In re I.J.
Filed 5/24/13
In re I.J. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
>
In re I.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | B243287 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK93924) |
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MAURICE L., Defendant and Appellant. |
APPEAL
from an order of the Superior Court of
County, Robert Stevenson, Referee. Affirmed.
Kimberly
A. Knill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Dependant and Appellant.
John
F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and
Kimberly A. Roura, Associate County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________
In an order dated August 3, 2012, the
juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over I.J. pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b),
and declared I.J. a dependent child of the court. The court found that the
Maurice L. (father) and Shelly J. (mother) endangered I.J.’s physical health
and safety. Father argues that there was
no substantial evidence supporting
the court’s jurisdictional finding. We
reject father’s argument and affirm the juvenile court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Family
I.J.
was born in July 2010. He lived with
mother and father until August, 2011, when father was incarcerated for
possession or purchase of a controlled substance. Father has been convicted of five felonies
and two misdemeanors related to illicit drugs.
He has never been convicted of a domestic violence crime, though in 2007
he was charged with inflicting corporal
cohabitant.
I.J.
has two half-sisters, Brandi W. and Nina W., who were 13 and 9 years old,
respectively, when these proceedings commenced.
Brandi’s presumed father is Jason M.
Brandi usually lived with Jason in Alaska for most of the year, and spent her summers with
mother in California. In 2012,
however, Brandi spent the school year with mother, and was planning on spending
the summer with Jason when this action was filed. Nina lives with her alleged father, Edward
P., in Wisconsin.
2. The
Detention of I.J. and Brandi
On June 8, 2012, when I.J. was about 22 months old, mother called the
police and asked for assistance because someone was allegedly breaking into her
apartment in Hollywood. When two
police officers arrived at mother’s home, they did not see any signs of a
The officers, however, found I.J. walking around with a
dirty diaper sticking to his skin, and a rash on the inside of his thighs and
on his genitals. The child appeared
malnourished. He also had “pink eye,â€
which caused one of his eyes to swell so badly it was almost closed. Mother appeared to be under the influence of
a controlled substance. The apartment
was filthy and unsanitary, filled with roaches and other insects, and old food
on the floor. The officers also found
over 200 anti-depression bills in a cup on the dresser, which was within I.J.’s
reach. Mother was arrested for child
endangerment. I.J. was detained by
respondent Los Angeles Country Department
of Children and Family Services (the Department) and placed in foster care.
When
the two police officers arrived at mother’s home, Brandi was at a dance
recital. Later that evening, a social
worker employed by the Department interviewed Brandi. Brandi reported, inter alia, that father and
mother had a history of domestic violence.
According to Brandi, father and mother would hit and throw objects at
each other. Although Brandi and I.J.
were in another room when the incidents occurred, Brandi could hear items
breaking, and she saw father and mother with bruises and scratches after the
altercations.
The
Department social worker also interviewed a number of other witnesses,
including Mary L., I.J.’s maternal grandmother.
The maternal grandmother stated that she was aware of domestic violence
between mother and father when the couple lived in Wisconsin.
3. The
Juvenile Dependency Petition
On June 13, 2012, the Department filed a juvenile dependency petition
requesting that the juvenile court assert jurisdiction over I.J. and Brandi
pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) [serious physical harm] and (b)
[failure to protect]. Of relevance here
are counts b-1 and b-4. In count b-1,
the petition alleged that father and mother’s history of domestic violence
endangers the children’s “physical health and safety and places the children at
risk of physical harm, damage and danger.â€
Count b-4 was based on mother’s possession of 250 unsecured prescription pills in a cup in
the children’s home. On the same day the
petition was filed, the juvenile court found that there was a prima facie case
to detain the children.
4.
Shortly before the jurisdictional and dispositional
hearing, the Department filed a jurisdiction/disposition report dated August 3, 2012. The report
indicated that Brandi was interviewed a second time on July 23, 2012. Brandi
reiterated to a Department social worker that mother and father engaged in
domestic violence. According to Brandi,
the couple frequently fought because mother did not want father smoking
marijuana, and father wished to do so.
Brandi also stated that after mother had altercations with father, she
saw mother with bruises on her arms and legs.
The
Department also interviewed father.
Father denied ever engaging in domestic violence with mother.
When
mother was asked by a Department social worker about the allegations of
domestic violence in the petition, mother stated: “It is possible that this statement is true.â€
The
Department concluded that the parents’ denial or minimization of domestic
violence indicated that there continued to be a substantial risk to the
children.
3, 2012, Hearing and Order
On August 3, 2012, the juvenile
court held a jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. At the hearing, the court stated that it
found Brandi’s statements regarding domestic violence credible, even though
Brandi did not actually see the violence occur.
Father was brought to the hearing
from the county jail. He indicated at
that time he was scheduled to be released on January 24, 2013.
At the hearing, the Department moved
to dismiss the allegations regarding Brandi in the petition. The Department did so because it determined
that Brandi could be safely released to her father, Jason, without further
court supervision. The court granted the
motion. This appeal does not involve the
court’s orders regarding Brandi.
In its August 3, 2012, order, the juvenile court
sustained the petition with respect to counts b-1 and b-4, discussed
counts. The order also stated that
father and mother were to be given family reunification services, and that
father’s services were to include domestic violence counseling. Additionally, the order provided that mother
and father were entitled to monitored visits.
Father
filed a timely notice of appeal of the
August 3, 2012, order.
ISSUE
The
issue is whether there was substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s
August 3, 2012, order asserting jurisdiction over I.J.
DISCUSSION
We
review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under the substantial
evidence test. (In re T.W. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161.) “The term ‘substantial evidence’ means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion; it is evidence which is reasonable in nature, credible, and of
solid value.†(In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1433.) In determining whether there is substantial
evidence, “we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the
findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light
most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact
and credibility are the province of the trial court.†(In re
Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.)
Section
300, subdivision (b) provides a child comes within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court if the child “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that
the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness†as a result of a
parent’s failure or inability to adequately supervise or protect the
child. The Department alleges that at
the time of the August 3, 2012 hearing, there was a substantial risk that I.J.
would suffer from serious physical harm or illness. By sustaining the petition, the juvenile
court impliedly found this allegation true.
There
was substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding. According to Brandi, father and mother
frequently engaged in domestic violence, including throwing things at each
other, while I.J. was in the house.
Brandi’s statements were corroborated by maternal grandmother’s statement
that father and mother had a history of domestic violence. Further, when asked about the allegations of
domestic violence in the petition, mother conceded that the allegations “might
be true.†A reasonable juvenile court,
weighing the evidence, could have concluded that Brandi’s statements regarding
father’s domestic violence against mother were true. The domestic violence described by Brandi
endangers I.J., who is still a toddler, because he can wonder into the room
where it is occurring, “and be accidently hit by a thrown object, by a fist,
arm, foot or leg.†(In re Heather A., supra,
52 Cal.App.4th at p. 194; accord In re
E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 576 [evidence of domestic violence was
sufficient to support jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)].)
Father
argues that although there was evidence of past
domestic violence, there was no evidence to support the juvenile court’s
assertion of jurisdiction at the time of
the jurisdictional hearing because he was incarcerated then. This argument is anchored in statements made
in In re Rocco M. (1991) 1
Cal.App.4th 814 (Rocco M.) and cases
following Rocco M., such as
393, 399 and In re Janet T. (2001) 93
Cal.App.4th 377, 388. In
probative of current conditions, the question under section 300 is whether
circumstances at the time of the hearing
subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.
[Citations.] Thus the past
infliction of physical harm by a caretaker, standing alone, does not establish
a substantial risk of physical harm; ‘[t]here must be some reason to believe
the acts may continue in the future.’ â€
(Rocco M., at p. 824, fn.
omitted.)
Several
cases have downplayed the significance Rocco
M. in light of subsequent amendments to section 300. In In
re J.K., for example, the court stated:
“Rocco M.’s analysis does not
account for or address the change in the statutory scheme, which provides for
the exercise of jurisdiction based on prior harm.†(In re
J.K., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1436.) The court also stated “the
value of the oft-quoted language in Rocco
M. is further diminished because it is clearly dicta.†(In re
J.K., at p. 1437; accord In re David
H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1642, fn. 14.)
Here,
even under the standard enunciated in Rocco
M., there was substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s
assertion of jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b). At the time of the jurisdictional hearing,
there was no evidence that father had ameliorated his pattern and practice of
engaging in domestic violence. To the
contrary, father outright denied that he ever engaged in such conduct. A reasonable juvenile court could have
concluded that father was falsely denying his history of domestic violence, and
thus had not made any progress toward ending such behavior. Moreover,
father was scheduled to be released from jail about five months after the
hearing. To protect I.J., the juvenile
court asserted jurisdiction and ordered father to enroll in a domestic violence
counselling. We find no error in the
juvenile court’s order.
DISPOSITION
The
juvenile court’s order dated August 3, 2012, is affirmed.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KITCHING,
J.
We concur:
KLEIN,
P. J.
ALDRICH,
J.
All future statutory references
are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
