In re Katrina B.

Filed 10/20/06 In re Katrina B. CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

This case involves a petition by the County of Santa Clara (the County) for disclosure of juvenile dependency records pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 (hereafter section 827).[1] The County was a defendant in a federal action alleging misconduct and constitutional violations on the part of County social workers. A mother of four children who had been subjects of juvenile dependency proceedings had submitted a declaration in the federal action, asserting that in the course of the dependency proceedings certain County social workers had made statements violating her rights of association. In its petition under section 827, the County sought access to the juvenile court files in order to be able to counter the contentions in the mother’s declaration in the federal action.

Following two hearings in July of 2005, the juvenile court granted the County’s petition and ruled that the County attorney could examine all files in the dependency cases, but must make copies of the documents he wished to utilize and show them to the court before using them in the federal action. The court included protective orders providing that the documents not be used outside of the federal action.

The mother appealed the order and we reviewed it in an unpublished opinion (In re W.B. (March 6, 2006, H029117) [nonpub.opn.]). The factual background of the case is set forth in more detail in that opinion, filed March 6, 2006. We found that it was unclear from the record before us if the mother’s declaration in the federal case had been submitted to the juvenile court as the factual basis for the County’s section 827 petition. The declaration was not included in our record on appeal, and the court did not mention or specifically refer to it during the hearing. Although our record was later augmented with a copy of the declaration, it was not file-stamped or authenticated in any way. We therefore remanded the matter so that the record could be perfected with the necessary declaration. However, in order to avoid the necessity of a second appeal and further delay, we proceeded to address the other arguments raised by the mother challenging the disclosure of the juvenile court records, and we rejected all of those arguments.

Our disposition of this case was as follows: “The order is reversed and remanded for the sole purpose of perfecting the record to include the declaration filed by the mother in the federal action. The juvenile court may then enter a new order on the petition based on a complete factual record.” (In re W.B., supra, H029117.)

On remand, the court noticed and held a hearing on April 20, 2006. The father’s attorney was present. An attorney for one of the children was present. Attorneys for the Department of Family and Children’s Services and for the County in the federal action were also present. The court received the mother’s declaration in evidence and noted that it had reviewed this document at the previous hearing in 2005. The court also indicated that it had reviewed the pertinent juvenile records in camera, and had conducted the requisite test balancing the confidentiality interests against the probative value of the records. On April 21, 2006, the court issued a written order reaffirming its previous order releasing the records to the County for use in the federal action. The court found that the confidentiality interests of the children were outweighed by the probative value of the information sought. The court included similar protective orders as in its prior order, providing that the released documents could be used only in the pending federal action. In addition the order provided that the documents could not be further disseminated, and that they must be returned to the dependency court or destroyed upon completion of the federal case.

The mother now appeals from this order. She contends that she was not provided adequate notice of the April 20, 2006 hearing. The record shows that notice was sent to her by first class mail on April 12, 2006. She argues that the Welfare and Institutions Code provides that a parent must be given ten days notice of a hearing that follows the initial petition hearing in a dependency case. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 291, subd. (c)(2).) The notice provided by the juvenile court was only eight days notice. She contends this was not calculated to provide her with sufficient notice and that as a result she was unable to attend the hearing and was deprived of the opportunity to present argument regarding the court’s protective orders.

We reject these arguments. Welfare and Institutions Code section 291 is not a general noticing provision for all dependency hearings; it applies specifically to the jurisdiction hearing, which is held after the initial petition. (See, e.g., In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 749.) The initial petitions for the mother’s children in this case were filed many years ago. California Rules of Court rule 1423 applies to petitions seeking release of juvenile court records. It provides that the court has discretion to set a hearing on the petition and that “[t]he clerk shall notice all parties of the hearing.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1423, subd. (e).) No particular timeline is mandated for the notice.[2]

Furthermore, if there was any error in the timeliness of notice to appellant, and we do not believe there was, it was entirely harmless in the circumstances here. The scope of our remand was extremely limited. The sole purpose of any further proceeding was to ensure that the court had received in evidence the mother’s declaration, which was the basis for the County’s petition. The mother had ample opportunity at the prior hearings in 2005 to challenge the court’s protective orders regarding release of the records, and she raised numerous challenges during those hearings, both written and oral, which the juvenile court heard and considered. She also raised her contentions regarding all aspects of the court’s order in the prior appeal in this court, where we thoroughly reviewed and decided these issues in a written opinion. No new issues were raised or decided by the court on remand. If anything, the court made its protective orders stronger than before. Under these circumstances, we do not find any deprivation of due process. The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

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Bamattre-Manoukian, ACTING P.J.

WE CONCUR:

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MIHARA, J.

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MCADAMS, J.

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[1] Section 827 governs the granting of access to confidential juvenile court and social services records. It allows access to specified persons, including the minor, the parents, the attorneys for the parties and court personnel, but also includes “[a]ny other person who may be designated by court order of the judge of the juvenile court upon filing a petition.” (§ 827, subd. (a)(1)(O).) It further provides that prior to the release of the case file, or any portion thereof, “the court shall afford due process, including a notice of and an opportunity to file an objection to the release of the record or report to all interested parties.” (§ 827, subd. (a)(3)(B).)

[2] The record indicates that the mother had actual notice of the hearing. In her notice of appeal, filed the same day as the hearing, the mother asserted that she was present the day of the hearing but that she was not “approached” until the hearing had concluded. The transcript of the hearing indicates that the attorney for the Department had looked for the mother in the hallways and waiting rooms and that the juvenile court had also asked the court assistant to go to the waiting rooms to inquire if the mother was present.