In re Jonathan H.
Filed 7/19/13
In re Jonathan H. CA1/2
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re JONATHAN H., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JONATHAN H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
A135972
(Contra
Costa County
Super. Ct.
No. J1101623)
A
supplemental juvenile wardship petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code section 602 alleged defendant had committed a number of crimes, including
conspiracy to commit a robbery (Pen.
Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1))
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] and petty theft
(§§ 484, 488). The juvenile court
denied defendant’s motion to suppress his confession to the police. At the conclusion of the
true seven allegations of petty theft and one allegation of conspiracy to
rob.
On
appeal, defendant contends that the juvenile court erred when it denied his
motion to exclude his confession to the police because, according to defendant,
his confession was coerced and his waiver of his rights pursuant to
did not support his convictions and that the juvenile court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over three of the petty
theft convictions. We conclude that
substantial evidence did not support the true findings on two of the counts of
petty theft but otherwise affirm the jurisdictional and dispositional orders.
BACKGROUND
On May 3, 2012, a
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 was filed alleging that
defendant had committed in count 1, felony conspiracy to rob (§ 182, subd.
(a)(1));
in count 2, felony grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)); in counts 3 through 11,
misdemeanor petty theft (§§ 484, 488); in count 12, misdemeanor resisting a
peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)); and in count 13, the unlawful possession
of a switchblade knife (§ 653k).
The juvenile
court held a contested jurisdictional hearing on June 7, 2011.
The evidence at the hearing was that a man was seated in his car in the
parking lot across from In-Shape, a health club, shortly before 4:00 a.m. on November
15, 2011, when he spotted two youths in hooded sweatshirts walking in
the parking lot. The man observed the
boys stand behind a car belonging to the manager of the health club. The boys retreated through the parking lot
when another person approached the gym.
The man in the car did not see the faces of the two youths.
The police were
called and Officer Mike Yaeger arrived at the health club parking lot at 4:08 a.m. Two other
officers also responded and they told Yaeger that they had discovered two
youths behind the “car wash or gas station,†which was about 100 feet from the
health club parking lot. Yaeger walked
to where the youths were being detained.
The youths were defendant and Taylor E.
Yaeger found what appeared to be a handgun and a ski mask in the nearby
shrubbery. A further search of the
shrubs disclosed a Halloween mask of President Barak Obama and an 8-inch
carving knife. A closer inspection of
the gun revealed that it was an altered rubber Airsoft B.B. gun. The officers searched the boys and found
nothing on them. None of the witnesses
at the health club was able to identify the youths.
The officers
arrested defendant, who was 14 years old at the time. Defendant was in the police station from the
time of his arrest at 4:20 a.m., and was
interviewed by Detective Peter Folena at 9:03 a.m. Folena was told that defendant had been
arrested for a curfew violation and that defendant had been stopped at the
health club early that morning. Folena
read defendant his Miranda rights. Defendant agreed to speak.
Folena’s
interrogation of defendant in the police station lasted 30 to 45 minutes. Folena did not believe that defendant had
eaten anything between the time of his arrest and the interrogation. Folena ended the interview at the station and
then, after further questioning while in the car, drove defendant to a
fast-food restaurant to have something to eat.
The car interview ended at noon or 12:30 p.m.
After the trial
court denied defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to Folena at the
police station, Folena testified that defendant told him he received a phone
call from his friend Taylor during the evening of November 14, 2011; they agreed to meet. Defendant snuck out of the house and took his
mask of President Obama with him. He met
Taylor and Taylor gave him the
choice of taking the kitchen knife or an Airsoft B.B. gun; defendant took the
B.B. gun.
During the
interview, Folena told defendant that he had already talked to Taylor and that he
needed defendant to be honest. Folena
told defendant that he knew that he had robbed or attempted to rob some
individuals and to break into some vehicles.
Defendant responded, “Oh, yeah.â€
Defendant then
told Folena that he and Taylor went to a grocery store to steal food. He reported that they hid in the bushes at
the rear of the store. They saw an older
woman and, while wearing their masks, they followed her to her home. She, however, entered her home and eluded
them. They were going to rob another
person in the parking lot of the grocery store but their plans were thwarted
when an “employee walked by and spooked them.â€
The boys walked
about a mile to a gas station near the health club, In-Shape. They intended to rob individuals, but were
unsuccessful. Defendant estimated that
they attempted to rob five persons but, for various reasons, failed. Defendant said they were going to rob a
female they spotted in the parking lot at In-Shape but they saw the police car
enter the parking lot and, thus, they hid in the bushes.
Defendant
mentioned that he had broken into a grey Honda Civic or Accord earlier in the
evening and had stolen a lighter and some cigarettes. Defendant claimed that he had burglarized so
many cars since the summer of 2011 that he had lost count; he broke into them
to get money.
Folena took
defendant in his vehicle to get lunch and to question him further. While driving around the City of Brentwood (Brentwood), defendant
showed Folena the cars that he had burglarized.
Folena testified during voir dire that defendant did not appear tired
when he was driving him around.
As Folena drove
around Brentwood, defendant pointed out the following cars as vehicles that he
had burglarized: A grey Honda Accord, a
silver 2003 BMW, a blue Toyota Tundra, a Dodge Magnum, a Jeep, a Dodge Durango,
and a white sedan. Meredith Nahm lived
on the street where defendant identified the grey Honda Accord as being a car
he burglarized. She stated that her
locked Honda had not been burglarized but her unlocked Hyundai Santa Fe had
been. Lynnette Torrez lived where
defendant identified the BMW that he burglarized. She stated that, in 2011 or early in 2012,
her unlocked Yukon was burglarized, but her locked BMW was not
burglarized. Eric Yunck resided on the
street where the blue Toyota Tundra was located, and he testified that in 2011
his Tundra was burglarized and the backseat television sets had been
stolen. James Brandt testified that when
he lived on the street where defendant identified the Dodge Magnum, a pack of
cigarettes and a cigarette lighter were taken from his Ford Flex in July or
August 2011. John Hemenes lived on the
street where defendant identified the Jeep that he burglarized, and he asserted
that in July 2011, a chrome grenade gear shift knob was removed from his son’s
Jeep; change was taken from two other vehicles he owned. Joy Scholtz confirmed that in July or August
2011, money was stolen from the ashtray of her Dodge Durango, and that she
lived on the street where defendant indicated he had burglarized a Dodge
Durango. Steven Padgett lived on the
street where defendant identified the white sedan that he had burglarized. Padgett testified that during July or August
2011, his white-topped Suzuki Sidekick was burglarized, and a garage door
opener, prescription medication, and a stereo faceplate were stolen.
Folena admitted
that car burglaries are common in the area where he had driven defendant.
At the
conclusion of a jurisdictional hearing,
the juvenile court sustained the petition as to seven of the petty theft
allegations (counts 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, and 11), and the allegation of
conspiracy to rob (count 1). The court
granted the People’s motion to dismiss the other counts.
On June 21,
2012, at the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court continued defendant as a
ward of the court, removed him from the custody of his parents, and ordered him
placed at the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility.
Defendant filed
a timely notice of appeal.
A. The Law
and Standard of Review
Defendant
contends the juvenile court erred in denying his
and not voluntary and these same law enforcement techniques made his waiver of
his Miranda rights involuntary. Defendant asserts the error requires reversal
because it was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
18, 24, and thus violated his constitutional federal and state rights to due
process.
“A
suspect, having been advised of his Miranda
rights, may waive them ‘provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently.’ [Citation.]†(In re
Norman H. (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 997, 1001.)
“In general, a confession is the defendant’s declaration of his or her
intentional participation in a criminal act.
[Citations.] A confession
constitutes an acknowledgement of guilt of the crime charged. [Citations.]â€
(In re Shawn D. (1993) 20
Cal.App.4th 200, 208.)
However,
“ ‘[i]t long has been held that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution makes inadmissible any involuntary statement obtained by a
law enforcement officer from a criminal suspect by coercion. [Citations.]
A statement is involuntary [citation] when, among other circumstances,
it “was ‘ “extracted by any sort of threats . . . , [or] obtained by any direct
or implied promises, however slight . . . .†’ †[Citations.]
Voluntariness does not turn on any one fact, no matter how apparently
significant, but rather on the “totality of [the] circumstances.†[Citations.]’
[Citation.]†(
1370, 1402.)
“ ‘The prosecution has the
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant’s
confession was voluntarily made.’ †(
405, 436.) “The
test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the
questioned suspect’s ‘will was overborne at the time he confessed.’ [Citation]â€
(People v. Cruz (2008) 44
Cal.4th 636, 669; see also Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 226.)
“ ‘A finding of coercive police activity is a prerequisite to a finding
that a confession was involuntary under the federal and state
Constitutions. [Citation.]’ †(Cruz, at p. 669.) In
determining whether a minor’s confession
is voluntary, we consider a number of factors including: the characteristics of the minor, including
his or her maturity, education, physical condition, mental health, emotional
state, and prior experience with the criminal justice system; and the
circumstances of the questioning, including the location, length and continuity
of the interrogation and any
police coercion, threats, promises of leniency, lies or deception. (People
v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 411; In
re Shawn D., supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 209.) “Threats, promises, confinement, lack of food
or sleep, are all likely to have a more coercive effect on a child than on an
adult.†(In re Aven S. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 69, 75.)
“
‘In assessing allegedly coercive police tactics, “[t]he courts have prohibited
only those psychological ploys which, under all the circumstances, are so
coercive that they tend to produce a statement that is both involuntary and
unreliable.†[Citation.]’ [Citation.]
[¶] A confession is not
involuntary unless the coercive police conduct and the defendant’s statement
are causally related. [Citations.]†(People
v. Williams, supra,
“We review independently
a trial court’s determinations as to whether coercive police activity was
present and whether the statement was voluntary. [Citation.]
We review the trial court’s findings as to the circumstances surrounding
the confession, including the characteristics of the accused and the details of
the interrogation, for substantial evidence.
[Citation.] ‘[T]o the extent the
facts conflict, we accept the version favorable to the People if supported by
substantial evidence.’ [Citation.]†(People
v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1093.)
B. Defendant’s
Confession and Waiver of Miranda Rights Were Voluntary
Defendant
maintains that his statements in the police station and in the police car were
coerced. His confession was coerced,
according to defendant, because he is a juvenile and was in the police station
for five hours before he was questioned.
During that period he did not have the opportunity to call his parents,
an attorney, or another adult and had nothing to eat. He was questioned for an additional one to two
hours while in the police car. These
same factors, defendant maintains, invalidated his waiver of his
The
record establishes that defendant was arrested shortly after 4:00 a.m. and then
questioned for 30 to 45 minutes just after 9:00 a.m. The record contains no evidence related to
the reason for the delay. The second
interview in the police car started after 10:00 a.m. and lasted until noon or
12:30. Thus, Folena interviewed
defendant for a total of three to four hours after defendant had been in
custody for five hours.
Based
on the totality of the circumstances, and not one particular fact, we conclude
that defendant’s admissions were voluntary.
Defendant emphasizes that he was young and had limited intelligence as
evidenced by his poor grades in school.
(See Gallegos v. Colorado (1962)
370 U.S. 49, 54 [confession involuntary where 14-year-old was held
incommunicado for five days]; J.D.B. v.
North Carolina (2011) ___ U.S. ___ [131 S.Ct. 2394, 2401-2403] [a
juvenile’s age plays a role in determining whether a juvenile understands he is
free to leave when interrogated by police].)
Although defendant’s
youth is a factor, his age did not preclude him from understanding and being
capable of waiving his rights. (
768, 772.) A determination regarding the
voluntariness of a confession does not “turn[] on the presence or absence of a
single controlling criterion . . . .†(Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at p. 226.)
The court must carefully scrutinize all of the surrounding
circumstances. (Ibid.) Here, defendant was
young, but his extensive involvement with the criminal system, including more
than 10 arrests before his current arrest on April 18, 2012, indicated that his
Miranda waiver was knowing and
voluntary. (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 384.)
Furthermore, there is no
evidence that defendant’s mental condition made it difficult for him to
understand the meaning and effect of his confession.
grade. Although the record establishes
that he was failing many of his classes at the time of his arrest and had
disciplinary problems as well as a high level of truancy, the record does not
show that his intelligence is below normal.
After his detention on April 18, 2012, defendant earned grades of two
C’s, two B’s, and one A during the third quarter of his school year, and grades
of two B’s and three A’s during the fourth quarter of his school year. Thus, the record shows that defendant’s
intellectual development is average or above average. Additionally, the record establishes that he
has no health issues and was not taking any prescribed medication.
Defendant complains that
he was not fed, had to wait five hours in the police station, and was not
permitted to call an attorney, his parents, or another adult. (See Haley
v. Ohio (1948) 332 U.S. 596, 604 (Haley).) Moreover, he was then taken in the police car
and questioned further for a total interrogation of three to four hours.
We disagree that the
circumstances of the interrogation showed coercion. Only one detective questioned defendant, and
the initial questioning took only about 45 minutes. The questioning in the car was longer, but this
questioning for an additional two or two and one-half hours was not unduly
long; defendant points to no evidence indicating that he was fatigued. (Cf. People
v. Alfieri (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 533, 537, 545 [confession of a 17-year-old
youth with borderline intelligence and subsequently psychiatrically diagnosed
as highly suggestible after being in custody for 36 hours and interrogated for
20 hours was involuntary].) Folena did
not threaten defendant and there were no express or implied promises that would
make defendant think that, if he confessed, he would receive more beneficial
treatment. Folena did not lie to
defendant. The record contains no
evidence of any intimidating behavior by Folena. Defendant did not eat until noon, but there
was no evidence that defendant was hungry earlier or asked for food. Folena testified that defendant did not
appear fatigued when he was in the car.
The present case differs
significantly from the cases cited by defendant. (Haley,
(1986) 476 U.S. 683 (Crane).) In Haley,
the United
States Supreme Court held that a 15-year-old’s confession was not voluntary
when he had been questioned for five straight hours––from midnight to 5:00
a.m.––by five or six officers working in relays and was not advised of his
right to remain silent or the right to an attorney until after he
confessed. (Haley, at pp. 598,
600-601.) After his confession, he was
not permitted to see an attorney for three days and his mother for five
days. (Id. at p. 598.) In contrast,
here, the interrogation was by a single officer and did not last five hours;
rather defendant had to wait five hours until he was interrogated. Additionally, defendant was provided his
his interrogation.
Crane,
supra, 476 U.S. 683, another case
cited by defendant with almost no analysis, is also unavailing. The present case is not legally or factually
similar to Crane. In Crane,
a 16-year-old defendant testified at a pretrial motion to suppress that he
had been detained in a windowless room for a protracted period of time, that he
had been surrounded by as many as six police officers during the interrogation,
that he had repeatedly requested and been denied permission to telephone his
mother, and that he had been badgered into making a false confession. (Id. at
p. 691.) At trial, the court would not
permit the defendant to present evidence about the duration and physical
circumstances of the confession, ruling that the evidence was relevant only to
the legal issue of voluntariness. (
trial court erred in excluding “testimony about the environment in which the
police secured his confession†as this evidence was related to the reliability
of the confession and could be an integral part of the defense. (Id. at
p. 691.)
In the present case,
unlike the situation in Crane,
circumstances of defendant’s confession.
Furthermore, as already discussed, the record does not contain evidence
of coercion. There is no evidence that defendant
asked to call anyone and only one officer, not multiple officers, interrogated
him. Furthermore, his actual
interrogation was not for a protracted period of time.
Defendant complains that
he was not able to call his parents, another adult, or his attorney. Defendant did not request to speak to an
attorney. The record also lacks any
evidence indicating that he ever asked to speak to his parents or that an
officer told him that he could not speak to his parents.
a requirement that police advise minors of a right to speak with parents or to
have a parent present during questioning.
(In re Aven S., supra, 1
Cal.App.4th at p. 76; In re John S. (1988)
199 Cal.App.3d 441, 445-446.)
Defendant cites no
evidence in the record suggesting that the wait in the police station caused
him stress or that the delay was unreasonable, unnecessary, or for the purpose
of overcoming his free will. (See, e.g.,
United States v. Valenzuela-Espinoza (9th
Cir. 2012) 697 F.3d 742, 745, 751-752 [under the federal presentment rule,
defendant must be brought before a magistrate within six hours of arrest and
confessions in violation of this rule must be suppressed if the delay was unreasonable].)
Nothing in the record indicates that defendant suffered any adverse
impact as a result of this wait. There
is no evidence that defendant was emotionally distraught, anxious, mentally
fatigued, or physically fatigued during the interview. Nothing in the record suggests that
defendant’s will was overborne and there is no evidence that Folena was
aggressive or domineering.
Accordingly, we conclude
that the juvenile court did not err in finding that the prosecution
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant’s confession and
waiver of his Miranda rights were
voluntary.
of the Evidence
A. Standard
of Review
Defendant
argues that insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings that
he conspired to commit robbery. He also
asserts that insufficient evidence supported six of the seven petty theft
allegations that the juvenile court found were true.
The standard of proof in juvenile court
proceedings involving criminal activity is the same as in adult criminal
trials. (People v. Nguyen (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1007, 1022.) The People must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the minor committed the offenses alleged in the Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602 petition.
(Nguyen, at p. 1022.)
“In reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we must
determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime or special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. We review the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses sufficient
evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value—supporting the decision, and not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We neither reweigh the evidence nor
reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. [Citation.]
We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the
jury [or trier of fact] reasonably could deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]
If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier
of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.]â€
(People v. Jennings (2010) 50
Cal.4th 616, 638-639.)
B.
Conspiracy to Commit Robbery
“Conspiracy is an
inchoate crime. [Citation.] It does not require the commission of the
substantive offense that is the object of the conspiracy. [Citation.]
‘As an inchoate crime, conspiracy fixes the point of legal intervention
at [the time of] agreement to commit a crime,’ and ‘thus reaches further back
into preparatory conduct than
attempt . . . .’ †(People
v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 599-600.)
“The crime of conspiracy is defined in the Penal
Code as ‘two or more persons conspir[ing]’
‘[t]o commit any crime,’ together with proof of the commission of an overt act
‘by one or more of the parties to such agreement’ in furtherance thereof. (. . . §§ 182, subd.
(a)(1), 184.) ‘Conspiracy is a “specific intent†crime. . . . The specific intent required divides
logically into two elements: (a) the intent to agree, or conspire, and (b) the intent to commit
the offense which is the object of the conspiracy.
. . . To sustain a conviction for
conspiracy to commit a
particular offense, the prosecution must show not only that the conspirators intended to agree but
also that they intended to commit the elements
of that offense.’ [Citation.]†(People
v. Swain, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 600, italics omitted.)
The target offense in the
present case is robbery. “The elements of robbery are (1) a taking of personal property, (2) from the person
or immediate presence of another, (3) through the use of force or fear, (4)
with an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property.†(People
v. Kelley (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1358, 1366.)
Defendant maintains that
the juvenile court should not have found that he conspired to rob because the
evidence did not establish that he had the specific intent to commit
robbery. He maintains that no witness
identified him and his admissions showed that he changed his mind about robbing
any person before attempting any robbery.
He asserts that his conduct demonstrated that he and his friend really
did not intend to rob anyone.
Contrary
to defendant’s argument, sufficient evidence established conspiracy to commit
robbery. The prosecution did not have to
prove attempt (see, e.g., People v.
Swain, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 599-600), as defendant seems to
suggest. “ ‘[C]onspiracy may be proved
through circumstantial evidence inferred from the conduct, relationship,
interests, and activities of the alleged conspirators before and during the
alleged conspiracy.’ †(
Cal.App.4th 1405, 1417, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 182.) The conduct of defendant and Taylor supported
the inference that defendant and Taylor conspired to rob individuals outside
the grocery store and in the parking lots of the gas station and health club. Defendant and Taylor had masks, a B.B. gun,
and a knife, and hid in the bushes at the rear of the grocery store. They did not actually rob any person, not, as
defendant asserts, because they had changed their minds about committing a
robbery, but because they were unsuccessful or an event or person
attempts. They changed their minds about
robbing a particular individual, but they never abandoned their plans to rob
someone. They were unsuccessful in
robbing an older woman at the grocery store because she was able to get into
her residence before they were able to rob her and they decided not to rob
another person in the parking lot of the grocery store because an “employee
walked by and spooked them.†At that
point, they did not cast aside their desire to rob someone; rather, they went
to the parking lot of In-Shape in search of a victim to rob. They were deterred and remained hidden in the
bushes only because they saw a police car enter the parking lot.
“Withdrawal
from a conspiracy requires ‘an affirmative and bona fide rejection or
repudiation of the conspiracy, communicated to the coconspirators. [Citations.]’ †(People
v. Sconce (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 693, 701, quoting People v. Crosby (1962) 58 Cal.2d 713, 730-731.) Here, defendant and Taylor never disavowed
their plans to rob a person.
As
already noted, on appeal all inferences are drawn in favor of the
judgment. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) The evidence in the record establishes that
defendant and Taylor had masks to conceal their identities and had a B.B. gun
and knife. Based on their mutual
agreement they intended to rob people, and orchestrated their plan for doing
so. They did not actually attempt to rob
any person, not because they abandoned their plan to rob someone, but because
an event or situation deterred or scared them from robbing the targeted
individual.
C. Petty Theft
The
juvenile court found that defendant committed seven counts of petty theft. The elements of petty theft are the
following: “(1) the defendant took
possession of personal property owned by someone else; (2) the defendant did so
without the owner’s consent; (3) when the defendant took the property, he or
she intended to deprive the owner of it permanently; and (4) the defendant
moved the property, even a small distance, and kept it for any period of time,
however brief.†(People v. Catley (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 500, 505.)
Defendant
challenges the juvenile court’s findings of petty theft on counts 3, 5, 8, 9, 10,
and 11; he does not challenge the finding of petty theft on count 4.
Defendant
argues that the record contains no evidence that he burglarized Torrez’s white
Yukon (count 3). Defendant never
admitted to breaking into a white Yukon, and the items reported missing did not
match the items defendant stated that he took.
Defendant
told Folena that he burglarized a silver BMW on Madrone Place in
Brentwood. He told Folena that he stole
“some Hot Cheetos, sour patch kids, and cigarettes.†Torrez testified that she lived on Madrone
Place and owned a BMW. She, however,
stated that her BMW was not burglarized.
Her unlocked Yukon was burglarized in late 2011 or early 2012, and a DVD
player, TV screens, and loose change were removed.
We
agree that this evidence was insufficient to support an inference that
defendant stole the electronic equipment and cash from the white Yukon. The record does not contain evidence “that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value†from which “a reasonable trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.†(People
v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792-793.)
Defendant’s statements to Folena about the burglary of the BMW on
Madrone Place did not match Torrez’s testimony that her white Yukon had been
burglarized.
Defendant
also challenges the finding on count 10 that he burglarized the blue Toyota
Tundra that belonged to Yunck. Folena
drove defendant on Surrey Way in Brentwood, and defendant told him that he
removed small televisions that were mounted on the rear of the headrests in the
Toyota Tundra. Yunck testified that his
black Tundra had been parked in the driveway of his residence on Surrey Way in
2011 when it was burglarized. He
explained that several televisions for a car were taken out of the vehicle, as
well as cables.
Defendant
argues that the evidence regarding the burglary of the Toyota Tundra was
insufficient because of the discrepancy in the color of the car and the
vagueness regarding the time of the theft.
We conclude that the evidence regarding count 10 was sufficient. Defendant admitted removing the televisions
from the vehicle and may not have remembered also removing cables. Defendant identified the make of the
vehicle. Given that defendant said he
burglarized cars in the early-morning hours the juvenile court could infer that
defendant was unable to distinguish between a blue and black vehicle in the
darkness. Solid, credible evidence
linked defendant to the burglary as he admitted removing portable television
sets from a Toyota Tundra parked on Surrey Way and the owner confirmed that
during the period defendant admitted he was burglarizing vehicles, his Toyota
Tundra parked on Surrey Way was burglarized and portable televisions, among
other smaller items, were removed.
The
juvenile court found that defendant burglarized the Hyundai Santa Fe owned by
Nahm (count 5). Defendant contends that
the evidence did not support this finding as he did not claim to have
burglarized a Hyundai Santa Fe, and the record contained no evidence connecting
him to that crime.
The
record indicates that defendant identified a grey Honda Accord that was parked
on Woodsong Lane as a vehicle that he burglarized. He could not remember whether he removed
anything from the vehicle. Nahm, who
lived on Woodsong Lane, testified that she owned a grey Honda Accord, but it
had not been burglarized. Her Hyundai
Santa Fe was burglarized and a navigator system, sunglasses, and a sunglass
case had been removed.
We
agree the record lacks reasonable and credible evidence that defendant
burglarized the Hyundai Santa Fe. The
People argue that defendant was simply mistaken that he burglarized the Honda,
but had actually burglarized the Hyundai.
The mere fact that defendant was burglarizing cars on Woodsong Lane in
2011 is not sufficient evidence to prove that he burglarized the Hyundai Santa
Fe when there is no reliable evidence connecting him to the burglary of that
vehicle.
The
juvenile court found that defendant burglarized a Dodge Magnum that belonged to
Brandt (count 8). Folena testified that
defendant told him that he removed $70, cigarettes, and a lighter from a Dodge
Magnum on Sarah Street. Brandt testified
that he lived on Sarah Street and that a pack of cigarettes, a cigarette
lighter, and $60 in a white envelope, as well as possibly other loose dollar
bills in the center console were removed from his Ford Flex. Defendant admits that the address of the
burglarized car and the items removed from the car matched the statements he
made to Folena, but he claims the evidence was insufficient because he said he
burglarized a Dodge Magnum and Brandt stated that his Ford Flex was burglarized
in July or August 2011.
We
conclude that the evidence supported a finding of petty theft on count 8. Defendant may not have remembered the make of
the vehicle correctly, but he recalled that he removed specific items from a
vehicle on Sarah Street. Brandt’s
testimony adequately matched defendant’s testimony to provide sufficient,
credible evidence in support of the trial court’s finding.
Defendant
also challenges the finding that he burglarized the Suzuki Sidekick that
belonged to Padgett (count 9). Defendant
told Folena that he burglarized a white sedan on Rosegate Drive and that he
removed pills and a garage door opener.
Padgett testified that he lived on Rosegate Drive and that a garage door
remote, prescription medication, and a faceplate for a stereo were removed from
his white-topped Suzuki Sidekick in July or August 2011. Here, Padgett’s testimony that he lived on
Rosegate Drive and that someone had removed prescription drugs and a garage
door opener from his white-topped vehicle was sufficient to connect defendant
to the burglary since defendant admitted taking these items from a white
vehicle on Rosegate Drive.
Finally,
defendant contends the record contains insufficient
evidence to support the finding that he burglarized a Dodge Durango owned
by Scholtz (count 11). Folena drove
defendant by a particular residence on Gristmill Drive and defendant stated
that he removed $2.00 in coins from a Dodge Durango at that address. Scholtz confirmed that she lived at the
residence on Gristmill and that she owned a Dodge Durango. She stated that change was removed from the
ashtray in her Dodge Durango and items were taken from her two other
vehicles.
Defendant
maintains that because he said nothing about removing items from Scholtz’s
other two vehicles, the evidence was insufficient to show that he removed money
from the Durango. We disagree. Defendant admitted removing money from a
Dodge Durango parked at a particular address and the owner of the vehicle and
resident of that address testified that money was taken from her Dodge Durango. This evidence was sufficient to support the
juvenile court’s finding that the allegation in count 11 was true.
Accordingly,
we strike the findings of petty theft as to counts 3 and 5, and affirm the true
findings of petty theft as to counts 4, 8, 9, 10, and 11.
Defendant argues that the juvenile court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over counts 3, 5, and 9, and claims that the record does
not contain evidence that the burglaries occurred in the State of
California. (See People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1276, 1283.) As discussed above, we are striking the true
findings for counts 3 and 5; thus, we need to address this argument only as to
count 9.
Defendant argues that a lack of jurisdiction renders the
judgment void, but venue “does not implicate the trial court’s fundamental
jurisdiction†and venue is not an element of crime. (See People
v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 206-208)
In any event, defendant’s argument lacks merit. Defendant admitted removing items from a
white sedan parked at Rosegate Drive in Brentwood. This evidence was sufficient to establish
that defendant committed the petty theft in count 9 in California.
findings as to the petty theft in counts 3 and 5 in the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional order are stricken. The
jurisdictional order is otherwise affirmed.
The dispositional order is affirmed.
_________________________
Haerle,
J.
We concur:
_________________________
Kline, P.J.
_________________________
Richman, J.
to the Penal Code.
understand his Miranda rights, but
argues that his waiver was involuntary for the same reasons that his confession
was involuntary.
