In re Luis G.
Filed 6/13/06 In re Luis G. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re LUIS G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | B184219 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YJ27051) |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LUIS G., Defendant and Appellant. |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
Irma J. Brown, Judge. Affirmed in part; and modified in part.
Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of the State of California, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Allison H. Chung, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Following Luis G.'s admission that he used a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of a carjacking, as alleged in count 1 of the petition in this matter, the trial court sustained that count of the petition and dismissed two other counts. The court found that appellant was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, adjudged appellant to be a ward of the court, and ordered short-term camp community placement.[1]
Appellant appeals from the orders sustaining the petition and adjudging him to be a ward of the court, contending that the minute order must be corrected to reflect the conditions of probation ordered by the court. Respondent does not oppose this claim. We order the minute order corrected, as set forth below, and affirm the trial court's orders in all other respects.
Facts[2]
Appellant and co-minor Roger M. approached a parked car belonging to Juan B. Roger's ex-girlfriend, Marienela R., was in the front passenger seat of the car. At some point, appellant pointed a weapon at Juan, who immediately fled. Appellant got into the driver's seat of Juan's car, and Roger got into the front seat on the passenger side. Marienela moved to the rear seat Appellant drove the car to Marienela's residence, then back to the location where it was originally parked. Appellant and Roger abandoned the car and fled the scene. They were arrested almost immediately.
Discussion
Appellant contends, and respondent agrees that the minute order does not accurately reflect two of the probation conditions imposed by the court. We agree as well.
The reporter's transcript shows that the trial court ordered probation conditions in pertinent part as follows: "[Number] 15, don't associate with the cominor [Roger] Marroquin. [¶] Don't have any contact with any of the victims. This is number 17, and that would be [Juan] Bedoy or [Marienela] Reveles."
In the minute order, all of the preprinted conditions of number 15 are checked, and appellant is thus ordered not to associate with "co-minors [or] anyone disapproved of by [his] parents or probation officer." Preprinted condition number 17 is checked, and appellant is thus ordered not to have contact with the victims or witnesses.
"Entering a judgment of the trial court in the minutes is a clerical function. Any discrepancy between the minutes and the oral pronouncement of a sentence is presumed to be the result of clerical error. Thus, the oral pronouncement of sentence prevails in cases where it deviates from that recorded in the minutes. [Citation.]" (People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224, 242.) Accordingly, probation condition numbers 15 and 17 should be modified to reflect the trial court's oral pronouncement of judgment.
Condition number 15 should order appellant not to associate with co-minor Marroquin. The prohibition against associating with anyone disapproved of by appellant's parents or probation officer is stricken.
Condition number 17 should order appellant not to have contact with the victims Bedoy and Reveles. The prohibition against having contact with the witnesses or with victims of other offenses alleged against appellant is stricken.
Appellant also contends that condition numbers 15 and 17, as set forth in the minute order, are so vague and overbroad as to violate his federal constitutional rights. Since those conditions no longer apply to appellant, we do not reach this contention.
Disposition
The June 9, 2005 minute order setting forth appellant's probation conditions is ordered modified as set forth above. The trial court's orders are affirmed in all other respects.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOSK, J.
KRIEGLER, J.
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[1] The court calculated appellant's maximum term of confinement at 12 years.
[2] These facts are taken from the probation report and a brief discussion of the carjacking in the reporter's transcript.