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In re J.H. CA4/3

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In re J.H. CA4/3
By
04:06:2022

Filed 4/20/21 In re J.H. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re J.H. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.H. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

G059533

(Super. Ct. Nos. 18DP0799, 18DP0825, 18DP0826, 18DP0827 & 18DP1254)

O P I N I O N

Appeals from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gary L. Moorhead, Judge. Affirmed.

Marsha F. Levine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant R.H.

Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.A.

Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.G.

Leon J. Page, County Counsel, and Karen L. Christensen and Deborah B. Morse, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

No appearance for the Minors.

* * *

INTRODUCTION

C.A. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental rights as to now eight‑year‑old Jon.G., six‑year‑old Joh.G., six‑year‑old Ja.G., four‑year‑old Ja.H., and two‑year‑old Je.H. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise specified.) She contends the juvenile court erred by finding inapplicable the parent‑child relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) and by failing to select legal guardianship as the permanent plan for the children.

R.H., who is the father of Ja.H. and Je.H., and J.G., who is the father of Jon.G., Joh.G., and Ja.G., have each appealed from the orders terminating parental rights. In their respective appellate briefs, R.H. and J.G. each state they do not raise any separate appellate issues but instead join and adopt Mother’s opening brief and argue that if Mother’s parental rights are reinstated, their parental rights must also be reinstated.[1] (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5.)

Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I.

The Juvenile Dependency Petitions Filed on Behalf of Mother’s Four Eldest Children

In July 2018, then 15-month-old Ja.H. was taken into protective custody and the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a juvenile dependency petition on his behalf. That petition alleged that Ja.H. came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support). The following month, then five‑year‑old Jon.G., then four‑year‑old Joh.G., and then two‑year‑old Ja.G. were also taken into protective custody and a juvenile dependency petition was filed on their behalf under section 300, subdivision (b)(1).

A.

The Allegations of the Petition Filed on Behalf of Ja.H.

The following summarizes the allegations of the petition filed on behalf of Ja.H., as amended by interlineation in November 2018.

In July 2018, Mother and R.H. engaged in a physical altercation in the presence of their son Ja.H., and Mother’s other children, Jon.G., Joh.G., and Ja.G., during which R.H. hit and punched Mother, who at that time was about five months pregnant with Je.H.[2] R.H. fled the scene with Ja.H.; Ja.H. was taken into protective custody later that day. Mother was transported by ambulance to Garden Grove Medical Center for treatment and Jon.G., Joh.G., and Ja.G. were released to the care of J.G.’s girlfriend. A few days later, Mother reported that the three oldest children were back in her care, but she refused to disclose their location; SSA was unable to learn the children’s location for some time “despite several letters, unannounced home visits and telephone messages.”

R.H. was arrested for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, child stealing, and contempt for violating a protective order. He also had an outstanding warrant related to a prior conviction for committing domestic violence against Mother.

The July 2018 incident reflected Mother and R.H.’s unresolved history of engaging in domestic violence in the children’s presence. Previously, in January 2018, R.H. physically assaulted Mother by pushing her to the ground, causing her to suffer abrasions to her knees and a cut to her right index finger, which bled; the children were present. On that occasion, R.H. was found to be in possession of a methamphetamine pipe. R.H. was arrested and pled guilty to inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant and possession of controlled substance paraphernalia. He was ordered to complete a batterer’s treatment program.

In January 2018, a three-year protective order was issued protecting Mother and the children from R.H. The protective order allowed R.H. to make peaceful contact with Mother only to facilitate the safe exchange of their child and for court‑ordered visitation. R.H. was otherwise to stay away from “the protected persons’ school, vehicle, home, and work.” R.H. and Mother violated that protective order and failed to protect the children.

In February 2018, Mother and R.H. placed the children at risk of harm when R.H. drove Mother and the children without a driver’s license; at least one of the children was not appropriately secured in a car seat. R.H. was charged with driving without a license and, after he failed to appear at a hearing in April, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Mother was also charged with violating the mandatory requirement of using rear seat passenger restraints for a child under eight years old. Mother similarly failed to appear at her hearing on the citation.

J.G. had a history of domestic violence against Mother. J.G. was previously arrested and/or convicted of domestic violence against Mother on several occasions, which resulted in the issuance of five separate three‑year criminal protective orders in February 2012, March 2012, April 2013, September 2014, and September 2015 protecting Mother from J.G. In June 2013, “a child abuse referral was received that [Mother] was not complying with the restraining order as [Mother] and [J.G.] were staying together and . . . [J.G.] physically assaulted [Mother] while she was holding [Jon.G.].” Mother reported to law enforcement that J.G. had grabbed her arm and twisted it behind her back. After Mother set Jon.G. on the ground, J.G. “shoved her and pushed against her neck such that she was only able to breathe in gasps.” Mother reported five previous incidents of domestic violence, only three of which had previously been reported to law enforcement. In September 2015, another child abuse referral was received regarding J.G. physically assaulting Mother in the presence of Joh.G.

Mother had a history of evading the intervention of SSA. During the prior investigations involving J.G. and the January 2018 investigation involving R.H., Mother could not be located despite many attempts to contact her. Mother denied she was aware of the investigations or received any messages from SSA.

Both Mother and R.H. had histories of substance abuse issues including the use of marijuana. In November 2016, Mother reportedly smoked marijuana in front of the children, and, during a welfare check, law enforcement personnel reported that the home smelled of marijuana. R.H. reported he smoked marijuana. As noted ante, R.H. pled guilty to possessing controlled substance paraphernalia following the January 2018 domestic violence altercation after a methamphetamine pipe was found that reportedly belonged to him.

Mother may have had unresolved mental health issues. In January 2018, R.H. reported Mother suffered from postpartum depression. She also had a criminal history which included arrests and/or convictions for disorderly conduct involving prostitution and obstruction of a public officer.

R.H. had a criminal history which included arrests and/or convictions for taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent, inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant, possession of controlled substance paraphernalia, child stealing, violation of a protective order, and driving without a license. As of the filing of the petition, R.H. was incarcerated and could not provide for the safety, support, and protection of Ja.H. and was unable to provide or arrange for appropriate care for him.

B.

Additional Allegations in the Petition Filed on Behalf of Jon.G., Joh.G, and Ja.G.

The following summarizes the allegations contained in the petition filed on behalf of Jon.G., Joh.G., and Ja.G., as amended by interlineation in October 2018, that were not alleged in the petition previously filed on behalf of Ja.H and summarized ante.

Mother failed to protect Jon.G., Joh.G., and Ja.G. by remaining with R.H. in violation of the criminal protective orders and continuing to engage in domestic violence with him in front of the children. Mother self‑reported the children witnessed two out of three incidents of domestic violence that occurred between January and July 2018.

Mother did not have a stable and safe residence for the children. She reported that she and the children had been homeless and staying in a car, at a motel, or at a friend’s house. She acknowledged she and the children should not have been around R.H., but explained he was the only person helping them find shelter.

J.G. had an unresolved anger management problem, an alcohol abuse problem, and a substantial criminal history including, most recently, unresolved domestic violence against his current girlfriend. J.G. was charged with several offenses and a protective order was issued stemming from an incident in May 2018, in which J.G. punched his girlfriend several times, causing her injuries. When the child of J.G.’s girlfriend tried to intervene, J.G. pushed and punched him.

II.

Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings as to Jon.G., Joh.G., Ja.G., and Ja.H.

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing for Jon.G., Joh.G., and Ja.G., Mother pleaded nolo contendere and J.G. submitted to the allegations of the amended petition filed on behalf of those children. The juvenile court found the allegations of the amended petition true by a preponderance of the evidence, thereby bringing the children within the court’s jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The court declared them dependent children of the juvenile court under section 360, subdivision (d), removed them from Mother’s custody, and vested custody of the children with SSA. The court granted Mother reunification services and monitored visitation.

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing for Ja.H., Mother and R.H. each pleaded nolo contendere to the amended petition filed on Ja.H.’s behalf. The juvenile court found the allegations of the amended petition true by a preponderance of the evidence, thereby bringing Ja.H. within the court’s jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). The court declared Ja.H. a dependent child of the juvenile court under section 360, subdivision (d) and vested custody of him with SSA. The court granted Mother reunification services and monitored visitation.

III.

Je.H. is Born and, Shortly Thereafter, Is Taken into Protective Custody; SSA Files a Juvenile Dependency Petition as to Je.H.

Days after she was born, Je.H. was detained and a juvenile delinquency petition was filed on her behalf alleging she came within section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling). As amended by interlineation, the petition filed on behalf of Je.H. reiterated many of the allegations contained in the petitions previously filed on behalf of Mother’s other children.

This latest petition added the following allegations. R.H. was ultimately convicted of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant, child stealing, and contempt for violating a protective order. In August 2018, a 10‑year criminal protective order was issued to protect Mother and Ja.H. from R.H. and to prohibit all forms of contact between them. Nevertheless, less than one month later, R.H. was arrested when, in violation of the criminal protective order, he had contact with Mother in front of the probation department. R.H. also admitted he recently had abused methamphetamine. He was incarcerated, but, a few weeks after his release, he again violated the criminal protective order by appearing at the hospital following Je.H.’s birth. Although Mother was enrolled in a personal empowerment program, she continued to have contact with R.H. Meanwhile, R.H. failed to participate in the court‑ordered reunification services regarding Ja.H.’s dependency case.

As of the end of November 2018, all five of Mother’s children were placed with their maternal aunt and uncle (the prospective adoptive parents).

IV.

After Mother’s Minimal Cooperation with the Case Plans and Minimal Progress in Mitigating the Causes that Led to Dependency Jurisdiction, the Juvenile Court Terminated Reunification Services and Set a Permanency Hearing.

In its 12‑month status review report, SSA recommended that the juvenile court terminate reunification services as to Mother’s four eldest children (all but Je.H.) and set a permanency hearing. The report stated Mother’s “cooperation with the case plan and efforts and progress made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating court involvement” had been minimal. (Capitalization omitted.)

At the 12‑month review hearings, the juvenile court found reasonable services had been provided or offered to the parents of Ja.H., Jon.G., Joh.G., and Ja.G., and that the extent of the parents’ progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating the children’s placement had been minimal. The court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a permanency hearing.

In the 12‑month status review report prepared in Je.H.’s dependency case, SSA similarly recommended that the juvenile court terminate reunification services and set a permanency hearing. SSA again cited Mother’s minimal cooperation with the case plan and minimal efforts and progress made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating court involvement.

The report also included the social worker’s summary of her meeting with Mother in November 2019, during which Mother had stated she wanted her children to remain with the prospective adoptive parents. Mother stated she did not intend to participate in further services. During another meeting the following month, Mother confirmed to the social worker that she was “adamant” that the children remain with the prospective adoptive parents. Mother stated she was working full time and the children were safe with her sister.

At the 12‑month review hearing in Je.H.’s dependency case, the juvenile court found reasonable services had been provided or offered to Mother and that the extent of Mother and R.H.’s progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating the child’s placement had been minimal. The court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a permanency hearing.

V.

The Permanency Reports and Addendum Reports

The permanency reports and addendum reports filed in advance of the permanency hearing reviewed the history of Mother’s participation in visits with the children. During monitored visits early on in the dependency cases, Mother went to the park and played soccer with the children and ate with them. Mother would take care of their needs during visits. The children were happy to see Mother and Mother was loving, caring, and affectionate with them. Mother acknowledged to the social worker that the children appeared happy placed with the prospective adoptive parents.

In April 2019, Mother was granted four hours of unsupervised visitation and 16 hours of supervised visitation per week. Less than one month later, however, visitation returned to 100 percent supervised and restricted to six hours per week after the children disclosed that R.H. had appeared at an unsupervised visit notwithstanding the protective order prohibiting such contact. After the children had left a monitored visit with Mother in June 2019, a family member reported that Mother was seen leaving with R.H. in Mother’s minivan. In July 2019, after missing some visits, Mother met with the social worker and reported she had “relapsed” and wanted to get back into services and begin visiting the children again.

During visits in September 2019, the children appeared happy to see Mother. Several of them would sit on her lap at one time. Mother played with them. She consistently came to visits prepared with food for the children. She was affectionate with them, greeting them with open arms and hugs. During visits, she accompanied them to the restroom and enforced consequences when the children would harm each other or ignore redirection.

As of July 2020, Mother continued visiting the children virtually due to COVID‑19 visitation protocols. She resumed in‑person visitation in August 2020.

The reports showed that the children (who remained placed together with the prospective adoptive parents since November 2018), were comfortable in that placement and looked to the prospective adoptive parents to meet their needs. On all compliance visits, the children appeared to have adapted to living with the prospective adoptive parents and were doing well. The children appeared to be physically healthy and were meeting developmental milestones.

The reports also showed that the prospective adoptive parents were experienced parents who had demonstrated their ability to meet the children’s needs and to otherwise parent and protect the children. They had provided the children with a safe and stable home. They appropriately supervised the children and facilitated visitation with their parents. The prospective adoptive parents expressed their love for the children. They were supportive of the children’s parents’ reunification efforts but recognized the parents were unable to care for them. The prospective adoptive parents wanted to provide the children with a permanent, stable, structured, and loving home where their needs would be met through adoption should the parents be unable to reunify.

VI.

The Juvenile Court Finds the Children Adoptable and No Exception to the Termination of Parental Rights Applies; Mother, R.H., and J.G. Appeal from the Orders Terminating Their Parental Rights.

At the permanency hearing for all five children, Mother testified about her relationships with them and that she did not agree that her parental rights should be terminated or that the prospective adoptive parents should adopt them. Mother testified that she loved her children, they loved being around her, and that it would “be something devastating in both of our sides” if parental rights were terminated. Mother acknowledged her visits with the children “have always been supervised.” She testified that during visits, she played with the children, made them meals, and provided snacks. She testified that even when visits were virtual through Zoom, she was able to interact with each child for 15 to 20 minutes and that the children seemed to enjoy the visits. She was able to resume in‑person visits in August or September.

Mother testified that each of her children is affectionate with her; she hugs and kisses them. During visits, Mother asks them about their day or about school and engages in activities with them based on their individual interests. If one of the children misbehaved, she testified she would explain to the child the problem that got the child in trouble and why the child would have to go into time out to think about it. If one of the children had an accident and was hurt during a visit, she testified the child would seek comfort and help from her which she would provide.

Mother testified all five children call her “mom.” Jon.G., Ja.G., and Ja.H. are sad when visits are over; Jon.G. has expressed that she does not want visits to end and that she would like to have more time with Mother. Joh.G. gets upset when visits end. Mother testified she offers encouragement to the children when visits end; she gives them a hug and kiss and tells them she will see them soon.

Mother testified she had made mistakes and that she was “not in the best place” to provide for the children but that she was doing everything possible to have them returned to her care. Mother acknowledged the prospective adoptive mother is taking care of the children.

The social worker testified that, although the children would benefit from continuing their relationships with Mother, in her opinion, Mother is unable to parent. The social worker cited Mother’s continuing “at-risk behaviors,” which include her ongoing contact with R.H. The social worker also cited Mother’s failure to complete services or prove she could safely supervise the children.

The court found it likely each child was generally and specifically adoptable. The court terminated parental rights and placed each child for adoption. The court explained: “I have no doubt after listening to the testimony of [Mother] and both fathers in this case that they all deeply love these children and want to parent them in the future. I also recognize that the COVID epidemic has had an adverse effect, at least temporarily, on the quality of their visits with these children over the last several months. It is especially difficult to engage with children under five on video chats for more than just a few minutes.”

The court continued:

“However, what is significant for both [Mother] and [J.G.]’s visits is that they remain supervised rather than unsupervised. What is also significant is that there is no drama or crying over leaving the visits by a child when any visit ends. Visits for [Mother] and [J.G.] appear to be happy and enjoyable by the children and they seem to be comforted when hurt or troubled in the visits by the parents, but this could also be said of visits with other relatives or familiar baby‑sitters close to the children.

“Playing games, bringing food, and hugging and kissing the children do not equate to fulfilling a parental role under the law, and although all children appear to enjoy their visits, the court does not find [by] a preponderance of the evidence that they will suffer any significant detriment if the parental rights are terminated. The evidence convinces me that the best interests of these children will be promoted by their adoptions and in a stable, permanent, and loving home.”

Mother, R.H., and J.G. each appealed.

DISCUSSION

I.

The Parent-child Relationship Exception and the Standard of Review

Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) allows the juvenile court to decline to terminate parental rights over an adoptable child if it finds “a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child” because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” Mother has the burden of proving both prongs of the parent‑child relationship exception are satisfied. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527, disapproved on other grounds in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989; In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 949.)

There is some dispute among appellate courts regarding how to frame the standard of review of a juvenile court’s finding that the parent‑child relationship exception is inapplicable. (See In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314.) In In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351, the appellate court stated that although reviewing courts have “routinely applied the substantial evidence test” to the juvenile court’s findings under the former version of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), the court considered the abuse of discretion standard to be more appropriate because the juvenile court in such circumstances is required to make a “quintessentially discretionary determination.” The court noted, however, “[t]he practical differences between the two standards of review are not significant.” (Ibid.)

In In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at page 1314, the appellate court held: “In our view, both standards of review come into play in evaluating a challenge to a juvenile court’s determination as to whether the parental or sibling relationship exception to adoption applies in a particular case. Since the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental or sibling relationship, which is a factual issue, the substantial evidence standard of review is the appropriate one to apply to this component of the juvenile court’s determination. Thus, as this court noted in In re I.W.[, supra,] 180 Cal.App.4th 1517 . . . , a challenge to a juvenile court’s finding that there is no beneficial relationship amounts to a contention that the ‘undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion.’ [Citation.] Unless the undisputed facts established the existence of a beneficial parental or sibling relationship, a substantial evidence challenge to this component of the juvenile court’s determination cannot succeed.” In In re Bailey J., the appellate court held the abuse of discretion standard governs review of the determination whether the existence of such a relationship constitutes a compelling reason for concluding the termination of parental rights would be detrimental. (Id. at p. 1315; see In re Collin E. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 647, 663 [“‘We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child’”].)

Still other courts have required evidence compelling a finding in favor of the parent as a matter of law. (See, e.g., In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 647 [“When the juvenile court finds the parent has not maintained regular visitation or established the existence of the requisite beneficial relationship, our review is limited to determining whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the parent on this issue as a matter of law”].)

The California Supreme Court has granted review to determine the appropriate standard of review for the parent‑child relationship exception. (In re Caden C. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 87, 106, review granted July 24, 2019, S255839.)

We do not need to address which iteration of the applicable standard of review is most correct. Even were we to construe the applicable standard of review liberally in Mother’s favor, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings that the parent‑child relationship exception is inapplicable.

II.

The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Finding the Parent‑child Relationship Exception Inapplicable.

We do not need to address whether Mother showed she had regularly visited and otherwise had contact with her five children because she failed to show the children would benefit from continuing her relationship with them within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).

As to the second prong of the parent‑child relationship exception, in In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575-576, the court held: “In the context of the dependency scheme prescribed by the Legislature, we interpret the ‘benefit from continuing the [parent/child] relationship’ exception to mean the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well‑being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated. [¶] Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. The significant attachment from child to parent results from the adult’s attention to the child’s needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. [Citation.] The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. [Citation.] The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. [¶] At the time the court makes its determination, the parent and child have been in the dependency process for 12 months or longer, during which time the nature and extent of the particular relationship should be apparent. Social workers, interim caretakers and health professionals will have observed the parent and child interact and provided information to the court. The exception must be examined on a case‑by‑case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child bond. The age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond.”

The permanency hearing reports showed Jon.G., Joh.G., Ja.G., Ja.H., and Je.H. were all very young when they were removed from Mother’s care (ages five years, four years, two years, 15 months, and under one month old, respectively). Since November 2018, all five children have lived with the prospective adoptive parents to whom they have looked to have their needs met; the prospective adoptive parents delivered in consistently meeting those needs. The children all appeared to be comfortable and happy in the prospective adoptive parents’ home. The prospective adoptive parents expressed their love for the children and desired to provide a permanent and loving home for all five of the children if they were freed for adoption.

We recognize, as did the juvenile court, that Mother and the children love each other and enjoy their supervised visits together during which Mother provides for their needs. The social worker testified the children would derive a benefit from continuing their relationships with Mother although Mother was unable to parent them. Under well‑settled law, however, these facts are not enough to establish the application of the parent‑child relationship exception to adoption. (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 558-559 [“a parent may [not] establish the parent‑child beneficial relationship exception by merely showing the child derives some measure of benefit from maintaining parental contact”].) In In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 81, a panel of this court held that the parent‑child relationship exception did not apply, although the children referred to the mother as “‘Mom,’” the mother and her children loved each other, and the mother provided for her children’s needs during visits.

Substantial evidence showed the prospective adoptive parents have occupied a parental role in the children’s lives since their placement with them and supported the findings that the children would not benefit from continuing their relationships with Mother within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). The juvenile court did not err by finding the parent‑child relationship exception inapplicable and by terminating Mother’s parental rights accordingly.

In her opening brief, Mother argues the juvenile court should have selected a “lesser permanent plan, such as legal guardianship” for the children instead of terminating parental rights and selecting adoption as the appropriate plan. Mother’s argument is without merit.

“The express purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is ‘to provide stable, permanent homes’ for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) Once the court has decided to end parent‑child reunification services, the legislative preference is for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1); In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532 . . . [‘f adoption is likely, the court is required to terminate parental rights, unless specified circumstances compel a finding that termination would be detrimental to the child’]; [i]In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 . . . [‘f the child is adoptable . . . adoption is the norm. Indeed, the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.’].” ([i]In re Breanna S., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 645.)

Here, the parties do not dispute the adoptability of any of the children. For the reasons we discussed ante, substantial evidence supports the court’s findings that the parent‑child relationship exception is inapplicable. We find no error.

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

ARONSON, J.


[1] Because neither R.H. nor J.G. raises any separate issues in this appeal, our summary of the allegations pertaining to R.H. and J.G. is limited to providing only relevant background to the issues raised by Mother.

[2] R.H. denied hitting Mother, but acknowledged he pulled her out of a car during the incident. The petition filed on behalf of Ja.H. alleged that during an interview, Jon.G. reported that R.H. “pushes and hits” Mother. It also alleged R.H. “self-reported pushing” Mother. The Ja.H. petition further alleged R.H. has an unresolved anger management problem; R.H. denied that allegation but acknowledged he has a tendency to “speak aggressively at times.”





Description C.A. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental rights as to now eight year old Jon.G., six year old Joh.G., six year old Ja.G., four year old Ja.H., and two year old Je.H. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise specified.) She contends the juvenile court erred by finding inapplicable the parent child relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) and by failing to select legal guardianship as the permanent plan for the children.
R.H., who is the father of Ja.H. and Je.H., and J.G., who is the father of Jon.G., Joh.G., and Ja.G., have each appealed from the orders terminating parental rights. In their respective appellate briefs, R.H. and J.G. each state they do not raise any separate appellate issues but instead join and adopt Mother’s opening brief and argue that if Mother’s parental rights are reinstated, their
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