Filed 4/5/18 In re J.J. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(El Dorado)
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In re J.J. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. C085804


EL DORADO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Super. Ct. Nos. PDP20160086, PDP20160087, PDP20160088)



Mother D.J. appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights and freeing the minors for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) She argues the juvenile court erred in finding an insufficient bond based on hearsay and lay opinion in the report filed by the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA). We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
The juvenile court terminated mother’s parental rights as to three children, but mother’s challenge on appeal pertains only to the minor J.J., who was nine years old when the selection and implementation hearing was held. Mother was then incarcerated.
Prior to the contested selection and implementation hearing, mother’s counsel relayed two requests to the juvenile court: to have a bonding study and to have the minor testify at the hearing.
As to the bonding study, county counsel objected, noting it would not be helpful given mother’s limited contact with the minor and her extensive incarceration. The juvenile court denied the request. It cited the difficulty in assessing a bond due to mother’s incarceration: “[T]here’s no way to assimilate any kind of normalcy between [the minor] and his mother while his mother is incarcerated.” It also questioned the study’s relevance given evidence of a bond could be provided by the CASA report, the prior caretaker, the parents, and possibly the minor.
As to the minor testifying, the juvenile court initially expressed skepticism, however, it invited a written issue statement as to why the minor’s testimony would be necessary.
At a later hearing, mother was represented by new counsel who reiterated mother’s request to have the minor testify. But new counsel added, “I find that the law supports the opposite . . . and I don’t think there’s anything in my opinion that [the minor] would offer that would help my client.” The juvenile court issued a tentative ruling denying the request for the minor’s testimony. It noted it was not in the minor’s best interest, it would be traumatizing to him, and the record was replete with evidence of mother’s parenting that would show the degree of bond between mother and child. The court, however, offered, “[I]f she can offer me some reason why [the minor’s] testimony is necessary, the Court will be happy to hear that argument.”
At the selection and implementation hearing, mother testified that the minor would visit her in prison and they talked by phone. She testified that he was always happy to see her, he tells her he loves her, and he wrote cards saying, “I can’t wait until you get out of jail” and, “I want you to come home.”
At the hearing’s conclusion, the juvenile court terminated parental rights as to all three children, including the minor. It found the children adoptable. As to the minor, it found a bond between him and his mother, though it was “not a parental bond.” Citing the CASA report, the court noted the minor had identified a former caretaker as his family. The court found, “there is an emotionally significant relationship between [the minor] and [mother], but it does not bare the resemblance to a constituent daily mark that a parental relationship exists.” Any bond, “is not nearly significant enough to outweigh the permanency that [the minor] will receive through adoption.”
Mother’s counsel did not object to the use of the CASA report.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, mother challenges the juvenile court’s finding regarding the bond with her son. She argues she was denied due process because the court relied heavily on hearsay statements and lay opinion in the CASA report. She maintains she was prejudiced, pointing to her testimony of her strong bond with the minor (which she avers the section 366.26 report did not contradict) as well as the denial of her requests for a bonding study and to have the minor testify. We find no error.
Mother’s challenge to the court’s reliance on hearsay and lay opinion in the CASA report is forfeited by her trial counsel’s failure to object. The failure to raise an evidentiary objection forfeits a later claim on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353; In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 132 [“any hearsay objections . . . were waived by the failure to object below”].) Thus mother is precluded from claiming error on appeal and we do not reach this issue.
Further, neither the bonding study nor the request to have the minor testify are referenced as subjects of the argument of error in mother’s opening brief, which claims only that the juvenile court erred in considering the CASA report. We would therefore be justified in deeming those arguments forfeited as well. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) However, because respondent clearly addresses both arguments we will briefly address them.
Nothing mandates a bonding study before a termination order. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339.) Rather, “discretion to order a bonding study arises from Evidence Code section 730,” which permits a court to appoint an expert to investigate and create a report. (In re S.R. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 864, 869.) “[T]he reason for appointment of an expert is that the expertise is, or may be, required to resolve issues in the case.” (Ibid.) Such decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of E.U. and J.E. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1389.)
Here, as the juvenile court noted, evaluating the bond while mother was incarcerated would give little information about the relationship under normal circumstances. And evidence of the bond was available through other sources. Thus, given the limited relevance and the likelihood of delaying permanency, denying the study was within the court’s discretion. (See In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1197 [“Bonding studies after the termination of reunification services would frequently require delays in permanency planning”].)
Finally, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in refusing mother’s request to have the minor testify. A juvenile court may exclude a child’s testimony to avoid psychological harm to the child. (In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1088.) Assuming without deciding that the claim was not forfeited by new counsel’s representation to the court that the minor’s testimony would not assist mother’s case, the court acted well within its discretion in denying the request. Neither counsel nor mother could offer the court an explanation for why the minor’s testimony was necessary. Accordingly, denying mother’s request to have the minor testify was within the trial court’s discretion.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.




/s/
Duarte, J.



We concur:



/s/
Hull, Acting P. J.




/s/
Hoch, J.