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Filed 5/2/17 In re Isabella S. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re ISABELLA S., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
MENDOCINO COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.S. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
A149304
(Mendocino County
Super. Ct. No. SCUKJVSQ151723702)
A.S. (mother) and B.S. (father), the parents of two-year-old Isabella S., appeal
from a juvenile court order terminating their parental rights under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26.1
Their sole contention on appeal is that the court erred
by finding Isabella adoptable. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
In June 2015, when she was eight months old, Isabella was removed from
mother’s care after mother was arrested on charges arising from a physical altercation
with her boyfriend. Witnesses identified mother as the aggressor, and her boyfriend

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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sustained visible injuries, including bite marks on his nose and arm. Some witnesses
reported that mother was holding Isabella during the altercation.
A few days later, the Mendocino County Department of Social Services
(Department) filed a petition alleging that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over Isabella
under section 300, subdivision (b) based on mother’s arrest and ongoing participation in
domestic violence and under section 300, subdivision (g) based on mother’s inability to
identify an appropriate alternate caregiver for Isabella after being arrested. The following
month, mother reported that father, with whom she had lost touch but who was eventually
located in jail in San Luis Obispo, might be Isabella’s biological father, and DNA testing
later confirmed this to be true. The Department filed an amended petition that added
allegations under section 300, subdivision (b) based on father’s past criminal history,
including a conviction for attempted murder, and under section 300, subdivision (g)
because father had not been involved in Isabella’s life and his whereabouts were
unknown. At the jurisdiction hearing later in July, the court struck the allegation that
mother could not identify an appropriate caregiver but otherwise found the amended
allegations true.
In September 2015, the Department filed a subsequent petition under section 342
alleging that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over Isabella under section 300,
subdivision (b) for the additional reason that mother had a substance abuse problem.
Mother had recently tested positive for methamphetamine and appeared visibly under the
influence during a meeting with the social worker. At the November disposition hearing,
the court sustained the subsequent petition’s allegations, ordered reunification services
and monitored visits for mother, and denied reunification services to father.
The April 2016 six-month-review report recommended that mother’s reunification
services be terminated due to mother’s failure to follow her case plan. Mother had not
visited Isabella for over five months, had not enrolled in or attended anger management
classes or substance abuse treatment, continued to test positive for methamphetamine,
and had failed to complete a mental health evaluation. At the six-month-review hearing
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later in April, the juvenile court terminated mother’s reunification services and set a
selection-and-implementation hearing under section 366.26.
The July 2016 section 366.26 report recommended that the juvenile court
terminate parental rights and find Isabella adoptable. The Department’s adoption
assessment reported that Isabella was healthy and emotionally and behaviorally normal
for her age. She had recently begun living with a new foster parent who was willing to
adopt her. The assessment also noted that Isabella was making developmental progress,
although there was some concern about “lazy eyelids” and certain developmental issues,
and it was recommended that her neurodevelopment be reassessed the following year. At
the section 366.26 hearing the following month, the court found Isabella adoptable by
clear and convincing evidence, a finding neither parent disputed, and terminated mother’s
and father’s parental rights.
II.
DISCUSSION
Mother claims that the juvenile court erred in terminating parental rights on the
basis of its finding that Isabella was adoptable.2
We disagree.
To order adoption as a permanent plan, a juvenile court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that “ ‘the minor will likely be adopted if parental rights are
terminated.’ ” (In re Brandon T. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1408; see § 366.26,
subd. (c)(1).) In determining whether a minor is generally adoptable, “the focus is on
whether a child’s age, physical condition[,] and emotional state will create difficulty in
locating a family willing to adopt.” (In re R.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 486, 491.)
We review the juvenile court’s determination that a child is adoptable for
substantial evidence. (In re R.C., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 491.) In doing so, “[w]e
give the court’s finding of adoptability the benefit of every reasonable inference and
resolve any evidentiary conflicts in favor of affirming.” (In re Gregory A. (2005)

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Father joins mother’s claim and does not raise any separate claims. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).)
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126 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1562.) We determine “whether there is any substantial evidence,
whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact.” (In re
A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1313.) Although neither parent objected below that
proof of adoptability was lacking, “a claim that there was insufficient evidence of [a]
child’s adoptability at a contested hearing is not waived by failure to argue the issue in
the juvenile court.” (In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 623 (Brian P.).)
Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting the finding that
Isabella was adoptable because the Department had not fully documented Isabella’s
developmental issues and further evaluation was pending. We disagree. Isabella’s minor
developmental delays do not negate the juvenile court’s determination. (See In re
Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 223-225.) Nor was certainty required about the
outcome of future developmental testing. (See In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th
71, 79.) The adoption assessment reported that Isabella was “a sweet little girl who loves
to be held, loves being read to, and loves to eat,” and she was emotionally and
behaviorally normal. The mere fact that the record may contain some evidence that could
have led to a contrary determination does not warrant reversal.
Neither of the two decisions on which mother primarily relies changes our
conclusion. Brian P., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 616, is distinguishable because in that case,
there was no adoption assessment at all, and the record raised serious questions about the
minor’s adoptability. (See id. at pp. 624-625.) Here, in contrast, the juvenile court had
the benefit of an adoption assessment that addressed the likelihood of adoption and
provided a clear picture of Isabella and her physical, mental, and emotional health. This
assessment provided evidence that Isabella was healthy and had no significant mental or
emotional problems.
In re Valerie W. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1, also does not aid mother’s position. In
that case, the potential medical problems at issue were more severe, including a possible
seizure disorder and stunted growth, and the adoption assessment did not comply with a
former version of section 366.21, subdivision (i), which lists categories of information
that must be included in such documents. (Valerie W., at pp. 5-6, 13.) Furthermore, the
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prospective adoptive parents did not know the extent of care that would be necessary
because they had not been informed of the child’s “diagnosis or possible diagnoses,
prognosis[,] or any needs for treatment or special care.” (Id. at p. 15.) In contrast, the
problems noted here were far less serious, and the adoption assessment provided far more
information.
In a related argument, mother contends that the adoption assessment did not
substantially address all seven subject areas that are statutorily required, including the
minor’s medical, scholastic, developmental, and emotional status, the prospective
adoptive parent’s ability to care for minor, and the likelihood the minor would be adopted
in a reasonable time. (See § 366.21, subd. (i)(1).) As noted by the Department, however,
there was no objection below to any deficiencies in the adoption assessment, and the
argument is therefore forfeited. (Brian P., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 623.) For the
same reason, we decline to consider mother’s argument that the section 366.26 report did
not comply with section 366.21’s requirements either.
III.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights to Isabella is affirmed.
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_________________________
Humes, P.J.
We concur:
_________________________
Margulies, J.
_________________________
Banke, J.