In re M.F.

Filed 10/26/07 In re M.F. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(El Dorado)

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K.M. (appellant), the mother of four minors (the minors), appeals from juvenile court orders terminating appellants parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395; further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellant contends the juvenile court violated appellants due process rights by terminating her parental rights in the absence of sufficient evidence that the Department of Social Services (DSS) provided her with reasonable reunification services. Disagreeing with that contention, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 22, 2005, DSS filed an original juvenile dependency petition pursuant to section 300 on behalf of the four minors, who ranged in age from 16 months to six years old. That petition alleged in part there was a substantial risk the minors would suffer serious physical harm due to appellants failure to provide the minors with adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment. The petition also averred appellant was unable to provide the minors with regular care due to appellants mental illness or substance abuse. In support of those allegations, the petition also claimed appellants ability to provide a consistent and adequate safe home environment for the minors was hindered by appellants substance abuse.

The juvenile court sustained the petition in part. Thereafter, the court adjudged the minors dependent children and ordered DSS to provide appellant with reunification services. Those services included parenting classes, a substance abuse assessment and drug testing, and a psychological evaluation. The court also ordered appellant to comply with any requirements generated by the psychological evaluation, including counseling.

Appellant failed to complete most of the elements of her reunification plan in a timely manner. DSS described appellant as resistant to engaging in her family reunification services. DSS identified substance abuse and mental health difficulties as factors in appellants failure to participate in services.

On March 22, 2005, the juvenile court had ordered appellant to submit to a psychological examination. Unfortunately, due to delays caused by appellant, she did not begin the process of completing that task until nearly seven months later, on October 18, 2005. Thereafter, as a result of delays due to the examining psychologist, the written evaluation was not completed until February 2006.

Clinical psychologist Eugene Roeder concluded that appellant required both psychotherapy and medication in order
to address her diagnosis of major depression with psychotic features. However, as Roeder noted, appellant was rejecting
. . . any type of psychotherapeutic assistance . . . . During the examination, appellant indicated she did not need counseling, stating that [c]ounselings not going to get me anywhere.

DSS recommended termination of appellants reunification services. In support of that recommendation, the social worker relied in part on appellants resistance to counseling and her minimal compliance with the requirements of her service plan. DSS also referred to psychologist Roeders prognosis concerning appellant, which included his serious concerns about appellants ability to function effectively as a parent of four young minors. The social worker opined that, unless appellant agreed to counseling and a medical evaluation, there would be no hope of appellant reunifying with the minors.

On March 3, 2006, the juvenile court found appellant had received reasonable services and terminated those reunification services. Thereafter, appellant filed a petition for extraordinary writ, in which she challenged the adequacy of her reunification services. On October 18, 2006, this court denied appellants petition by order.

At the January 29, 2007, section 366.26 hearing, appellant testified about the progress she had been making. According to appellant, if her parental rights were terminated, the minors would be greatly harmed. Appellant asked the juvenile court to apply a statutory exception to adoption based on her relationship with the minors and to order a guardianship of the minors. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found it was likely the minors would be adopted and terminated appellants parental rights.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends that, as she was not provided with reunification services tailored to her specific needs, the juvenile courts finding that DSS provided her reasonable reunification services is not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, appellant argues, the court violated her due process rights by terminating her parental rights. According to appellant, her primary difficulty, known to DSS, was mental illness, yet DSS failed to assist her in addressing it. Moreover, appellant asserts, DSS made no attempt to overcome her resistance to treatment. Finally, appellant notes that she did indicate a willingness to participate in counseling.^[1]

The strong preference of the law in dependency matters, expressed both judicially and legislatively, is reuniting children with their natural families whenever possible. (In re Joanna Y. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 433, 438.) To effectuate this paramount goal of reunification, the law requires that reasonable reunification services, tailored to the parents individual needs be offered . . . . [Citations.] The agency supervising the children must identify the problems leading to the loss of custody, offer services designed to remedy these problems, and maintain reasonable contact with the parents to assist in areas where compliance provides difficult, such as transportation. (Ibid.) A reunification service plan should be well defined, specific, and tailored to provide services that will lead to the resumption of a family relationship. (In re Mario C. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 599, 603-604.)

We must determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting the juvenile courts finding that reasonable services were provided. (In re Joanna Y., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 439.)

At the March 3, 2006, review hearing, appellant argued she had completed most of her case plan. Appellants counsel told the juvenile court that, [o]n the psychological report, the main elements of concern from the [psychologist] about [appellants] inability to be a parent dealt with her lack of interest in receiving counseling and also a lack of interest in receiving any medication for depression and anxiety. And [appellant] has informed me on both of these issues shes more than willing to accept counseling and would like to pursue counseling and she would also be interested in getting medication for both depression and anxiety.

If appellant wanted counseling and medication to be included in her reunification plan, at the dispositional hearing she should have asked for it. If not granted then, appellant could have challenged the denial of individual counseling and medication services in an appeal from the dispositional order. To the extent appellants complaints about specific components of her service plan are directed at the appropriateness of services and the efforts of DSS to remedy deficiencies in her plan, it constitutes a challenge to the composition of the reunification plan. Such a challenge now is untimely. (Cf. John F. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 400, 404-405.)

The social worker must make a good faith effort to provide reasonable services responding to the unique needs of each family. (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 254.) The question is not whether more or better services could have been provided, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)

The record reflects appellant was ordered to participate in parenting classes, receive a substance abuse assessment and submit to drug testing, and undergo a psychological evaluation. Appellant also was directed to complete any requirements that are generated by the psychological evaluation, such as, counseling and/or medication evaluation. Thus, appellants case plan contemplated counseling as a consequence of the psychological evaluation appellant would receive.

Unfortunately, as the record reflects, in most respects appellant failed to comply in a timely manner with the requirements of her reunification plan. She missed intake appointments pertaining to parenting classes, failed to drug test regularly, and delayed for more than six months the scheduling of her psychological examination. Thereafter, during her examination, appellant made it clear that she would not engage in therapy or a medication evaluation. It was appellants minimal compliance with her service plan that led DSS to recommend the termination of its reunification efforts for appellant.

It is hardly surprising that parents, beset by mental difficulties and suffering stress due to the removal of their children from the home, often will resist counseling and other proffered services. But it is disingenuous to accuse DSS, as appellant does here, of doing little or nothing on her behalf when the record demonstrates DSS had a plan in place, tailored to appellants needs, and addressing her difficulties, which appellant chose not to utilize, at least not until near the end of the reunification period.

Childhood cannot wait for a parent to establish readiness for parenting. (In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 610.) Here, at the disposition hearing the juvenile court warned appellant that her services might be terminated after only six months. Thus, it was too little, too late for appellant to express a willingness to enroll in counseling or take medication nearly 12 months later. (See id. at p. 608.)

On this record, it is difficult to discern how counseling, a medication evaluation, and an additional period of services would have been beneficial to appellant or made reunification reasonably probable.

In this case, the record establishes that appellants services were reasonable, but that she failed to make progress in ameliorating the conditions that led to the filing of the dependency petition. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts order terminating appellants reunification services. There was no denial of due process or abuse of discretion in the courts decision.

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

NICHOLSON , J.

We concur:

BLEASE , Acting P.J.

DAVIS , J.

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^[1] Appellant is correct that her claim is cognizable in this appeal because she made a challenge to the termination of her reunification services in her petition for extraordinary writ, which was denied summarily by this court. (K.M. v. Superior Court, C053581, petn. den. Oct. 18, 2006.) ( 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(A)-(C); Joyce G. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1513-1514.)