In re J.G.







Filed 9/30/11 In re J.G. CA1/3




NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re J.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.G., Defendant and Respondent; FACEBOOK INC., Objector and Appellant.	A128898 A129157 (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. SJ070076144

This is a consolidated appeal from a juvenile court order dated April 22, 2010, that imposed on appellant Facebook, Inc. (Facebook), a nonparty to these juvenile criminal proceedings, a monetary sanction in the amount of $100,000 for failing to comply with certain court orders relating to production of Facebook records relevant to the underlying matter.[1] For reasons set forth below, we reverse the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 8, 2010, a juvenile wardship petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that defendant J.G. (minor) committed three felony counts of forcible sexual penetration (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1)), and one felony count of false imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 236).[2] During the course of these juvenile proceedings, minor served at least three subpoenas on Facebook seeking information related to the victim’s Facebook user account, including electronic messages sent to and from the account and other data.
The first of these subpoenas, drafted on the mandatory judicial council form for juvenile and criminal subpoenas entitled “Order to Attend Court or Provide Documents: Subpoena/Subpoena Duces Tecum,” was issued on March 3, 2010. This subpoena, which demanded production of the requested documents within five business days or, in the alternative, Facebook’s appearance at a court hearing set for March 12, 2010, did not bear a court seal or judicial signature, and was signed only by minor’s attorney, Laura Robinson. It was served by email in accordance with the standard procedures for service of legal documents set forth on Facebook’s corporate website, and received the same day by Facebook law enforcement analyst Parvez Jamshed. In boldface type on page one, the subpoena’s recipient was given the following warning: “You must attend court or provide to the court the documents listed below.” Page one further stated: “If you do not, the judge can fine you, send you to jail, or issue a warrant for your arrest.”
On March 17, 2010, Jamshed sent an email message to minor’s counsel attaching written objections to the subpoena. Among the objections were Facebook’s contentions that insufficient information was provided to enable it to locate the victim’s user account and that a federal law, the Stored Communications Act (tit. 18, U.S.C., § 2701 et seq.) (“SCA”, prohibited it from disclosing the requested information. Later the same day, Craig Clark, Facebook’s in-house litigation counsel, spoke by telephone with Walter Stannard, the private investigator for minor who had served the subpoena, and later with minor’s counsel, Laura Robinson, regarding its objections to the subpoena. During these communications, Clark was informed that the underlying juvenile matter was criminal rather than civil in nature, and that Facebook’s appearance was required at a court hearing scheduled for the next day, March 18, 2010. In addition, Clark instructed minor’s representatives to direct all further communications regarding the case to Facebook’s outside litigation counsel, Tom Gray.
Clark later followed up with an email to Robinson providing further information regarding Facebook’s objections, as well as documenting certain details of their phone conversation, including his instruction to direct further communications to Tom Gray, who was copied therein. Gray, in turn, corresponded with both Robinson and Stannard the next day, March 18, 2010, regarding the subpoena.[3] However, no Facebook representative appeared at the scheduled court hearing, during which, among other things, defense counsel requested an order requiring Facebook to appear in court on a new date, April 5, 2010.
On March 29, 2010 and April 7, 2010, Stannard served two additional subpoenas on Facebook in accordance with the corporation’s standard procedures requesting production of substantially the same information identified in the first subpoena. As before, the subpoenas were on the mandatory judicial council form entitled “Order to Attend Court or Provide Documents: Subpoena/Subpoena Duces Tecum,” and commanded the recipient to “Attend Court or Provide to the Court the Documents Listed.” The subpoenas also warned on page one that “You must attend court or provide to the court the documents listed below,” and “[i]f you do not, the judge can fine you, send you to jail, or issue a warrant for your arrest.” However, unlike the first subpoena, the second and third subpoenas were issued and signed by a court officer: juvenile court commissioner Mark Kliszewski.
The March 29, 2010 subpoena, which was received by Facebook employee Jamshed, directed the company to produce the requested documents within five business days or appear for hearing on April 5, 2010. Similarly, the April 7, 2010 subpoena, also received by Jamshed, directed the company to produce the requested documents or appear for hearing on April 13, 2010.[4] Two days later, on April 9, 2010, Facebook objected in writing to minor’s counsel to disclosure of the information identified in the second and third subpoenas on many of the same grounds contained in its objections to the first subpoena. Facebook did not, however, file these objections with the court or appear for the April 5 hearing identified in the second subpoena.
On April 12, 2010, the day before the hearing date identified in the third subpoena, minor’s counsel contacted Jamshed to request a consent form that could be executed by the victim to authorize Facebook to release the requested information. Jamshed promptly emailed minor’s counsel Facebook’s template consent letter. Robinson thereafter acknowledged receiving the letter and advised Jamshed: “You don’t need to go to court tomorrow.”
The next day, April 13, 2010, Facebook did not appear for or submit any documents in anticipation of the scheduled court hearing. Later that day, Stannard sent Jamshed an email attaching a signed copy of the consent letter. Contrary to Jamshed’s instruction, the letter was signed by a representative of the district attorney’s office rather than by the victim. Stannard’s email informed Facebook that its handling of the subpoenas had been discussed in court earlier that day, and that another hearing in the matter was scheduled for April 20, 2010. In addition, the email noted that, should minor be found guilty in the underlying juvenile criminal proceedings, he could be “subject to imprisonment.” A few days later, on April 16, 2010, Stannard sent the signed consent letter to Thomas Gray, Facebook’s outside counsel, and reminded him that Facebook’s appearance was required in court on April 20, 2010.
On April 19, 2010, one of Gray’s colleagues, attorney Julio Avalos, arranged for a paralegal to contact the court regarding the next day’s hearing. The court’s clerk confirmed to the paralegal that the hearing was in fact scheduled to occur. A short time later, however, minor’s counsel advised Avalos that the hearing had been cancelled, prompting the paralegal to again contact the court clerk, who confirmed the hearing would in fact occur and that a Facebook representative was expected to attend.
Facebook outside counsel Avalos thereafter complied with the court clerk’s directive to appear on behalf of Facebook for the April 20, 2010 hearing, during which Commissioner Kliszewski advised that the court was considering sanctioning Facebook for failing to comply with court orders related to the subpoenas. The juvenile court commissioner thereafter gave Avalos the chance to respond. Among other things, Facebook’s counsel explained to the court the SCA’s restrictions on disclosure of the information sought pursuant to the subpoenas.
The court also heard testimony from minor’s private investigator, Walter Stannard, regarding his efforts to procure the subpoenaed documents from Facebook, including conversations he had with Facebook legal representatives regarding its need for further identifying information and the SCA’s prohibition on disclosure absent the victim’s consent. On cross-examination, Stannard admitted his failures to abide by Facebook’s instruction that he communicate only with outside counsel Thomas Gray and not with Facebook employees like Jamshed.
Following the April 20, 2010 hearing, the juvenile court imposed a sanction on Facebook in the amount of $100,000, payable to the Alameda County Superior Court, “for failure to respond to the Court after being served with a Subpoena Duces Tecum.” Earlier at the hearing, when considering the sanction amount, the court noted that he “saw in the [newspaper] two weeks ago that your C.E.O. made three billion dollars in 19— excuse me, 2009, three billion dollars . . . .” Two days later, on April 22, 2010, minor’s counsel provided Facebook with a signed waiver by the victim consenting to disclosure of the requested information. The same day, Facebook produced the information and the juvenile court immediately released minor on home supervision.[5]
On April 29, 2010, Facebook filed a motion to vacate the sanction order, raising several arguments, including those that are the subject of this appeal. On June 17, 2010, the juvenile court issued an 11-page opinion and order denying Facebook’s motion. In doing so, the court found that “Facebook disregarded and ignored three properly executed Orders of this court and failed to produce documents until sanctions were imposed. As a result of Facebook’s conduct, a minor remained in custody and was deprived of his liberty for a substantial period of time.” The court further noted that Facebook’s attorney had been “free to file an objection, a motion to quash, to provide no documents but appear at the hearing to articulate his objections, or make any number of other responses to the court. He was not free to do nothing. It is certainly reasonable to expect corporate counsel to understand that court orders cannot be ignored.” Describing Facebook’s attitude toward the juvenile court as “cavalier,” the court added: “This was not a civil disagreement, but a criminal/juvenile matter in which a child’s liberty was at stake.”
This consolidated appeal of both the sanction order and the subsequent order denying the motion to vacate followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Facebook contends the juvenile court commissioner erred by imposing a sanction against the company in the amount of $100,000 pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 2.30 because: (1) Facebook did not receive adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to imposition of the sanction; (2) the commissioner lacked inherent authority to impose the sanction and the sanction was not statutorily authorized; (3) Facebook’s conduct in responding to the subpoenas was reasonable, substantially justified and in good faith; and (4) Facebook did not consent to the commissioner acting as judge pro tempore over Facebook during the sanction proceedings.
“ ‘The imposition of sanctions, monetary or otherwise, is within the discretion of the trial court. That discretion must be exercised in a reasonable manner with one of the statutorily authorized purposes in mind and must be guided by existing legal standards as adapted to the current circumstances. [¶] Inherent in our review of the exercise of discretion in imposing monetary sanctions is a consideration of whether the court’s imposition of sanctions was a violation of due process. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Winikow v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 719, 726-727.)
“ ‘When the question on appeal is whether the trial court has abused its discretion, the showing is insufficient if it presents facts which merely afford an opportunity for a difference of opinion. An appellate tribunal is not authorized to substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge. [Citation.] A trial court’s exercise of discretion will not be disturbed unless it appears that the resulting injury is sufficiently grave to manifest a miscarriage of justice. [Citation.] In other words, discretion is abused only if the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’ [Citation.].)” (In re Woodham (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 438, 443.)
“In reviewing the facts which led the trial court to impose sanctions, we must accept the version thereof which supports the trial court’s determination, and must indulge in the inferences which favor its findings. [Citations.]” (West Coast Development v. Reed (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 693, 698.)
With these guiding principles in mind, we turn to Facebook’s claims of error.
I. Did Facebook have adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard with respect to the sanction order‌
Facebook first challenges the sanction order on due process grounds, claiming the company received no notice or meaningful opportunity to be heard before the juvenile court sanctioned it for noncompliance with orders to produce the documents sought under the subpoenas or to appear for hearing. As Facebook notes, the juvenile court commissioner opened the April 20, 2010 hearing, with the following statement. “The purpose of this hearing is to figure out what’s going on with the subpoenas that were served on Facebook and react to how we’re going to deal with that. It’s an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed.” According to Facebook, before this statement was made, Facebook, a nonparty to the action, had no knowledge the court was considering imposing sanctions against it, or that an order to show cause had issued regarding its failure to comply with court orders relating to the subpoenas. The following legal principles are relevant to this procedural challenge.
“[T]he imposition of sanctions always requires procedural due process,” regardless of the legal basis underlying the sanctions order. (Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 970, 976 [“due process protections must be afforded in every situation in which the state deprives an individual of property”].) Due process in this context requires adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of sanctions. (Ibid.; see also Lesser v. Huntington Harbor Corp. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 922, 930 [“Adequate notice is mandated not only by statute, but also by the due process clauses of both the federal . . . and state . . . Constitutions”].)
“[The] adequacy of notice should be determined on a case-by-case basis to satisfy basic due process requirements.” (Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 63, 70.) In particular, “the appearance of a party at the hearing of a motion and his or her opposition to the motion on its merits is a waiver of any defects or irregularities in the notice of the motion. [Citations.] This rule applies even when no notice was given at all. (City of Pasadena v. Superior Court [(1931)] 212 Cal. 309, 315 [298 P. 968]; Reynolds v. Harris [(1860)] 14 Cal. 667, 677; Overton v. White [(1937)] 18 Cal.App.2d 567, 576 [64 P.2d 758, 65 P.2d 99].) Accordingly, a party who appears and contests a motion in the court below cannot object on appeal or by seeking extraordinary relief in the appellate court that he had no notice of the motion or that the notice was insufficient or defective.” (Tate v. Superior Court (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 925, 930. See also Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1288-1289 [“if the party appears at the appropriate hearing and opposes the motion on the merits—but without making any request for a continuance or demonstrating prejudice from the defective notice, the issue is waived”].)
Finally, “just as with the issue of notice and opportunity to be heard, due process requires that any order giving rise to the imposition of sanctions state with particularity the basis for finding a violation of the rule.” (Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 978.) “The requirement that the court’s order specify the circumstances in justification serves yet another purpose: it enables us, as the reviewing court, to determine whether the court abused its discretion in making its award.” (Ibid.)
In this case, it is undisputed legal counsel Julio Avalos appeared on behalf of Facebook at the April 20, 2010 hearing, which concluded with the court’s decision to impose the $100,000 sanction. Despite being informed at the outset of this hearing that its purpose was to consider imposition of sanctions, Facebook’s counsel did not raise any objection to the proceedings, or request a continuance. Rather, counsel introduced himself to the court, twice took the opportunity afforded him to cross-examine defense witness, private investigator Walter Stannard, offered two exhibits into evidence during this questioning, and then declined the court’s offer to present further evidence once Stannard left the stand. Following the presentation of evidence, Facebook’s counsel then raised several arguments against imposition of sanctions, including that Facebook acted in good faith and in cooperation with defense counsel to attempt to resolve certain issues that restricted its ability to comply with the subpoenas, such as the SCA. In doing so, counsel acknowledged that Facebook was aware of the court’s displeasure with its compliance efforts, and that “it’s entirely possible that some things may have fallen through the crack.”
As this factual record reflects, even accepting Facebook’s representation that it learned for the first time at the April 20, 2010 hearing that the juvenile court was considering sanctioning it for failing to appear or otherwise respond to the court with regard to the subpoenas, Facebook was given, and indeed fully availed itself of, the opportunity to defend against the court’s proposed punishment. As such, despite any procedural deficiencies that may have occurred prior to the sanction hearing, we nonetheless conclude the issues of fair notice and opportunity to be heard have been waived by Facebook’s actual participation in that hearing. (See Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 977.)
Moreover, the same facts lead us to conclude that reversal of the sanction order on due process grounds would be inappropriate on another ground: “In order to obtain a reversal based upon such a procedural flaw, the appellant must demonstrate not only that the notice was defective, but that he or she was prejudiced. ([Citations.]; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) As explained in Lever v. Garoogian (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 37, 40 [115 Cal.Rptr. 856], ‘Procedural defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties do not constitute reversible error. (Code Civ. Proc., § 475.)’ ” (Reedy v. Bussell, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1289.)
Here, the record on appeal reveals that Facebook not only participated fully in the sanction hearing, it filed extensive papers after the hearing seeking to vacate the juvenile court’s order. Facebook also participated in a subsequent hearing during which its counsel appeared and availed himself of a full opportunity to argue grounds for vacating the order. In ultimately denying Facebook’s motion, the juvenile court issued an 11-page written opinion and order, setting forth detailed factual findings in support of its order, as well as addressing each of the legal grounds raised by Facebook to challenge it. Under these circumstances, we conclude that, even aside from waiving its right to raise a due process challenge, Facebook sustained no prejudice from any irregularity in the procedures followed by the juvenile court in reaching the sanction order. Accordingly, we turn to Facebook’s next argument.
II. Did Facebook consent to the commissioner acting as judge pro tempore‌
In a separate procedural challenge to the sanction order, Facebook contends it did not consent to the commissioner acting as judge pro tempore for purposes of the sanction proceedings. In doing so, Facebook points to California Rules of Court, rule 2.816 (rule 2.816), which requires that parties receive notice that a temporary judge has been appointed to hear a matter and have the opportunity to either stipulate to the temporary judge’s service or exercise its right to have the matter heard before a judge, commissioner, or referee of the court. (Rule 2.816, subds. (a)-(d).) In this case, the parties to the underlying juvenile matter (i.e., minor and the prosecutor) stipulated in writing to Commissioner Kliszewski’s service as a temporary judge. However, Facebook, a nonparty to these proceedings, did not. According to Facebook, this circumstance requires us to vacate the sanction order as null and void. We disagree.
“The Supreme Court recognized that the jurisdiction of a temporary judge to try a cause derives from the parties’ stipulation [(In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 90).] [footnote omitted]. It found, however, (1) that an attorney has the power to stipulate to a temporary judge on behalf of his or her client and, thus, that it is not necessary to obtain a defendant’s personal stipulation (id. at pp. 97-98); (2) that ‘ “an implied stipulation arises from the parties’ common intent that the subordinate officer hearing their case do things which, in fact, can only be done by a judge” ’ (id. at p. 98); and (3) that such an implied stipulation results from the conduct of counsel in participating in the proceedings and thus tacitly recognizing the authority of the temporary judge. (Ibid.) “ ‘An attorney may not sit back, fully participate in a trial and then claim that the court was without jurisdiction on receiving a result unfavorable to him. [Citation.]” ’ (Id. at p. 91.)” (In re Julio N. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1123; see also Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 988-989.)
In this case, although Facebook is not a party to the underlying juvenile proceedings and did not enter into a written stipulation consenting to the juvenile court commissioner’s jurisdiction, there is no question that the company, through its counsel, fully participated in the sanction hearing “without complaint and without objection to the [commissioner].” (In re Julio N., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123; see also Estate of Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 988.) Nonetheless, Facebook, having received an unfavorable result from the hearing, now contends that result must be vacated based on the commissioner’s temporary judge status. However, under the appellate authority set forth above, we reject Facebook’s contention on the ground that Facebook’s stipulation to the commissioner’s jurisdiction was implied as a result of its conduct at the sanction hearing, and that any error resulting from the court or parties’ failure to obtain Facebook’s written consent to the commissioner’s service prior to the hearing was waived. (Ibid.)
III. Was the juvenile court authorized to impose the sanction against Facebook‌
Facebook next contends there was no statutory basis for imposing the $100,000 sanction, and that the juvenile court commissioner lacked inherent authority to impose it. The following legal principles are relevant to these contentions.
“We generally review orders for monetary sanctions under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (See, e.g., Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1212 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 265]; Burkle v. Burkle (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 387, 389 [50 Cal. Rptr.3d 436].) However, the proper interpretation of a statute or rule of court relied upon by the trial court as its authority to award sanctions is a question of law, which we review de novo. (In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1479 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 29]; see People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 11 P.3d 956]; Scottish Rite Cathedral Assn. of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 108, 115 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 207].)” (Vidrio v. Hernandez (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1452.)
In this case, the sanction order itself was in the form of a minute order with little analysis of the order’s legal underpinnings. Later, when denying Facebook’s motion to vacate the sanction order, however, the juvenile court provided the following legal reasoning. First, the court noted that the Code of Civil Procedure limits to $1,500 the amount of any sanction imposed for a party’s violation of a court order without good cause or substantial justification. (Code Civ. Proc., § 177.5 (section 177.5).) However, the court continued, section 177.5 “falls short of providing . . . an appropriate avenue to address entities such as Facebook who disregard court orders” with resulting costs to a child’s liberty. In particular, the court found, a sanction limited to $1,500 would not adequately deter “a multimillion dollar company such as Facebook.”[6]
As such, the juvenile court relied instead upon California Rules of Court, rule 2.30 (rule 2.30) to justify imposing a $100,000 sanction on Facebook, notwithstanding the court’s recognition that rule 2.30, on its face, does not apply to juvenile cases. (Rule 2.30, subd. (a).) In doing so, the court reasoned as follows: “California Rules of Court, [rule] 2.30 permits a court to ‘order a person to pay reasonable monetary sanctions to the court . . . for failure without good cause to comply with the applicable rules.’ A ‘person’ may be a party, attorney, or witness. This rule explicitly does not apply to juvenile court cases, however, its broad language is most informative. It provides the court with teeth to ensure its orders are not disregarded – even by a witness rather than a party.”
In reviewing this legal analysis, we first note our agreement with the juvenile court commissioner’s assumption that, in crafting sanction orders in the absence of controlling statutory authority, judges indeed possess certain inherent powers necessary to maintain supervision over their proceedings. (Andrews v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 779, 781-782; In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1231.) However, the California Supreme Court has made clear these inherent powers must be construed quite narrowly “to avoid the ‘serious due process problems’ that would arise if trial courts had unfettered authority to award . . . sanctions. ([Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal.3d 626, 637-638 (Bauguess)].) Hence, Bauguess prohibited a trial court from using fee awards to punish misconduct unless the Legislature, or the parties, authorized the court to impose fees as a sanction.”[7] (Olmstead v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 804, 809.)
Our colleagues in the Second Appellate District, Division Seven, recently described the California Supreme Court’s position on this issue as follows: “California courts have inherent power to ‘take appropriate action to secure compliance with . . . orders, to punish contempt, and to control its proceedings.’ (Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal.3d 626, 637 [150 Cal.Rptr. 461, 586 P.2d 942]; see [Code of Civ. Proc.] § 128, subd. (a) [“[e]very court shall have the power to do all of the following: [¶]. . . [¶] (4) To compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process . . . [¶] (5) To control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto”].) However, our trial courts have no inherent power to impose monetary sanctions. (Bauguess, at pp. 638-639; Trans-Action Commercial Investors, Ltd. v. Firmaterr, Inc. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 352, 366-367 [70 Cal. Rptr.2d 449] (Trans-Action Commercial); see Andrews v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 779, 782 [98 Cal. Rptr.2d 426] [punitive monetary sanction is not authorized under the inherent powers of the courts].) ‘It is a general rule that, outside of a contempt proceeding, trial courts lack inherent power to impose a monetary sanction against an attorney for misconduct in court.’ (People v. Mohammad (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 313, 316 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 308].)’ ” (Vidrio v. Hernandez, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1454-1455 [emphasis added]. See also In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1224 [“The court had no inherent authority to impose sanctions”].)
Thus, as these authorities make clear, while a court does have inherent authority to punish for contempt and to control its own proceedings, a court does not have inherent authority or power to impose punitive monetary sanctions. (Bauguess, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 638-639; Andrews v. Superior Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 782.) Rather, an order imposing such sanctions must be grounded in either statutory law or agreement of the parties. (Ibid.; Olmstead v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 809.)
Here, as Facebook points out, there is no codified rule of law in California that specifically authorizes the imposition of punitive monetary sanctions against a nonparty witness, like Facebook, for failing to comply with a lawful court order to appear or produce documents. As set forth above, rule 2.30, which the juvenile court relied upon to justify imposition of the sanction, expressly applies to nonparty witnesses, but only those participating in non-juvenile court proceedings. (Rule 2.30, subd. (a) [limiting the rule’s application to rules of court “relating to general civil cases, unlawful detainer cases, probate proceedings, civil proceedings in the appellate division of the superior court, and small claims cases”].) Section 177.5, in turn, also cited in the court’s order, expressly limits monetary sanctions to $1,500, an amount far below the $100,000 sanction imposed against Facebook in this case. (Cf. People v. Tabb (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1300, 1304, 1311-1312 [imposing a $75 fine pursuant to section 177.5 for an attorney’s failure to appear at a court hearing, failure to answer calendar call twice, and failure to notify the clerk of his whereabouts or reason for nonappearance.]; Moyal v. Lanphear (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 491, 496 [imposing a $450 fine for a party’s failure to appear at a court hearing].) And, while section 128.5 authorizes an order of sanctions to compensate a party for “reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by [the] party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay,” in this case, the court ordered sanctions paid to the court for the purpose of deterrence or punishment rather than paid to a party to cover their expenses.
In minor’s responding brief, he mentions for the first time California Rules of Court, rule 5.546, subdivision (j) (rule 5.546(j)) as a possible source of authority for the juvenile court’s sanction order. (See People v. Hua (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1033 [a trial court ruling correct under any legal theory, even one not relied upon below, must be affirmed on appeal].) In doing so, minor points to the use of the term “person” in subdivision (j) to argue that the rule’s disclosure requirements extend to nonparties such as Facebook.[8] However, as Facebook correctly points out, a reading of the rule in its entirety makes clear that it governs only the disclosure duties of the parties in a juvenile proceeding – to wit, the petitioner and the minor’s parent or guardian. It nowhere purports to govern the conduct of nonparty witnesses like Facebook. (Rule 5.546.) In particular, the reference in subdivision (j) to “a person [who] has failed to comply with this rule or with an order issued under this rule” does not extend the rule’s application to nonparties; rather, it simply authorizes imposition of sanctions against those persons already subject to the rule’s requirements for their failure to comply.
Finally, we note that the juvenile court possessed authority under the Welfare and Institutions Code to hold Facebook in contempt for failing to comply with its lawful order(s) to appear or produce documents. (§ 213 [“[a]ny willful disobedience or interference with any lawful order of the juvenile court or of a judge or referee thereof constitutes a contempt of court”].) However, neither the subpoenas nor the sanction order contained any finding that Facebook was in contempt of court. In fact, the juvenile court made no reference whatsoever to “contempt,” when considering or imposing the $100,000 sanction. Thus, to the extent the commissioner’s order could be construed as an adjudication of contempt proceedings, such order would be defective and unenforceable. (In re Marcus (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1014-1015 [a contempt order must be “clear, specific, and unequivocal,” with “[a]ny ambiguity in [the order] . . . resolved in favor of an alleged contemnor”]; Koehler v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1166-1167 [“there is no presumption of regularity in contempt proceedings [citations], nothing can be implied in support of an adjudication of contempt”].)[9]
Thus, having identified no authority, statutory or otherwise, for the $100,000 sanction imposed against Facebook in this case, we conclude the juvenile court commissioner’s order was invalid as a matter of law. We therefore reverse the sanction order, as well as the related order denying Facebook’s motion to vacate, and remand this matter to the juvenile court for further consideration in light of the conclusions reached above without addressing Facebook’s alternative argument that the sanction order lacked an adequate factual basis because the company at all relevant times acted reasonably and in good faith.

DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order imposing a sanction on Facebook in the amount of $100,000 and related order denying Facebook’s motion to vacate are reversed, and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with the opinions expressed herein. Each side shall bear its own costs on appeal.

_________________________
Jenkins, J.

We concur:

_________________________
McGuiness, P. J.

_________________________
Pollak, J.


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