In re M.R.

Filed 9/29/06 In re M.R. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Robert W. Nagby, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, and Carole A. Nunes Fong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jennifer Mack, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.

This is an appeal by Angelina R. (hereafter mother) from the trial court’s orders terminating her parental rights to her then 10-year-old daughter M.R., and selecting adoption as the permanent plan in a dependency proceeding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.^[1] Mother contends that the sibling relationship exception to parental rights termination applies in this case such that guardianship, not adoption, should be the permanent plan. Mother also contends that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that M.R. is likely to be adopted. We conclude, for reasons we explain below, that mother’s claims are meritless. Therefore we will affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The pertinent factual and procedural details are not in dispute. Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) filed a section 300 petition on January 3, 2003, with respect to mother’s two children, then seven-year-old M.R. and her four-month-old brother, D.D., after D.D.’s father admitted that he had bitten the infant’s ears and had previously bitten the infant’s arm, causing inflammation and bruising. D.D.’s father claimed that he had not intended to hurt D.D. and had only bitten the child because D.D. is so cute the father just wanted to eat him up. D.D.’s father admitted that he has a biting “fetish” and that he had bitten other people in the past, including M.R.^[2] This dependency was terminated at a six-month review hearing at which the trial court awarded mother custody of both M.R. and D.D.

DPSS reopened the dependency in March 2004 by filing an amended petition that alleged in pertinent part that mother was abusing controlled substances and as a result was willfully or negligently failing to provide food, clothing, and shelter for M.R. and D.D. Based on those allegations DPSS alleged that the children came within the provisions of section 300, subdivision (b).

According to the social worker’s report prepared for the jurisdiction hearing, mother had been using drugs, specifically marijuana and methamphetamine, and had not been taking care of the children. Among other things, the social worker stated that M.R. had not attended school for two weeks, and both M.R. and D.D. had been left outside, unattended, for hours at a time. M.R. told the social worker that she did not like D.D.’s father and that if her mother were to live with D.D.’s father again, M.R. would want to live with Michael B.^[3] M.R. also told the social worker that her mother was doing well and had gotten a job because M.R. had asked her to -- “‘[s]he did it for me, and she does it for free.’” M.R. said, “‘me and my mom will love each other till the day we die.’” According to M.R., her mother and grandmother, with whom mother and the children had been living, yell at each other a lot and that makes M.R. feel as if something bad was going to happen. M.R. reported that sometimes she feels likes she wants “‘to run away as far as I can.’” At the end of the interview, and at M.R.’s request, the social worker and M.R. talked with mother about the possibility of M.R. living with Michael B. When M.R. asked if she could live with Michael B. during the week and see mother on the weekends, mother said no and explained that she needed M.R. and that M.R. was mother’s “strength.”

Mother told the social worker that her mother had just thrown her out of the house because she did not contribute enough to the household. Mother intended to use hotel vouchers until she could find suitable housing. Mother also “admitted to a significant substance abuse history.” Mother stated that she had been clean for four years but had relapsed, once before she met D.D.’s father, and then again recently when she smoked marijuana once and twice used methamphetamine. Mother stated that she immediately realized her mistake and enrolled in a substance abuse program. Mother reported that she had been clean for 90 days and was doing well in the program, an assertion the program also confirmed.

The social worker observed that mother and M.R. have “a very open communication system” and that mother has a very close bond with both children. Despite her drug problem, the social worker reported that mother “is very dedicated to her children’s well being.” Therefore, the social worker recommended that the children remain with mother and that she receive family maintenance services.

In an addendum to the jurisdiction report, the social worker stated that mother had tested positive for methamphetamine during a random drug test and had initially denied using the drug. Mother later called the social worker and apologized for being dishonest and confirmed that she had twice used methamphetamine. Mother explained that she had put the drug in her milk, not to get high but only to get energy. Mother and D.D. were living in the home of a family friend at the time. M.R. was living with Michael B.’s parents, whom M.R. considered to be her grandparents, where mother had temporarily allowed the child to stay so that M.R. would have a stable home and finish the school year at one school. The social worker did not change the original recommendation that the children continue in mother’s care and that mother be provided with family maintenance services.

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on April 21, 2004, the trial court found the allegations of the amended petition to be true, and ordered that the children be continued in their placement with mother. The trial court also ordered DPSS to provide mother with services.

In June, the social worker filed an ex parte application asking the trial court to authorize mental health services for mother and M.R. According to that application, M.R. had refused to go home with her mother, and had expressed a desire to live permanently with Michael B.’s parents. Both mother and M.R. wanted to participate in counseling in order to improve their relationship. The trial court granted that request.

In September, DPSS filed a section 387 petition alleging that the previous disposition had been ineffective in protecting M.R. and D.D. because, among other things, mother had continued to use methamphetamine, had failed to complete her service plan, and was currently homeless. M.R. continued to live with Michael B.’s parents and refused to live with mother not only because mother did not have stable housing and M.R. was tired of moving around, but also because M.R. feared mother’s boyfriend (D.D.’s father). Michael B.’s parents reported that M.R. was fearful that her mother was going to come and take her from their home. They reported having to sleep some nights at the home of a neighbor because M.R. was so fearful her mother would come during the night to pick her up.

Mother was living in a motel with D.D. at the time, and did not want to go to an in-patient drug program because she was looking for a place to live with D.D.’s father. Mother later moved from the motel without telling DPSS. Several days later mother contacted the social worker. Mother had still not enrolled in a drug treatment program and again was living in a motel. After mother failed to keep an appointment, the social worker met her at the motel where mother then was living and took D.D. into custody. Although mother denied current drug use, the social worker reported that mother had what appeared to be open speed bumps on her face. The social worker also removed M.R. from mother’s custody and formally placed the child with Michael B.’s parents.

Following a detention hearing on the section 387 petition, the trial court detained the children and set the matter for a contested jurisdiction hearing. On October 21, 2004, the trial court conducted a combined six-month review hearing on the amended petition and a jurisdiction hearing on the section 387 petition pursuant to which DPSS removed the children from mother’s custody.

In the report prepared for the review hearing, the social worker recommended that M.R. continue in her placement with the B.’s and that D.D. be placed with his maternal grandmother. Mother had not completed a drug treatment program, continued to use drugs, failed to complete her family maintenance plan, and continued to struggle with housing, having lived in six different places, three of which were motels, over the past nine months. Mother acknowledged that she needed to separate from D.D.’s father. She also acknowledged that she needed help to overcome her lack of self-esteem which she believed was the result of her own mother paying more attention to her boyfriends than she paid to mother and mother’s siblings.

M.R. was happy and felt safe living with the B.’s because they provided her with a stable home, food, and supervision. M.R. told the social worker that the B.’s made sure she attended school and encouraged her to have friends and to participate in extracurricular activities.

The report for the jurisdiction hearing on the section 387 supplemental petition included similar information, namely that mother had not made progress on her case plan, had not pursued drug treatment, had not found a stable living arrangement, and was still involved with D.D.’s father even though DPSS had informed mother that such involvement could be detrimental to her progress. M.R. was reported to have told the social worker that she did not like to talk with her mother over the phone because “‘she makes me feel bad all the time and I cry.’” M.R. reported that she did not want to live with her mother “‘because she keeps picking boyfriends that I don’t like. And every time I live with her she gets kicked out and we have to move to different places and then I have to make new friends.” M.R. reported having recurring nightmares about having to live with mother. M.R. also openly discussed incidents that occurred when she lived with mother; including the fact that mother would go out at night and be gone for a long time. M.R. also stated that she once had found a bag of weed in one of her mother’s drawers.^[4] In addition, M.R. said that she found a pipe, which she described as a “glass thing with two circles on it,” that is used for smoking weed.

At the combined hearing, the trial court made the requisite jurisdiction findings on the section 387 supplemental petition and removed M.R. and D.D. from mother’s custody. The trial court ordered that D.D. continue in his placement with maternal grandmother and further authorized mother to live with D.D. upon specified conditions. With respect to M.R. the trial court ordered that she continue in her placement with the B.’s, that she and mother participate in conjoint counseling, and that D.D. and M.R. have sibling visits a minimum of once per week. In connection with the six-month review hearing on the second amended petition, the trial court, among other things, ordered six additional months of reunification services for mother.

By the time of the next review hearing, set for April 21, 2005, mother was living with D.D. in the home of her mother. She had made progress on her case plan and DPSS was recommending that D.D. be placed with mother and that she receive six additional months of service. As for M.R., the social worker reported that she is smart and articulate. “She is able to let you know what she wants, how she feels, and what she thinks is right or wrong.” The social worker also reported that M.R.’s therapist says she has never seen a child so terrified at the thought of returning to her mother. M.R. was still living with the B.’s, whom she referred to as her “grandparents.” M.R. did not want to live with her mother but regretted that she could not see her brother, whom she appeared to love very much, more often than once a week. According to the social worker, M.R. “has put some distance as to her mother because she appears to be afraid to be with her. According to [M.R.], she chooses not to have visits with her mother and only cares to see her brother.”

Because of the unresolved issues between M.R. and her mother, DPSS concluded that it would be detrimental to return M.R. to her mother’s care. Therefore, DPSS recommended that the court provide mother with six additional months of reunification services.

On the date originally set for the six-month review hearing, the trial court among other things ordered the social worker to submit a report explaining why mother was not getting her visits with M.R. The trial court then continued the hearing.

In accordance with the trial court’s directive, the social worker submitted an addendum report explaining that M.R. does not want to return to her mother’s care or have visits with her mother at the present time. M.R. “has stated that she is scared of her mother and of what might become of her if she was [sic] to return to her mother’s care.” In a letter from M.R.’s therapist, attached as an exhibit to the social worker’s addendum report, the therapist expressed the opinion that M.R. suffers from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of the “abuses she incurred while in her mother’s care.” The therapist explained that M.R. has never wanted to visit with her mother (a concern the therapist had set out in a letter to the social worker in November 2004 which the social worker also submitted) and that M.R. has been “further traumatized” by being forced to visit with her mother. During sessions M.R. shared what the therapist described as numerous incidents in which mother took her anger and frustration out on M.R., including a reported incident of physical abuse, the details of which are not recounted in the letter. M.R. also reported that she had been sexually abused by mother’s boyfriend (D.D.’s father); allegations that mother said were either lies or the result of M.R. coming on to him.

Based on the therapist’s letters, on the date set for the review hearing, M.R.’s attorney made an oral motion to suspend visits between M.R. and mother. The trial court granted that motion, ordered M.R. to undergo a psychological evaluation, and continued the review hearing.

Before the next hearing date, the social worker submitted an addendum report in which she stated that M.R. was glad the court had not forced her to have visits with her mother and that M.R. is only interested in visits with her brother. M.R. and her brother had been having visits every Saturday and M.R. enjoys spending time with him. The social worker also stated that M.R.’s therapist reported M.R. was willing to participate in conjoint therapy with her mother and that the therapist had scheduled the first session, which mother was unable to make because she had to take D.D. to the doctor. Mother also missed the second therapy session but apparently did not contact either the therapist or the social worker to explain why she had not attended.^[5]

At the review hearing on June 13, 2005, the trial court, among other things, ordered six additional months of reunification services for mother and M.R. The court also ordered that visits between M.R. and mother were to occur only during their conjoint therapy sessions.

By the next review hearing,^[6] the social worker recommended that reunification services with respect to M.R. be terminated. According to the social worker’s report, mother had been inconsistent in attending conjoint therapy sessions with M.R. M.R.’s therapist reported, in letters attached as exhibits to the social worker’s report, that mother attended only four of the 15 scheduled conjoint therapy sessions The purpose of those sessions was to allow M.R. an opportunity to explain to her mother why she did not want to live with her. According to M.R.’s therapist, M.R. felt she could never trust her mother again. When mother did attend sessions, she denied or minimized M.R.’s claims of abuse and trauma. Mother also tried to make M.R. feel guilty about not wanting to live with her. In the therapist’s view, “[M.R.] and her mother seemed to switch roles so that [M.R.] was made to feel responsible for taking care of her mother’s depressed feelings. In summary, conjoint therapy was a failure and also a very painful and hurtful experience [for M.R.].” The therapist recommended that M.R. remain permanently with the B.’s, with whom M.R. appeared to be “very bonded” and had a “trusting relationship.”

M.R. told the social worker that she did not want to live with her mother and asked that the social worker quote her exactly -- “‘I do not want to live with my mother!!!’ (with three exclamation points.)” M.R. wanted visits with her mother and brother, but not long weekend visits.

The social worker expressed the view, based on the foregoing information, that returning M.R. to her mother’s care would be detrimental. The two had many issues that remain to be resolved. The B.’s were interested in becoming M.R.’s legal guardians, a prospect with which M.R. agreed. Therefore, the social worker recommended that mother’s reunification services be terminated with respect to M.R. and that the matter be set for a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.

At the review hearing, mother’s attorney offered and the trial court accepted a stipulation that if mother were called to testify she would state, among other things, that the reason she missed the conjoint therapy sessions is that those sessions occurred at a location that involved a three-hour bus ride each way and also required that she obtain a babysitter for D.D.; that she has weekly visits with M.R. that are going well; and mother would like more time for those visits.

Based on the reports and evidence, the trial court found with respect to M.R. that DPSS had provided reasonable services to mother, that mother had failed to make substantial progress on her case plan, and that there was no substantial probability that M.R. would be returned to mother’s custody if services were continued. Therefore, the trial court terminated mother’s reunification services and set a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.

The trial court conducted the contested selection and implementation hearing on March 16, 2006. In the report prepared for that hearing, the social worker recommended that the trial court terminate mother’s parental rights and establish a permanent plan of adoption for M.R. The social worker reported, in pertinent part, that although the B.’s initially expressed interest in legal guardianship, they and M.R. decided that adoption “is the best option in regards to [M.R.’s] well being.” M.R.’s therapist also supported adoption, noting that adoption by the B.’s is what M.R. wanted and that the stability and security the B.’s provided to M.R. would benefit her immensely. The social worker also reported M.R.’s desire to continue a relationship with her brother.

Mother’s attorney offered and the court accepted a stipulation that if mother were called to testify she would state that she loves M.R. very much, that she wants to continue to have a relationship with M.R., and that she wants M.R. and her brother to continue to have a relationship with each other. The trial court also accepted M.R.’s stipulated testimony in which she stated that she is close to her brother, she loves him very much, and wants to continue their brother-sister relationship after the adoption.

Mother’s attorney urged the trial court to consider legal guardianship rather than adoption as the permanent plan, arguing that both the beneficial parental relationship and the sibling relationship exceptions to termination of parental rights applied. In addition, mother’s attorney asserted that the adoption assessment was incomplete because it did not include information on the criminal and child welfare services backgrounds of the prospective adoptive parents. With respect to the former, DPSS advised the court that the B.’s fingerprints had been obtained and that the B.’s have no criminal history. In addition, the trial court noted that a criminal background check would have been conducted on the B.’s as part of the initial assessment done in order to place M.R. in their home.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated mother’s parental rights and ordered adoption as the permanent plan for M.R. In doing so the trial court found that the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply. Although “a bit more of a closer call,” the trial court also found that the sibling relationship exception was not applicable.

DISCUSSION

We first address mother’s claim that the sibling relationship exception applies in this case and that the trial court abused its discretion in finding otherwise and terminating mother’s parental rights.

1.

THE SIBLING RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION

Adoption is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature. If the trial court finds that a child cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of five exceptions specified in section 366.26, subdivision (c). (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.) One such exception is set out in subdivision (c)(1)(E), of section 366.26, which creates an exception to termination of parental rights where termination would cause a substantial interference with a sibling relationship: “If termination will substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) lists numerous factors the juvenile court is to consider in determining whether the circumstance of any given case warrant [sic] the application of the exception. First a juvenile court must consider the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, factors such as 1) whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, 2) whether the child shared significant common experiences, or 3) whether the child has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling. If the relationship exhibits some or all of these factors, the juvenile court must then go on to balance any benefit, emotional or otherwise, the child would obtain from ongoing contact with the sibling against the benefit of legal permanence the child would obtain through adoption. [Citations.]” (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403; see also § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E); In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 949.) The party asserting the exception has the burden of proving its predicate facts. (In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1119-1120; In re L.Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 951-953.)

As mother correctly points out, the trial court found the question of whether the sibling relationship exception applied to be a closer one than whether the beneficial parental relationship exception precluded termination of mother’s parental rights to M.R. Specifically, the trial court found that M.R. “does have a significant relationship with her sibling.” The court then observed that the relationship between M.R. and her brother would continue because M.R. wants to maintain the relationship, the adoptive parents will allow that to occur, and mother sees the importance in continuing the sibling relationship. Moreover, the trial court referred the parties to mediation in order to facilitate an agreement regarding post-adoption contact between M.R. and her brother. Thus, at the outset the court found that termination of parental rights would not substantially interfere with the sibling relationship.

Mother argues that the trial court’s finding is not supported by substantial evidence because the adoptive parents indicated in the adoption assessment they were not interested in encouraging contact between M.R. and her biological family. The record does not support mother’s assertion. The pertinent section of the preliminary adoption assessment states only that that no post-adoption assessment is suggested or has been signed, but that “[t]he prospective adoptive parents will provide whatever contact with the birth family as deemed is in the best interest of the minor.” Moreover, the trial court noted that in addition to her desire to maintain a relationship with her brother, M.R. has also clearly expressed her desire to be adopted in order to obtain permanence and stability in her life. Weighing that need against the benefit of continued sibling contact, the trial court found that adoption prevailed and was in M.R.’s best interest.

There must be a “compelling reason” for applying the sibling relationship exception. (In re Daniel H. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 804, 813.) This is a “quintessentially discretionary determination.” Thus, we review the juvenile court’s determination for an abuse of discretion. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) Nevertheless, “‘[e]valuating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling. . . . Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge. The reviewing court should interfere only “‘if [it] find[s] that under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no judge could reasonably have made the order that he did.’ . . .”’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)

The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in finding that the benefit M.R. would receive from adoption outweighed the benefit the child would receive from maintaining her relationship with her brother. Accordingly, we must reject mother’s contrary claim.

2.

ADOPTION AS THE PERMANENT PLAN

As a purported separate claim, but one we view as an adjunct to her claim that the sibling relationship exception to parental rights termination applies in this case, mother contends that the trial court should have ordered legal guardianship, rather than adoption, as the permanent plan for M.R.

As previously stated, once the court found that M.R. could not be returned to mother and also found that M.R. was likely to be adopted, the trial court was required to select adoption as the permanent plan unless the court found that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to M.R. because one of the five exceptions specified in section 366.26 applied. (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.) We have addressed and rejected mother’s claim that the sibling relationship exception precluded termination of parental rights. Mother does not expressly assert that any other exception is applicable. Instead, mother contends only that the evidence showed M.R. loved mother but was not ready to live with her, and therefore guardianship would have been the better permanent plan.

The trial court was not at liberty to order legal guardianship as the permanent plan for M.R. unless it found that one of the exceptions to termination of parental rights applied. Consequently, we will construe mother’s assertion as a claim that the beneficial parental relationship exception applies and thus precludes termination of mother’s parental rights. All the evidence presented in the trial court, recounted above, from M.R.’s stated preference for adoption, to the opinion of M.R.’s psychologist that M.R. would benefit greatly from adoption, supports the trial court’s finding that the beneficial parental relationship exception does not apply in this case. Mother has not demonstrated otherwise and therefore we must reject her claim.

3.

ADOPTABILITY FINDING

As her final challenge, mother contends that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that M.R. is likely to be adopted and therefore the trial court erred in terminating mother’s parental rights. Specifically, mother argues that the trial court found M.R. to be adoptable based solely on the fact that the B.’s wanted to adopt the child. Mother claims that finding was defective because at the time of the section 366.26 hearing, the B.’s had not actually been approved to adopt M.R.

Mother’s argument is based on the apparent incorrect view that the trial court must find M.R. will actually be adopted. Section 366.26 requires the trial court to find that the child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) “The issue of adoptability posed in a section 366.26 hearing focuses on the minor, e.g., whether the minor’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor. [Citations.] Hence it is not necessary that the minor already be in a potential adoptive home or that there be a proposed adoptive parent ‘waiting in the wings.’ [Citations.]” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) A child may be generally adoptable, i.e., any prospective adoptive parent would want to adopt the child. (See In re Jayson T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 75, 88, disapproved of on other grounds in In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396.) When a child is generally adoptable, and the trial court’s adoptability finding is made on that ground, inquiry into the suitability of a specific potential adoptive family is irrelevant. (In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1650.)

Evidence that there are specific prospective adoptive parents willing to adopt the child is also sufficient to support a trial court’s finding that the child is likely to be adopted. (In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1649-1650.) When a child who might otherwise be considered unadoptable due to the child’s age, poor physical health or other factor nevertheless is found to be adoptable because a prospective adoptive family is willing to adopt the child, “an inquiry may be made into whether there is any legal impediment to adoption by that parent . . . .” (Id. at p. 1650.)

The trial court in this case did not make a general adoptability finding but instead relied on the fact that the B.’s were willing to adopt M.R. as the basis for finding that she was likely to be adopted. Therefore, under the principle cited above, an inquiry into whether there are any impediments to adoption may be made. Mother’s inquiry here focuses on the fact that at the time of the section 366.26 hearing, DPSS had not yet received written results of the adoptive parents’ criminal backgrounds and prior referrals for child abuse or neglect. Mother argues that the lack of such information is an impediment that precluded the trial court from making its adoptability finding.

Mother concedes that at the selection and implementation hearing, the social worker advised the court that a fingerprint search had been conducted and the B.’s did not have any criminal history. Mother asserts that the social worker’s representation “falls short of what is required by statute.” The statutes in question, section 366.21, subdivision (i)(4) and section 366.22, subdivision (b)(4), require, as pertinent here, “[a] preliminary assessment of the eligibility and commitment of any identified prospective adoptive parent or legal guardian, particularly the caretaker, to include a social history including screening for criminal records and prior referrals for child abuse or neglect . . . .” (§§ 366.21, subd. (i)(4), 366.22. subd. (b)(4).) Neither statute specifies the manner either of conducting or reporting the results of the pertinent inquiry, mother’s suggestion to the contrary notwithstanding. An investigation based on a fingerprint search, the results of which are orally reported to the court by the social worker, is sufficient to determine whether a prospective adoptive parent has a criminal history.

In addition, and as the trial court pointed out at the selection and implementation hearing, DPSS necessarily conducted a criminal background check on the B.’s at the time DPSS approved M.R.’s placement in their home. Such an investigation is required under section 362.7 when a nonrelative extended family member is being considered for placement of a child.^[7] Mother does not claim otherwise.

We conclude the trial court’s finding that M.R. is adoptable is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1153-1154; see also In re John F. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1378 [“[E]ven if the assessment is incomplete in some respects, the court will look to the totality of the evidence; deficiencies will go to the weight of the evidence and may ultimately prove insignificant. [Citation.] Substantial compliance with the assessment provisions has been deemed enough. [Citation.]”].) Accordingly, we reject mother’s contrary claim.

DISPOSITION

The orders appealed from are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

/s/ McKinster

J.

We concur:

/s/ Ramirez

P.J.

/s/ Miller

J.

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^[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless indicated otherwise.

^[2] M.R. and D.D. do not have the same father. M.R. has never met her father and he was not located in the course of the dependency.

^[3] Michael B. is a former boyfriend of mother’s whom M.R. once believed was her father but has since come to view as her stepfather. M.R. described Michael B. to the social worker as the “bestest dad I’ve ever had in my whole life.”

^[4] The social worker asked M.R. how she knew it was weed, and M.R. replied that it appeared to be a green-type plant that was kept in plastic bags.

^[5] The social worker does not mention the psychological evaluation of M.R. that the trial court had ordered, nor does the record include any information regarding such an evaluation.

^[6] The reports identify the hearing as a 12-month review under section 366.21, subdivision (f).

^[7] Section 362.7 provides in pertinent part that, “When the home of a nonrelative extended family member is being considered for placement of a child, the home shall be evaluated, and approval of that home shall be granted or denied, pursuant to the same standards set forth in the regulations for the licensing of foster family homes which prescribe standards . . . for basic personal care, supervision, and services provided by the caregiver.”