Filed 2/15/22 In re J.K. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Christopher B. Marshall, Judge. Affirmed.

Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant J.K.

Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant K.G.

Steven O’Neill, Interim County Counsel, and Dawn M. Martin, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

In this dependency proceeding, K.G. (Mother) filed petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 asking the juvenile court to return her children to her care or, in the alternative, reinstate her reunification services. (Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) The court denied Mother’s petitions without holding an evidentiary hearing and terminated parental rights to the children, L.K. and J.K. Mother appeals from the order denying her section 388 petitions and the order terminating parental rights. Je.K. (Father) appeals from the order terminating parental rights. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Detention

The family came to the attention of San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) in April 2020, when L.K. was nearly three years old and J.K. was a newborn. At J.K.’s birth, he tested positive for methadone and opiates, and Mother tested positive for methadone and alcohol. Mother admitted to using methadone to treat an addiction to opiates. She also said that she had taken two pain pills before going into labor because she had fallen and injured her knee. She denied using alcohol or any other substances. After CFS asked her to drug test in May 2020, she tested positive for methadone and opiates. Mother, who was 40 years old, reported that she had been addicted to pills since she was 17 years old. She had engaged in several treatment programs throughout the years. Most recently, she had started a treatment program in December 2019.

The reporting party alleged that Father also used drugs, but the party did not know what type. Father denied abusing any substances. He was unaware Mother had taken pain pills before J.K.’s birth, and he said that he had never observed Mother abusing substances. After CFS asked him to drug test, he tested positive for amphetamines.

Mother agreed to stay at maternal grandmother’s home with L.K. until CFS could verify Mother’s treatment history. (J.K. was still in the hospital undergoing treatment for withdrawal symptoms.) Mother’s counselor at her treatment program reported that she was doing well, but Mother had consistently tested positive for heroin from December 2019 to March 2020.

CFS filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b), as to each child, alleging that both parents had a history of substance abuse, Mother used methadone and heroin during her pregnancy and obtained minimal prenatal care, and Father knew or should have known that Mother was using drugs and failing to obtain prenatal care.

The court detained the children from the parents in May 2020. The children were placed in maternal grandmother’s home. The court ordered supervised visitation twice weekly for two hours.

II. Jurisdiction and Disposition

When interviewed for the jurisdiction and disposition report, Mother reported that she was still in her treatment program and drug testing. She missed two drug tests in May 2020. Father continued to deny that he abused substances, but he had recently enrolled in a treatment program and was taking methadone, which he obtained from Mother.

Maternal grandmother reported that Mother had completed an intensive inpatient treatment program in July 2019. Maternal grandmother knew Mother had enrolled in an outpatient program, but she was not aware Mother had been using again until CFS had intervened. Maternal grandmother was supervising the parents’ visits, and they had all been appropriate. L.K. was adjusting well to maternal grandmother’s home. J.K. was still in the hospital and would be released to maternal grandmother’s care.

After the parties engaged in mediation, Mother stipulated to reworded allegations that she had a history of substance abuse, experienced a relapse, and failed to get appropriate prenatal care, placing the children at risk. CFS agreed to dismiss the allegations that Father had a history of substance abuse, and Father stipulated to the allegations that he knew or should have known of Mother’s substance abuse and failure to get appropriate prenatal care.

In July 2020, the court found the stipulated allegations to be true and dismissed the remaining allegations. The court also removed the children from the parents’ custody and ordered reunification services, including substance abuse treatment, random drug testing, parenting classes, individual counseling, and a psychiatric evaluation for Mother, if recommended by her therapist. The court ordered the current visitation schedule to continue, plus an additional eight-hour supervised visit every week for Mother. CFS had authority to increase the frequency and duration of supervised visits.

III. Six-Month Review Period

In preparation for the six-month review hearing, CFS reported that the parents refused to sign consent forms permitting the social worker to communicate with their service providers. The parents refused to sign because they did “not want the [social worker] to know their history prior to CFS involvement.” Both parents said that they were in an outpatient treatment program and participating in counseling as part of the program, but CFS, lacking the signed consent forms, was able to verify only their period of attendance. Mother attended the program from December 2019 to January 2021, and Father attended for only 17 days in June 2020. During the review period, Mother drug tested negative twice. She tested positive for amphetamines, methadone, and opiates once, and she missed eight tests. Father drug tested negative once and missed 12 tests. Mother had documentation showing that she had completed two hours of parenting classes.

The social worker described both children as happy, thriving, and well adjusted in maternal grandmother’s home. Still, maternal grandmother reported that L.K. was having nightmares or night terrors since her detention and removal from the parents’ care. Maternal grandmother said that when the parents came for L.K.’s bedtime routine and stayed until she fell asleep, her nightmares were less frequent. The parents’ visits with the children were going well, according to maternal grandmother. She kept a visitation log with a short description of each visit from May to November 2020. (CFS attached the log to its six-month review report.) Mother often brought food or cooked for the children, and she did laundry. The parents played with the children, read to them, bathed them, and changed diapers, and the parents occasionally brought toys or clothes for the children. The parents and the children were loving and affectionate with each other, and the children were happy to see the parents. L.K. frequently asked when her parents would visit next, and she said that she missed them. Mother attended a number of medical or dental appointments for the children.

Beginning in August 2020, L.K. saw a therapist every other week; in October 2020, she started weekly appointments with a new therapist. The therapist and L.K. discussed L.K.’s nightmares, and the therapist’s goal was to help L.K. process her trauma and express her feelings more. Maternal grandmother had purchased books for L.K. to help with her nightmares and explain the separation from Mother. Maternal grandmother initially told CFS that she wanted to adopt the children if reunification efforts failed, but she later said that she wanted a legal guardianship to allow for the possibility of reunification in the future.

The court terminated the parents’ reunification services at the six-month review hearing in March 2021. The court reduced visitation to twice per month for two hours and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.

IV. Mother’s Section 388 Petitions and Section 366.26 Proceedings

In preparation for the section 366.26 hearing, CFS reported that the children were strongly bonded to maternal grandmother. They sought her out for attention and affection and “present[ed] as very happy children.” But maternal grandmother said that L.K. missed her parents. The parents continued to visit as often as the court’s order permitted. L.K. became upset and cried at the end of their visits. She tended to have anxiety when they left. During visits, she clung to them and cried if they left the room. She was also waking in the middle of the night and crying for Mother. L.K. told the social worker that she felt her parents were “‘lost’” because they visited less often. The child was still seeing her therapist weekly. J.K. engaged positively with the parents and did not exhibit any behavioral changes when visits ended.

Maternal grandmother described her relationship with the children as very loving but firm; she was working with L.K.’s therapist on routine and structure. Maternal grandmother also wrote a letter to the court expressing her desire to be the children’s legal guardian. She thought that Mother was “on the right track,” and she wanted to give the parents a chance to make progress. She said that both children were bonded to the parents. L.K. was attending weekly counseling and was doing well when the parents visited three times per week, but L.K. had gotten worse since visitation had decreased to twice monthly. L.K. was biting herself and acting out at school. While maternal grandmother preferred a legal guardianship, she would adopt the children if the court chose adoption as the permanent plan. She loved the children and wanted them to be safe and have permanency.

Relying on the parents’ bond with the children and maternal grandmother’s preference, CFS initially recommended that the court select legal guardianship as the permanent plan. Several weeks later, however, maternal grandmother changed her mind and wanted to adopt the children, and CFS changed its recommendation to adoption. Mother had admitted to maternal grandmother that Mother was not making progress and had “‘not done anything to address her sobriety.’” Maternal grandmother no longer believed that she was discouraging the parents’ progress by adopting the children, and she was committed to putting the children’s needs above the parents’ needs.

The section 366.26 hearing was scheduled for July 6, 2021. That morning, Mother filed section 388 petitions as to each child. In her supporting declaration, Mother explained that she had enrolled in an outpatient treatment program on June 19, 2021, and had attended an unspecified number of Narcotics Anonymous meetings. She had drug tested through CFS until April 2021. Her program included random drug testing and individual therapy sessions, and she had attended six counseling sessions outside of the program. In addition, she had completed nine sessions of a 16-session parenting class. Mother requested that the court vacate the section 366.26 hearing and return the children to her custody or, in the alternative, reinstate her reunification services and liberalize visitation. She argued that the proposed changes were in the children’s best interests because the children were deeply bonded to her and would benefit from more contact with her.

At the section 366.26 hearing, the court denied the section 388 petitions without holding an evidentiary hearing. It continued the section 366.26 hearing to the following day.

Both parents testified at the continued hearing. Father testified that L.K. had been in his care for nearly three years at the time of her removal, while J.K. was removed as a newborn. He had not missed any visits with the children. Both children called him “Daddy.” They were very excited to see him at visits and wanted to be held by him. He had to carry L.K. for almost the entirety of the visits because she was “stuck to [his] hip.” Mother cooked and he cleaned, and they would do everything else as a team during visits. The visits had always been supervised. He and the children loved each other, and he believed that termination of his parental rights would be detrimental to their “overall health.”

Mother testified that she had never missed a visit either. Before the court terminated reunification services, the parents visited in the evenings and put L.K. to bed before they left. Mother characterized the child’s separation anxiety as severe, but if L.K. went to bed before they left, she would not have a “full-blown meltdown.” During visits, Mother cooked dinner while Father played games with the children. She bathed the children while Father cleaned up after dinner, and the family would read books or watch a Disney movie together. Mother also brought the children clothes and food and did their laundry when she could. As to L.K., Mother tried to follow what the child was doing in daycare and bring complementary books or workbooks. As to J.K., the parents were teaching him to swim and walk, and they were teaching him colors and shapes.

Since the court had reduced visitation to twice per month, the visits occurred at the park.[1] Mother explained that L.K. had been in therapy to address anxiety about separation from the parents, but that anxiety was returning with the park visits. At the end of the visits, L.K. screamed, cried, and grabbed the parents’ legs. The therapist was also addressing L.K.’s nightmares or night terrors. Mother said that maternal grandmother had called her roughly three times when L.K. was having a night terror. In one instance, L.K. put on her shoes and backpack and was standing at the front door, crying and screaming for the parents. L.K. appeared to be in a dream-like state or not fully awake. Maternal grandmother spoke to L.K.’s doctor about the incident and explained the other occasions when L.K. had awakened screaming and crying. The doctor said that the incidents were night terrors.

Mother believed that L.K. would suffer lifelong trauma if the court were to terminate parental rights. She believed that J.K. would also suffer detriment from termination of parental rights, because she was the only one who could “control and comfort him completely.” For the first month of his life, she visited him every day in the hospital.

Both parents argued that the parental bond exception to adoption applied, but the court ruled that it did not. The court noted that it had listened carefully to the parents’ testimony and had evaluated their credibility. The court explained that there was evidence the parents shared an emotional bond with the children. However, it also concluded that the parents had not shown that severance of the parent-child relationship would deprive the children of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the children would be greatly harmed. The court noted that J.K. had never lived with the parents and that L.K. had been out of their care for one year. Visits had never progressed to unsupervised. In addition, the children were strongly bonded to maternal grandmother, and she was committed to continuing the children’s relationship with the parents, to the extent that it was healthy for the children. And while there was “a suggestion” that termination of parental rights would cause harm to L.K., there was no evidence that there would be great harm to either child. The court determined that the parents had not shown that the parent-child relationship benefitted the children to such a degree as to outweigh the benefit they would derive from a permanent home with their adoptive parent. The court found that the children were likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights.

DISCUSSION

I. Mother’s Section 388 Petitions

Mother argues that the court abused its discretion by denying her an evidentiary hearing on her section 388 petitions. We disagree.

“Section 388 permits the parent of a dependent child to petition the juvenile court for a hearing to modify an earlier order on the basis of changed circumstances or new evidence. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) The petitioning party bears the burden of showing that there is new evidence or changed circumstances and that the proposed modification would be in the best interests of the child.” (In re N.F. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112, 120 (N.F.).)

“‘Not every change in circumstance can justify modification of a prior order.’ [Citation.] The change in circumstances supporting a section 388 petition must be material. [Citations.] In the context of a substance abuse problem that has repeatedly resisted treatment in the past, a showing of materially changed circumstances requires more than a relatively brief period of sobriety or participation in yet another program.” (N.F., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 120-121.)

The petitioner must make a prima facie showing of both the changed circumstances and best interests factors to trigger the right to a hearing on the section 388 petition. (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 205.) If the petitioner fails to make a prima facie showing of either factor, the court may deny the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 188-189; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d)(1).) “A ‘prima facie’ showing refers to those facts which will sustain a favorable decision if the evidence submitted in support of the allegations by the petitioner is credited.” (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.) In determining whether a prima facie showing has been made, “the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case.” (In re K.L. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 62.) We review for abuse of discretion the summary denial of a section 388 petition. (In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.)

In this case, the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing and summarily denying Mother’s section 388 petitions. Even if the court credited Mother’s supporting declaration, she failed to make a prima facie showing of materially changed circumstances. The record discloses that Mother had a decades-long history of drug use. She said that she had participated in several treatment programs throughout the years. Shortly before this case, she completed an intensive inpatient program in July 2019 and started an outpatient program in December 2019, but she relapsed. According to her outpatient program, she consistently tested positive for heroin through March 2020. She also tested positive for alcohol in April 2020 and opiates in May 2020. Mother attended the outpatient program through January 2021, but CFS had no other information about Mother’s progress, because Mother would not consent to share that information. And while she was attending that program during the six-month review period, Mother missed eight drug tests and tested positive for amphetamines and opiates once.

After all of that history, Mother’s declaration in support of the section 388 petitions stated that she had started another outpatient treatment program 18 days earlier and had attended an unspecified number of Narcotics Anonymous meetings. She did not claim to have been clean and sober for any period of time. Nor did she claim that her recent drug tests for the program were negative. Given Mother’s history of treatment and relapse, Mother’s recent enrollment in another treatment program was not prima facie evidence of a material change in circumstances. It “was only the most recent attempt in a series of unsuccessful attempts to overcome her substance abuse.” (N.F., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 122.)

Moreover, Mother’s declaration that she attended six counseling sessions and nine parenting sessions was not prima facie evidence of materially changed circumstances. The court took jurisdiction over the children primarily on the basis of Mother’s unresolved history of substance abuse. Without a prima facie showing that her substance abuse had materially changed, her recent reengagement in other services was likewise a nominal change.

In sum, Mother failed to make a prima facie showing of materially changed circumstances in support of her section 388 petitions. She therefore was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the petitions, and the court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying them.

II. Parental Bond Exception

Mother and Father argue that the parental bond exception applied and the juvenile court therefore erred by terminating their parental rights. (Each parent joins in the other’s arguments.) We are not persuaded.

When the juvenile court finds that a dependent child is likely to be adopted, it must terminate parental rights and select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds that adoption would be detrimental to the child under one of several exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630-631 (Caden C.).) The exceptions allow the court “‘to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.’” (Caden C., supra, at p. 631, quoting In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) “t is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” ([i]In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350, disapproved on another ground by Caden C., at p. 636, fn. 5.)

Under the parental bond exception, the parent bears the burden of proving three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 636.)

We review for substantial evidence the juvenile court’s findings on whether the parent has regularly visited and whether a beneficial parental relationship exists. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) Whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because of the beneficial parental relationship is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.) But we review any factual findings underlying that decision for substantial evidence. (Ibid.) This hybrid standard embodies the principle that as the reviewing court, we may not “substitute [our] own judgment as to what is in the child’s best interests for the trial court’s determination in that regard.” (Id. at p. 641.)

Under the exception, “[a] showing the child derives some benefit from the relationship is not a sufficient ground to depart from the statutory preference for adoption.” (In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 646, disapproved on another ground in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 637, fn. 6, 638, fn. 7.) Rather, the parent must show that the child has such “a substantial, positive emotional attachment” to the parent that “the child would be greatly harmed” by severance of the relationship. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 (Autumn H.); Caden C., at pp. 633, 636.)

In determining whether the exception applies, the court “must decide whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) “[T]he court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; Caden C., at p. 633.) The parent must show that his or her relationship with the child “promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (Autumn H., at p. 575.)

The juvenile court may consider issues ranging from “the specific features of the child’s relationship with the parent and the harm that would come from losing those specific features to a higher-level conclusion of how harmful in total that loss would be.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) The court must also assess “how a prospective adoptive placement may offset and even counterbalance those harms,” and in that respect the court may consider “findings ranging from specific benefits related to the child’s specific characteristics up to a higher-level conclusion about the benefit of adoption all told.” (Ibid.) The court must engage in a “subtle, case-specific inquiry” and “a delicate balancing” of the various factors. (Id. at pp. 633, 640.)

Here, the court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the parental bond exception did not apply. There is no dispute that both parents regularly visited the children. Moreover, the evidence shows that the parents’ visits were loving, affectionate, and pleasant. The parents played with the children, read to them, fed them, bathed them, changed their diapers, and brought them clothes or toys. But the “parent[s] must show more than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits.” (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.) J.K. was a newborn when the court detained him from the parents. He never lived with them—he went from the hospital to maternal grandmother’s home. He was strongly bonded to maternal grandmother and happy in her care. The parents never had unsupervised visits with him. And while he was happy to see the parents, there is no evidence that he suffered negative effects when the visits ended or from being separated from the parents. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [beneficial relationship “may be shaped by a slew of factors,” including “‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs’”].) Thus, even if J.K. had an emotional bond with the parents and benefitted somewhat from the relationship, the court reasonably concluded that they did not share such a substantial, positive emotional attachment that J.K. would be greatly harmed by severance of the relationship.

The evidence demonstrates that the parents’ emotional bond with L.K. was stronger. She had lived with them for the first three years of her life. She was happy to see them, said that she missed them, and frequently asked when their next visit would be. And there is evidence that she suffered some negative effects from her separation from the parents. She had nightmares or night terrors after her detention from the parents, and maternal grandmother said that they occurred less when the parents visited. The parents timed their visits so that they could put her to bed and avoid upsetting her with their departure. When the visits became less frequent, L.K. clung to the parents and cried if they left the room; she cried, screamed, and grabbed the parents’ legs at the end of the visits; she woke in the middle of the night crying for Mother; and she was biting herself and acting out at school.

But even if L.K. had a more significant emotional attachment to the parents than J.K., the court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that any harm from severing the relationship did not outweigh the sense of security and stability the child would experience in a permanent adoptive home. The record reflects that L.K.’s separation anxiety did not prevent her from forging a strong bond with maternal grandmother over the past year or from being happy in maternal grandmother’s care. Moreover, the record is unclear about how often L.K. had nightmares or night terrors, though Mother said that maternal grandmother called her about night terrors only three times. The record is likewise unclear about exactly how L.K. was acting out in school, how often that happened, and how often she had bitten herself. In any event, L.K. was attending weekly therapy to address her behaviors. And the only evidence that L.K. would suffer long-term harm was Mother’s opinion that the child would suffer lifelong trauma from termination of parental rights. L.K.’s therapist did not testify, and there was no documentary evidence from the therapist. The court was not required to credit Mother’s opinion. In short, the court reasonably determined that the parents failed to show their relationship with L.K. promoted her well-being to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being she would derive from a permanent adoptive home. That conclusion applies with equal if not greater force to J.K.

Mother argues that the juvenile court relied on factors that our Supreme Court rejected in Caden C. The only improper factor that the court mentioned in its ruling was maternal grandmother’s commitment to continuing the children’s relationship with the parents. (In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 128 [“the juvenile court injected an improper factor into the weighing process, namely, the prospective adoptive parents’ willingness to allow the children to have continued contact with mother”].) If the court determines that the parent has proven all three elements of the parental bond exception, the court cannot terminate parental rights on the basis of an unenforceable promise of future visitation with the parents. (Ibid.) “Because terminating parental rights eliminates any legal basis for the parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts must assume that terminating parental rights terminates the relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) But even if the court here considered maternal grandmother’s willingness to continue contact with the parents, it also found that the parents had not carried their burden of proving all three elements of the exception, and it relied on a number of proper factors in reaching that conclusion. This was not a case in which the court determined that the parents had established the exception but nevertheless terminated parental rights because it believed the caregiver would voluntarily permit future contact. On this record, it is not reasonably probable that the court would have reached a different result if it had not considered maternal grandmother’s willingness to allow future contact. Any error in considering the factor therefore was harmless.

Mother also argues that the children’s best interests are served by preserving the parent-child relationship because of maternal grandmother’s age and health issues. Mother suggests that maternal grandmother’s health may preclude her from caring for the children in the future. The argument lacks merit. First, the section 366.26 hearing “does not provide a forum for a parent to contest the ‘suitability’ of a prospective adoptive family as long as the minor is generally adoptable.” (In re R.C. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 486, 494.) The court found that the children were likely to be adopted, and Mother does not contest that finding. Accordingly, the question of maternal grandmother’s suitability as an adoptive parent was “‘reserved for the subsequent adoption proceeding.’” (Ibid.)

Second, to the extent that maternal grandmother’s attributes were relevant to the parental bond exception, the inference that maternal grandmother could not provide permanence and stability is speculative. The record reflects that maternal grandmother is 62 years old and has high blood pressure, nerve pain in her feet, “thyroid issues,” asthma, and a persistent cough. She also had a hip replacement and knee surgery in recent years, and she had a pending CT scan for a spot on her lung. But CFS reported that maternal grandmother treats her medical conditions with medication and an inhaler. Moreover, CFS reported that despite her medical conditions, maternal grandmother was providing excellent care for the children and appeared to be very active. Indeed, Mother presented no evidence that maternal grandmother’s age or medical conditions affected her care of the children. The juvenile court acted well within its discretion by relying on CFS’s assessment of the situation.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the benefit J.K. and L.K. would receive from adoption was not outweighed by any detriment they might suffer from the termination of parental rights.

DISPOSITION

The orders denying Mother’s section 388 petitions and terminating parental rights are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

FIELDS

J.

[1] Mother has a 10-year-old son who also lived with maternal grandmother. That child is the half-brother of L.K. and J.K. According to Mother, the visits with L.K. and J.K. had been moved to the park because the father of her 10-year-old son did not want the visits occurring at maternal grandmother’s house.