Filed 9/12/17 In re Lucas N. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
| In re LUCAS N., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. |
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ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
D.N.,
Defendant and Appellant.
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G054470
(Super. Ct. Nos. 16DP0287, 16DP0288 & 16DP0289)
O P I N I O N |
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gary L. Moorhead, Judge. Affirmed.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Jeannie Su, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
D.N. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s findings and orders sustaining the allegations of a dependency petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (b), (c), and (j); all statutory citations are to this code) concerning her son Lucas (born December 2008) and twin daughters Lauren and Lynn (born March 2016), and removing the children from her physical custody (§ 361).[1] Mother contends the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to establish a causal link between her conduct and potential harm to the children. We disagree. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding mother suffered from mental health issues that caused her to neglect her children, and caused Lucas to suffer serious emotional damage. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
I
Factual and Procedural Background
In March 2016, SSA filed a petition alleging the children had suffered, or were at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm, illness or neglect due to mother’s mental illness. (§ 300, subd. (b); see also § 300, subd. (j) [siblings at substantial risk of abuse or neglect].) Specifically, the petition and accompanying detention report asserted mother had not followed a physician’s feeding schedule for her newborn daughter Lauren, and mother had provided the child only half the amount of food required to avoid serious health issues. The mother ignored Lauren’s crying and took no “measure to address the child’s discomfort.” Hospital staff and maternal relatives believed mother had unresolved mental health issues. Hospital workers reported mother “rambled,” became “quickly defensive,” and “agitated and confrontational.” She refused to speak with the hospital staff and SSA social workers, and yelled at the maternal grandmother to prevent her from speaking to a social worker. Mother’s family had a history of mental illness, including a deceased maternal uncle with schizophrenia who committed suicide.
Mother did not work. The maternal grandparents purchased a home for her, supported her financially and brought groceries to the home. A maternal aunt believed mother could not properly care for the children, explaining mother isolated herself and Lucas, was adamant about raising the children herself, and declined family assistance with childcare. Lucas did not attend school and was developmentally delayed. Mother claimed she “homeschooled” Lucas, but the seven year old behaved like a toddler, could not speak comprehensibly, and communicated primarily through nonverbal means. Mother refused to speak English or Vietnamese to Lucas during the first year of his life because she wanted him to learn Japanese. Mother provided no structure for the child. She slept during the day, and she and Lucas stayed awake late into the night. Neighbors saw Lucas riding his bike in the neighborhood at 2:00 a.m. when he was two or three years old. Mother’s home was unsanitary, with black, standing water in a sink for several days. Mother often did not feed Lucas and he had to fend for himself.
SSA placed the children with a maternal aunt, D.D (caregiver). Mother refused to participate in a team decision meeting because SSA’s policies did not allow her to have an attorney present. The social worker recommended a psychological evaluation for mother.
At the contested initial detention hearing, mother and the social worker testified. Mother denied failing to feed her daughters sufficiently, or that she had difficulty cooperating with people trying to help her care for her children, but acknowledged she had argued with hospital staff, ordered her doctor and social worker to leave her hospital room, and refused to speak with social workers.
The social worker, relying on the reports and opinions of medical professionals, testified the mother posed a risk of physical harm to the children because she had failed to provide them proper nutrition. The maternal aunt testified about the unsanitary conditions of mother’s home, and identified several hygiene and safety items mother had not addressed, including plumbing issues and burned out lighting in a stairway area. She also testified that mother neglected Lucas, who had difficulty communicating verbally, and had to draw pictures and use hand motions.
The court detained the children, finding prima facie evidence mother posed a substantial risk to the children’s physical or emotional health. (See § 319.) The court offered mother voluntary services, and authorized funding for a psychological evaluation (Evid. Code, § 730) for mother if she chose to participate. The court authorized daily monitored visits, and directed the parties to address Lucas’s educational needs.
According to reports prepared for the jurisdiction hearing, Lucas stated he did not want to live with mother. The caregiver reported Lucas appeared to function at a younger age, with limited vocabulary and no social skills. Lucas did not like to follow directions and threw tantrums when he did not get what he wanted. Mother objected to enrolling Lucas in school and preferred for a tutor to come to the house. The social worker could not locate Lucas’s homeschooling records, which suggested mother had not registered him for homeschooling through a school district. Over mother’s objection, the court temporarily limited mother’s educational rights so Lucas could attend school.
Mother refused to speak with social workers without her attorney present. Mother asked to record the interview, which SSA would not allow. Mother sent an e-mail to the social worker asserting the court had “determined that the allegations against [her] were groundless . . . .” Mother expressed frustration the children were out of her care and thought it was “due to a clogged sink.”
A nurse described her encounter with mother at the hospital. The nurse asked “mother to hand her the child. . . . [T]he mother handed the child to her like the child was a sack. . . . [T]here were no tears, no emotion. . . . [T]he mother . . . never went back to see the baby again. . . . [T]he mother went up to the nurse and asked her for [the obstetrician’s] supervisor’s telephone number.”
The maternal aunt, Denise, reported Lucas wanted to go to school and wanted social interaction, but mother would not allow it. Lucas did not want to go home to mother and according to the caregiver, Lucas made “amazing improvements” in her home. Denise said it took the whole family to care for the children and she could not imagine mother being able to care for them alone. Mother had “big mood swings” and would sometimes “blow up at the maternal grandparents,” who provided for her financially. Denise believed mother “has a mental health issue or . . . anger or resentment buil[t] up.”
The caregiver reported mother was upset Lucas was in school, and because the caregiver allowed the social worker and the children’s attorney to speak with Lucas and see the twins. Mother’s daily visits were “going ok,” and she helped Lucas with homework. But the caregiver stated “there is no way [mother] can take care of [the children] by herself full time.”
The social worker visited Lucas in the caregiver’s home on May 19. Lucas said he liked school, enjoyed his visits with mother, but he did not want to live with mother and wanted to stay with the caregivers. A public health nurse examined the twins and advised she would make a referral to the Orange County Regional Center (regional center) as they appeared “to demonstrate some developmental delays.” Lucas’s school psychologist stated Lucas had “some delays in the areas of socialization and attention. . . . [He did] not understand how to play with other children.” She believed “he suffered emotional damage because of the lack of exposure and cited damage in that he does not know how to work through problems with his peers or play with them. . . . f there is a problem on the playground, he will shut down and cry. . . . [H]e cries quite often.” The psychologist noted it was evident he lacked exposure to routines and structure, and he had difficulty problem solving. He liked school and living with his aunt and uncle, but he did not talk about his mother and “‘shuts down’” when asked about her. The school’s speech pathologist identified deficits in vocabulary and providing oral narrative, which she attributed to his background. Many of his language scores, including understanding and speaking, were 1.5 standard deviations below average for his age, which placed him in the seventh percentile.
The juvenile court admitted SSA’s reports at the jurisdictional hearing, and also heard testimony from several witnesses. Mother’s obstetrician, Dr. Dubyak, described her communications with mother as “challenging.” Mother strongly disagreed with Dubyak’s medical plan concerning the twins’ birth, and requested Dubyak perform her C-section “earlier than recommended” because she incorrectly believed “there could be increased risk for stillbirth” by a later delivery. Mother was “long-winded and rambling,” and it was “sometimes difficult to understand” her primary concern. Her e-mails “demonstrated unusual behavior and a focus, despite extensive counseling, that was unrelenting.”
Mother brought Lucas to the hospital, and did not have “a plan for [supervising him] at night” after the delivery, even though they had counseled her previously that Lucas could not remain unattended. Dubyak requested a hospital social worker consult with mother after the delivery, and another physician recommended a psychiatrist interview mother, who became “upset” by the referrals and refused to speak to the specialists. She refused to see Dubyak further, and another physician took over her care. Mother’s behavior in the hospital led a social worker to contact SSA.
The social worker, Maureen Naganuma, testified she believed mother had not provided for Lauren’s physical needs at the hospital. Nurses reported mother underfed Lauren and did not respond to the child’s cries “four times . . . within a specific time period.” After Mother was discharged she visited Lynn in the intensive care unit, but “needed coaxing . . . to feed the child at that time.” The social worker expressed concern “mother would not respond to the child’s crying and cues that she may have needed to be fed at the time and the reports that she was not feeding Lauren according to the feeding schedules that were given to her and that she was underfeeding the child by 50 percent.” Based on reports from family members that Lucas looked undernourished, and the social worker’s observation that Lucas could not list many foods he liked, she believed mother had failed to provide for Lucas’s physical needs. She was concerned mother “would not provide the proper nutrition or proper care for the children,” and this posed a risk of substantial harm to the children because it could result in serious health and developmental issues.
Naganuma also believed mother had unresolved mental health issues. Mother was “somewhat paranoid, agitated, angry, somewhat argumentative,” and presented with a “flat affect.” She believed “if the mother has some mental health issues . . . she may not be able to respond to the children in an appropriate manner to provide for their basic needs. [She] may not respond to their cues of when they need to eat or when they need to have something done for them or their care.” The social worker believed mother could not safely care for the children in an unsupervised setting, and requested the court order a psychological evaluation.
The social worker also opined mother was not providing for Lucas’s educational and developmental needs, which could “impact his ability to learn and grow. As he grows up it could impact his social relationships.”
The school psychologist, Janette Dunn, testified she assessed Lucas and spent significant time with him. He scored average in several cognitive areas, but had difficulty socializing with peers, initiating conversation, and solving problems. He would “cut in front of students, push students, make inappropriate comments. . . . He didn’t understand why [or how] his behavior was impacting the others . . . .” When the other children got upset with him, Lucas became irritated, sad, and cried. On the playground, during a game such as tag, Lucas thought other children were “going to hurt him” and did not understand it was a game. He displayed similar confusion in the classroom, and had difficulty understanding various routines. The school psychologist concluded Lucas had deficits possibly related to social isolation, which posed an “extremely high” risk of serious emotional damage. The child might not be “able to establish friendships” or “follow simple routines in schools,” which could lead to depression and other problems. When Lucas arrived at the school, he would not talk much, avoided peers on the playground, stood by himself, and cried. He showed signs of extreme anxiety, far beyond the typical new student. Recently, Lucas made some friends, followed routines, and his academics improved. Lucas never spoke about his mother, and when asked about her, he turned around and stared down. He spoke about his aunt and uncle, whom he liked living with, and whom he referred to as mom and dad.
The caregiver testified mother objected when she learned the caregiver took the twins to the pediatrician and objected when she learned the doctor had prescribed vitamins for the girls. The caregiver also testified mother had never taken Lucas to the dentist. Lucas talked to himself every day, typically when he was alone in the bathroom or before bedtime, often for more than an hour. When Lucas arrived at the caregiver’s home, he did not know how to comb his hair, take a shower, or eat a regular meal. He had difficulty communicating, became agitated easily, and had tantrums. He never asked for mother, and pretended he was tired so he could terminate her visits early. Mother had not allowed Lucas to play with others, and he had no friends other than the caregiver’s daughters.
The caregiver described mother’s personality traits, explaining mother had isolated herself since college. She expressed fear other people were trying to harm her and Lucas, and videotaped people at the community swimming pool where she lived because she believed they were there to spy on her. The caregiver testified mother also was litigious, noting she had sued her neighbors, the homeowner’s association, and health care providers.
According to SSA’s report dated June 29, Lucas’s speech pathologist believed environmental factors likely contributed to Lucas’s language delays. According to Lucas’s IEP (Individualized Education Program), “Lucas’[s] isolation from others and lack of interaction with a variety of language models cannot be ruled out as being the cause of his language delays.” Lucas’s teacher stated Lucas often complained he did not have any friends, and noted he became easily upset, and often cried. She “rated [his] depression in the clinically significant range.”
SSA filed an amended petition on June 29, 2016, adding an allegation Lucas was suffering or at risk of suffering serious emotional damage evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward others as a result of mother’s conduct. (§ 300, sub. (c).)
On July 11, the court judicially noticed the Orange County Superior Court had declared mother a vexatious litigant (see Code Civ. Proc., § 391) in January 2015, which required her to obtain a court order to file new litigation in propria persona. The court noted it tended to “corroborate allegations that mother may have mental health issues [including paranoia and social anxiety] that affects her parenting of the children.”
SSA called mother to testify at the jurisdictional hearing. She described the lawsuit she had filed against her homeowner’s association and various neighbors, complaining her neighbors and others taunted and harassed her at the community pool, and also directed their children to harass her. She received violation notices containing false allegations designed to “intentionally inflame and provoke” her. She believed neighbors and their guests followed and stalked her, explaining these harassment incidents were “life threatening to Lucas.” Mother began videotaping her neighbors because of the harassment, and had her video “camera running . . . from the second [she] enter[ed] the association until [she drove] in to [her] garage.”
When testifying on her own behalf, Mother asserted she consistently visited the children on a daily basis. She brought breast milk to early visits, but the caregiver “hesitated allowing [her] to feed” the twins, stating she already had fed them, and mother “got discouraged because [she] couldn’t feed them [her] breast milk.” She denied refusing to make bottles for the twins, explaining the bottles usually were made when she arrived for visits. She fed the twins “[a]ll the time since day one.” She knew about feeding schedules, and noted she had cared for Lucas on her own. Lucas saw a doctor regularly, and she denied any concerns with her parenting of Lucas or his nourishment.
According to mother, tension arose with her sisters when she declined to enroll Lucas in school when he was around age five. She distanced herself from her sisters after this, but occasionally saw them at family gatherings. Mother denied engaging in any angry outbursts with her family.
Mother also denied isolating herself or Lucas. She homeschooled Lucas because she wanted to spend “quality time with him,” and felt she could “teach him academically.” She also preferred the flexibility of homeschooling rather a “rigid . . . every day in school of doing nothing but just wasting time.” She agreed it was important for Lucas to engage with other children, but she but she could not name any friends or playmates for Lucas other than his cousins, although he played with other children at the park.
Mother acknowledged concern about Lucas’s “speech since he turned one year old,” and brought it up with her medical provider. The medical provider referred her to a speech pathologist, who she could not name, but told her “he has no problem.” She continued to have concerns and researched the issue on the Internet and bought DVD’s about teaching “children to speak.” She primarily spoke Vietnamese with Lucas when he was younger, and denied only letting him speak Japanese. She later taught him to read in English, and spoke to him in English and Vietnamese.
Lauren Randall, the school’s speech and language pathologist who assessed Lucas, testified Lucas lacked awareness of “quite a few” linguistic concepts, his vocabulary was below average, and he “had extreme difficulty being able to either describe events or describe a story even if it’s one where he just has to immediately re-tell it.” Randall felt it was “very likely that there [was] at least some environmental impact” that caused his language deficit, particularly concerning “social language,” which is the child’s ability to use language differently in different situations, such as making requests, asking questions, hold a conversation and being able to switch volume or tone depending on the situation. She had observed Lucas since the initial assessment and noted his social language was improving. Generally children who have interacted with other children do better. Randall observed Lucas interact with other children at recess and noted he “was not consistent in his ability to be able to hold a conversation with his peers. . . . He didn’t quite know what to do . . . in terms of being able to play with the other kids and knowing what’s appropriate . . . . [¶] He got upset when someone . . . tapped him on the shoulder because they wanted to talk to him. He thought they were hitting him.”
At the conclusion of the jurisdiction hearing in August 2016, the juvenile court sustained the amended petition, but struck two factual allegations under section 300, subdivision (b). The court ordered an Evidence Code section 730 psychological evaluation for mother, even though mother’s counsel asserted mother would refuse to participate. The court granted permission for mother to videotape visits at SSA’s offices if the confidentiality of other families could be maintained. The court scheduled a disposition hearing for September.
At another hearing in September, the juvenile court ordered mental health evaluations by two professionals (Fam. Code, § 7827, subd. (c); Evid. Code, § 730) to determine whether there was an issue precluding mother from benefitting from reunification services (see § 361.5, subd. (b)(2)), and rescheduled the disposition hearing for late October. The court advised mother if she refused to participate in the evaluations the court could presume she had a mental illness or personality disorder precluding her from benefitting from services.
In late September, one of the section 730 evaluators, Dr. Godwin, advised the court mother refused to participate in the evaluation. Godwin would not complete an evaluation without mother’s participation.
SSA’s October 25 report recommended terminating reunification services for mother (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(2)), and scheduling a section 366.26 hearing. The social worker explained it did not appear mother would benefit from services because she would not acknowledge any problems, and mother continued to refuse to participate in the section 730 psychological evaluations.
The social worker summarized mother’s visits with Lucas as generally appropriate with some concerns: “The mother appears patient and loving during the visits, for the most part. She is observed feeding her babies, changing them and playing with them. The mother attempts to interact with Lucas and seems very focused, and at times preoccupied, with teaching him Vietnamese and drawing during their visits. The mother seldom plays with [Lucas], which appears to frustrate him. The mother is not very physically affectionate with the child during the visits, but does encourage him to spend time with her talking. . . . Lucas has made statements to [] mother that he missed her, but [she] does not respon[d]. The child is affectionate towards the mother when he greets her and when he is saying good-bye. The children have no problem with transitioning from [] mother to the caregiver.” Mother refused to help Lucas do his homework during visits, stating this was “her time.” Mother videotaped the children and herself during her visits by setting up a camera on a tripod.
Mother continued to display paranoid behavior. For example, after the first visit she learned the private room where she and the children met had a one way mirror. Believing the family in the adjacent room could watch her and the children, she sent an e-mail demanding that “ALL parties [to her email] subpoena all images (still and motion images) of the activities taken by any and all parties from the room next door to us,” as well as “a report by SSA monitor in regards to the activities in the room next door as they may pertain to the activities in our room.” The social worker stated mother “continues to insist upon isolating her children during visits,” and confronted Lucas about who was teaching him to talk back to her. Mother did not acknowledge “the possibility that [his] defiance could be a result of his own frustrations with her.”~(729)~ Mother often ignored the monitors’ attempts to redirect her.
The social worker’s reports prepared in advance of the disposition hearing summarized mother’s continuing monitored visits. The social worker noted during a visit mother would use the bathroom and ask Lucas to watch the twins, rather than asking the monitor. Lucas seemed frustrated with mother’s requests for him to learn Vietnamese and do the activities she preferred, rather than asking him what he wanted to do during visits. He continued to state he wanted to visit with mother, but wanted to live with the caregivers. At times, mother became preoccupied, which allowed one of the twins to grab an electric cord. Lucas’s teacher reported he had made significant progress, but still suffered deficits with his writing skills, spelling, and emotional development.
In December, SSA proposed to move monitored visits to the Orange County Child Abuse Prevention Center. The center did not allow videotaping, but did allow photographs. Mother objected the “unprovoked” change violated the court’s order allowing her to videotape visits and refused to attend. Mother also claimed SSA and the caregivers were “creating reasons to prevent [her] from” visiting the children. During a visit with Lucas on December 16, mother screamed at Lucas, who screamed back. The monitor was able to calm them down after notifying the deputy sheriff on duty in the lobby. The social worker stated mother displayed “a number of positive qualities during” visits. She was able to supervise, feed and redirect the children, and interact with them appropriately at times. But she also became “easily agitated, paranoid and upset.”
The disposition hearing commenced January 4, 2017. The court admitted SSA’s reports and the report prepared by the other section 730 evaluator, psychiatrist Dr. Ted Greenzang. Mother declined to speak with Greenzang, but he reviewed SSA’s reports, spoke with mother’s sisters, and the social worker. Although his ability to diagnose mother was compromised by her failure to cooperate, Greenzang opined she had “apparently manifested paranoid behavior,” and her emotional state was “best characterized as a possible psychotic disorder not otherwise specified,” “schizophrenia paranoid type,” or “schizoaffective disorder.” He described her propensity to neglect her children as “moderately high.” Her history was “consistent with paranoid ideation and emotional lability which has a significant potential to interfere with her parenting capacity.”
Greenzang could not “conclude definitively that [mother] is incapable of benefitting from family reunification services,” but her “unwillingness to date to avail herself of recommended services seriously compromises her ability to benefit from” services. He also opined continued placement with the caregivers was warranted, and monitored visitation should continue, perhaps reducing the duration, and preferably at the residence of a family member “such that Lucas does not experience difficulties precipitated by being in a confined space for an extended period of time.” Greenzang stated a psychiatrist should evaluate mother for the possible use of psychotropic medications, and should engage in psychotherapy to address family issues, suspiciousness, and her need for treatment. He also recommended parenting classes and family therapy.
The court declared the children dependents and removed them from mother’s physical custody. (See § 361, subds. (c)(1) [dependent child shall not be taken from the physical custody of parent unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence there is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child if returned home and there are no reasonable means to protect the child’s physical health without removal], (3) [child suffering severe emotional damage, as indicated by extreme anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward himself or herself or others, and there are no reasonable means to protect child’s emotional health without removal].) The court cited Dr. Greenzang’s report and stated mother’s mental health issues required removal for the children’s protection: “Mother’s oppositional behavior, her isolation from family and friends and her paranoia have and will continue to affect the children. Her conduct does matter. And even though she does not physically abuse them, the emotional and psychological abuse can at times be more harmful than any physical abuse.” The court ordered reunification services, including mental health services and conjoint therapy as suggested by Dr. Greenzang, and set a six-month review for June 15, 2017.
II
Discussion
A. [i]Substantial Evidence Supports Jurisdiction Under Section 300, Subdivision (c)
Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (c) (§ 300 (c)). We review the evidence to determine whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 828.) “Evidence sufficient to support the court’s finding must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be substantial proof of the essentials that the law requires in a particular case.” (In re N. S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 172.) A reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence or express independent judgment. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) We resolve all conflicts in the evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences, in support of the judgment. (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547.)
Section 300, subdivision (c), authorizes the juvenile court to exercise jurisdiction where “[t]he child is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian or who has no parent or guardian capable of providing appropriate care.” Mother argues there is insufficient evidence her conduct caused Lucas to suffer, or placed him at risk of suffering, serious emotional harm. (In re Alexander K. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 549, 557 [statute requires parental conduct causing serious emotional harm or risk of harm as evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or untoward aggressive behavior].)
Ample evidence supports the juvenile court finding that “Lucas’s isolation, caused by his mother’s mental health and personality conflicts, has caused and/or significantly contributed to his extreme anxiety and developmental retardation . . . .” Dunn, the school psychologist, testified when Lucas arrived at the school he had difficulty socializing with peers, initiating conversation, and solving problems. For example, he would “cut in front of students, push students, make inappropriate comments. . . . He didn’t understand why [or how] his behavior was impacting the others . . . .” Minor conflicts other children disturbed Lucas, causing him to cry and avoid contact with others. On the playground, during a game such as tag, Lucas thought other children were “going to hurt him” and did not understand it was a game. In the classroom, he failed to understand “the routines or the structures that are in place and he will oftentimes cry and get very upset.” Dunn explained social isolation creates an “extremely high” risk of emotional damage. Dunn explained Lucas showed signs of extreme anxiety, far beyond the typical new student. Lucas’s teacher also reported Lucas often complained he did not have any friends, he became easily upset, and cried easily. She “rated [his] depression in the clinically significant range.” Lucas required substantial additional support at school. Even at home, Lucas threw tantrums, struck the caregiver, and spoke to himself for hours at a time.
Mother draws a different inference from the evidence. She argues that removing him from her care and placing him in school caused him to undergo “the natural adjustment a sheltered child with speech problems would have [in] going to school for the first time.” The evidence, however, reflects Lucas’s emotional problems far exceeded those of a normal seven year old who previously had been homeschooled. Lucas’s school had to devote substantial resources to help Lucas transition to school, beyond those typically given to a general education student. Lucas also exhibited symptoms indicative of emotional damage in the caregiver’s home before he was placed in school. The record sufficiently demonstrates mother’s conduct caused Lucas to suffer serious emotional damage, and posed a risk he would suffer further emotional harm in her care.
Mother asserts Dunn’s testimony demonstrated Lucas recovered after the early crying incidents at school, and this suggests he did not display “behaviors . . . indicative of extreme withdrawal,” and his “fears, sadness and withdrawal were not as profound as the statute contemplates.” She also infers his behaviors were “transitory” because he adjusted within a few weeks of starting school Lucas. But section 300, subdivision (c), does not require lasting or permanent emotional damage. The purpose of the section is to address the child’s environment before he suffers any permanent emotional damage. Here, Lucas acclimated to school, and the caregiver’s home, and the consistent, structured environment both provided. But this did not mitigate the risk he would suffer serious emotional damage if he remained in mother’s care and she continued to raise him in the same manner she had for the previous seven years of Lucas’s life. We simply disagree with mother to the extent she suggests she did not suffer from “mental illness as manifest by paranoia, delusions and socially isolating behaviors,” and that there was no “factual nexus linking mental illness with harm or potential harm to Lucas.” The record sufficiently demonstrates mother suffered from mental health issues that resulted in mother’s socially isolating conduct, which caused Lucas to suffer severe emotional damage. This is not a case where the juvenile court simply presumed from the mere fact of mother’s mental illness that the children had been or would be harmed. (See In re A.G. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 675, 686.)[2]
Mother argues the record does not demonstrate “she was reclusive and isolated Lucas.” Rather, it shows she “resented her sister’s intrusions into her private life as well as [criticism at her decision] . . . to keep Lucas out of public school and she chose to be reclusive as to them, but not to the world.” Based on the evidence, recounted in detail above, this was hardly the only reasonable inference. Mother bases her claim largely on her testimony she took Lucas to the community pool, playgrounds, the zoo and community events. Tellingly, mother could name only one personal friend, and could not name any friend of Lucas. No one – not a family member, a friend, neighbor, acquaintance, tennis coach, piano teacher, or taekwondo instructor – testified to disabuse the court of the notion, amply supported by the record, that mother engaged in few, if any, positive personal interactions with others. She admits she largely avoided her family, and simply “dropped Lucas off” if she had something to do and he could not accompany her. Mother argues “nothing in the law prohibit[s] a person from limiting their children’s contact with others,” and a parent need not “step in time to general societal views on social life or education.” But where, as here, the social isolation causes or risks serious emotional damage to the child, the law will intervene. (§ 300, subd. (c).)[3]
Mother’s reliance on In re Brison C. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1373, is unavailing. Unlike the child in Brison C., Lucas exhibited significant behavioral abnormalities. And unlike the parents in Brison C., mother had not acknowledged the damage her conduct caused her son, nor had she taken any steps to address her behavior. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding under section 300, subdivision (c).
B. Substantial Evidence Supports Jurisdiction Under Section 300, Subdivision (b)
Mother also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b). Generally, where the dependency petition alleges multiple jurisdictional grounds, a reviewing court may affirm if substantial evidence supports any one of the enumerated statutory bases for jurisdiction. The reviewing court need not consider whether “other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.” (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) Here, substantial evidence reflects Lucas had suffered or was at substantial risk of suffering severe emotional damage resulting from mother’s conduct. This finding establishes jurisdiction over Lucas.
Nevertheless, we reject mother’s claim on the merits. Section 300, subdivision (b), authorizes jurisdiction where “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.” (See In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194-196 [court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child].) A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b), requires substantial evidence of neglectful conduct by the parent, causation and serious physical harm or illness to the child, or a substantial risk of such harm or illness at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135.)
The juvenile court found the evidence did “not support any claim of physical harm by the mother to her children.” The court stated delay in feeding Lauren “was not a pattern,” mother had just undergone C-section surgery, and the infants were not at risk in a hospital setting. The court also remarked “[t]here were no pediatric records supporting any concern of malnutrition” concerning Lucas. But the court found there was “a cause or connection between mother’s mental health symptoms and condition and Lucas’s extreme emotional anxiety and developmental retardation,” explaining that this “anxiety, like depression, is . . . ‘an illness,’”, and “its detrimental effects are physical, as well as mental and emotional, and just as harmful.”
The record supports the juvenile court’s finding mother had undiagnosed mental health issues. The court reasonably could conclude mother’s conduct showed paranoia, which led her to isolate Lucas and herself. She unreasonably believed individuals in her community were stalking, harassing, and provoking her. Medical professionals who observed her in the hospital believed she had mental health problems that impaired her ability to safely parent the children. She rambled, perseverated, and obsessively e-mailed hospital staff. According to the obstetrician, mother argued with the physician about the timing of the delivery, wrongly believing the children should be delivered earlier than medically indicated. She displayed a “flat effect” and did not react appropriately to cues from her infants. She did not respond to Lauren’s cries, but laid in bed with a blank expression. A nurse reported mother handed the child over like a sack, showing no emotion, and did not return to see the child before she left the hospital. Mother’s obstetrician referred her for a psychiatric evaluation, but she refused to participate.
The medical professionals and social workers most closely involved with mother and the children concluded mother’s postpartum behavior was not typical, and the children were at risk of harm in her care. Mother’s persistent refusal to accept the validity of professional opinions and assistance where it was required placed her children at risk of harm. We discern no basis to reverse the section 300, subdivision (b), finding.
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Dispositional Findings Under Section 361, subdivision (c)(1)
Section 361, subdivision (c), provides in relevant part: “A dependent child shall not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents or guardian or guardians with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence . . . . [¶] (1) there is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s or guardian’s physical custody. . . . (3) The minor is suffering severe emotional damage, as indicated by extreme anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward himself or herself or others, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s emotional health may be protected without removing the minor from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian]; Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248.)
Mother argues that “[s]ince evidence does not support the exercise of jurisdiction by a preponderance of evidence, . . . it is also insufficient to support a removal order requiring the clear and convincing standard of proof.” Because substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional findings, we reject mother’s argument. (See Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 880-881 [clear and convincing test disappears on appeal and the usual rule of conflicting evidence is applied, giving full effect to the respondent’s evidence, however slight, and disregarding the appellant’s evidence, however strong].) We also note mother expressed no recognition of her deficits, nor an inclination to adjust her behaviors or accept assistance to protect her children. Mother objected when Lucas was enrolled in school. Lauren showed signs of developmental delay, yet mother would not sign a referral for a regional center evaluation. Mother’s visits continued to require a monitor. She initially did not bring or prepare food for visits. Mother refused to participate in a psychological evaluation or any court-recommended services. Substantial evidence supports the court’s dispositional findings.
III
Disposition
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders are affirmed.
ARONSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
THOMPSON, J.
[1] Mother conceived the children using a single sperm donor. There is no other parent involved in this case.
[2] Mother’s reliance on the school’s speech and language pathologist’s testimony is misplaced. Randall did not directly opine on the issue of Lucas’s emotional damage. As noted, she believed it was “very likely that there [was] at least some environmental impact” that caused Lucas’s language deficits. To the extent Lucas’s adjustment to a new language figured into his emotional problems, the juvenile court was amply warranted in concluding his emotional issues were attributable to mother’s conduct toward Lucas.
[3] Nothing in the record or the juvenile court’s comments suggest it found mother’s desire to homeschool Lucas problematic in and of itself. Rather, the court reasonably concluded mother’s mental instability and associated behaviors made her an unsuitable surrogate for a trained, professional educator even if she had imparted sufficient knowledge such that Lucas tested at grade level in math and reading. Also, as noted above, the social worker could not locate Lucas’s homeschooling records, which suggested mother had not registered him for homeschooling through a school district as required by law.
