Filed 4/24/17 In re Mariah C. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publica-tion or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re MARIAH C.,
a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_______________________________
ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MARIAH C.,
Defendant and Appellant.

A148309

(Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. C190802)

A148309

(Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. C190802)


In 2016, Mariah C. was 16 years old and a dependent of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 et seq. since 2004, when a foster child died while in her parents’ care. During her dependency, she lived in numerous foster homes, testified against her father, who was convicted of murdering the foster child, became an advocate on behalf of foster youth in the state, and returned to her mother’s home and care. During this time, various psychotropic medications were administered to her by order of the juvenile court on the recommendation of the Alameda County Social Service Agency (Agency).
In 2015, as the Agency sought to terminate her dependency, Mariah C. concluded the Agency’s summary of her medical history was missing some information about the psychotropic medications administered to her and she asked to review her case file. The court ordered the dependency continued and therapy services be provided to Mariah C. to prepare her to review the file. After she completed the therapy, the court ordered the Agency to allow her and her attorney to review the file. After doing so, Mariah C. asked the Agency to give her a copy of the file. The Agency agreed to do so if she paid for copying costs.
Mariah C., via appointed counsel, then moved under section 827 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.552 (section 827 motion) for a court order requiring the Agency to give her a copy of the file at no cost to her because she was indigent. The Agency indicated it would copy the file for her if she paid fifty cents a page for copying costs or allow her to have it copied by an outside service at her own expense. But it opposed her motion solely on the ground that the court could not order it to give her a copy of the file without charging her for its copying costs. The court denied Mariah C.’s motion because she did not provide legal support for her requested order and because the court believed it was barred by the separations of powers doctrine from ordering the Agency to copy the file at no cost to her, as the Agency argued. Mariah C. appeals from the court’s denial of her motion.
Like the court below, we understand and appreciate the reason for Mariah C.’s request. A dependent child who was approaching majority after living under the jurisdiction, supervision and care of the court and the Agency for more than a decade, Mariah C. had reason to want a copy of the file containing her full medical history, including to show her medical providers in the future. Further, no one challenged her assertion that she could not afford to pay for copying the file. However, it is the role of the Legislature, not the courts, to establish the dependency laws. We agree with the juvenile court that Mariah C. did not provide legal authority requiring or permitting the court to issue the specific order she requested, and we affirm the court’s ruling solely on that basis.


BACKGROUND
The parties have submitted a voluminous record in excess of 1,400 pages, but we need summarize only some of the case background to resolve this appeal. Mariah C. was a dependent of the court for about 12 years, starting in 2004 when she was removed from her parents’ custody after a foster child died while in her parents’ care. Mariah C. was placed in foster care herself. In 2009, she testified at trial against her father. He was convicted of murdering the foster child and felony child endangerment, and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. Her mother, who had been arrested for felony child endangerment, also testified against father.
During Mariah C.’s years as a dependent of the court living in foster care, the Agency reported she was having certain emotional and behavioral difficulties. It recommended that the court order her to be given certain psychotropic medication. For example, in 2007, the court approved the Agency’s unopposed application for an order authorizing the administration of imipramine for anxiety and enuresis; clonidine for “flashbacks,” and sertraline for depression. In 2009, the year of her father’s trial, the court approved the Agency’s application for an order authorizing the administration of more psychotropic medication despite Mariah C.’s objection to taking it. The medication included Abilify for mood lability and aggression; an antidepressant for “low mood, energy, appetite”; imipramine for enuresis; and a mood stabilizer.
Also in 2009, Mariah C. began having supervised visits with her mother. In 2013, the court gave the Agency discretion to place Mariah C. with her mother. Mariah C. was returned to her mother’s custody in 2014, with family maintenance services provided to mother.
In June 2015, the Agency recommended that the juvenile court dismiss Mariah C.’s dependency and order that her mother have sole legal and physical custody of her. Her mother agreed with this recommendation. Mariah C. indicated that she felt safe and in a good situation with her mother, but also indicated she did not want the case dismissed.
At the subsequent hearing that same month, Mariah C., who had become active in foster care and youth rights issues in California, requested a copy of her psychotropic medication records. She believed the health and education passport the Agency provided to her was missing information about psychotropic medications administered to her from 2005 to 2012. At one point, responding to the court’s question about her medication history, she said, “That was during the time that my parents were on trial and they put me on quite a few psychotropic medications. I’m doing a lot of work about mental health across the state and I’m kind of wondering what I was on and if it has any effects with me in the future.” Her counsel made similar comments about her desire for this information. The Agency’s social worker indicated the Agency had provided Mariah C. all the information the Agency had found. The court continued the matter to July 7, 2015.
At the July 7, 2015 hearing, the court ruled that Mariah C. had a right to review her medical history and not just the summary provided in the passport. It ordered her to engage in therapy before reviewing the first two years of her case file, which Mariah C. was willing to do.
The Agency continued to recommend that the dependency be dismissed. In September 2015, the court granted a continuance to allow Mariah C. to engage in therapy she needed to review her case file. In February 2016, after the Agency again recommended dismissal, the court ordered it to allow Mariah C. and her attorney to review the Agency’s file on two dates and continued the dependency until April 11, 2016.
In March 2016, after reviewing her file, Mariah C. asked her Agency case worker for a copy of it. The Agency’s counsel subsequently informed her the Agency would provide copies to her for $1.00 a page. On April 8, 2016, Mariah C., through her appointed counsel, filed her section 827 motion, contending she was entitled to a free copy of her file as an indigent minor.
At a hearing on April 11, 2016, the court stated that it did not “know if because [Mariah C.]’s a minor, she would get any special treatment in terms of the cost of duplicating the file.” It asked the Agency to provide the court with legal authority for its contention that it could charge Mariah C. for a copy of it. The Agency filed a written opposition in which it argued Mariah C. had not provided any legal authority for her motion and that under the separation of powers doctrine, the court could not order the Agency to provide her with a free copy of her file. The Agency also asserted that the juvenile court did not have the authority to continue the dependency until the Agency paid for Mariah C.’s copy of her case file. Mariah C. filed a response, in which she analogized the Agency’s providing her with a free copy of her file to civil discovery production. The parties provided no evidence of, and we have not determined from our own examination of the record, the costs for the Agency to copy Mariah C.’s file or for her to have them copied by an outside service.
At an April 25, 2016 hearing, the juvenile court denied Mariah C.’s section 827 motion “based upon the fact that . . . neither the Court nor the parties can find [authority] that would allow the Court to order the Agency to produce and pay for a copy of the records that are being requested. And, also, the Court believes that there is a separation of powers issue here. So that being the case, the Court denies the motion.” The court also dismissed the dependency.
Mariah C. filed a timely notice of appeal to the court’s dismissal of the dependency and denial of her section 827 motion.
DISCUSSION
The parties agree that Mariah C. was entitled to receive a copy of her case file. The only issue in this appeal is whether the juvenile court should have ordered the Agency to provide her a copy at no cost. Mariah C. argues the court erred by not exercising its discretion under section 827 and rule 5.552(b)(1)(C) of the California Rules of Court (rule 5.552) to waive any requirement that she, an indigent minor, pay the Agency’s costs of copying her case. Mariah C.’s argument is unpersuasive because the authorities she has cited below and on appeal do not establish that the juvenile court could order the Agency to give her a copy of the case file without charge.
Although we generally review court denials of section 827 motions under an abuse of discretion standard (In re Gina S. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1082), Mariah C.’s appeal raises the question of whether the juvenile court had the statutory authority to grant her motion. Since this issue involves the interpretation and proper application of certain statutory and California Rule of Court provisions, de novo review applies. (See In re Anthony Q. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 336, 344.)
Mariah C. relies on section 827 and rule 5.552, which govern confidential juvenile court records. Under section 827, a minor subject of a dependency proceeding may inspect his or her confidential case file (§ 827, subd. (a)(1)(C)) and “may also receive copies of the case file” (id., subd. (a)(5)). A “ ‘juvenile case file’ means . . . reports of the probation officer, and all other documents filed in that case or made available to the probation officer in making his or her report, or to the judge, referee, or other hearing officer, and thereafter retained by the probation officer, judge, referee, or other hearing officer.” (Id., subd. (e).)
Rule 5.552 similarly provides that such a minor “may inspect, receive, and copy the juvenile case file without an order of the juvenile court.” (Rule 5.552(b)(1), (b)(1)(C).) It further clarifies that a “juvenile case file” includes: [¶] (1) All documents filed in a juvenile court case; [¶] (2) Reports to the court by probation officers, social workers of child welfare services programs, and CASA volunteers; [¶] (3) Documents made available to probation officers, social workers of child welfare services programs, and CASA volunteers in preparation of reports to the court; [¶] (4) Documents relating to a child concerning whom a motion has been filed in juvenile court that are maintained in the office files of probation officers, social workers of child welfare services programs, and CASA volunteers; [¶] (5) Transcripts, records, or reports relating to matters prepared or released by the court, probation department, or child welfare services program; and [¶] (6) Documents, video or audio tapes, photographs, and exhibits admitted into evidence at juvenile court hearings.” (Id., subd. (a)(1)–(6).)
“In general, juvenile court records are confidential. [Citation.] ‘But this policy of confidentiality is not absolute.’ ” (City of Eureka v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 755, 761.) Under section 827, “the juvenile court has ‘exclusive authority to determine whether and to what extent to grant access to confidential juvenile records’ to unauthorized persons. [Citation.] This statutory scheme reflects a legislative determination that the juvenile court has ‘both the “ ‘sensitivity and expertise’ to make decisions about access to juvenile records.” ’ ” (J.E. v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1337.)
In contending that these provisions authorized the juvenile court to grant her section 827 motion, Mariah C. cites, without discussing, the same case law, statute and California Rule of Court that her juvenile court counsel cited before he concluded, “Requiring an indigent party to pay for a copy of his/her juvenile case file, which he/she is entitled to under the law, would seem inconsistent” with her cited authorities.
First, as did her juvenile court counsel, she cites with hardly any discussion two cases that concluded an indigent parent was entitled by different statutes to transcripts of dependency proceedings at no cost (Davis v. Superior Court (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 13) and to the appointment of counsel on appeal (In re Jacqueline H. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 170, 176–177) (Jacqueline H.). These cases are not persuasive. They established, based on courts’ views of specific statutes regarding the rights of litigants appearing before our courts, that indigent parties had certain rights that are not implicated here. Specifically, Davis concluded that under section 347, a party had an absolute right to obtain a copy of a reporter’s transcript of a juvenile court hearing and that an indigent party was entitled to this transcript at no cost; the court discussed section 347 and cited case law regarding the constitutional rights of indigent litigants appearing before our courts. (Davis, at pp. 16–17, and citing Andrus v. Municipal Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 1041, 1051–1053.)
In Jacqueline H., the court similarly engaged in a statutory analysis in determining an indigent parent had the right to appointed counsel in an appeal from a ruling in a proceeding conducted under Civil Code section 232, which at the time (it has since been repealed) “provide[d] for proceedings whereby a minor child can be taken from the custody and control of the natural parents if they will not consent to the adoption of the child.” (Jacqueline H., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 174.) The court noted that “[a]ppointment of counsel for indigent parents is presently authorized at all stages of proceedings brought under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. Welfare and Institutions Code section 317 provides for the appointment of counsel by the juvenile court, and section 395 provides free transcripts for indigent appellants.” (Id. at p. 176. ) The court then discussed the Legislature’s recognition that a parent’s possible loss in section 232 proceedings is greater than in section 300 proceedings, as well as an indigent appellant’s right by juvenile court law and rules to appointed counsel in adoption cases. (Jacqueline H., at pp. 176–177.) It concluded that “the Legislature could not have intended to withhold from an indigent parent the right to an effective appeal, and, therefore, the services of appellate counsel in section 232 proceedings. Accordingly, this court construes Civil Code sections 237.5 and 238 to require a reviewing court to appoint counsel for any indigent parent appealing from an order terminating parental rights pursuant to Civil Code section 232.” (Id. at p. 177, fn. omitted.)
Mariah C. does nothing to establish that section 827 and rule 5.552 give her a similar statutory right to the court order she seeks here, or implicate her constitutional rights as a litigant appearing before our courts. Section 827 merely states that the minor and others, along with a right to inspect a case file, “may . . . receive copies of the case file.” (§ 827, subd. (a)(5).) Similarly, rule 5.552 merely provides that the minor “may inspect, receive, and copy the juvenile case file without an order of the juvenile court.” (Rule 5.552(b)(1)(C).) These provisions say nothing about whether the agency or the minor will bear the cost of the copy.
Second, Mariah C.’s trial counsel invoked section 395 and rule 5.590 of the California Rules of Court, which involve the provision of transcripts and the appointment of counsel in appeals. Mariah C. cites these provisions on appeal as well. However, she does not establish that these authorities apply in any way to her circumstances. We do not see how they can, given that her motion did not request the provision of transcripts or the provision of counsel on appeal.
Mariah C. also cites two statutes that she did not discuss below. Specifically, she cites portions of Government Code section 68630 emphasizing indigent litigants’ access to the legal system and argues that the Legislature has intended “that court fees should not be a barrier to court access for those with limited financial resources.” She also cites a provision of Government Code section 70633 that allows a court to reduce or waive a fee normally charged by the court for making or certifying copies of documents filed in a criminal action. We do not see the relevance of these statutes here either, because Mariah C. is not seeking to gain access to the legal system as a litigant or to obtain copies of court files in a criminal action. Again, the parties do not challenge her right to receive a copy of her case file. The only issue is whether the court can and should order the Agency to give her a free copy of that file.
Finally, Mariah C. argues in the alternative that the juvenile court should have determined whether her parents should be responsible for the costs of copying her case file pursuant to section 903.1. It provides in relevant part that “[t]he father [or]
mother . . . shall be liable for the cost to the county or the court, whichever entity incurred the expenses, of legal services rendered to the minor by an attorney pursuant to an order of the juvenile court.” (§ 903.1, subd. (a).) However, Mariah C. did not move below under section 903.1, and she does not argue the juvenile court had any sua sponte duty to consider whether it should make this determination. Therefore, we see no reason to consider this argument further.
In short, we agree with the juvenile court that Mariah C. did not meet her burden as the moving party below to establish that the juvenile court had the authority to issue the specific order she requested. She does not establish it in this appeal either.
DISPOSITION
The rulings appealed from are affirmed. In the interests of justice, each party shall bear its own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)





STEWART, J.



We concur.




RICHMAN, Acting P.J.




MILLER, J.