Filed 11/20/18 In re M.L. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
| In re M.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. |
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| THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. M.L., Defendant and Appellant. |
A153862
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J13-00800)
|
Memorandum Opinion[1]
“Welfare and Institutions Code section 391[[2]] authorizes the juvenile court to terminate its jurisdiction over a nonminor dependent in foster care who is between the ages of 18 and 21, but only in three narrowly defined circumstances and only after the county welfare department has submitted a report containing recommendations and verifying it has provided the nonminor with certain information, documents, and services.” (In re Nadia G. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1113 (Nadia G.), italics added; §§ 391, subd. (b)–(e), 452, subd. (c).)
Sections 391 and 452 implement legislation allowing California foster youth to obtain the advantages of federal funding for additional support services. “Before 2008, most dependent children ‘emancipated’ from—i.e., became ineligible for—foster care on their 18th birthday. In 2008, in order to improve outcomes for children who aged out of foster care, Congress passed the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008. (Pub.L.No. 110–351 (Oct. 7, 2008) 122 Stat. 3949.) Among other things, the 2008 act provided federal funding to reimburse states for part of the cost of providing maintenance payments to eligible youths who remained in foster care after their 18th birthdays, so long as those youths had not yet reached their 21st birthdays and were either enrolled in school, employed at least 80 hours a month, or participating in ‘an activity designed to promote or remove barriers to employment.’ (Congressional Research Service, Child Welfare: The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (P.L. 110–351) (Oct. 9, 2008) p. 9.) [¶] In 2010, in order to take advantage of expanded federal foster care funding, California passed Assembly Bill 12. As relevant here, Assembly Bill 12 permits a juvenile court to continue to exercise dependency jurisdiction and provide foster care benefits to eligible nonminors until the age of 21. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Section 391 provides that the court ‘shall continue’ dependency jurisdiction over (and order continuing benefits for) a nonminor if he or she ‘meets the definition of a nonminor dependent as described in subdivision (v) of Section 11400,’ unless the court finds that the nonminor ‘does not wish to remain subject to dependency jurisdiction’ or ‘is not participating in a reasonable and appropriate transitional independent living case plan.’ (§ 391, subd. (c)(1).)” (In re A.A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 765, 772–773, italics omitted; see In re Aaron S. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 507, 516.)
Here, the probation department submitted a report in advance of the termination hearing containing recommendations; however, it provided no verification. At the subsequent hearing, the juvenile court, after finding M.L. fell within one of the defined circumstances, terminated jurisdiction and set aside his placement.
On appeal, M.L. contends the court erred in terminating his nonminor dependency because (1) he was in compliance with eligibility requirements to continue as a dependent and because termination was not in his best interest, and (2) the probation department failed to comply with the requirements of sections 391, subdivision (e)(2) and 452, subdivision (c), which list a number of documents that must be provided to the nonminor before jurisdiction is terminated and require certification said documents have been provided.
Since the filing of his brief, M.L. has turned 21 years old and is no longer eligible for placement as a nonminor dependent, so we need not and do not address his first contention.
As for M.L.’s second contention, the Attorney General concedes the probation department failed to certify that it provided him with all statutorily-required documents and therefore agrees the matter should be remanded.
Our review of the record confirms that the Attorney General’s concession is well taken. We therefore reverse the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction and remand to ensure that the probation department has duly complied with the requirements of sections 391 and 452, and that the juvenile court’s findings, in turn, comport with these statutory provisions and California Rules of Court, rule 5.555(d)(2)(E).[3] (See Nadia G., supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1121–1124 [nonminor dependent termination order reversed and matter remanded because department did not comply with mandates of section 391].)
Disposition
The order terminating jurisdiction is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
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Banke, J.
We concur:
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Margulies, Acting P.J.
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Kelly, J.
A153862, People v. M.L.
[1] This matter is properly decided by memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1, subdivisions (1) and (3).
[2] “All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.”
[3] We agree with M.L. that the 90-day transition plan (see § 452, subd. (c)(3); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.555(d)(2)(E)(vi)) must provide current information relevant to the particular needs of the nonminor dependent. (See In re Aaron S., supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 521.)
