In re Jacob S.



























Filed 6/19/13 In re Jacob S. CA1/3











>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.







IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION
THREE




>

In re JACOB S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JACOB S., Defendant and Appellant.	A137037 (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J12-00319)

Jacob
S. was placed on nonwardship probation for possessing
a knife on school grounds. (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a)(1); Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 725, subd. (a).) He contends the court should have
suppressed the knife because it was discovered during an unlawful detention.
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1.) Alternatively, he maintains he did not
possess the knife on school grounds because his possession occurred in a car
parked on a road adjacent to school property. We conclude that Jacob was
lawfully detained and that his possession of the knife occurred on school
grounds because “school” is statutorily defined to include “any public
right-of-way situated immediately adjacent to school property.” (Pen. Code,
§ 626, subd. (a)(4).) We shall affirm the jurisdictional and dispositional
orders.

STATEMENT OF facts

Jacob
is a student at Pinole Valley
High School. The school is a
“closed campus”; students are not permitted to leave during lunchtime without
written permission. Students are also subject to a municipal daytime curfew
that, absent specified exceptions, prohibits unaccompanied minors from being
out of school without parental or school authorization. (Pinole Ord. No.
9.16.020.) A Pinole police officer is assigned to Pinole
Valley High School
as a “school resource officer” to enforce these rules and others. The officer
testified that his duties are to “[k]eep the school safe, protect the students,
protect the teachers and staff, arrest law violators, mentor, even sometimes
teach.”

On
November 7, 2011, the
officer was in an unmarked police car observing the school campus at the start
of the students’ noon lunch period.
He saw Jacob, whom he knew to be a student, in a parked car on Pinole
Valley Road “directly adjacent to campus.” The
school is located at 2900 Pinole Valley Road.href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
Pinole Valley Road borders the east side of the school campus and provides the
main access to the school’s buildings. Jacob was parked at the curb of the
public access sidewalk that runs along Pinole Valley Road, “five or six feet”
across the sidewalk from a school parking lot. The officer testified that
students often park on the road and use their cars as lockers to store and
retrieve items during the school day. The officer was trained to patrol the
area and to regard the sidewalk and road adjacent to the campus as part of the
school grounds.

The
officer first observed Jacob in a parked car on Pinole Valley Road in front of
the school then saw him drive away from the curb and down the road. Concerned
that Jacob was leaving campus without permission, the officer drove after him
and made a traffic stop near the campus.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]
The officer walked to the car window to talk to Jacob, where he smelled burnt
marijuana. The officer asked Jacob “why he was off campus and if he had
permission to be off campus.” Jacob said he left without permission and was
“going to use the bathroom.” Jacob was asked to provide his driver’s license,
car registration, and proof of insurance. Jacob did not provide the documents.
Jacob reached into the car’s center console to retrieve a traffic citation to
show the officer. Jacob did so by lifting the console lid a few inches “instead
of opening it all the way up,” which made it difficult to retrieve the item.
The officer was suspicious that Jacob was hiding something. The officer looked
inside the center console and found “two Swisher Sweet cigars” and a “locking
folding knife” about seven inches long with a three inch blade A fishing pole
and cooler were also found in the car. Jacob said he was fishing the day before
and used the knife to cut his fishing line then left the knife in the car.

procedural history

In
March 2012, a juvenile wardship petition
was filed alleging that Jacob possessed a weapon on school grounds, a
misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a)(1); Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 602.) Jacob denied the allegation and, with the assistance of counsel,
filed a motion to suppress the knife seized during the car search. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 700.1.) In July 2012, the motion was heard in conjunction
with the contested jurisdictional hearing. Jacob’s attorney argued that the
school resource officer was without reasonable suspicion to stop Jacob because
the officer did not know if Jacob had permission to leave school for a medical appointment
or other authorized purpose. On the substantive charge, href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">defense counsel maintained that Jacob was
not on school grounds when he possessed the knife. Counsel acknowledged that
the statute broadly defines school to include “any public right-of-way situated
immediately adjacent to school property” (Pen. Code, § 626, subd. (a)(4))
but maintained that the sidewalk alone, not the road where Jacob was parked,
fit that description.

The
court denied Jacob’s motion to suppress evidence, finding that the officer had
a “reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the minor” as a possible truant.
The court requested briefing on the question whether Jacob’s knife possession
occurred on school grounds. Supplemental briefing and a hearing on the matter
occurred in August 2012. The court sustained the allegation that Jacob
possessed a knife on school grounds upon finding that Jacob possessed the knife
in his car and that the car, parked at the curb of a sidewalk abutting the
school, was on school grounds within the meaning of the statute. (Pen. Code,
§ 626.10, subd. (a).) The dispositional hearing was held in October 2012.
The court placed Jacob on nonwardship probation for six months. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 725, subd. (a).) Jacob filed a timely appeal.

discussion

1. The trial court properly denied Jacob’s motion to suppress evidence.

Jacob
asserts that the juvenile court should have suppressed evidence of the knife
and its discovery in his car because the knife was found during an href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">unlawful detention. “ ‘On appeal
from the denial of a suppression motion, the court reviews the evidence in a
light favorable to the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] We must uphold those
express or implied findings of fact by the trial court which are supported by
substantial evidence and independently determine whether the facts support the
court’s legal conclusions.’ ” (In re
William V. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1468.)

Jacob
was detained on suspicion of truancy while driving on a public street after
leaving campus. Truancy is “conduct that warrants detention for the purpose of
investigation.” (In re James D. (1987)
43 Cal.3d 903, 916, fn. 7.) A police officer “may arrest or assume temporary
custody, during school hours, of any minor subject to compulsory full-time
education . . . found away from his or her home and who is absent
from school without valid excuse . . . .” (Ed. Code,
§ 48264.) A municipal daytime curfew prohibits unaccompanied minors from
being out of school without parental or school authorization (Pinole Ord.
No. 9.16.020.), as do school rules. “A detention to investigate whether a
person is a truant is justified when there are specific and articulable facts
causing an officer to suspect, reasonably, that a truancy violation is
occurring, and that the person he intends to detain is a truant.” (>In re James D., supra, at p. 916,
italics deleted.)

A
truancy detention has been upheld where the police stopped a young person
carrying a back pack on a public street miles from school during school hours.
(In re Humberto O. (2000) 80
Cal.App.4th 237, 240-241; accord In re
James D., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 917-918.) The facts here provide a
stronger basis for the detention because the officer who detained Jacob knew he
was a student subject to compulsory education and saw Jacob leave a closed
campus during school hours. Jacob contends that reasonable suspicion is
nevertheless absent because the police officer had only a “hunch” that Jacob
lacked permission to leave. The officer was not required to know that Jacob was
leaving without permission. During school hours, minors away from school may be
detained to ascertain if they are truants. (In
re Humberto O., supra, at p. 241.) The possibility that Jacob had
authorization to leave school does not prohibit a police officer from stopping
him to ask for proof of authorization. It is well established that “[t]he
possibility of an innocent explanation does not deprive the officer of the
capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Indeed, the
principal function of his investigation is to resolve that very ambiguity and
establish whether the activity is in fact legal or
illegal . . . .” (In
re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894.) The officer here was justified in
stopping Jacob to ask if he had permission to leave school.

2. Substantial
evidence supports the court’s finding that Jacob possessed a knife on school
grounds.

Jacob
had a knife in his car, which was parked on Pinole Valley Road fronting the
school. The knife was a locking folding knife with a three-inch blade. It is
unlawful to bring or possess “a knife having a blade longer than 2½ inches” or
a “folding knife that locks into place” “upon the grounds of, or within, any
public or private school providing instruction in kindergarten or any of grades
1 to 12.” (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a)(1).) “School” is defined to
include a “four-year high school” or “any public right-of-way situated
immediately adjacent to school property.” (Pen. Code, § 626, subd.
(a)(4).) Jacob contends there is insufficient evidence that his possession of
the knife occurred on school grounds. He concedes that the sidewalk along
Pinole Valley Road is a public right-of-way adjacent to the school but maintains
that the right-of-way does not extend to the road.

“Our
statutory construction begins with the plain, commonsense meaning of the words
in the statute ‘ “because it is generally the most reliable indicator of
legislative intent and purpose.” ’ [Citation.] ‘When the language of a
statute is clear, we need go no further.’ [Citation.] Here, the language is
clear, and interpreting it according to its plain meaning will not
‘ “ ‘result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not
intend.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 592.) The usual meaning of a “public
right-of-way” includes streets. (E.g., Gov. Code, § 39933 [referring to
“[p]ublic streets, highways, and other public rights of way”].) It is “the
right of passage held by the public in general to travel on roads, freeways,
and other thoroughfares.” (Black’s Law Dict. (8th ed. 2004) p. 1351,
col. 1.)

Jacob
concedes that public rights of way are commonly understood to include sidewalks
and streets but insists that some ambiguity in the meaning remains and thus the
statute should be interpreted in his favor to exclude streets. We discern no
ambiguity with respect to the present circumstances. While there may be some
ambiguity in applying the statute to the traffic lanes of a street that run by
a school campus, the parking lane of the street, where Jacob’s car was parked,
clearly is within the “public right-of-way situated immediately adjacent to
school property,” so that Jacob’s possession of the knife was upon school
grounds within the meaning of the statute. (Pen. Code, § 626, subd.
(a)(4).)

Our
interpretation of the statute is consistent with Legislative intent. “The
Legislature has recognized that the ‘[p]roliferation of weapons and other
injurious objects brought onto school grounds by pupils serves to exacerbate
instances of violence.’ [Citation.] It has enacted [Penal Code] section 626.10
to prevent violence at schools by reducing the incidence of weapons on campus.”
(In re Arturo H. (1996) 42
Cal.App.4th 1694, 1698.) In doing so, the Legislature prohibited knives not
only “within” schools but also “upon the grounds” of any school (Pen. Code,
§ 626.10, subd. (a)(1)) and broadly defined school to include “any public
right-of-way situated immediately adjacent to school property” (Pen. Code,
§ 626, subd. (a)(4)). Particularly in view of the testimony that students
regularly use their parked cars as lockers, it would frustrate the purpose of
the law to interpret a public right-of-way to end at the sidewalk and exclude a
student’s car parked at the curb.

>

disposition

The
order is affirmed.









_________________________

Pollak,
J.





We concur:





_________________________

McGuiness, P. J.





_________________________

Jenkins, J.