Filed 12/29/17 In re J.P. CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


In re J.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.P.,
Defendant and Appellant.




A149202, A151375

(Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. J1500054)


J.P., a minor, appeals from two victim restitution orders. He contends, primarily, that his restitution hearings were fundamentally unfair because he was denied a meaningful opportunity to challenge the victims’ claims; the evidence was insufficient to support the amount of the restitution awards; and his legal representation was constitutionally inadequate. In a consolidated petition for writ of habeas corpus, J.P. contends his attorney’s failure to timely appeal from the first restitution order deprived him of effective assistance of counsel.
We agree that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise J.P. of his appeal rights and file a timely notice of appeal from the first order, so we deem his notice of appeal from the second order timely as to both. On the merits, we conclude that the proceedings at the first restitution hearing violated J.P.’s due process rights. Accordingly, we reverse the first restitution order and remand for a new hearing. The second order is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
The August 2014 “K.B.” theft
On August 30, 2014, Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Deputy Matthew Buckley stopped a Pontiac Grand Prix sedan for speeding and other Vehicle Code violations. J.P. was the driver and sole occupant. The front passenger side window was broken, J.P.’s hand was cut, there was broken glass and dried blood inside the car and on J.P.’s clothing, he did not have a driver’s license and he appeared to be under the influence of a central nervous system depressant. J.P. told Deputy Buckley that two black men he encountered near a park gave him the car. He admitted he knew the car was stolen, but claimed he did not steal it.
K.B., the car’s owner, testified at the jurisdictional hearing held April 24 and May 8, 2015. Early on the morning of August 30, 2014, police told K.B. his stolen car had been recovered. Several items of his personal property were in the car when it was stolen: a hockey bag and hockey sticks, a set of golf clubs, some food and a pair of cell phones. The hockey bag contained skates, shin guards, two pairs of gloves and socks, four jerseys, a jock strap and protective cup, a customized mouthpiece and a helmet. The total value of the hockey gear and golf clubs was “probably $4,000. The skates in the hockey bag alone cost a thousand dollars.”
K.B. thought his car was a 2004 model. The car was in “drivable condition” before it was stolen. “[T]here were definitely a few dings and scrapes, but nothing that would catch your eye to being damaged per se.” The car was damaged during the time it was stolen and was deemed a total loss. Defense counsel asked K.B. if his insurer had compensated him for the loss, but the prosecutor objected that the question was irrelevant. Defense counsel said she would “save it for [the] restitution issue later if it comes up.”
The juvenile court found true allegations that J.P. committed felony auto theft and misdemeanor driving without a license. On May 22, 2015, J.P. was declared a ward of the court and committed to the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility (Orin Allen) for nine months, plus 90 days on conditional release on parole. Victim restitution was reserved for determination at a later date and the court directed the prosecution to provide defense counsel with its documentation supporting the restitution claim.
Almost a year later, in March 2016, the probation officer reported that K.B. had submitted a written claim for $9,025 in restitution comprised of $2,275 for his hockey gear, $1,500 for the golf equipment, $5,000 for a loan for a replacement car, and $250 for car rentals and a bike for transportation. K.B. submitted a victim claim statement and email itemizing the value of the missing sports gear. He noted, “most items were ‘top of the line’ at the time they were stolen. . . . Values shown will not represent current value of item. Not everything in the hockey bag had a dollar value to it. Some of [them] were things I’ve had for my entire career (i.e. jerseys from childhood, etc. . . ) Some items on the list are no longer in production which will make it [too] hard to truly replace.”
A combined parole review and victim restitution hearing was held on March 18, 2016. The court awarded K.B. the total $9,025 amount of his claim.
The September 2014 “S.L.” theft
On September 22, 2014, not quite a month after his arrest for the “K.B.” auto theft, J.P. was arrested driving a stolen Toyota Highlander. Its owner, S.L., was homeless and lived in her car. On August 5, 2015, the district attorney filed a supplemental petition alleging felony auto theft and receiving stolen goods. On September 18, 2015, J.P. admitted both counts as misdemeanors. The court continued J.P. as a ward of the court with 60 days of additional home supervision upon his release from Orin Allen. The issue of restitution was reserved.
A restitution hearing was held on July 29, 2016. The court awarded restitution of $9,800.
The Appeal and Writ Petition
J.P. filed a timely notice of appeal from the July 29, 2016 “S.L.” restitution order. He also petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus asserting his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to preserve his right to appeal the March 18, 2016 “K.B.” order. We issued an order to show cause why the petition should not be granted and specified we would deem the opposition and reply to be the return and traverse, respectively, unless the parties filed a formal return and traverse. They did not. We consolidated the habeas petition with the appeal and ordered the Attorney General to brief the merits of the March 18, 2016 restitution order.
DISCUSSION
I. The March 18 Restitution Order
A. Timeliness
We first address the consequences of J.P.’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal from the March 18 restitution order. “[C]ounsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.” (Roe v. Flores-Ortega (2000) 528 U.S. 470, 480 (Flores-Ortega.) In context “consult” means to advise the client “about the advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal, and making a reasonable effort to discover the defendant’s wishes.” (Id. at p. 478.) By statute, California enhances a lawyer’s obligation to require consultation about the possibility of an appeal in every case and to file a timely appeal when “the attorney is of the opinion that arguably meritorious grounds exist for a reversal or modification of the judgment or orders to be appealed from, and where, in the attorney’s judgment, it is in the defendant’s interest to pursue any relief that may be available to him or her on appeal; or when directed to do so by a defendant having a right to appeal.” (Pen. Code, § 1240.1, subds. (b), (a); see Flores-Ortega, supra, at p. 479.)
Where trial counsel has failed to consult with his or her client about an appeal, the defendant establishes the requisite prejudice for ineffective assistance of counsel by demonstrating a reasonable probability that he or she would have timely appealed but for counsel’s failure to consult. (Flores-Ortega, supra, at p. 484.) “[E]vidence that there were nonfrivolous grounds for appeal . . . will often be highly relevant in making this determination. (Id. at pp. 485, 486.)
Here, evidence in support of J.P.’s habeas petition established that he did not recall discussing an appeal with his lawyer, was not aware of his right to appeal, and would have filed a timely appeal had he been properly advised. J.P.’s original attorney attested that at the disposition hearing on May 22, 2015, the court said restitution would be addressed at a later parole review hearing. The reporter’s transcript confirms counsel’s recollection. But that attorney left the juvenile unit before the restitution hearing, did not consult with J.P. about it or his right to appeal any future restitution order, and did not think she discussed those issues with J.P.’s successor counsel. The attorney who took over J.P.’s representation attested that she did not remember discussing a possible appeal with J.P. or his prior counsel and that her notes did not reflect any such discussions.
This showing established a prima facie case that trial counsel failed to counsel and advise J.P. about his appeal rights in violation of the per se duty imposed by Penal Code section 1240.1. (See Flores-Ortega, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 479.) As will be clear from our discussion of the merits, post, that failure also violated counsel’s constitutional duty to advise the client about appeal rights when there are nonfrivolous grounds for an appeal. (Id. at p. 480.) Prejudice is sufficiently established by appellate counsel’s declaration that J.P. told her he would have appealed had he been properly advised.
The People’s opposing arguments are unpersuasive. Any suggestion that trial counsel had no duty to consult with J.P. about his appellate rights flies in the face of the duties stated in Flores-Ortega and Penal Code section 1240.1, subdivision (a). So, too, their contention that defense counsel could have decided against consulting with J.P. about a potential appeal because “the likelihood of a significantly lower restitution amount was unlikely.” An attorney’s duty to consult his or her client does not depend on the odds an appeal will succeed. To the contrary, trial counsel has a per se duty to “provide counsel and advice as to whether arguably meritorious grounds exist” for an appeal. (Pen. Code, § 1240.1, subd. (a); Flores-Ortega, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 479.) And counsel must file a timely appeal regardless of its perceived merits if the defendant, so advised, directs counsel to do so. (Pen. Code, § 1240.1, subd. (b).) Finally, the People’s assertion that there is no evidence J.P. “personally wanted to pursue an appeal . . . during the period when a notice of appeal would have been timely” is both irrelevant, because the evidence establishes J.P. was never informed he could file an appeal, and belied by the evidence that he would have appealed had he been apprised of his rights.
The People speculate that perhaps trial counsel “simply forgot” that she advised J.P. against taking an appeal, or that J.P., appropriately counseled, may have decided not to pursue an appeal that, at best, would only result in a new restitution hearing. But they have alleged no facts that controvert J.P.’s allegations and evidence, or that show why they cannot do so. (See People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 485–486; People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 738 [return “must allege facts establishing the legality of the petitioner’s custody”].) “In a habeas corpus proceeding the return to the order to show cause must allege facts tending to establish the legality of the petitioner’s detention. . . . [Citations.] It is in this manner that the factual and legal issues are joined for review. [Citation.] When the return effectively admits the material factual allegations of the petition and traverse by not disputing them, we may resolve the issue without ordering an evidentiary hearing.” (In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1252, holding modified in People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 476, 479, 484–485.) This is such a case. The People have failed to controvert the petition’s prima facie showing or demonstrate a legal or procedural bar to the requested relief. We therefore grant the petition and deem J.P.’s notice of appeal from the second restitution order to encompass a timely notice of appeal from the March 18 restitution order.
B. Merits
J.P. asserts the restitution award violated his due process rights because he was denied a meaningful opportunity to contest the amount of restitution. He argues, inter alia, that (1) he was not provided adequate notice that restitution would be decided at the March 18 hearing; and (2) the court erroneously relied on testimony at the jurisdictional hearing, at which restitution was not at issue and J.P. had not been apprised of the full extent of K.B.’s claimed losses. These circumstances, J.P. argues, resulted in a hearing procedure that was fundamentally unfair. We agree that, under the circumstances, J.P. was not afforded an adequate opportunity to dispute the restitution claim.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 requires the juvenile court to order restitution to the victims of juvenile offenders “in the amount of the losses, as determined. If the amount of loss cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing, the restitution order shall include a provision that the amount shall be determined at the direction of the court at any time during the term of the commitment or probation. The court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd. (h)(1).) The restitution order “shall be of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor’s conduct for which the minor was found to be a person described in Section 602.” (Ibid.) “A minor shall have the right to a hearing before a judge to dispute the determination of the amount of restitution.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd. (h)(2).)
“The scope of a criminal defendant’s due process rights at a hearing to determine the amount of restitution is very limited: ‘ “A defendant’s due process rights are protected when the probation report gives notice of the amount of restitution claimed . . . , and the defendant has an opportunity to challenge the figures in the probation report at the sentencing hearing.” ’ ” (People v. Cain (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 81, 86.)
“Generally speaking, restitution awards are vested in the trial court’s discretion and will be disturbed on appeal only when the appellant has shown an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ‘ “[E]ven though the trial court has broad discretion in making a restitution award, that discretion is not unlimited. While it is not required to make an order in keeping with the exact amount of loss, the trial court must use a rational method that could reasonably be said to make the victim whole, and may not make an order which is arbitrary or capricious.” ’ ” (People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1320.) But, we apply the independent standard of review to constitutional questions, giving deference to the court’s factual findings. (Townsel v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Bd. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 940, 946.)
Here, the probation officer’s report apprised J.P. of the total restitution claimed and itemized the specific amounts for the stolen sporting equipment and car. J.P. asserts this was inadequate because the probation report merely set out K.B.’s claims without recommending a specific restitution amount. The omission was not critical. Rather, the question is whether J.P. received sufficient notice to investigate and oppose the claim for restitution. (In re S. S. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 543, 548; see In re Brian K. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 39, 42 [“the essence of due process is actual notice and a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to be heard”].) He did. Even without a specific recommendation from the probation officer, the report informed J.P. of the nature and amount of the claim sufficiently to investigate and prepare to oppose it at the restitution hearing.
Nonetheless, this does not resolve whether J.P. had an adequate opportunity to oppose the restitution claim at the hearing. The probation report described K.B.’s claimed losses, but it also explicitly recommended that the restitution hearing be continued until two weeks after the March 18 date set for the combined parole review and restitution hearing. This appears to have been due to difficulties obtaining a victim impact statement related to the September 2014 theft charge (the “S.L.” matter), but the probation officer’s express recommendation to “continue the restitution hearing two weeks” cannot reasonably be interpreted as applying only to one of the two matters. At a minimum, we would not expect reasonable counsel to so understand it. We are therefore not persuaded that J.P.’s counsel received constitutionally adequate notice that K.B.’s restitution claim would be addressed and determined at the March 18 hearing.
Of more concern is what happened at the hearing. J.P. was represented by his new attorney. At the outset, defense counsel agreed with the probation officer’s recommendation to continue the restitution hearing. The court noted that “[on] May 22, 2015, [J.P.] was committed to the Ranch, and restitution was left to be determined. I do not believe we have set restitution in that matter as of yet. [¶] We had a contested hearing. There was ample testimony with respect to the loss incurred by the victim, and that was the gentleman who only recently moved here. [¶] Hockey was the central theme of his life. He had extensive and expensive equipment in his vehicle that was taken and never recovered, along with his golf equipment that he testified to. So I’m prepared to set it as it relates to him. [¶] I do see, in addition to his testimony, we’ve been provided with a victim claim statement and a description of loss that is broken down in fair detail, along with an e-mail attached to it. [¶] . . . [¶] And attached to that e-mail, again, is further breakdown. We really have extensive testimony on this issue and an opportunity to cross-examine.”
The court asked defense counsel, “So do you have anything that you wanted to add as it relates to [J.P.’s] claim?” Counsel replied, “So my objection would be that there hasn’t been adequate proof of loss.” The court overruled the objection. Observing that J.P.’s current attorney did not represent him at trial, it said: “We had a good deal of testimony on the loss and the condition of the vehicle when it was recovered, all the items that were stolen, and in addition now, Probation has provided even more by way of loss. [¶] As I said, there was ample opportunity to cross-examine, and this particular witness was very credible. [¶] In fact, his testimony stayed with me for quite a while because it was rather sad that this young man moved to this area and to have, essentially, much of his worldly belongings that meant something to him taken in such a way, made an impact on the Court in terms of an impression that is lasting. [¶] So I am going to set restitution as it relates to that particular victim. And I shall grant his request.”
The first problem with this reasoning is that restitution was not at issue at the earlier hearings. In fact, restitution was expressly reserved for determination at a later date. Since J.B. was not provided notice of or information about KB.’s restitution claim in advance of (or at) the jurisdiction and disposition hearings, there was no reason or basis for defense counsel to cross-examine K.B. about the value of his stolen property. Moreover, more than half of the total $9,025 awarded in March 2016 was for a replacement car loan, car rentals and a bicycle. Those items were not even mentioned at the 2015 hearings.
The court thus erred when it concluded J.P. had an adequate opportunity to challenge the amount of K.B.’s loss at the 2015 hearings and, based on that conclusion, prevented J.P. from challenging K.B.’s restitution claim at the 2016 hearing. It is true, as the People observe, that the level of process due a defendant at a restitution hearing is more limited than in either a civil or criminal trial. (People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1184.) But even that minimal due process requires that the defendant be afforded the opportunity to challenge the restitution claim before a judge. (§ 730.6, subd. (h)(2); People v. Cain, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 86.) Accordingly, we will reverse the March 18 restitution order and remand for a new hearing. Because of this disposition, we do not address J.P.’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting K.B.’s specific claims or his assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel at the March 18, 2016 hearing.
II. The July 29, 2016 “S.L.” Restitution Order
J.P. asserts the July 29 victim restitution order must be reversed because the court did not permit his attorney to cross-examine S.L. about her claimed losses. The question is whether the hearing procedure deprived J.P. of an opportunity to challenge the restitution amounts in the probation report. (People v. Cain, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 86, 88; People v. Resendez (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 98, 113.) We conclude it did not. We also reject various other challenges to the order.
A. Background
According to an October 16, 2015 probation report, “probation was able to speak to the victim by telephone. However, due to the victim’s primary language being Portuguese, probation had difficulty obtaining clear information. The victim reported that her car was towed as a result of the offense and various items from the vehicle were stolen including all of her clothes, cell phone, passports, and immigration documentation. The victim estimated her loss at around $3,200. However, probation is not fully clear of her losses, as the victim reported that her car had been burglarized a week prior.”
A December 11, 2015 probation report stated that S.L. reported her car had been salvaged because she lacked the $1,000 required to recover it from impound. S.L. valued her Highlander at $4,000, but her insurance company paid her only $3,019 for it. She told the probation officer that “all of her clothes, a vacuum, cleaning supplies, passports, immigration documentation, and a safe (containing several diamond rings and a gold necklace) were taken” from her car and that she incurred expenses to replace her passport and immigration paperwork. S.L. valued the missing items at $5,000. The probation officer recommended total restitution of $9,000, comprised of $5,000 for S.L.’s personal property and $4,000 for her car.
In June, 2016, S.L. submitted an itemized restitution claim for $9,800. This included $350 for a laptop computer not mentioned earlier and specified values of $2,000 for two diamond rings, $900 for a gold necklace, $125 for a safe, $1,500 for clothes, $60 for cleaning supplies, and $800 to replace passports and immigration paperwork. The probation officer increased the recommended total restitution to $9,800.
J.P.’s attorney contested S.L.’s claim at the July 2016 restitution hearing on the ground that no receipts had been provided for her claimed losses. S.L. testified that her Toyota Highlander was worth $4,000. Asked how she knew the value, she answered, somewhat cryptically, “[b]ecause I financed the car for $13,000” and paid by the month. She lacked the “like $1,700” to reclaim the car from impound after it was stolen, so she never got it back.
S.L. testified that none of the stolen items were recovered. She described the missing property she had previously listed and added shoes, family pictures, earrings and other family belongings. She explained the necklace was a gift from her father many years ago and corrected the value she had listed for it from $900 to $1,500. The court asked why she had so much property in her car at the time of the theft. S.L. responded that she had lost her jobs because of her health and was evicted from her apartment, so she had her belongings in her car to put them into storage.
Following S.L’s direct testimony, defense counsel began to cross-examine her about discrepancies between her initial stolen property reports and the later reports that added the jewelry and computer. The juvenile court intervened. It stated: “it’s okay. There’s really no right to cross-examine a victim who submits a claim. You are welcome to put on whatever evidence you want. You can challenge, if you like, her statements to the Court with what you have, but I’m going to allow the witness to step down. This is clearly very emotional and traumatizing to her. [¶] I think there’s been a prima fasci[e] showing. So if you have evidence you want to use to rebut that. I’m not going to allow you to cross-examine the witness. You may step down.” Defense counsel objected to being prevented from questioning S.L. further, and submitted the police and probation reports containing S.L.’s prior statements about her losses.
The court ordered the $9,800 in restitution recommended by probation. It stated: “I have to say that although on paper it may appear that [S.L.] is taking advantage of an opportunity to make some claim to get rich through restitution, it is clear to me visibly that she’s distraught by this situation. She seems credible to the Court. [¶] In addition, by the own words of this police report, [S.L.] was living in her car and had been told by Big Lots employees that she could not stay in the parking lot in her car there. And it’s tragic these days that people because of economics are forced to live in cars. . . .
“I find that there is more than ample evidence to support the claim of the victim in this case. And it should be noted in the police report that she reported her passport and additional items were in the vehicle, including her cell phone. So there does not appear to have been any attempt on behalf of the police department to sit down and get an itemization of every item taken from her as a result of this stuff. [¶] I find her credible. I find her claim credible.”
[¶] . . . [¶]
“I am going to set restitution for [S.L.] in the amount sought as I find this is reasonable that is directly related to [J.P.’s] conduct in this case, and it has been proven sufficiently. So restitution is set in the amount of $9,800.”
B. The Hearing Was Not Fundamentally Unfair
“While the hearing must be fundamentally fair [citation], the Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses does not apply to sentencing hearings. (People v. Birmingham (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 180, 184; People v. Cain, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 84–85 [no Sixth Amendment or due process right to cross-examine victim’s psychotherapist at restitution hearing].) J.P. asserts the early termination of cross-examination rendered the hearing fundamentally unfair because his attorney was left with no realistic means of rebutting S.L.’s claims. We agree that counsel’s inability to cross-examine S.L. about her claims left defense counsel in a difficult position and limited her ability to explore their validity. This is particularly so because there was no documentation to support S.L.’s valuations. Counsel presumably would have wished to explore the reasons S.L. increased her claim from $3,200 in September 2015 to $5,000 in December and $9,800 in June 2016.
Nonetheless, we cannot conclude the hearing procedure was fundamentally unfair. J.P. was notified in advance of S.L.’s claim and could have researched and presented rebuttal evidence on the value of at least some of the more generic items for which S.L. was seeking restitution, such as the car and computer. Counsel could have attempted to procure further information by contacting the victim or by requesting that the probation officer do so. (See In re S.S., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 548.) And, rather than submitting on the police and probation reports, counsel could have argued that S.L. lacked credibility for the same reasons J.P. now raises on this appeal. So while the situation was undoubtedly challenging, we are not persuaded that defense counsel had no realistic means of contesting S.L.’s claims.
We must also recognize that the trial court has broad discretion to restrict and control cross-examination to protect witnesses from “undue harassment or embarrassment” (Evid. Code, § 765, subd. (a); People v. Chenault (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1514), and that we may not disturb its exercise of that discretion in the absence of a clear abuse. (Ibid; People v. Barragan (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 625, 628.) Here, the court observed that testifying at the hearing was “clearly very emotional and traumatizing” to S.L. It explicitly found her direct testimony was credible and explained that the discrepancies between her initial and subsequent lost property reports did not persuade it otherwise. And while the court severely restricted J.P.’s ability to cross-examine S.L., it invited counsel to put on rebuttal evidence. On this record, the early termination of cross-examination was within the court’s broad discretion.
C. The Award Is Supported By Sufficient Evidence
J.P. argues the restitution amount is not supported by substantial evidence. Here, too, we disagree. “A restitution order pursuant to [section 730.6], to the extent possible, . . . shall be of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor’s conduct. . . , including . . . [f]ull or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd. (h)(1).) Once the victim makes a prima facie showing of his or her economic losses the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the claimed amounts. The defendant may carry that burden by submitting evidence to prove the amount claimed exceeds the repair or replacement cost of the stolen property. (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1543.) The standard of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at p. 1542.)
S.L. reported her valuation of the stolen property to J.P.’s probation officer, with some variations as time went on, and submitted a final itemized claim for $9,800 in lost property and documentation. The trial court was entitled to accept those statements as prima facie evidence of the value of the stolen property. (People v. Foster (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 939, 946; see In re S.S., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 546–548.) In addition, S.L. reaffirmed these claims when she testified at the restitution hearing, with one upward adjustment as to the missing necklace that the court apparently rejected and was not reflected in the restitution award. We also disagree with J.P.’s assertion that there was inadequate support for the amounts S.L. claimed for her lost jewelry and clothing. While value is ordinarily determined by its market value, “ ‘[w]here certain property has a peculiar value to a person recovering damages for deprivation thereof, or injury thereto, that may be deemed to be its value . . . against a willful wrongdoer.’ ” (In re Brian S. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 523, 530.) The court did not err in recognizing that these items could have particular value to S.L. and accepting the value she ascribed to them.
J.P. casts numerous aspersions on S.L.’s credibility, but it is the exclusive province of the trial court to determine credibility and resolve conflicts or inconsistencies in her testimony. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 402; In re Estate of Odian (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 152, 168.) “To warrant the rejection of the statements given by a witness who has been believed by a trial court, there must exist either a physical impossibility that they are true, or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions.” (People v. Huston (1943) 21 Cal.2d 690, 693.) It is not apparent that S.L.’s statements were untrue or impossible, so we have no basis to disturb the court’s credibility determination.
J.P.’s contention that the $4,000 award for S.L.’s car was an unlawful “windfall” is also unpersuasive. The value of the car was based on S.L.’s assessment, which the court found to be credible. Although S.L. received only $3,109 from her insurance company, there was no evidence that the insurance payment covered her full cost to replace her vehicle. J.P. also asserts there was insufficient evidence that his actions caused S.L.’s property losses, but here too we disagree. S.L. testified that all of the items for which she sought recompense were in her car before it was stolen and were never returned to her. That was a sufficient prima facie showing that the theft of her car was a substantial factor in causing her loss (see In re A.M. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 668, 673), and J.P. introduced no evidence to rebut it.
D. Remaining Arguments
J.P.’s remaining points warrant only brief discussion. His arguments that S.L. failed to mitigate her loss or identify co-offenders who might also be liable for restitution were forfeited by his failure to raise those objections at the restitution hearing. He asserts his attorney provided ineffective assistance at the restitution hearing, and we agree, as our prior discussion indicates, that there potentially was more counsel could have done to challenge S.L.’s prima facie showing. But to prevail on this claim J.P. must show both deficient performance and a reasonable probability the court would have awarded less in restitution. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694.) It is plain from the record that, having reviewed the police and probation reports and listened to S.L.’s direct testimony, the court considered and rejected the possibility that she was inflating her claims. J.P. has not demonstrated any likelihood that anything further counsel might have done would have changed that assessment, so his claim of deficient legal representation fails.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The March 18 restitution order in favor of K.B. is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings on that issue. The July 29 restitution order in favor of S.L. is affirmed.



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Siggins, J.


We concur:


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McGuiness, P.J.


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Jenkins, J.