In re J.L.,










Filed 12/16/10








CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re J.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.L., Defendant and Appellant.	G040507 (Super. Ct. No. DL009632-16) O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Donna L. Crandall, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Paul R. Ward, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Janet Neeley and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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J.L. appeals from the juvenile court's adjudication sustaining allegations he committed four lewd and lascivious acts with three children, his cousins. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); subsequent statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unless noted.) Defendant contends the dire consequences of the adjudication -- including lifetime registration as a sex offender, potential exposure to civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP), and residency restrictions under Proposition 83 (Jessica's Law) -- are punitive in nature. Defendant argues due process requires a jury trial before the state may impose such severe punishment. He contrasts his lifetime punishment with the less severe outcomes that mark typical juvenile adjudications, where the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned proceedings less formal than a criminal prosecution, including the absence of a jury trial, based on the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system. (See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528 (McKeiver).) Defendant also argues equal protection of the law requires a jury trial before a trial court may impose the lifetime punishment he faces. Defendant asserts juveniles subject to these consequences are similarly situated with adults who are subjected to these identical consequences only after a criminal conviction. Because their similarly-situated adult counterparts are entitled to a jury trial, defendant asserts equal protection requires that juveniles should have the same right.
Defendant's due process and equal protection arguments hinge on whether the consequences he identifies are punitive. As we explain below, controlling precedent establishes that neither sex offender registration, nor SVP civil commitment proceedings constitute punishment. Defendant's premise therefore fails as to these consequences.
But we agree with defendant that the lifetime residency restrictions he faces as a result of his juvenile adjudication are punitive in nature. We recently determined in People v. Mosley (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1112 (Mosley), that the residency restrictions imposed by Jessica's Law (§ 3003.5, subd. (b)) are â€