Filed 4/24/17 In re K.C. CA4/3


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


In re K.C., a Person Coming Under Juvenile Court Law.
_________________________________

ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.B.,

Defendant and Appellant,






G053928

(Super. Ct. No. DP026024-001)

O P I N I O N
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gary G. Bischoff, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed. Request for Judicial Notice. Granted.
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Jeannie Su, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
M.B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s findings and orders made at the 12-month status review (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f); all statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated) placing her daughter K.C. with the father, E.C. Mother disputes the court’s findings K.C.’s return to mother’s home would pose a substantial risk of detriment, that mother received or was offered reasonable services, and that reunification with mother within the 18-month statutory period was not likely. She also contends substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that placing K.C. with father in the State of Washington would not pose a substantial risk of detriment to her. She seeks return of K.C. to her custody, or an additional six months of reunification services. Our review discloses no basis to reverse the court’s orders and therefore we will affirm.

I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We restate, with minor revisions, the facts and procedural background from our prior opinion involving K.C.’s half sibling, Ethan. (M.B. v. Superior Court (Dec. 14, 2016, G053927 [nonpub. opn.] (G053927).) Both appellate proceedings arose from the same 12-month review hearing.
In March 2015, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a petition alleging K.C. (born January 2005), her half brother Ethan (born March 2009) and their half sister Diana (born June 1999) had suffered, or there was a substantial risk they would suffer, serious physical harm inflicted by the parents (§ 300, subd. (a)), and there was a substantial risk they would suffer serious physical harm resulting from the parents’ failure to protect them or to provide them with adequate care (§ 300, subd. (b)).
According to the petition and detention report, on March 13, 2015, mother struck Diana on the face and back with a metal spatula, grabbed Diana’s hair, dragged her into the living room, held her down, and cut her hair. She also cut up one of Diana’s dresses. Mother threatened to kill Diana if she reported the abuse. After the beating, Diana ran away to a friend’s house, but mother did not look for her, and instead left California to work out of state. Irvine police officers contacted Diana three days later and observed bruising on her thighs, hand, and wrist. K.C. and Ethan witnessed mother’s assault of Diana, and reported mother had physically abused them in the past.
Mother’s boyfriend, M.K., was babysitting K.C. and Ethan when officers arrived to investigate the incident. Previously, in late November 2014, police officers had investigated domestic violence between mother and M.K. At that time mother had visible injuries and reported M.K. hit her several times in the face, causing her temporarily to lose consciousness. Mother stated she feared M.K. and acknowledged he had hurt her children. The children also reported M.K. physically abused Ethan.
Diana and K.C. were prior dependents of the court in Ohio. Diana was in foster care between January 2007 and October 2010, and again from 2011 to April 2014. K.C. was in foster care between January 2007 and July 2010. Ohio authorities reported mother had mental health issues, including depression and bipolar disorder. She took prescription medication for anxiety, had attempted suicide, and threatened to hurt herself and the children.
After authorities took the children into protective custody, mother phoned Irvine police. Mother was angry and threatened to sue the police department, but also admitted she “did those things to” Diana. After she returned to the state, the police cited her for misdemeanor child abuse. She denied physically abusing K.C. and Ethan, denied using a metal spatula on Diana, claimed Diana manipulated K.C. to support Diana’s false accusations, and asserted Diana had mental health issues and fabricated the Ohio incidents. She also denied any domestic violence with M.K., and claimed a social worker manipulated her into getting a restraining order against him.
At the time SSA filed the petition, the whereabouts of K.C.’s father, E.C., were unknown. Diana and K.C. stated they never had any contact with him.
The court detained the children, and ordered monitored visitation. K.C. and Ethan were placed with their longtime babysitter, A.R. Diana declined placement with A.R., and she was ultimately placed in a separate foster home.
The social worker described mother as uncooperative, noting she had canceled several interview appointments. Mother contacted a potential placement resource for the children and warned her to stay away from the children. The social worker noted mother prioritized employment over her children’s welfare, she hurt the children physically, and punished the girls “in an emotional way by not speaking to” them.
The social worker recommended reunification services, but felt the prognosis was poor because mother denied most of the allegations and blamed Diana for “most of the disorder at home.” The social worker recommended conjoint therapy, and stated mother needed to spend more time with the children.
In May 2015, mother submitted on the allegations of the petition, and the juvenile court found them to be true. The court removed custody from mother and ordered reunification services with monitored visits. The court adopted SSA’s case plan, which required therapy (individual, conjoint, family, and/or group) with an SSA-approved therapist, parenting classes, and an SSA-approved anger management program. The court approved SSA’s plan for monitored weekly visits and gave SSA discretion to liberalize visitation if circumstances improved.
The social worker referred mother to a parenting program, Personal Empowerment Program (PEP) classes, and counseling services in June 2015, but mother did not attend because they conflicted with her work schedule. She later sought out her own programs and enrolled in anger management and parenting classes, and therapy.
E.C. (father), who lived with his wife in the State of Washington, surfaced in September 2015. He asserted he was K.C.’s father, but not Diana’s, and asked to play an active role in K.C.’s life. He reported meeting mother in 2004, and cared for Diana and K.C. during mother’s stay in a psychiatric hospital, and after her release when she told him she could not care for the girls. After the children returned to mother’s care, mother became “manipulative,” moved away, and he did not see the children. His last contact with mother occurred in 2009. He denied any domestic violence with mother. He was able to care for K.C., and also offered to provide care for Ethan so K.C. would not be separated from her younger brother.
The social worker’s report for the six-month review hearing recommended continuing reunification services, noting mother’s moderate progress on the case plan. Mother attended two counseling sessions in September, but none in October. She promised to reinitiate counseling in November. Mother attended 10 anger management sessions, but her progress was “between satisfactory and unsatisfactory.” She claimed to have completed parenting classes, but failed to provide a certificate of completion. Mother stated she had learned she had a communication deficiency, did not show the children affection or empathy, and was too demanding, especially concerning K.C. Mother maintained regular phone contact with the children, and monitored visits had gone well.
At the November 18, 2015, six-month review hearing, the parties stipulated to continue reunification services. The juvenile court directed mother to address domestic violence and personal empowerment in counseling, but did not require a separate PEP program. The court directed SSA to initiate an investigation concerning father in Washington. Mother believed father’s visits should take place at a police station or with a law enforcement officer present.
K.C. had a visit with father in November 2015 and maintained telephone contact with him after he returned to Washington. Mother falsely accused father of making negative comments about her. K.C. told the social worker she felt “stressed” because mother told her not to speak to father, explaining to K.C. she worried that talking with him would jeopardize their own relationship. Mother continued to express animosity toward father to her daughter. K.C.’s teacher reported K.C.’s progress had suffered and she had been crying in class because mother warned K.C. if she decided to live with father, she would no longer pursue reunification with the children.
The social worker permitted mother unsupervised visits with the children. Mother continued to complain about father, fearing he would kidnap K.C. The social worker reminded mother to have positive conversations with the children, and mother agreed not to make negative statements. The social worker further liberalized mother’s visits in January 2016 to three visits a week beginning after school until 6:00 p.m.
In the initial report for the May 2016, 12-month permanency review, the social worker recommended continuing the case for an 18-month review for K.C. and Ethan. Mother’s misdemeanor child abuse charge resulted in a battery conviction and a grant of probation on condition she complete a 52-week child abuse treatment program. During a meeting to discuss overnight visits, mother became agitated and raised her voice concerning father, claiming he previously had attempted to kill her. She admitted she would not facilitate contact with him once the children were placed back in her care. The social worker advised mother he was entitled to visits and “must be” allowed to have them.
The social worker again described mother’s progress with the case plan as moderate. Mother had begun overnight visits and the children enjoyed their time with her doing homework, watching movies, and eating meals together. The children denied any abuse or neglect or that any other persons were present during visits.
In April, mother’s therapist sent a letter to the social worker stating mother had made significant progress in “overcoming the negative effects of her trauma,” and was learning to “manage her symptoms” to maintain “a happy, healthy life for herself.” The social worker attempted to follow up with the therapist concerning several issues, including mother’s animosity toward father, whether mother had addressed domestic violence and empowerment in counseling sessions, whether the therapist had any concerns about mother’s mental health, and whether more therapy sessions were necessary. Although the social worker warned mother it was “crucial” for the social worker to discuss mother’s progress with the therapist, mother directed the therapist not to speak with the social worker and revoked her authorization to release information. The progress reports from mother’s anger management program contained inconsistencies, but the provider had not returned the social worker’s calls seeking more detailed information. Mother also claimed she had enrolled in a child abuse treatment program through probation, but the social worker learned the program had no record of her enrollment and mother could not remember the name or location of the program and objected to providing the information to the court.
The social worker noted other concerns. Although mother claimed she did not have any contact with M.K., the social worker learned he and mother shared a joint bank account and he had handled her finances. In April 2016, father claimed mother had been calling him at night using a blocked number. He asked the social worker to question mother about her employment, asserting she had a history of prostitution. He also asserted mother had been mentally unstable and manipulative in the past and he worried whether she could provide a safe home for the children. The social worker asked mother about her employment. Mother claimed she worked for the Social Media Agency for Models, recruiting women to promote clubs in San Francisco and San Diego, but the social worker could not find mother’s supposed employer online. Mother provided a pay stub for a “spa” that appeared to be a pornography site. The social worker expressed concern mother’s employment could “potentially be a risk factor for the children” because she had taken the children with her to work.
The social worker declined to recommend a 60-day trial visit. She noted mother continued to refuse to provide information concerning her therapy, and based on mother’s mental health history, and her tendency to become anxious in stressful situations, the social worker recommended adding a mental health component to the case plan, and assessing whether mother needed medication. Mother contested SSA’s recommendation to continue reunification efforts without returning the children, and the court set a hearing for June 14, 2016.
In May 2016, mother’s therapist called the social worker to reveal, with mother’s consent, that mother had consistently attended sessions and was making good progress. They addressed domestic violence, and mother’s “anxiety levels appear to heighten” when speaking about father. Mother continued to suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and anxiety, but the therapist did not observe symptoms suggesting a need to evaluate mother for medication. Mother expressed frustration about the process and length of time necessary to demonstrate the children could be safely returned to her care, and felt the nature of her work should not pose an impediment.
In early June, mother advised the social worker the maternal grandmother would be staying at her apartment while she was away at work. Mother did not believe the grandmother could assist her on a long-term basis, however. The court directed SSA to assess the grandmother as a potential caretaker, and authorized the grandmother to babysit for periods not to exceed 24 hours.
The children reported the grandmother left them in the care of maternal Aunt D. Mother and father had advised the social worker Aunt D. had a criminal record for prostitution. Grandmother and mother previously had declined to provide D.’s last name as “they [did not] want to get her involved.” Because the grandmother might leave the children with an unapproved person, the social worker concluded mother had not yet found an appropriate caregiver.
Mother stated she would not attend the review hearing if the children were not being returned to her care, explaining she wanted the children home so she could move on with her life. Mother’s child abuse program therapist reported mother had missed two sessions and if she missed one more she would be sent back to criminal court.
Washington social workers approved a home study reflecting father and his wife could provide a safe and nurturing home for K.C. He had completed a parenting class at his own expense, and a domestic violence counselor felt he did not need domestic violence treatment. Father had no criminal record in Washington or Ohio. K.C.’s monitored visits with father in early July 2016 went well. K.C. said she felt good, and wanted to visit her father in Washington during her vacation.
Mother complained to the caregiver that father should not be visiting K.C. without her knowledge. Mother was visibly upset, complaining she did not understand why K.C. told her she did not want to visit father, but told everyone else she did. Later, while K.C. was on an overnight visit with mother, K.C. called the caregiver and said she did not want to visit father the following day or the next, as previously arranged. The social worker canceled K.C.’s visits with father. The social worker explained to mother that K.C. may have told mother she did not want to visit with father to spare mother’s feelings. In late July, mother continued to state she had concerns about father and did not agree with K.C. visiting him in Washington. Later, K.C. told the social worker even though she would like to visit her father in the future, it was too stressful now because “mother needs her.”
The social worker expressed concern mother would alienate K.C. from father once mother regained custody of K.C. She also questioned mother’s honesty, and worried mother and the maternal grandmother would leave the children in the care of someone who may not provide appropriate care. The social worker recommended continuing reunification efforts and scheduling an 18-month review, but also recommended reducing mother’s visits “while mother continues to process the issue with her therapist and complete conjoint therapy” with K.C.
At the 12-month review commencing August 8, 2016, the social worker testified she could not recommend returning the children to mother because of concerns about childcare, noting the grandmother had left the children with an aunt who had a criminal record. The social worker also described the risk mother posed to K.C.’s relationship with father, explaining K.C. appeared “really happy to be able to have a relationship with her father,” but K.C. changed her mind about visiting her father after spending time with mother.
The social worker also testified about an incident that had just occurred at the courthouse. Mother told K.C. “she wasn’t going to fight for her [anymore] and didn’t want her home.” K.C. felt mother was giving up on her “just like she gave up on Diana.” Based on mother’s statement to K.C. at the courthouse, the social worker felt it was no longer appropriate for mother to have unmonitored visits. The social worker also emphasized K.C. and Ethan were close and therefore it would be detrimental to separate them.
A tearful and crying K.C. testified she was unsure if she wanted to continue visits with mother based on mother’s statements to her at the courthouse.
Mother testified how her parenting and anger management classes provided her with the “tools” to understand her children and show more empathy. She had difficulty defining the meaning of “empathy,” however, describing it as “showing feelings or showing affection” and “expressing [her]self” to the children. She could not describe what she learned in the criminal court child abuse program because it was for “people who been committing crimes, like real crimes, like abusing children[].” She admitted what she did to Diana was “completely wrong,” and acknowledged that slapping children is child abuse and can cause emotional harm. She admitted her confrontation with K.C. at the courthouse was inappropriate, and conceded that telling K.C. she no longer wanted her home “had a real dramatic impact on” K.C. Mother explained she confronted K.C. because “I just went to how I feel.” Mother still had concerns father might take K.C. “away from this country,” because he had tried that before when K.C. was three years old. She asked for return of the children, stating with “the right services and” support she “can do this.”
On August 17, 2016, the juvenile court found “It is absolutely clear it would inappropriate to return the children to [mother’s] care,” explaining mother “failed in every respect to benefit from [her] services.” The court declared there was not a substantial probability of returning the children to mother by the end of the statutory reunification period. The court also found SSA provided reasonable reunification services. The court found father’s home was “suitable and appropriate,” and returning K.C. to him would not create a substantial risk of detriment to her physical or emotional well being. The court noted the need to “acclimate [K.C.] to the new placement,” and approved a “graduated process of reintroducing her into father’s home,” beginning with an extended visit. The court ordered monitored visitation for mother’s visits and required an SSA-provided neutral monitor to oversee the visits. The court directed the monitor to terminate the visit if mother “acts inappropriately in any fashion.”





II
DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Augment Record on Appeal
After the case was submitted for decision, mother moved to vacate submission and to augment the appellate record. Exhibit A contains several documents referencing an incident of domestic violence allegedly perpetrated by father in Ohio in 2006 and 2007. Exhibit B contained mother’s notice of appeal, which had been omitted from the clerk’s transcript.
On February 3, 2017, this court received a clerk’s declaration from the juvenile court. The deputy clerk stated she had received the motion to augment, but could not fulfill the request because the juvenile court’s minutes did “not show that these records were received.” The clerk prepared a supplemental transcript containing the notice of appeal.
We vacated submission, directed the clerk of this court to file the clerk’s declaration and supplemental transcript, deemed the augmentation complete, and resubmitted the case.
Although the juvenile court ordered the social worker to “bring the material . . . from Ohio,” including “any charging document that they had that’s equivalent to our petitions and any reports that you have,” nothing reflects the court filed or lodged the documents contained in mother’s Exhibit A. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a) [reviewing court may order the record augmented to include any document filed or lodged in the case in superior court], rule 8.340 [omitted documents or transcripts that any rule or order requires to be included in record].) Because these documents were not filed or lodged in the juvenile court, mother’s motion to augment was properly denied as to the documents included in Exhibit A.
B. Judicial Notice
In its respondent’s brief, SSA asks this court to take judicial notice of our prior opinion (G053927). SSA contends our earlier the opinion addressed and rejected three contentions raised by mother in the current appeal, including whether return of the child to mother’s care would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being, whether mother was offered reasonable reunification services, and whether reunification services should have been extended to an 18-month review date. SSA argues mother’s current claims are barred by res judicata and law of the case.
In her reply brief, mother objects to the request to take judicial notice. She notes the earlier decision involved Ethan, who was younger and differently situated from K.C., “rendering the Opinion . . . irrelevant.” She asserts the doctrines of law of the case and res judicata do not apply because the appeals involve differently situated minors with distinct interests.
Both sides have had the opportunity to present to the court information relevant to the propriety of taking judicial notice. (See Evid. Code, § 455.) We hereby take judicial notice of our prior opinion. (Evid. Code, § 459 [reviewing court may take judicial notice of any matter specified in Evidence Code section 452]; Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (a) [state decisional law and records of any court of this state].)

C. Res Judicata – Collateral Estoppel
Relying on In re Diana G. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1468 (Diana G.), SSA argues res judicata precludes relitigation of the three issues litigated in Ethan’s case. Diana G. was an appeal from a final order terminating parental rights following a section 366.26 hearing. The parents previously had filed an appeal from the order terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing, which the appellate court dismissed as moot and nonappealable. (Id. at p. 1476.) On appeal following the section 366.26 hearing, the parents raised the same issues they previously asserted in the dismissed appeal. The court held it could not consider these issues because the parents had not filed a petition for extraordinary writ relief from the decisions made at the earlier review and referral hearing. “In view of the importance of expediting the process whereby minors are placed in a permanent home and minimizing the uncertainties occasioned by delay [citation], we conclude that the findings made [at the 12-month review that]. . . subsequently formed the basis of the termination ruling [] following the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing, have become res judicata.” (Id. at pp. 1477-1478.) Diana G. is not applicable here because mother has not sought to raise on appeal matters that she could only have asserted in a petition for extraordinary relief.
We also consider whether collateral estoppel or issue preclusion applies to bar mother’s appeal. (In re Donovan L. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1075 (Donovan L.).) The doctrine prohibits relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action. Preclusion applies after final adjudication of an identical issue actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party. (Id. at p. 1084.) The public policies underlying collateral estoppel include preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation. (Ibid.; see Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 343.) Collateral estoppel applies in the juvenile dependency context. (Donovan L., supra, at p. 1084.)
In Ethan’s case, mother litigated the same three issues also raised in K.C.’s case, and we decided those issues in an opinion which is now final. Although a different child is involved, public policies underlying collateral estoppel apply here, including preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, the importance of consistent results, and promotion of judicial economy. As SSA notes, K.C. and Ethan were detained together, the court sustained one petition and ordered reunification services for both children, and the juvenile court’s findings as to Ethan were made jointly with the findings as to K.C. and were based largely on mother’s detrimental acts toward K.C. Mother made no attempt in the juvenile court to distinguish the risk to both children if they were returned to her care. Nor did she distinguish between the children when arguing she was not given reasonable reunification services, or whether the court erred in not extending her reunification services. No reason exists to provide mother with a second bite of the apple. But assuming our prior opinion does not bar consideration in this appeal of issues resolved in Ethan’s case, mother’s claims as to K.C. fail on the merits, for the same reasons they failed as to Ethan. We address those claims below in parts D-F.

D. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding Returning K.C. to Mother Would Create a Substantial Risk of Detriment to Her Physical or Emotional Well Being
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding mother posed a substantial risk of physical and emotional harm if the court returned K.C. to mother’s care.
As she did in her previous appeal in Ethan’s case, mother asserts she made substantive progress in reaching the goals of her case plan and points to her participation in parenting classes, anger management, individual counseling, and visitation. As we noted previously, the issue is not whether mother can cite evidence to support her position, but whether substantial evidence supports the court’s orders. We conclude the evidence is sufficient and therefore no basis exists to grant mother’s request for relief.
Section 366.21 provides the juvenile court shall return a child to parental custody at the 12-month review hearing “unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) Failure to participate regularly and make substantive progress in the case plan constitutes prima facie evidence of detriment. (Ibid.)
A reviewing court must uphold a juvenile court’s findings and orders if they are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1036-1037.) Evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value satisfies the substantial evidence standard. (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.) Determining the credibility of witnesses and resolving conflicts in the evidence are within the province of the juvenile court; we do not revisit these matters on review. (In re Tanis H. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1226-1227.) We must draw all inferences in support of the juvenile court’s findings and view the record in the light most favorable to the court’s orders. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 423.) Consequently, the appellant bears the burden to show the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s decision. Mother testified at the 12-month hearing that K.C.’s accusation of physical abuse was not true. The court reasonably could disbelieve mother’s claim and conclude mother had not fully accepted responsibility for her actions that led to the removal of her children. This testimony, considered in conjunction with her earlier and repeated denials of the children’s accounts describing how she and her boyfriend abused them, supports the court’s conclusion mother failed to make the necessary progress required despite her parenting and counseling sessions.
The evidence also showed mother repeatedly inflicted psychological harm on her children through impulsive and emotional statements. The juvenile court reasonably could conclude mother made these statements to satisfy her own emotional frustration and was either indifferent or unaware how her remarks would affect her children. The statement mother made to K.C. before the hearing is illustrative and played a key role in the court’s determination. Mother told K.C. she would no longer “fight” to regain custody of her because “I just can’t do it no more.” K.C., devastated by this news, broke down on the stand when repeating mother’s statement. Mother testified she made the statement because “I just went how I feel.” This was not an isolated incident. Mother repeatedly made statements to K.C. undermining K.C.’s relationship with her father, resulting in pressure on K.C. that was emotionally harmful. The court reasonably could conclude mother did not discriminate among her children when making her impulsive and emotionally harmful remarks, as shown by her estrangement from her oldest daughter and Ethan’s chronic misbehavior, which resulted, according to the social worker, in therapy to address “past trauma.” The court was not, as mother asserts, “punish[ing] mother for confronting [K.C.] for her lying in the” courthouse hallway – the court was attempting to protect K.C. from further emotional harm.
As we also noted in the prior opinion, the juvenile court could rely on evidence of the mother’s unresolved childcare issues and the problems posed by leaving the children with the maternal grandmother. Mother points out the social worker approved the grandmother for childcare for no more than 24 hours. But the grandmother allowed the maternal aunt to watch the children, and mother knew the aunt had a criminal record, but would not reveal the aunt’s name to the social worker.
Finally, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude mother failed to resolve other issues, such as whether she completely severed her relationship with M.K., and mother’s mental health problems.
Nothing in sections 366.21 and 366.22 requires that the risk of harm posed by returning the minor to her parent must involve only the same type of harm that resulted in removing the minor from parental custody. (In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 898.) “Thus, while the court must consider the extent the parent has cooperated with the services provided and the efforts the parent has made to correct the problems which gave rise to the dependency (§ 366.22, subd. (a)), the decision whether to return the child to parental custody depends on the effect that action would have on the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (In re Joseph B., at p. 899.)
Based on the foregoing, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s detriment finding.

E. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding Reasonable Services Had Been Provided or Offered to Mother
At the 12-month permanency hearing, the juvenile court “shall also determine whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent or legal guardian to overcome the problems that led to the initial removal and continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.21, subd. (f)(1)(A).) Where the period of time for court-ordered services has not exceeded the statutory period (§ 361.5), and a child is not returned to the custody of the parent, the court “shall . . . [c]ontinue the case for up to six months for a permanency review hearing . . . if the court finds . . . that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent . . . .” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1); see Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010 (Mark N.) [appellate courts may not overturn reasonable services finding if substantial evidence supports the court’s order].)
Mother contends SSA did not provide her with reasonable services because the social worker had identified conjoint counseling between mother and K.C. to deal “with the resurface of [K.C.’s] father into their lives and mother’s childcare as factors preventing reunification, but never made the necessary referrals for mother to deal with these issues.” As noted in our prior opinion, the social worker could not recommend returning the children to mother at the 12-month review based on mother’s efforts to undermine K.C.’s relationship with her father. The social worker pursued arranging conjoint therapy by calling one therapist who was unavailable, but failed to locate another. As we noted, the record reflects the court and SSA referred mother to appropriate services to address the issues in this case, including parenting classes, therapy, counseling and anger management. Mother also had participated in numerous programs in Ohio. The record reflects mother chose her own therapist and the providers for her parenting and anger management classes. The therapist and mother appeared to focus on mother’s trauma and achieving “a happy, healthy life for” mother, rather than issues related to the safety of the children. And when the social worker attempted to follow up with the therapist concerning mother’s issues with father, past domestic violence, and mother’s mental health, mother directed the therapist not to speak with the social worker and revoked her authorization to release information. The court reasonably could conclude mother lacked an interest or the capacity in overcoming certain attitudes harming her children, such as her extreme enmity toward father, which posed an ongoing risk of emotional harm to K.C. The court noted conjoint therapy is indicated once the parent progresses in individual therapy, but mother had failed to reach that point despite approximately 17 months of effort.
Mother also notes the social worker “testified as childcare being one of the issues preventing reunification, but never referred mother to any licensed child care facility in her area.” As we noted in the prior opinion, the lack of childcare options did not figure prominently if at all in the court’s decision to terminate reunification services without returning Ethan to mother’s care. We also noted mother’s decision to rely on the grandmother for childcare, and her refusal to provide information about the maternal aunt, suggested mother continued to pose a risk to the children. “The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but the services were reasonable under the circumstance.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) In sum, the court did not err in concluding mother had received reasonable services.

F. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding There Was Not a Substantial Probability the Court Would Return K.C. to Mother By the 18-Month Permanency Review
If the juvenile court does not return the child to the parent at the 12-month permanency hearing, the court “shall . . . [¶] (1) [c]ontinue the case for up to six months for a permanency review hearing, provided that the hearing shall occur within 18 months of the date the child was originally taken from the physical custody of his or her parent. . . . The court shall continue the case only if it finds that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent . . . and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent or legal guardian. For the purposes of this section, in order to find a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time, the court shall be required to find all of the following: [¶] (A) That the parent or legal guardian has consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child. [¶] (B) That the parent or legal guardian has made significant progress in resolving problems that led to the child’s removal from the home. [¶] (C) The parent or legal guardian has demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of his or her treatment plan and to provide for the child’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs.” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A)-(C); S.T. v. Superior Court (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1015.)
Mother asserts she consistently and regularly visited K.C. and progressed to unmonitored visits, she did not physically hurt or discipline the children during the reunification period and was described as loving, affectionate, and appropriate during visits, she regularly participated in court-ordered case plan activities, and her service providers believed she had made significant progress. She argues she had demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete the objectives of the case plan and to provide a safe home by the extended date.
As we noted in the prior opinion, the juvenile court expressly found mother was not cognizant of past mistakes and did not accept responsibility for her actions. Rather, the court found mother’s history of physical and emotional abuse, and her conduct throughout the proceedings, reflected she had failed to benefit from the services provided. The court concluded mother’s testimony demonstrated she did not believe she had committed “real child abuse and actually denied some of the abuse,” and it was not “possible for her to achieve anything” with additional reunification services. Thus, the court found mother had failed to make significant progress, explaining mother “failed in every respect to benefit from those services, despite the fact she regularly engaged in them. . . .” Given the 18-month date in September 2016 was approximately a month from the date of the August permanency review, the court did not err in declining to find there was a substantial probability it would return K.C. to his mother’s physical custody by September 2016.




G. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding Return to Father Would Not be Detrimental to K.C.
Mother contends the court erred in not finding return of K.C. to father would create a substantial risk of detriment to K.C. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding.
Mother argues father did not substantially comply with his case plan. (See, e.g., 366.21, subd. (f)(1)(B) [failure of parent to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental].) Specifically, mother notes the sustained petition alleged mother had a history of domestic violence with father, and records from the State of Ohio reflected this history. Mother also notes father’s case plan contained domestic violence and counseling components, and asserts father did not comply with these requirements.
The record reflects father attempted to enroll in a domestic violence program near his home, but he did not meet the program’s criteria. Neither he nor the social worker could find a Spanish-language provider near his home. The social worker told him he could address domestic violence in individual counseling. Father did locate a counselor on his own initiative and enrolled, although he was apparently not in counseling at the time of the 12-month review because his counselor left the agency a month earlier. The record is unclear whether the social worker verified with the counselor that father had addressed domestic violence in therapy.
Apart from the sustained allegation, which was apparently based largely on mother’s claims, and occurred before father’s appearance in the case, nothing in the record suggests mother’s claim of domestic violence by father was substantially accurate. Father denied any domestic violence history with mother. The social worker’s report dated June 14, 2016, reflected the social worker had received the approved home study for father. The home study reflected father had completed a domestic violence evaluation in February 2016 and the counselor did not feel he needed domestic violence treatment. Father did not have any “concerning criminal history,” nor was there “substantiated allegations as to [father] . . . of domestic violence.” Father had “sought out and accessed services from a behavioral counselor” and after the “assessment the counselor reported [father] does not qualify for counseling services.” Nothing in the record suggests father posed a risk of physical or emotional harm to K.C. based on the sustained allegations of domestic violence and his apparent failure to complete aspects of his case plan. Indeed, the record reflects father wanted the best for his daughter and was willing to do anything and complete any program to allow the court to place K.C. in his care.
Mother also asserts K.C. would suffer detriment in father’s care because of his long absence from her life and his failure “to make the effort to visit [her] except on two monitored visits in November 2015 and July 2016” when he “was in town for the only two hearings he attended.” The record reflects father contacted the social worker in late September 2015 and stated he had learned through social media K.C. was in protective custody. K.C. had been in his care for four years after K.C. was born, but after he separated from mother because of her infidelity, and the girls returned to mother’s care, he did not continue to see K.C. because of “mother’s manipulative behavior and therefore pulled away, not having any contact . . . .” His last contact with mother, and presumably K.C., was in 2009. He moved to Washington in 2010 and married his wife in 2011. At the inception of the case in March 2015, 11-year-old K.C. told the social worker she did not know her father and never had contact with him.
After father entered the dependency case in the fall of 2015, K.C. was happy to learn she had a dad, and enjoyed the two visits that occurred in conjunction with the review hearings in November 2015 and July 2016, and the numerous phone calls they shared over the ensuing months. Given father’s modest income, and his residence in Washington, father’s failure to visit more frequently and attend the 12-month review hearing after it was continued to August is not significant. (See also fn. 7, ante.) Although K.C. consistently expressed she did not want to live with father in Washington, this hardly is surprising given that father only recently had re-entered her life, and her mother, brother, longtime caregiver, friends, school, and activities were all located in Orange County. As noted, the court placed K.C. with father through a gradual transition beginning with an extended visit. Contrary to mother’s claim the court’s plan would have “a devastating emotional impact on K.C.,” nothing in the record shows placing K.C. with her father posed a substantial risk of detriment. We note father was willing to accept Ethan into his home, and nothing suggested father would prevent K.C. from continuing her relationship with mother and other important people in her life. We discern no error.

III
DISPOSITION
The post-judgment orders made at the August 8, 2016, 12-month permanency review hearing are affirmed.



ARONSON, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:



FYBEL, J.



IKOLA, J.