In re Mia C.
Filed 6/12/13 In re Mia C. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento
----
In re MIA C., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
C069411
(Super. Ct. No.
JD227654)
SACRAMENTO
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
L.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Mother’s
live-in girlfriend, L.L., was determined to be a presumed parent
under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d) (undesignated statutory
references are to this code). Mother’s
husband, F.C., was later determined to be a presumed parent under section 7611,
subdivision (a). Faced with competing parentage
presumptions, a contested hearing was held, after which the
considerations of policy and logic lean in favor of†declaring F.C. the
presumed parent. L.L. appeals this
order, contending (1) since F.C. and
mother had been separated for several years prior to the minor’s birth, the
juvenile court erred in finding the presumption under section 7611, subdivision
(a) applied to F.C.; and (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion in
finding F.C. was the presumed parent. We
find the propriety of F.C. being declared a presumed parent was forfeited by
L.L.’s failure to raise her objection in the juvenile court. Moreover, even if the claim were not
forfeited, following the plain language of the statute, the court properly
applied it to F.C. Lastly, we find no
abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s weighing of the considerations
underlying the parentage presumptions.
Finding no error, we shall affirm the order of the juvenile court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mother
and F.C. married in 1994 when mother was 15 years old and, in 1999, she gave
birth to their first child, a daughter.
Mother alleged there was an extensive history of domestic violence
between herself and F.C. and they separated in 2004. Although they separated in 2004, F.C. and
mother did not obtain a divorce. F.C.
was granted full custody of their daughter and, beginning in 2009 or 2010,
mother had regular visits with her.
In
December 2005, mother gave birth to a son, C.C.
She does not know who C.C.’s father is.
Because she was “in and out of jail,†she had trouble caring for C.C.
and signed guardianship of him over to the father of a friend.
Mother
met L.L. in 2007 when they were both incarcerated and mother was pregnant with
the minor here, Mia C. (born in June 2008).
Like mother, L.L. has a history of substance abuse. Shortly after the minor was born, she
exhibited signs of drug withdrawal.
Mother had tested positive for methamphetamine twice during her
pregnancy, including just weeks before the minor was born. Accordingly, the minor was taken into custody
by the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the
Department) based on allegations of mother’s ongoing substance abuse problems
and the positive drug tests during her pregnancy. At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on July 22, 2008, the petition was
sustained, the minor was removed from mother’s custody and reunification
services were offered. No paternity
finding was made. In these proceedings,
L.L. was identified as mother’s live-in girlfriend and came to court with her
at least once. Mother admitted that less
than one month before the minor’s birth, she and L.L. had gone to a friend’s
house and smoked methamphetamine. Mother
also stated L.L. knew mother was using drugs and did not confront her about her
drug use. After mother completed
services, the minor was returned to mother in January 2009. In July 2009, dependency jurisdiction was
terminated and mother was granted legal and physical custody of the minor.
In May
2011 when the minor was two years 11 months old, she was again detained. This detention was as a result of mother’s
substance abuse and domestic violence between mother and L.L. Mother had completed her court-ordered
rehabilitation services in 2009 and remained sober until sometime between
September and November 2010, when L.L. was released from incarceration. From November 2010 until May 2011 mother used
methamphetamine once or twice a week. In
March 2011, officers conducted a probation search of mother and L.L.’s
apartment. In the bedroom, officers
found a glass methamphetamine pipe and a digital scale, both with
methamphetamine residue. Mother and L.L.
each claimed ownership of the pipe
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]
and each admitted they had used methamphetamine that day.
There
were also a number of reports of domestic
violence between L.L. and mother. In
December 2010, mother and L.L. got into a verbal argument that became
physical. Mother reported L.L. choked
her, slapped her and punched her in the face.
Both the minor and L.L.’s daughter were present during the altercation
and could have been hit. L.L. was
arrested for corporal injury to a cohabitant.
L.L. denied the allegations of domestic violence and pleaded no contest
to false imprisonment. A three-year
criminal protective order was issued on December 9,
2010, restraining L.L. from harassing, striking or attacking
mother. In April 2011, L.L. and
mother got into another argument that became physical. L.L. pushed mother onto the bed as they
argued. Mother hit L.L. in the back
twice with the inside garage door and slapped her on the arm. Police noted L.L. had injuries consistent
with having been hit. Mother was arrested
as a result of this incident. The minor
reported she saw mother hit L.L. with the door and had witnessed other
occasions where mother and L.L. hit each other on their arms. Witnessing these fights frightened the minor
and made her cry.
Ronald
A., a family friend and the minor’s alleged father, reported he had monthly
contact with the couple. He also
regularly saw bruises on their bodies, which they informed him they had caused
to each other. L.L. usually had more
bruises than mother.
L.L. was
incarcerated in late September 2010.
Upon her release, it became plain that mother had relapsed into drug
use. Mother was unable to take care of
her needs and the needs of the minor on her own and so developed a relationship
with a neighbor, Keith. Keith supplied
mother and L.L. with methamphetamine.
When mother’s use of methamphetamine escalated, so did the fighting
between mother and L.L. L.L. would
sometimes leave the home for a few days, for a “cooling off†period. Despite being aware of mother’s drug use,
L.L. left the minor with mother and was
not concerned for the minor’s safety.
Mother
and L.L. lived together for about four and a half years, along with the minor
and L.L.’s daughter. L.L. was present at
the minor’s birth, assisted with the birth and cut the umbilical cord. The minor’s birth certificate listed the minor’s last name as a hyphenated
combination of mother’s and L.L.’s surnames.
L.L. raised the minor while mother was at school or volunteering, and
with mother’s encouragement the minor called L.L. “Daddy.†L.L.’s daughter and the minor consider
themselves sisters. Mother relied on
L.L. for emotional support, financial support and assistance in caring for the
minor. According to mother, L.L. had
been a parent to the minor “[i]n every way that it matters.â€
F.C. met
the minor when she was a year and a half old.
Mother had supervised visits with their older daughter once every other
week and she would sometimes bring Mia to those visits. Mother did not always bring the minor to the
visits and there was a period of time during which no visits took place. F.C. had multiple convictions for driving
under the influence and was on probation for his most recent conviction in
2006. The minor called F.C. “Uncle†and
knew F.C. was her half sister’s father.
F.C. acknowledged he had not acted as a father to the minor, but wanted
to provide a home for her.
The minor
wanted to reunify with mother and L.L.
Mother indicated she could co-parent with either L.L. or F.C. as both
were important to the minor.
On June 7, 2011, L.L. was determined to
be a presumed parent under section 7611, subdivision (d). On July
28, 2011, the court found F.C. was a presumed parent under section
7611, subdivision (a). Following a
contested hearing, on September 27,
2011, the court determined F.C.’s claim of paternity was
controlling and adjudicated him to be the minor’s father. The court found F.C. had a lengthy
relationship with mother, had extensive knowledge of her history of substance
abuse and a demonstrated ability to co-parent with her while keeping the
minor’s half sibling safe. Mother had
supervised visits with the minor’s half sibling and the minor spent time with
F.C. and her half sibling every other weekend.
The visits went well. The minor
thinks of F.C. as an uncle. The court
acknowledged F.C.’s history of DUI convictions and considered them in making
its decision. The court also noted
mother used methamphetamine during her pregnancy while in her relationship with
L.L. and there was no mention of L.L. in the 2008 dependency proceedings.
year of her life in foster care.
name="_ftnref4" title="">[4] The court acknowledged L.L. had lived with
the minor for a number of years, the minor referred to her as “daddy,†and they
shared a bond. However, the minor was
also aware of the domestic violence between mother and L.L. In addition, there was drug paraphernalia
found in mother and L.L.’s bedroom. The
court found L.L.’s “violent relationship with the mother and her inability to
provide a drug[-]free environment for [the minor] . . . weigh more
heavily in the court’s decision. Policy
dictates that the court make choices that offer children the greatest safety
and stability because it is in that atmosphere that children thrive. Thus both policy and logic dictate that
[F.C.’s] claim of presumption under [section] 7611[, subdivision] (a)
control[s].†L.L. appeals this
predispositional order.
On October 5, 2011, the juvenile court
sustained the petition, placed the minor with F.C., and granted him sole legal
and physical custody. Dependency
jurisdiction was terminated.
DISCUSSION
I. Under California
Rules of Court, Premature Appeal Deemed Timely
In
dependency cases, the first appealable order, the final judgment, is the
dispositional order. (
532; In re Joann E. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 347, 353-354; In re
Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1250.) “[J]urisdictional findings and other orders
entered before the dispositional hearing are generally reviewable on appeal
from the dispositional order. (In re
Joann E., supra,
104 Cal.App.4th at p. 354 [‘[i]f there is no specific statutory
requirement that a writ be taken before a final, appealable order or judgment
is entered, review of intermediate rulings and orders may occur on appeal’]; In
re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 624; In re Megan B.
(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 950 [‘[a] jurisdictional finding, while not
appealable, may be reviewed in an appeal from the dispositional order’]; Code
Civ. Proc., § 906.)†(In re M.C.
(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 784, 801.)
Here, the
order regarding presumed parentage was made prior
to the dispositional order. L.L.
acknowledges the general rule governing appeals in dependency cases and that
this appeal is taken from an order issued prior to the dispositional
order. She contends that the finding on
presumed parent status is appealable as a collateral order.
We do not
agree the determination of presumed parent status is a collateral order in a dependency
proceeding. An interim order may be
directly appealable when (1) the order is final as to a collateral matter, (2)
the subject of the order is in fact collateral to the general subject of the
litigation, and (3) the order directs the payment of money or the performance
of an act. (Sjoberg v. Hastorf (1948) 33 Cal.2d 116, 119;
Cal.App.4th 289, 297-298.) “In
determining whether an order is collateral, ‘the test is whether an order is
“important and essential to the correct determination of the main issue.†If the order is “a necessary step to that
end,†it is not collateral.’ †(
84 Cal.App.4th 536, 561.) Here, the
order is final as to the issue of presumed parent status. Presumed parent status is not, however, an
issue collateral to the general subject of the litigation.
The
general subject of the litigation in a dependency case is protection of the
child and, if possible, preservation of the family. (In re
Kaylee H. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 92, 109; In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1112.) The determination of who constitutes the
minor’s family is central to preservation of that family. To that end, when a dependency petition is
filed, the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine
paternity. (In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 620.) The juvenile court is required to ask mother
to identify all presumed or alleged fathers as soon as practicable. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd.
(a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.635(b).
appears at a hearing in [a] dependency matter . . . and requests a
judgment of parentage on form JV-505, the court must determine: [¶]
(1) Whether that person is the biological parent of the child; and [¶]
(2) Whether that person is the presumed parent of the child, if that
finding is requested.†A parent’s status
is significant in dependency cases because it determines the extent to which
the parent may participate in the proceedings and the rights to which the
parent is entitled. (
113 Cal.App.4th 155, 159.) Presumed
fathers are accorded greater rights than are mere natural fathers. (In re
Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 448-449.) “ ‘Presumed [parent] status entitles the
[parent] to appointed counsel, custody (absent a finding of detriment), and a
reunification plan.’ †(
1120; see also In re
1357.) Accordingly, we cannot say the
determination of presumed parenthood is a matter collateral to the general
subject of the litigation. In addition,
the presumed parent finding does not meet the requirement for review of a
collateral “final†order as it does not direct the payment of money or the
performance of an act by L.L. (
119 Cal.App.4th 438, 456; Lester v.
Lennane, supra,
84 Cal.App.4th at pp. 556-565.)
However,
rule 8.406(d), provides, “A notice of appeal is premature if filed before the
judgment is rendered or the order is made, but the reviewing court may treat
the notice as filed immediately after the rendition of judgment or the making
of the order.â€
title="">[6] Such a premature notice is to be liberally
construed in favor of its sufficiency and treated as timely filed, particularly
where the opposing party is neither misled nor prejudiced by the premature
filing. (See Marcotte v. Municipal Court (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 235, 239;
Owens–Corning Fiberglas, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 955,
960-961.) Because the Department has
neither alleged nor shown any prejudice from the premature filing, we exercise
our discretion and treat the notice of appeal as timely. (Rule 8.406(d).)
II. Termination
of Dependency Proceedings Did Not Render Appeal Moot
The
Department also contends the appeal should be dismissed as moot. After awarding F.C. sole
the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction. Despite the fact that the minor is no longer
a dependent child, the issue on appeal—whether the court properly weighed
competing claims regarding presumed parent status—is not moot. (In re
P.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 974, 979.)
“ ‘An issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome
of subsequent proceedings.’ (
65 Cal.App.4th 765, 769 .)†(
733, 740.) As noted above, the
determination of who is accorded presumed parent status has a significant
impact on subsequent proceedings.
Presumed parents have the right to custody and
person accorded presumed parent status is entitled to custody of the
minor. If the presumed parent is not yet
ready to take custody, presumed parent status entitles him or her to
reunification services and visitation.
These are significant consequences of the presumed parent finding that
clearly “infect†the subsequent dependency proceedings. Therefore, termination of
this appeal moot.
III. F.C. Was
Properly Declared a Presumed Parent
A. Claim
Forfeited by Failure to Object
L.L.
argues the juvenile court erred in determining that F.C. was a presumed parent
under section 7611, subdivision (a), which provides, a man is a presumed father
if “[h]e and the child’s natural mother
are or have been married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death,
annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce, or after a judgment of
separation is entered by a court.†There
is no dispute that the minor was born during F.C. and mother’s marriage. L.L. argues, however, that the court erred in
applying this section to F.C. because, as a matter of public policy, the
subdivision should not be “applied when a husband and wife have been separated
for years before conception or the child’s birth and a petition for divorce has
been filed.†As the Department points
out, this claim was not raised in the juvenile court. “We see no reason to deviate from the usual
rule that when a parent does not raise an issue in the trial court, he or she
is precluded from raising the issue on appeal.
(In re S.B. (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.)†(
129 Cal.App.4th 189, 197.)
B. Juvenile
Court Did Not Err in Following Plain Language of Statute
Even if
the matter was not forfeited, we would find no error. “ ‘Our role in construing a statute is to ascertain the Legislature’s
intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citations.]
We consider first the words of the statute because they are generally the
most reliable indicator of legislative intent.â€
(In re J. W. (2002)
29 Cal.4th 200, 209.)
“ ‘ “If the statutory language is unambiguous, we presume the
Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls. [Citation.]â€
[Citation.] We consider extrinsic
aids, such as legislative history, only if the statutory language is reasonably
subject to multiple interpretations.’ â€
(In re W.B. (2012)
55 Cal.4th 30, 52; see In re J.F. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 321,
331; see also In re Carl R. (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1069.) There
is nothing ambiguous in the language of section 7611, subdivision (a), and its
plain meaning governs: A man is a
presumed father when a child is born to his wife during their marriage or might
have been conceived within the marriage.
There are no additional requirements to satisfy this rebuttable
presumption. (Craig L. v. Sandy S. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 36, 48.) Accordingly, F.C. was properly determined to
be a presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (a).
IV. Juvenile
Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Weighing
Competing Policy Considerations
“The
Uniform Parentage Act [of 1973] (UPA), Family Code section 7600 et seq.,
provides the statutory framework for judicial determinations of parentage, and
governs private adoptions, paternity and custody disputes, and dependency
proceedings. (Adoption of Michael H.
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 1043, 1050 . . . ; In re Jesusa V.[, supra,]
32 Cal.4th [at p.] 603.)†(
the statutory criteria that give rise to a presumption of parentage, where
there is a natural mother, there can be only one presumed parent. (In re
Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th
at p. 603; Neil S. v. Mary L.
(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 240, 248.)
under section 7611, the trial court must identify the presumption ‘which on the
facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic.’ (§ 7612, subd. (b).) This matter is entrusted to the trial court’s
discretion. (In re Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 606.)†(Gabriel
P. v. Suedi D. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 850, 864.)
L.L.
contends the trial court abused its discretion when it weighed the competing
interests of herself and F.C. and found that “policy and logic dictate that
[F.C.’s] claim of presumption under [section] 7611[, subdivision] (a)
control[s].†She argues the underlying
purpose of parentage presumptions is to preserve the family, and her
relationship with the minor was more substantial than F.C.’s. Thus, she contends the considerations
underlying her claim of parentage should have prevailed. We agree with L.L. that her relationship with
the minor was more substantial and parental in nature than F.C.’s. However, L.L.’s argument fails to account for
other policy considerations underlying the parentage presumptions – the
protection of the well-being of the child and the best interests of the child. On the facts of this case, the juvenile court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that those were the weightier
policy considerations.
We will
not reverse a trial court’s discretionary determination “ ‘ “unless
the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination
[citations].†’ [Citations.] . . . : ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be
deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its
decision for that of the trial court.†’ †(In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
In
determining which parentage presumption is founded on “weightier considerations
of policy and logic,†the court is obligated “to weigh all relevant factors.†(
at p. 608, italics added.) “The
[parentage] presumptions are driven by state interest in preserving the
integrity of the family and legitimate concern for the welfare of the
child.†(Steven W. v. Matthew S. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1108,
1116.) These are the core considerations
in determining which parentage presumption controls. (Neil
S. v. Mary L., supra,
199 Cal.App.4th at p. 248.)
These policies are consistent with those underlying dependency
proceedings; “to provide maximum safety and protection for children who are
currently being physically, sexually or emotionally abused, neglected or
exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional
well-being of children who are at risk of that harm, while not disrupting the
family unnecessarily or intruding inappropriately into family life. ([Welf. & Inst. Code,] §§ 300,
302.)†(In re Kaylee H., supra,
205 Cal.App.4th at p. 109.)
Moreover, “[t]he policy of the UPA is to meet the best interests of the
child†(N.A.H. v. S.L.S. (Colo. 2000)
9 P.3d 354, 363) and “the best interests of the child [must] be fully
considered in resolving competing presumptions of paternity†(
in In re Jesusa V., supra,
32 Cal.4th at pp. 607-608 [and cases cited therein]). In the end, the court’s decision must
“protect the well-being of the child.†(
125 Cal.App.4th at p. 43.) “No
single factor—whether social or biological—controls resolution of the conflict
between these competing [parents]. (
at p. 608.)†(In re P.A., supra,
198 Cal.App.4th at p. 985.)
The
record here reflects L.L. had a substantial and established bond with the minor
and had demonstrated a significant commitment to the minor. L.L. was present in the hospital when the
minor was born, shared her surname with the minor and raised the minor while
mother was at school or volunteering.
L.L. lived with and cared for the minor on a day-to-day basis from at
least January 2009 through September 2010.
this petition was filed, so L.L. had lived with her for about half of her young
life. L.L. held the minor out as her
child and acted as a parent toward her.
The minor called L.L. “daddy†and considered L.L. her parent. L.L. also provided emotional and financial
support to mother.
By
contrast, F.C. first came into the minor’s life when she was about a year and a
half old. He never lived with her and
there is no evidence he ever had overnight visits with her. He saw her every other weekend as he
supervised visits between mother and the minor’s half sibling. There were periods when visits did not
happen, and the minor did not attend every visit with mother. F.C. never held the minor out as his child
and never acted as a parent to her. She
thought of him as an uncle, not a parent.
If “ ‘ “ ‘preserving and protecting the developed
parent-child . . . relationships’ †’ †(
policy consideration to be put in the balance, L.L.’s claim of presumed
parentage would likely prevail. But it
is not. The court must consider all relevant
factors, including the minor’s well-being and best interests.
Credible
evidence of domestic violence is a
factor to consider in determining the best interests of the child and
protecting her well-being. (See
§ 3011; In re Marriage of Ohr
(Colo.Ct.App. 2004) 97 P.3d 354, 356.)
It is well established that domestic violence in the same household
where a child lives is detrimental to the child. (§ 3020, subd. (a); In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194.) It is undisputed mother and L.L. engaged in
repeated acts of domestic violence against each other and in front of the
minor. The minor described seeing L.L.
and mother hit each other. She reported
that the fights frightened her and made her cry. Police officers were repeatedly called to the
home. The officers saw evidence of
domestic violence and that the minor had witnessed the violence. Ronald A. saw both mother and L.L. with
bruises, which they stated the other had caused. L.L. was charged with spousal abuse and
pleaded guilty to false imprisonment.
Mother obtained a restraining order against L.L., which it appears L.L.
violated on at least one occasion.
Mother
also claimed there had been domestic violence in her relationship with F.C. Unlike the domestic violence with L.L.,
mother’s claims as against F.C. were not substantiated by any independent
sources. There were no witnesses, no
police reports and no admissions by F.C.
To the extent there were incidents of violence between mother and F.C.,
there was no indication of any recent incidents of violence nor was there any
indication any violence occurred in the presence of a child.
In
addition to the harm associated with domestic violence, there was the risk to
the minor’s well-being presented by mother’s substance abuse. As the court noted, mother was using
methamphetamine when she was pregnant with the minor. Although L.L. was aware mother was using drugs,
she did not confront her. In fact, L.L.
used methamphetamine with mother just weeks before the minor was born. In March 2011, officers found a
methamphetamine pipe with methamphetamine residue on it in L.L. and mother’s
bedroom. Both mother and L.L. claimed
ownership of the pipe and that they had used drugs that day. From November 2010 until May 2011 mother used
methamphetamine at least weekly. Keith
supplied both mother and L.L. with methamphetamine. L.L. knew mother was using methamphetamine
again, but left the minor with mother and was not concerned about the minor’s
safety with mother.
Although
F.C. has suffered convictions for driving under the influence, there is no
evidence in the record that F.C. shares mother’s drug history or substance
abuse problems. F.C. is aware of
mother’s drug history and has protected the minor’s half sibling from exposure
to mother’s drug use. He did not leave
their older daughter with mother when mother was using drugs. Rather, he took action to protect the minor’s
half sister by obtaining custody and supervising visits between her and mother.
The
policy considerations at issue in resolving a conflict among parentage
presumptions are preservation of the family, the well-being of the minor and
the minor’s best interests. Absent a
showing of parental unfitness, “the child’s well-being is presumptively best
served by continuation of the [presumed] parental relationship.†(Adoption
of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 849.) The violence and substance abuse in this case
serve to rebut that presumption. “In the
end, the court‘s determination must ‘give[ ] the greatest weight to [the
child’s] well-being’ (Craig L.[
court did.†(J.R. v. D.P. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 374, 391.) In this case, the violence and substance
abuse problems posed such a significant risk to the minor’s well-being and best
interests these policies outweighed the interest in preserving the family. This is what the juvenile court determined. Accordingly, we can find no abuse of
discretion.
DISPOSITION
The order
of the juvenile court is affirmed.
BUTZ , J.
We concur:
NICHOLSON , Acting P. J.
MAURO , J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] “Although [Family Code] section 7611 speaks
in terms of fathers, the . . . provisions applicable to determining a
father and child relationship shall be used to determine a mother and child
relationship ‘[i]nsofar as practicable.’
([Fam. Code,] § 7650, subd. (a); see also Elisa B. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 108, 119-120 (
decisional law has focused on the definition of the presumed father, the legal
principles concerning the presumed father apply equally to a woman seeking
presumed mother status. [Citation.]†’].)†(E.C.
v. J.V. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1084-1085, fn. 3.) Because this case involves claims of a
presumed mother and a presumed father, rather than use the terms “presumed
father†and “paternity presumptions,†we will generally use the terms “presumed
parent†and “parentage presumptions,†respectively.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] In subsequent interviews with the Department,
L.L. denied she had claimed ownership of the pipe or that she had used
methamphetamine.
