In re Jamar D.
Filed 7/25/06 In re Jamar D. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
| In re JAMAR D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | B183660 (Super. Ct. No. NJ17207) |
| THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMAR D., Defendant and Appellant. |
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, John H. Ing, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed as modified and remanded with directions.
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Kyle S. Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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By petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602), Jamar D. was charged with robbery and, by allegation, with the use of a deadly weapon during the commission of the robbery. The petition was sustained, and Jamar was placed in a community camp subject to certain conditions. Jamar appeals, challenging the language of some of the conditions, contending his custody credits were miscalculated, and claiming the juvenile court miscalculated his maximum period of confinement. We modify the dispositional order and, as modified, affirm and remand with directions.
BACKGROUND
A petition was filed in December 2002, alleging that Jamar (then 13) had committed a commercial burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.)[1] Jamar admitted the charge, the petition was sustained, and Jamar was placed at home on probation.
A second petition was filed in April 2003, this time alleging that Jamar had committed two counts of misdemeanor battery. (§§ 242, 243, subd. (a).) Jamar admitted the charges, the court sustained the petition as to one count, dismissed the other, and again placed Jamar at home on probation.
A third petition was filed in December 2004, alleging that Jamar had committed a commercial burglary and a petty theft. (§§ 459, 484, subd. (a).) Jamar admitted the petition, the court sustained the burglary count, dismissed the theft count, and left Jamar at home on probation under the May 2003 order.
The fourth (and current) petition was filed in January 2005, alleging that Jamar had committed a robbery and used a deadly and dangerous weapon. (§§ 211, 12022, subd. (b)(1).)[2] A contested hearing was held, after which the petition was sustained and an Evidence Code section 730 evaluation report was ordered (with Jamar left at home on probation pending receipt of the report). At the continued disposition hearing, the court considered the expert's report and the probation department's recommendation for a camp community placement, terminated the prior probation order, and placed Jamar in the camp program under specified terms and conditions for a period not to exceed six years, two months (with 96 days credit on the current petition).[3]
DISCUSSION
I.
We agree with Jamar that three conditions of probation (Nos. 15, 16, 21) requiring him (1) not to associate with anyone disapproved by his parents or probation officer, (2) not to be in the presence of any unlawfully armed person, and (3) to stay away from places where narcotics users congregate, are constitutionally overbroad because they do not include a knowledge requirement. (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1115-1117; In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 816; People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 627-629; People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102; People v. Hackler (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1058.)[4]
Condition 15 should provide: â€
