposition hearing indicate it was ready to address both placement options in addition to the DJJ and, although the court did not identify why it characterized Camp Barrett an "unlikely" possibility, it is not required to explain its reasoning. (See Nicole H., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159.)
In addition, there was substantial evidence to support a determination that Hector's placement in less restrictive local programs would not be appropriate. By the date of the disposition hearing, Hector had been granted a wide variety of opportunities for rehabilitation in local programs, without success, and had run away from prior placements on multiple occasions. Although he had never been enrolled in the Camp Barrett program, he had assaulted a rival gang member and injured a probation officer while housed at Camp Barrett. He also admitted he had gang associates in custody at YOU and would be ready to assist them in gang fights if the opportunity arose. On this record, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Hector's commitment to the DJJ.
II. Assessment of Hector's Educational Needs
Hector contends the juvenile court further erred by not adequately complying with rule 5.651 or addressing Dr. Jordan's recommendation for further educational testing, and remand is required to allow him to be assessed for an updated IEP. The People maintain Hector forfeited his claim regarding the court's compliance with rule 5.651 by not raising it below and argue that even if the claim is preserved, the juvenile court complied with the intent of rule 5.651 and there is no need for remand for additional findings.
A. Forfeiture
Generally, complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356; People v. De Soto (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1, 8-9.) The forfeiture doctrine has been applied in juvenile delinquency and dependency cases. (See In re Travis W. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 368, 379 [failure to object to defects in the probation officer's report]; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 [failure to object to absence of statutorily-required assessment of a prospective guardian]; see also In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 885 [noting application of "the rule to appellate claims involving discretionary sentencing choices . . . is appropriate, because characteristically the trial court is in a considerably better position than the Court of Appeal to review and modify a sentence option . . . that is premised upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case"].)
We agree that if Hector believed the juvenile court did not adequately comply with rule 5.651 and was obligated to obtain an additional IEP for him in order to make an informed dispositional decision, he should have raised the issue below. However, even assuming Hector did not forfeit his claim, we conclude no remand is required.
B. Legal Principles
Special education laws provided by the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the California Education Code provide for appropriate education of minors with disabilities meeting certain criteria. (Ed. Code, § 56026; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3030; 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A).) Under the IDEA, a child may obtain an evaluation and, if the child is deemed to be a "child with a disability," an IEP Team consisting of parents, teachers, and local agency representatives will prepare an IEP for the student. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(B), (d)(1)(A)-(B).) The IEP describes how the student's disability affects his or her performance in the general education curriculum, recommends specifically designed instruction and related services "reasonably calculated to enable the child to make progress appropriate in light of [the child's] circumstances," and sets measurable annual goals. (Endrew F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. RE-1 (2017) ___ U.S. ___ [137 S.Ct. 988, 1002, 197 L.Ed.2d 335, 353]; 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).)
California law likewise provides "individuals with exceptional needs" with the "right to participate in free appropriate public education." (Ed. Code, § 56000.) An "individual with exceptional needs" is one who has been identified by an IEP Team as a "child with a disability" under the IDEA; has an impairment that "requires instruction and services which cannot be provided with modification of the regular school program"; and meets other specific criteria. (Ed. Code, § 56026, subds. (a)-(d); see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3030.)
The California Rules of Court implement these federal and state mandates in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Under rule 5.651(b)(2)(A), the juvenile court at dispositional and subsequent hearings must consider numerous factors concerning the educational needs of minors under its jurisdiction. In addition, the court's findings and orders must address whether the minor's educational needs are being met and indicate any special education and related services, assessments, or evaluations the minor may need. (Rule 5.651(b)(2).) However, although a minor's educational needs are an important consideration at disposition, when a minor exhibits complex problems and violent behavior, the minor's educational needs do "not trump other factors the court [must] weigh in making its commitment decision." (Joseph H., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 544.)
As described above, we review a juvenile court's commitment decision for abuse of discretion (Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396) and its findings for substantial evidence (Nicole H., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1154), and we will reverse in response to an erroneous finding only if it appears reasonably probable that the appellant would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error (Jonathan B., supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 876; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836).
C. Analysis
We disagree with Hector's assertions that the juvenile court decided to commit him to DJJ in violation of rule 5.651 because it failed to heed Dr. Jordan's recommendation that Hector receive further educational evaluation or adequately consider his educational needs. Notably, there is no evidence Dr. Jordan made any recommendation for further testing. Rather, Hector appears to have misinterpreted Dr. Jordan's statement noting Hector's special educational needs were not readily apparent during the course of his evaluation but indicating he deferred to "the more thorough assessment process of [Hector's] IEP." In addition, the record indicates the court carefully evaluated Hector's circumstances prior to the disposition hearing. Specifically, the court's order stated it had considered his entire file; the court mentioned it had read the probation report and reviewed Dr. Jordan's report; the court had made notations on various records, including on Dr. Jordan's report (which contained numerous references to Hector's IEP); and various comments the court made during the hearing evidenced its knowledge of Hector's background. The juvenile court also specifically referred to the educational opportunities provided by the DJJ in issuing its ruling. In light of these facts, it appears likely the juvenile court simply made a clerical error when finding that Hector did not have exceptional needs.
However, even if the court was mistaken regarding the status of Hector's educational needs when making its exceptional needs finding, there is no indication that Hector was prejudiced by the court's mistake. The DJJ identified the error and the court corrected the commitment order to identify Hector as a minor with exceptional needs. The DJJ therefore had notice of Hector's educational needs.
More importantly, there is no reasonable probability the court's commitment decision would have been any different had it been premised on a finding that Hector had exceptional educational needs. (See Jonathan B., supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 876; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) In light of Hector's entrenchment in a local gang, escalating pattern of violent assaults, and history of escaping his placements, his educational requirements represented only one of many issues the juvenile court had to weigh in determining his disposition. (Joseph H., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 544.) At the disposition hearing, the court referred to the DJJ placement as beneficial to Hector because it would distance him from his local gang and afford him educational opportunities. The record indicates the DJJ offers multiple targeted resources for offenders with IEPs, including counseling, which is one of the services required by Hector's IEP. Under these circumstances, we conclude any error in the juvenile court's original finding regarding Hector's educational needs status was harmless.
In addition, Hector's reliance on Angela M. to support his contention that remand is required for further consideration of his educational needs is misplaced. In that case, there was no evidence the juvenile court gave any consideration to the minor's educational needs, despite a psychologist's report unequivocally recommending she obtain an IEP assessment. (Angela M., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1395, fn. 1, 1398-1399.) The Court of Appeal therefore ordered a limited remand "to permit the juvenile court to make proper findings, on a more fully developed record, regarding Angela's educational needs." (Id. at p. 1399, fn. omitted.) Here, in contrast, Hector had been provided with an IEP prior to his disposition hearing, the juvenile court reviewed records describing his IEP, and Dr. Jordan did not recommend any additional educational testing. Accordingly, unlike the circumstances in Angela M., in this case remand for further review of Hector's educational needs is unnecessary.
We conclude to the extent the juvenile court erred in making its rule 5.651 findings, the error was harmless and no remand for further findings is required.
III. Hector's Restitution Payment
A. Additional Facts
As noted above, Hector admitted he knowingly received a stolen vehicle. Hector was a passenger in the vehicle when it was involved in a collision, and he suspected the vehicle was stolen when he got in due to the damaged condition of the ignition and dashboard (the dashboard was cracked, the car was running without keys, and ignition wires were exposed). In addition to Hector, there were at least two other minors in the car at the time of the collision. At the hearing in which Hector made his admission, the juvenile court informed him it was reserving jurisdiction over the issue of restitution.
During the subsequent restitution hearing in February 2016, the owner of the stolen vehicle described the vehicle as a total loss, testifying it would cost approximately $7,900 to repair the vehicle but it was only worth about $1,190. The victim also testified he had incurred towing expenses for the vehicle; had recently replaced the engine, brakes and timing belt on the vehicle; and had lost wages as a result of missing work to testify. The juvenile court ordered Hector to pay restitution in the amount of $1,690 (jointly and severally with two other minors) to compensate the victim for the fair market value of the vehicle and his towing expenses and lost earnings.
B. Argument
Hector contends the court erred in ordering him to pay restitution because the damage was "causally unrelated to any action on his part" and section 730.6, subdivision (a)(1), allows restitution only for a victim's economic loss occurring as a result of the minor's conduct.
C. Legal Principles
California crime victims have a constitutional right to recover restitution from offenders for losses caused by their criminal conduct. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b), par. (13).) Section 730.6 implements this constitutional mandate for victims of crimes committed by juvenile offenders. Section 730.6, subdivision (a)(1), provides: "It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of conduct for which a minor is found to be a person described in Section 602 who incurs an economic loss as a result of the minor's conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor." (§ 730.6, subd. (a)(1).) In addition to making the victim whole, imposition of restitution in juvenile court acts as a deterrent and serves the important rehabilitative goal of requiring minors to take responsibility for their wrongdoing. (In re Anthony M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016-1017; see Stats. 1994, ch. 1106, § 1, subds. (b) & (c) [when enacting § 730.6, the Legislature made findings that "[r]estitution is recognized to have a rehabilitative effect on criminals" and "is recognized as a deterrent to future criminality."].)
Because section 730.6, subdivision (a)(1), refers to "economic loss as a result of the minor's conduct," a showing of causation is required to award restitution. (In re A.M. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 668, 673.) However, the minor's conduct need not be the sole cause of the victim's loss, as such a requirement "would be at odds with the principle that restitution laws are to be broadly and liberally construed." (Ibid.) Thus, when multiple causes are involved, the correct legal test for determining if victim's loss satisfies the criteria of section 730.6, subdivision (a), is whether the minor's conduct was at least "a substantial factor in causing the injury." (Ibid. [concluding minor's conduct of driving without a license was a substantial factor in causing a pedestrian's death because her inexperience and lack of driving skills played a role in the accident].) The substantial factor test requires each individual's causal contribution to be more than an infinitesimal or theoretical part in bringing about injury, damage or loss. (People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1322.) Even " 'a very minor force that does cause harm is a substantial factor [citation].' " (Ibid.)
We generally review a juvenile court's restitution order for abuse of discretion. (Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 305.) A court abuses its discretion when it acts contrary to law. (In re Anthony M., supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016.) However, our review is de novo when the propriety of a restitution order turns on the interpretation of a statute. (In re Alexander A. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 847, 852; In re Tommy A. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1580, 1586.) We " 'broadly and liberally' " construe statutory provisions implementing a victim's right to restitution. (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132.)
D. Analysis
Hector does not contend there is any error in the amount of repair costs awarded. Consequently, we address only the extent to which section 730.6 requires a showing of causation in order to award restitution and whether the evidence presented is sufficient to satisfy statutory requirements. We conclude causation is a required condition for awarding restitution under section 730.6, but we disagree with Hector's contention that his conduct was "causally unrelated" to the victim's loss.
The facts demonstrate Hector got into a vehicle he knew was stolen and traveled in the vehicle with other minors until it crashed into an embankment. Although there is insufficient proof to establish that Hector stole the vehicle or drove it, he admittedly received the vehicle and thereby enjoyed the benefits of its use, relinquishing it only after it was damaged to the extent of being unusable. In addition, Hector's presence in the vehicle made the crash more likely to occur. The California Legislature has determined that vehicle accidents are prevalent among teenage drivers and has implemented restrictions on young drivers in an attempt to reduce these accidents, including a prohibition on transporting passengers under 20 years old. Consequently, the juvenile court could have reasonably inferred that Hector's participation in the joyride was a contributing concurrent cause of the damage to the vehicle and a substantial factor in depriving the owner of his property. Moreover, the juvenile court's award of restitution served the important goal of impressing upon Hector the consequences of riding in a stolen vehicle and discouraging him from engaging in similar conduct in the future. We therefore affirm the restitution order.
DISPOSITION
The disposition and restitution orders are affirmed.



McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:




NARES, J.




O'ROURKE, J.