In re Joseph L.

Filed 6/12/06 In re Joseph L. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Robert M. Padia, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal.Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Laura L. Furness, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, Anna M. Deckert, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jacquelyn E. Gentry for minor.

Appellant Debra A. (mother) appeals from the decision of the juvenile court to terminate her parental rights to her son, Joseph L. (minor), at a hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.^[1] Mother contends that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's findings under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the minor. Specifically, mother argues that substantial evidence does not support the court's findings that: 1) the minor would not benefit from continuing the mother-child relationship; and 2) adoption would not substantially interfere with the minor's relationship with his half-brothers such that ongoing contact would be in the minor's best interest, as compared to the benefit the minor would obtain by being adopted. As described below, we reject these two arguments and affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

Statement of Facts

The four-month-old minor was detained on May 18, 2004, after employees of a restaurant called police to report that mother was acting in a bizarre manner, had dropped the minor's car seat with him still in it, force fed him ice cream, and held him around the neck in a headlock. Mother was placed on a three-day hold for a mental evaluation under section 5150. The minor was placed in foster care, along with his two half-brothers, ages 12 and 14, who were placed together in a separate foster home.^[2]

At the May 21, 2004, detention hearing, the juvenile court authorized reunification services and frequent supervised visitation for mother. At the July 7, 2004, jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found true the allegation that mother had failed to protect the minor. (§ 300, subd. (b).) At the September 1, 2004, disposition hearing, the juvenile court found that mother's progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement had been unsatisfactory. The court also advised mother that, because the minor was under the age of three at the time of removal, reunification services would not exceed six months. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1).)

At the six-month status review hearing eventually held on April 13, 2005, the juvenile court made a finding of detriment if the minor were to be returned to mother (§366.21, subd. (e)), terminated mother's reunification services, and set a selection and implementation hearing (§ 366.26), at which the court would consider adoption as the permanent plan for the minor. Mother filed a writ petition challenging this decision, which this court denied. (See Court of Appeal opinion in case No. E037932.)

The selection and implementation hearing was held on October 3, 2005. The Department of Public Social Services (Department) submitted on its reports and mother presented no affirmative evidence. Counsel for mother argued that Joseph should be placed with his maternal uncle in Texas, where his two half-brothers had also been placed, and that the Department should have provided the uncle with assistance in adopting the minor.^[3] The juvenile court found that the minor was likely to be adopted and would suffer no detriment if parental rights were terminated. The court also found that none of the exceptions in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) applied. Consequently, the juvenile court determined that adoption was the appropriate permanent plan for the minor and terminated mother's parental rights. The court gave the minor's foster family's application for adoption preference over any other application. Mother appeals the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights.

Discussion

1. Introduction and Standard of Review

At a hearing held pursuant to section 366.26 to select and implement a permanent plan for a minor whose parent has failed to reunify, the juvenile court must first determine whether the minor is likely to be adopted. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Once the juvenile court has made the finding of adoptability, â€