Filed 5/22/18 In re Matthew C. CA5



NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re MATTHEW C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MATTHEW C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

F075983

(Super. Ct. No. JJD070250)


OPINION

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Robert Anthony Fultz, Judge.
Kristen Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Christopher J. Rench, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Matthew C., age 17 at the time of the offenses, was adjudged a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after he was found to have committed the crimes of home invasion robbery in concert, during the commission of which a principal was armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A), 12022, subd. (a)(1); counts 1 & 4), criminal threats, during the commission of which a principal was armed with a firearm (§§ 422, 12022, subd. (a)(1); counts 5, 7, & 13), and first degree burglary (§ 459; counts 14 & 15). His maximum period of confinement was determined to be 18 years, and he was committed to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities.
On appeal, we hold the juvenile court was not required to stay the disposition on count 5 pursuant to section 654. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
Early on the morning of December 4, 2016, N.H. and her family resided in one of two trailers located, along with a house, on a large property in Earlimart. They were awakened by the noise of cars outside, and someone banging on the door and yelling to open it. When they did not comply, Matthew pulled the door open and entered, accompanied by another person. Matthew grabbed Y.H., N.H.’s brother, and started asking for someone the family did not know. Matthew said that if they did not tell him where the person was, he was going to take Y.H. and the family would not see Y.H. again. He threatened to kill Y.H. Matthew said he had a gun, but Y.H. did not see one. According to N.H., however, Matthew was holding a gun when he grabbed Y.H.
Matthew took the cell phones belonging to N.H. and her mother. He did not take Y.H.’s cell phone, because Y.H. kept it in his pocket. When Matthew and the other intruder left, Y.H. called the police.
Y.H. believed there were about five people, including Matthew, in all. One was female. N.H. saw four people — males with one female — but there was another car full of people outside. They had rifles and were looking for someone. They went next door to the trailer where Y.H.’s aunt lived with her child and boyfriend. Y.H. could hear men screaming, but could not tell what was being said.
According to Y.H., Matthew returned to Y.H.’s trailer, grabbed Y.H. by the shirt, and said that if Y.H. did not tell him where the people were, he would kill Y.H. According to N.H., two of the people returned to their trailer. They pointed guns at her brother.
Shortly after 3:00 a.m., Tulare County Sheriff’s Deputy Evans responded to a location in Earlimart, following a wireless 911 call. Evans observed a white vehicle parked outside the fenced property. Matthew was standing next to the vehicle, and a group of people was standing within the property.
Evans contacted Matthew and advised him of why Evans was there. Matthew said his grandmother accidentally dialed 911. When Evans said he would have to talk to his grandmother to confirm that actually happened, Matthew said he would get her. There was then an argument between Matthew and the group of people inside the property, who resided there. They appeared scared. They told Evans that Matthew had made threats to kill them. Matthew’s fists were clenched, and Evans detained him. Meanwhile, the white vehicle drove off.
Evans searched Matthew. Matthew did not have a gun on his person, but Evans removed three cell phones from him. Matthew stated the white iPhone belonged to him.
Matthew subsequently was advised of his rights and gave a statement to Detective Nevarez. Matthew related that he had given “Gonzalo” a ride from the Southern California area to Earlimart, and Gonzalo owed him $500. Matthew said he went to the location in Earlimart to collect the money. He was inside a small house on the property when a male with Gonzalo pulled out a gun. Gonzalo and some males robbed Matthew. They took his cell phone and his wallet, which contained $900. Matthew said he was punched in the stomach and left there, and Gonzalo and his companions left. Matthew said he used another phone he had to call a friend, who had given him a ride to the location, to come back and pick him up. When the friend returned, he and Matthew went back to the house to look for Gonzalo. When they did not find Gonzalo, they went to the other homes on the property to look for him. Matthew wanted to get back his property that had been taken. He said he heard some noise in the back of one of the trailers, so he went inside and started asking for Gonzalo. Matthew admitted taking cell phones from the people who lived in the trailers. He believed he would be able to find contact information for Gonzalo.
DISCUSSION
By finding true the allegations of counts 4 and 5, the juvenile court found Matthew robbed N.H. (count 4) and made criminal threats against her (count 5). In the course of setting the maximum term of commitment at 18 years, the court imposed terms of two years four months on count 4 and one year on count 5. Matthew now contends section 654 required the juvenile court to stay the term on count 5, because the conduct associated therewith was indivisible from the robbery that formed the basis of count 4.
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” The statute applies to juvenile proceedings. (In re Michael B. (1980) 28 Cal.3d 548, 556, fn. 3.)
Section 654’s purpose is to ensure that punishment is commensurate with an offender’s culpability. (People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1211.) Thus, the statute “precludes multiple punishment for a single act or indivisible course of conduct punishable under more than one criminal statute. Whether a course of conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the ‘intent and objective’ of the actor. [Citation.] If all of the offenses are incident to one objective, the court may punish the defendant for any one of the offenses, but not more than one. [Citation.] If, however, the defendant had multiple or simultaneous objectives, independent of and not merely incidental to each other, the defendant may be punished for each violation committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations share common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. [Citation.]” (People v. Cleveland (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 263, 267-268; see People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.)
Although the juvenile court here made no express finding of separate intents and objectives, at one point during the disposition hearing, it commented: “[T]his minor came from San Diego with a group of people. They had a plan, it seemed, as they went from home to home confronting individuals, taking their telephones so they could not call for assistance.” This constitutes an implied finding, since, under the juvenile court’s view of the evidence, the objective behind the taking of the victims’ cell phones was different from the objective in going from home to home and confronting the victims.
“The question whether section 654 is factually applicable to a given series of offenses is for the trial court, and the law gives the trial court broad latitude in making this determination. Its findings on this question must be upheld on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them. [Citations.] ‘We must “view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent and presume in support of the [sentencing] order the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312-1313; accord, e.g., People v. Mejia (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1046; People v. Cleveland, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 271.)
We uphold the trial court’s implied finding. The evidence showed the threats made to N.H. were a means of attempting to locate Gonzalo, not of acquiring N.H.’s cell phone. (See People v. Watts (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1264-1265.) There was no evidence defendant looked through the contacts stored in N.H.’s phone, and the juvenile court was not required to credit Matthew’s statement he took the phone because he believed he would find contact information for Gonzalo. Rather, a reasonable inference is that Matthew took the phones to prevent the victims from calling for assistance. He did not discard or return the phones once he supposedly checked the contacts or immediately leave the premises once he was unable to locate Gonzalo, and his desire not to have law enforcement summoned is demonstrated by the threats he made to the victims once he realized deputies had arrived and by the flight of his companions. That the circumstances might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the juvenile court’s determination. (See People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215.)
Matthew points to the following portion of the prosecutor’s argument: “[Matthew] specifically places himself in the trailer of . . . [Y.H.] and [N.H.] because he had cell phones that belonged to them on his person, and he even admitted to taking them. He admits to taking them because he says they have information on Gonzalo. [¶] We’ve heard . . . that the minor came in looking for somebody who they didn’t know, that he was accompanied by people, people with guns, that he went to the trailer where . . . [Y.H. and N.H.] lived. He then went to the [other] trailer . . . and then went to the northern residence. [¶] . . . [¶] When you add everything up, everything fits with what the victims’ testimony was that the minor went into their trailers. He took property from them. He threatened to kill them. Threatened harm to not only them, but their immediate family members.”
The foregoing in no way precluded the juvenile court from finding separate intents and objectives with respect to counts 4 and 5. (See People v. McCoy (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340.) Matthew has failed to demonstrate separate terms were improper under section 654.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.