Filed 6/26/17 In re M.D. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR


In re M.D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
M.D.,
Defendant and Appellant.

A149636

(Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. 38704J)


MEMORANDUM OPINION
M.D. appeals from a disposition order declaring her a ward of the juvenile court and placing her on probation in an ACT program. M.D.’s sole contention is that her probation conditions are unconstitutionally vague because they do not contain express “knowledge” requirements. This claim fails in light of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494 (Hall).
Background
Probation conditions imposed at M.D.’s disposition hearing included the following: “She’s not to use or possess intoxicating substances or beverages or associated paraphernalia. She’s not to use, possess, transport, sell or have under her custody or control any firearm, replica firearm, ammunition, weapon or other weapons. That includes knives or explosives or any item intended to be used as a weapon.”
M.D. contends these conditions are not sufficiently precise to provide her with constitutionally adequate notice of what is required of her because the prohibited conduct is stated in general terms and not subject to any knowledge requirement. Specifically, she complains that she could be assessed with a probation violation based on such unwitting conduct as accepting a ride in a car without knowing that the car contains alcohol or narcotics; possessing a multi-use item without realizing that it could be used as drug paraphernalia; or possessing an item that could be used as a weapon without having knowledge of its illegal characteristics. To remedy this perceived constitutional flaw, M.D. posits that each probation condition she challenges here must be modified to provide “essential specificity” by including language permitting revocation of probation only for a knowing violation.
Analysis
The void-for-vagueness “doctrine, which derives from the due process concept of fair warning, bars the government from enforcing a provision that ‘forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague’ that people of ‘common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’ [Citations.]” (Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 500; see also People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1115 1117.)
“To withstand a constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition must be sufficiently definite to inform the probationer what conduct is required or prohibited, and to enable the court to determine whether the probationer has violated the condition. [Citations.] In determining whether the condition is sufficiently definite, however, a court is not limited to the condition’s text. [Citation.] We must also consider other sources of applicable law [citation], including judicial construction of similar provisions. [Citations.] Thus, a probation condition should not be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague ‘ “ ‘if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 500 501.)
In Hall, supra, 2 Cal.4th 494, the California Supreme Court rejected a void for vagueness challenge to probation conditions that were substantially similar to the conditions M.D. challenges here. Holding that the absence of an express knowledge requirement does not render a possessory probation condition unconditionally vague, the court explained that “California case law already articulates not only a general presumption that a violation of a probation condition must be willful, but also specifically provides that probation conditions barring possession of contraband should be construed to require knowledge of its presence and its restricted nature. [Citation.] The requisite scienter for these probation conditions is thus easily ascertainable by reference to ‘ “other definable sources” ’ that make sufficiently clear the conditions’ scope. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 501.)
Applying Hall here, we conclude that the probation conditions imposed on M.D. are not unconstitutionally vague. “[T]he vagueness doctrine demands ‘ “no more than a reasonable degree of certainty.” ’ [Citation.]” (Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 503.) This requirement is satisfied by construing the challenged conditions in accordance with the relevant case law, which establishes that possessory probation conditions are construed to require knowledge of both the presence of the prohibited contraband and its illegal nature. (Id. at p. 501.) Thus, modifying these conditions by adding language requiring a knowing violation would not change their substance. Under these circumstances, appellant is not entitled to a modification of the challenged probation conditions “simply to make explicit what the law already makes implicit.” (Id. at p. 503, fn. omitted.)
The disposition order and challenged probations conditions are affirmed.
 





_________________________
RUVOLO, P. J.


We concur:


_________________________
RIVERA, J.


_________________________
STREETER, J.
























A149636, In re M.D.