In re Lidia M.

Filed 10/15/07 In re Lidia M. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

John H. Ing, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, 21.) Affirmed as modified.

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel Jr. and Sonya Won, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________

The minor Lidia M. appeals from the juvenile courts order of wardship after finding she attempting to dissuade a victim or witness from reporting a crime or giving testimony at trial or other authorized legal proceeding. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602; Pen. Code,  136.1, subd. (c)(1).)^[1] The minor contends the evidence is insufficient to support the finding. We affirm the order as modified.^[2]

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The evidence at the adjudication hearing established that as 11th grader Jessica G. and her friend Maria E. were walking home from school, seven or eight girls came up behind them. The minor, then 15 years old, and her friend Bonnie M. were among the girls. Bonnie M. screamed at Jessica G. to stop calling Bonnie M.s boyfriend. Jessica G. turned to face Bonnie M. and denied calling the boyfriend. The minor intervened and demanded that Jessica G. contact police to recant earlier statements she had made implicating the minors friends in a robbery for which they were subsequently taken into custody. The minor told Jessica G. to tell police the minors friends never did anything to [Jessica G.] or [else] something was going to happen to [Jessica G.] or [to her] family.

Jessica G. testified that she was frightened and concerned for her own and her familys safety. The minor was bigger than Jessica G. and was released from school earlier in the day than Jessica G. This provided the minor with an opportunity to lie in wait for her. Jessica G. feared for her family because she had three younger siblings, and the minor could easily learn from Bonnie M.s boyfriend where Jessica G. lived.

During Jessica G.s encounter with the minor and the other girls, a friend drove up, inquired if anything was wrong, and offered Jessica G. a ride home. Jessica G. and Maria E. got into the friends car and left.

The minor and two other witnesses testified for the defense. Maria E. testified that she recalled the minor having an argument with Jessica G. over some incident involving the minors friend. She also recalled the minor had demanded that Jessica G. tell police the minors friend had not been involved in the incident. Maria E. could not remember whether the minor threatened to hurt Jessica G. or her family.

Edith V., one of the girls in the group, testified that the minor told Jessica G. to let police know the truth about the minors friend, but that the minor never made any threats to Jessica G. or towards her family.

The minor testified that she came upon Bonnie M. and Jessica G. arguing. Already mad at her for putting her friend in jail, the minor decided to speak to Jessica G. The minor told Jessica G. that she should tell police the truth about her friend, that it was not right for her friend to be in jail because she was pregnant, and that if the issue was Jessica G.s necklace, then the minor would give Jessica G. the money. The minor denied having threatened Jessica G. or her family in any way.

At the conclusion of the adjudication hearing, the parties agreed the issue turned on witness credibility. The defense argued: (1) only Jessica G. testified the minor had made certain threats; (2) her friend Maria E. was unable to corroborate the testimony of Jessica G. pertaining to the minors testimony; and (3) the minor and Edith V. refuted Jessica G.s testimony that the minor had threatened her or her family.

The juvenile court expressly found that Jessica G. was credible, and the minor and Edith V. were not credible. As for Maria E., the court noted that although her testimony indicated that she had a poor memory of what had occurred, significantly Maria E. did recall the minor insisting that Jessica G. tell police the minors friend had not been involved in the purported robbery. The court concluded, But the bottom line is that the court believes the testimony of Jessica [G.] and thats the basis of the decision. So the petition is sustained as to count 1.^[3]

At the disposition hearing that immediately followed, the juvenile court declared the minor a ward of the court, ordered her home on probation, declared the offense to be a felony, and calculated the maximum term of confinement as four years.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

The same standard of appellate review is applicable in considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding as in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction. (In re Cheri T. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404; In reJose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275.) In either case we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We resolve all conflicts in the evidence and questions of credibility in favor of the verdict, and indulge every reasonable inference the jury could draw from the evidence. (People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction]. (Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331.)

2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding the Minor Violated Section 136.1, Subdivision (c)(1)

Section 136.1 makes it a felony to knowingly and maliciously attempt to prevent a victim of a crime from making a report of that victimization to any peace officer, when that attempt is accompanied by force or by an express or implied threat of force. ( 136.1, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1).)

The minor renews the argument she made to the juvenile court that the testimony of Jessica G., the sole prosecution witness, was clearly fabricated, and when pitted against the testimony of the three defense witnesses, it is obvious that Jessica G. was never threatened by the minor. The minor maintains that she is asking this court to essentially disbelieve Jessica G.s testimony because it is inherently improbable, and the minor asserts the trial courts finding that it constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt shock[s] the moral sense.

Determining witness credibility is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) The testimony of a single witness, unless physically impossible or inherently improbable, is sufficient to support the verdict. (People v. Elwood (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1365, 1372.) Nothing in the record suggests that Jessica G.s testimony was inherently improbable or physically impossible. Jessica G. consistently testified the minor said that something was going to happen to Jessica G. or to her family if she failed to recant earlier statements to police implicating the minors friends. It is not unreasonable to infer the minor was impliedly threatening Jessica G. or her family with force or violence if Jessica G. refused to comply with the minors demand.

Jessica G.s testimony was reasonable, credible and of solid value. (People v.Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331.) That is all that is required to support the juvenile courts finding. (Ibid.) By pointing to what the minor perceives as the implausible aspects of Jessica G.s testimony as opposed to the overall quality of the defense witnesses testimony, the minor is inviting us to reweigh the evidence and to engage in speculation, neither of which is the function of an appellate court. (People v. Culver (1973) 10 Cal.3d 542, 548; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1084, overruled in part on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.) In sum, the minors challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is utterly without merit.

DISPOSITION

The maximum term of confinement is stricken and in all other respects the order of wardship is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

WOODS, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

ZELON, J.

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^[1] Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

^[2] We agree with the minors second contention that because she was ordered home on probation and not removed from the physical custody of her parents, the juvenile court erred in setting a four-year maximum term of confinement. (In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 573-574.) The confinement time set by the court has no legal effect; we order it stricken.

^[3] The court dismissed count 2, alleging the minor had made a criminal threat in violation of section 422. The court found that Jessica G.s testimony, while truthful, did not establish the minor made a threat to commit a crime which would result in death or great bodily injury within the meaning of the statute.