Filed 5/23/22 In re M.A. CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

M.A.,[1] a minor never previously before the juvenile court, admitted to robbing two people and carjacking another at gunpoint on separate occasions, as well as fleeing the scene of a collision after losing control of a stolen car. M.A. challenges the juvenile court’s order committing him to a county-run juvenile rehabilitation facility rather than his family’s custody at home, given the undisputed evidence of his exceptional qualities and the aberration his offenses represented. Because the court did not abuse its broad discretion in finding that M.A.’s need for rehabilitation and the severity of the offense warranted the placement, we affirm.

1. BACKGROUND

1. The Offenses

In the pre-dawn hours of April 26, 2020, R.C. was leaving a Safeway parking lot driving a 1998 Buick. R.C. noticed that he was being followed by a dark sedan. When the driver of the sedan flashed its headlights, R.C. pulled over. Two individuals exited the sedan. One of them brandishing a handgun, they relieved R.C. of his Buick, his cell phone, and his wallet.

Two days later, just after midnight, M.A. crashed R.C.’s Buick into a parked car and fled, but he was identified by witnesses who later spoke to police.

Four months later, police officers obtained data from M.A.’s Snapchat account. This included pictures of M.A. in the Buick holding a gun and messages from M.A. to friends in which he touted his commission of the carjacking/robbery of R.C. while armed, and also talked of the later collision.

Shortly after midnight on September 7, 2020, four days after the police obtained M.A.’s Snapchat data, F.V. was giving M.C. a ride home. When F.V. noticed a car following her closely and flashing its headlights, she pulled over to let the car pass. The car instead stopped next to hers. Both its occupants were wearing ski masks. The car’s passenger got out, pointed a gun at F.V., and ordered her out of her car. F.V. froze momentarily. The gunman opened her car door and pointed the gun at her head, ordering her and M.C. to get out and empty their pockets. The driver also emerged to point a gun at F.V. and M.C. from across the roof of the suspect car. Once F.V. and M.C. complied, the passenger told them both to run and drove off in F.V.’s car. His companion likewise sped off. Besides F.V.’s car, the assailants made off with F.V.’s phone, credit cards, and debit cards and with M.C.’s phone.

The next day, police officers arrested M.A. and searched his home. Police officers discovered 49 rounds of nine-millimeter Luger ammunition in M.A.’s bedroom.

At all relevant times, M.A. was fifteen years old.

2. Jurisdiction

The District Attorney filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,[2] alleging seven counts: (1) two counts each of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)) and second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (c)), as to both F.V. and M.C. on September 7, 2020; (2) one count each of carjacking and second degree robbery, as to R.C. on April 26, 2020; and (3) misdemeanor hit and run driving causing property damage on April 28, 2020 (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)). As to each of the six felony counts, the District Attorney alleged that M.A. personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (b)).

The parties reached a settlement by which M.A. admitted one count of second degree robbery, without enhancement, as to both victims on September 7, 2020; one count of carjacking, with personal use of a firearm, on April 26, 2020; and one misdemeanor count of hit and run driving causing property damage on April 28, 2020. The juvenile court dismissed the remaining counts and enhancements pursuant to the parties’ agreement.

3. Disposition

On October 19, 2020, the juvenile court held a contested dispositional hearing.

The probation officer, in a lengthy social study, recommended that M.A. be committed to the Santa Clara County Juvenile Rehabilitation Facilities’ Enhanced Ranch Program for six to eight months, opining that the placement and services during and after would help M.A. adopt a positive routine, learn coping mechanisms, and make better decisions to avoid placing himself in risky situations. M.A. “is a bright young man with a world of potential” who also “needs services intended to help him make better decisions.” The probation officer described the “serious nature of the sustained offenses” as a “primary concern” motivating her recommendation because M.A. “displayed a complete disregard for himself and the safety of others as he carelessly victimized innocent people” by “carjack[ing] the victims, at gunpoint[.]”

M.A. opposed the recommendation, seeking to return home or be placed with his maternal grandparents, subject to electronic monitoring. Citing his supportive home environment, personal history (including the lack of any prior contacts with the juvenile justice system), and personality traits, M.A. contended that ranch placement was unnecessary to protect the public and was likely to be counterproductive for his personal development.

In addition to considering the probation officer’s report, the juvenile court heard testimony from M.A.’s father, maternal grandmother, and maternal step-grandfather, as well as M.A.’s cross-examination of the probation officer.

An excellent student previously, M.A. began exhibiting academic and disciplinary problems in school starting in eighth grade. He was suspended once in eighth grade for fighting and again in ninth grade for beating another student in concert with a peer. He was occasionally disrespectful of teachers, including vaping in class and writing abusive comments about one teacher to others during class. M.A.’s father, himself a teacher, had long made a point of working at whatever school M.A. was then attending, but he was nonetheless unaware of M.A.’s school disciplinary issues other than the suspensions; these the father believed to be a matter of M.A. being “bullied” or otherwise justified in his conduct.[3]

According to a Juvenile Assessment and Intervention System risk/needs assessment, M.A. required selective intervention (SI) against a low risk for recidivism. According to the probation officer, “SI boys may commit crimes due to an external stressor or internal, neurotic, problems,” and for the latter, “delinquent/criminal behavior will continue unless and until the internal problem is resolved.” The probation officer and M.A.’s family agreed that an inflection point in M.A.’s behavior roughly coincided with his parents’ six-month separation beginning toward the end of his eighth-grade year. To the family, the change appeared limited to poor academic performance and M.A.’s expressing that he “didn’t like” the parental split. In a behavioral health assessment, M.A. identified the death of his maternal great uncle in 2016 and maternal grandfather in 2019 as a source of unresolved trauma.

Once the parents reconciled, the father believed that M.A.’s behavior improved in his freshman year—after a “rocky start.” But M.A. committed the instant offenses several months after the reconciliation. The father believed that M.A. was receiving high marks at the start of 10th grade prior to his arrest. But the records from Downtown College Prep were more mixed. The father said M.A. either “always [had] a curfew” or did not need one. But all of the offenses in question were committed between the hours of midnight and 4:00 a.m.

M.A. denied that his commission of the instant offenses was due to the influence of others. Yet his counsel declined to clarify or correct a report[4] about a “cousin” who was believed to be his co-participant in the April 26 incident.

M.A.’s father opined that M.A.’s time in juvenile hall while awaiting the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings adversely affected his demeanor and that M.A. was once again the victim of bullying. While in juvenile hall, M.A. was demoted once for responding to a verbal provocation by challenging another minor to fight. M.A. avoided demotion on a later occasion after his persistent verbal provocation of another minor, who reacted by trying to hit him.

A social worker with the county’s behavioral health services evaluated M.A. and rated his “readiness for change” and for treatment as “100 percent.” The social worker concluded that M.A. would “benefit from behavioral health counseling at an outpatient facility where he can address his underlying depression, grie[f] over his multiple losses, possible family conflicts, and the source of his anxiety that might [have] contributed to his poor judgment and poor decisionmaking.”

M.A.’s father, maternal grandmother and maternal step-grandfather testified as to M.A.’s character and the support he would receive if he were allowed to remain at home. All three denied any foresight that M.A. had been at risk of committing the instant offenses; all three testified to the closeness of their relationship with M.A. and their attentiveness to his needs. The maternal grandmother and step-grandfather both testified that their employment with a local law enforcement agency made them particularly alert to signs of gang association. Other than M.A.’s declining grades, however, none of the three observed signs of behavioral problems stemming from the parental separation, and none were aware of negative peer influences. Indeed, M.A.’s grandmother specifically denied any behavioral issues associated with the separation and “still [doesn’t] believe this is actually happening.” M.A.’s father had been concerned about the potential influence of the boy who would later identify M.A. as the hit-and-run driver on April 28 and accordingly had barred that boy from the family home.

After considering the record before it, the court ordered a ranch placement. M.A. timely appealed.

2. DISCUSSION

On appeal, M.A. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering ranch placement “without giving adequate consideration to the progressive dispositional framework that is at the heart of the juvenile justice system” and without substantial evidence supporting the commitment. M.A. identifies no failure by the juvenile court to consider evidence favorable to his position, no reliance on a prohibited factor, and no error of law. Rather, the essence of M.A.’s argument is a request that we reweigh the evidence, substituting our judgment for the juvenile court’s balancing of competing factors to reach a different result. That, we cannot do. (See In re Khalid B. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1288 (Khalid B.); In re Edward C. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 813, 829; see also In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640.)

A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles

Once juvenile court jurisdiction is established on a petition under section 602, “the court considers the probation officer’s social study and other evidence to determine an appropriate disposition. (§ 706.) In reaching a disposition, the court considers (1) the minor’s age, (2) the circumstances and gravity of the offense, and (3) the minor’s previous delinquent history. (§ 725.5.)” (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 404 (Greg F.).) The court must also consider (1) the protection and safety of the public, and (2) rehabilitation of the minor through care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with the minor’s best interest, holds the minor accountable for his or her behavior, and is appropriate for the circumstances. (§ 202, subds. (a), (b), (d).) “[J]uvenile proceedings are primarily ‘rehabilitative’ [citation], and punishment in the form of ‘retribution’ is disallowed [citation]. Within these bounds, the court has broad discretion to choose probation and/or various forms of custodial confinement in order to hold juveniles accountable for their behavior, and to protect the public. [Citation.]” (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 507 (Eddie M.).)

We review the juvenile court’s placement decision for abuse of discretion. (In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1154.) A juvenile court does not abuse its discretion except by exercising it “ ‘ “in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (In re Amanda A. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 537, 552.) Nor may we “ ‘lightly substitute our decision for that rendered by the juvenile court. Rather, we must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings where there is substantial evidence to support them.’ ” (Ibid.) In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support commitment, we must examine the record presented at the disposition hearing in light of the purposes of juvenile court law. (Khalid B., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288.)

B. Analysis

As the juvenile court acknowledged, the evidence before the court made the question of disposition “very, very difficult.” It noted, “I have a two-pronged job today. One is to make sure the public is kept safe and two is to make sure that this young man is able to be rehabilitated in a way that causes him not go further into systems and frankly get off a pipeline to prison.” After considering the full record, the juvenile court highlighted several factors that led it to order a ranch commitment: (1) the seriousness and extent of the conduct requiring a response; (2) M.A.’s pre-petition history of aggressive behavior and disrespectful and defiant conduct in school; and (3) the dissonance between the description of the family environment and the conduct that M.A. engaged in—the appearance that “things” were either not “seen” or not “acknowledged” by M.A.’s family. The court expressed the hope that the family would participate in M.A.’s therapeutic intervention to sort out “how we can find oursel[ves] here” and so that it “never happen[s] again.” The court’s consideration of these factors demonstrates that it carried out the required analysis.

M.A. does not dispute that, in discharging its duty under section 202, the juvenile court considered the probation officer’s social study and its diverse sources of information together with all evidence presented, including the family testimony. (See § 706.) The court considered the factors required by section 725.5. As to M.A.’s age, the court’s repeated references to him as a “young man” suggested that the court did not consider his age to be particularly mitigating. (See § 707, subd. (b).) As to his prior delinquent history, it acknowledged this was M.A.’s first system involvement, though it resisted the characterization by defense counsel of M.A.’s conduct as a “first offense” rather than a course of conduct. As to the circumstances and gravity of the offense, the court emphasized its severity and made a concerted effort to convey its significance to M.A. and his family: beyond noting that the offenses spanned a course of conduct rather than a unitary decision, it cited the former risk of adult criminal prosecution before recent changes in juvenile law; it further noted what was then the potential for a commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice, and the retention of jurisdiction until M.A. was 25; and it noted more than once the fact of M.A.’s personal use of a firearm, F.V.’s account of having a gun put to her head, and the “terrifying” effect of M.A.’s offenses on the community. In this context, we understand the court’s express reference to the Department of Juvenile Justice and associated retention of jurisdiction to age 25 as a clear indication that—but for the ample evidence on which M.A. understandably relied in support of a home placement—M.A. otherwise risked a more restrictive commitment than what the court ultimately imposed.

M.A. does not suggest that the court’s emphasis on the severity of the offense was improper, given the court’s broad discretion in applying section 725.5. But he does suggest that the juvenile court committed an error of law by ordering a ranch commitment “without giving adequate consideration to the progressive dispositional framework that is at the heart of the juvenile justice system.” Yet a ranch commitment upon a minor’s first contact with the juvenile system does not, in itself, constitute an abuse of discretion: “[J]uvenile placements need not follow any particular order[,]” and a court does not “necessarily abuse its discretion by ordering the most restrictive placement before other options have been tried.” (Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 507.) Rather, the statutory framework is intended to give the juvenile court flexibility to craft orders aimed at rehabilitating the particular ward before it. (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 411.) Here, the record reflects no judicial misunderstanding of the governing legal principles.

To be sure, the juvenile court could have assigned still greater weight to the county behavioral health assessment and the positive traits M.A. had exhibited before and since the offenses. But it was likewise within its discretion to doubt whether the family’s undisputed desire to support M.A.’s rehabilitation would—without an initial placement in a rehabilitation facility—suffice to meet the twin protective and rehabilitative objectives of juvenile justice. Precisely because of the contrast between M.A.’s obvious potential and the deterioration of his conduct over time, the court questioned whether M.A.’s family had “seen or . . . acknowledged” the school disciplinary problems that the court considered a precursor to his system involvement. The court ordered a disposition intended both to protect the public and ensure adequate rehabilitative treatment for M.A. The record accordingly discloses no legal error.

Against this backdrop, M.A.’s substantial evidence argument proceeds on two tracks. Neither line of argument demonstrates error.

First, M.A. challenges the persuasive value of the probation officer’s social study, which was offered in the juvenile court in support of a ranch placement. Specifically, M.A. contends that the court should not have considered the probation officer’s opinion that M.A.’s father “minimized” the significance of M.A.’s offenses: before the jurisdictional hearing, the father—questioning the probation officer’s refusal to authorize M.A.’s release—had protested that “it’s not illegal for minors to have ammunition” and a minor “could use a firearm under adult supervision.”

M.A. argues that the probation officer’s opinion was a “non-empirical” “subjective” interpretation of conduct that was open to competing interpretations.[5] But M.A. cites no authority to support the proposition that any statements in the probation officer’s social study, or testimony discussing the same, are inadmissible at a dispositional hearing because they can be characterized as “non-empirical” or “subjective.” The probation officer has a “duty” “to prepare for . . . a hearing as provided by Section 702, a social study of the minor, containing such matters as may be relevant to a proper disposition of the case. The social study shall include a recommendation for the disposition of the case.” (§ 280; see also In re Devin J. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 1096, 1098-1099 [preparation of social study is mandated by statute, failure to prepare a current social study for the dispositional hearing required reversal of an order of commitment].) Much of this information will be subject to competing interpretations. The juvenile court must, in the first instance, weigh the evidence before entering a disposition. (See § 706 [“court shall receive in evidence the social study of the minor made by the probation officer”]; Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 404.) Appellate courts, in turn, review the juvenile courts’ factual findings for substantial evidence and placement decisions for abuse of discretion.

Nor is it apparent that the juvenile court relied on or endorsed the probation officer’s opinion of her exchange with M.A.’s father. The court made no reference to it in articulating its ruling but instead expressed concern generally about what M.A.’s family had either “not seen” or “not acknowledged” of the deterioration in M.A.’s actual behavior outside the home. Independent of his father’s statements to the probation officer and how they should be interpreted, the court’s stated concerns were supported by other evidence of the contrast between M.A.’s actual course of conduct over time and the perceptions of his family members, as reflected in the social study and the live testimony at the dispositional hearing.

Second, M.A. emphasizes the evidence he adduced in the juvenile court in support of a home placement with electronic monitoring. M.A. argues that the court should have adopted a less restrictive disposition due to evidence in the record concerning: (1) the absence of prior judicial interventions; (2) M.A.’s academic record in the time preceding his parents’ temporary separation; (3) his father’s post-offense efforts to provide rehabilitative activities and better monitoring of M.A. should he be released; (4) the willingness of M.A.’s maternal grandparents to assume physical custody of M.A.; (5) M.A.’s low risk of recidivism per the probation officer’s Juvenile Assessment Intervention System analysis; and (6) a social worker’s recommendation that M.A. participate in an outpatient treatment.

Like the juvenile court, we acknowledge the record evidence of the unwavering devotion of M.A.’s family and their sincere concerns that exposure in a ranch placement to youth of greater criminal sophistication would hinder M.A.’s rehabilitation rather than enhance it. The presence of some record evidence that may have supported a different disposition, however, does not demonstrate that the court’s findings were unsupported by substantial evidence or warrant a conclusion that the court abused its discretion. We believe the juvenile court’s acknowledgement of the difficulty of the case reflects its appreciation of the very factors on which M.A. relies. Implicit in the juvenile court’s order, however, is its finding that M.A.’s rehabilitation would be better served in a placement where his supervision would be undertaken by more objective and perhaps less credulous custodians, and that even a low risk of recidivism—given the magnitude of harm threatened by commission of violent offenses at gunpoint—required more intensive supervision than a loving family that by its own account was still reeling from a first-time confrontation with a significant disciplinary issue. We cannot conclude that its assessment was arbitrary or capricious.

The juvenile court considered the full record and the governing legal framework before exercising its discretion to issue a difficult ruling based on substantial evidence. In so doing, the court acted to put M.A. in a position where he could correct his course after a year spent accelerating in the wrong direction, impose a measure of accountability on M.A., and protect the public. The court recognized the weight of its ruling and expressed hope that as a result of its ruling the underlying issues would be identified and addressed. We discern no error.

3. DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s dispositional order is affirmed.

LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

GREENWOOD, P.J.

GROVER, J.

People v. M.A.

H048591

[1] We note that information in the record suggests that the minor might more commonly be known as M.B. Absent a more definitive contrary identification, we use the initials from the juvenile court caption for consistency.

[2] Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

[3] According to the father, M.A. “was bullied a little bit. . . . [H]e got into an altercation in eighth grade, and then in freshman year [came] to the defense of a young lady that was hit by a young man.” According to the school narrative of the latter incident, the video recording showed: (1) a female student approached a male student who was playing basketball and began hitting him; (2) the male student pushed the female student away while backing up; and (3) three male students, including M.A., rushed the male student and two of them, including M.A., physically attacked the male student. The school inferred from a student’s recording of the incident that the assault had been planned in advance.

[4] Because M.A. declined to be interviewed about the offense, we surmise that the comment noted by the juvenile court—not otherwise in the record on appeal—was among the data gleaned from his Snapchat account.

[5] M.A. maintains that his father’s statement was “a measure of [his] father’s willingness to support the minor’s rehabilitation.”