In re M.S.H.

Filed 6/8/07 In re M.S.H. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Deborah Daniel, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI,  21.) Affirmed.

Kate M. Chandler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant John H.

Diana W. Prince, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant M.C.

Ruth E. Stringer, County Counsel, Phebe W. Chu, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors.

John H. (Father) and Monica C. (Mother) appeal from the juvenile courts order terminating their parental rights as to 9-year-old A.H., 6-year-old M.S.H., and 3-year-old M.H. On appeal, the parents contend (1) the juvenile court prejudicially erred in denying their request for a continuance of the contested Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26^[1]hearing; and (2) there was substantial evidence to support the beneficial relationship exception to the termination of parental rights pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The children came to the attention of the San Bernardino County Department of Childrens Services (DCS) when Father failed to pick up A.H. from school. He reportedly returned for A.H. three or more hours later than scheduled. When Father returned, he was arrested on outstanding arrest warrants pertaining to his failure to register as a sex offender and welfare fraud. The family was reportedly residing in a motor home parked behind a store and had been homeless for about six months before that. Mother was six months pregnant and was no longer taking her medication for bipolar disorder due to the pregnancy. Father also had bipolar disorder and was taking medication. The children were taken into protective custody.

The family has had numerous prior referrals to DCS, with substantiated allegations of physical and emotional abuse by Mother. Father and Mother also had a criminal history. A counselor with the Oasis Counseling Center (Oasis), a program that serves the mentally ill and homeless population, informed the social worker that she had worked extensively with the family in an attempt to stabilize their living situation, without success. The family had been receiving services from Oasis since May 2003.

On February 4, 2004, DCS filed petitions on behalf of A.H. and M.S.H. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). At the detention hearing the following day, the court detained the children in foster care and ordered reunification services to the parents pending a further hearing.

By March 29, 2004, the parents still appeared to be transient. In addition, Father had discontinued his psychiatry services after his release from jail, and Mother discontinued her medication altogether. The social worker opined that the parents mental health issues were not being appropriately addressed and that despite all of the resources Father noted were at his disposal, the parents remained in the same condition as when the children were taken into protective custody.

On April 12, 2004, the court sustained the section 300, subdivision (b) allegations but made no findings as to the subdivision (g) allegations. The children were declared dependents of the court. The parents were offered reunification services and ordered to participate.

On April 22, 2004, DCS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of newborn M.H. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j).

As of April 23, 2004, the parents still remained transient, and M.H. was taken into protective custody. When the parents came to visit with the older children, they were provided with referrals for mental health services, therapy, parenting classes, and housing assistance. However, as of May 2004, the parents had failed to follow through with their referrals. In addition, at visits they needed to be prompted on what was appropriate care for a newborn baby, and Father had to be prompted to even interact with M.H. At one visit, Mother did not attend to the baby for about 15 minutes, and when she did, she held the baby incorrectly. In addition, she began to feed the baby but then handed her to six‑year-old A.H.

By October 2004, although the parents still had housing issues, Father had a temporary job and had applied for Veterans Affairs (VA) benefits. In addition, the parents had maintained regular contact with DCS and had been very cooperative with the social worker, showing a willingness to comply with their service plan. They began taking their medication and attending counseling sessions. Mother had also shown a marked improvement in her parenting skills. The parents and the children looked forward to the visits, and the children became sad to leave them. The baby also appeared to have a sense of who her parents were. Further, the parents had been present, punctual, and patient for their twice weekly one-hour visits. The social worker opined that the visits went well and that there was a very close bond between the parents and the children; she therefore recommended unsupervised visits when Father was available to supervise. Though the children were developing well in their foster homes and had adjusted very well to their foster family, M.S.H. expressed a desire to live with his parents.

The parents were provided with six more months of reunification services and unsupervised visitation on October 13, 2004.

By April 2005, the social worker recommended terminating reunification services, as the parents still did not have housing, employment, or any additional sources of income to facilitate the childrens return to their custody. Although Father qualified for VA benefits, he refused to complete the necessary paperwork or meet with staff at the VA office. Mother was receiving partial financial assistance from her father, but she had failed to follow through with securing assistance from Regional Center Services, and she continued to mislead the social worker into believing she was actively seeking services. In addition, the parents misled the social worker into believing that Father was employed by a temporary agency. When the social worker contacted the temporary agency, she was informed that Father had not worked for them since May 2003. Additionally, the parents still had housing issues and remained transient, even though numerous efforts by DCS and others had been made to secure housing for them. Mother remained on active probation, and Father had an outstanding warrant against him for his failure to appear at a hearing. On the positive side, the parents had maintained regular visits with the children, and the visits usually went well. The parents had also completed parenting classes, maintained therapy, and complied with their medication.

At the May 5, 2005, 12-month contested review hearing, the contest was resolved when DCS agreed to extend reunification services for the full 18 months, until August 3, 2005. Mother agreed that she would participate in an assessment to determine if she was eligible for, and then participate in, services through the Regional Center. Father indicated that he understood that he had to secure adequate housing within the next three months.

By August 3, 2005, the social worker again recommended terminating reunification services. The parents continued to live a transient lifestyle despite numerous referrals and provided conflicting stories about their residence. However, the parents continued to visit the children regularly, and the children enjoyed the visits. Both A.H. and M.S.H. were closely bonded to the parents and still anticipated returning to their care. M.H. tolerated the visits but eagerly looked forward to being returned to her foster mother. The children also continued to develop well in their placement and had bonded well with their caregivers. The childrens foster parents were bonded with the children as well and were willing to adopt them and maintain visits with the parents.

The 18-month contested review hearing was held on August 29, 2005. Following presentation of evidence, the court found that the parents did not have a safe home for the children, that they had failed to regularly participate in their court-ordered treatment plans, and that they both had active felony warrants. The court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.

On September 14, 2005, M.H. was placed in the same foster home as her siblings after M.H.s foster mother reported she could no longer care for M.H. for personal reasons. M.H. was doing well and appeared comfortable in her new home. Both parents were pleased to have all three siblings placed together.

The social worker reported that the childrens prospective adoptive parents were willing and able to adopt all three children and that the children were appropriate for adoption due to their ages. A.H. informed the social worker that she liked where she was living, but she missed her mother. M.S.H. told the social worker that he also liked where he was living. A.H. and M.S.H. had been residing with the prospective adoptive parents since February 2005. The children appeared to be very close and bonded with each other as well as to their caretakers. The social worker observed that the children went to their caretakers for hugs and kisses and to get their needs met. The prospective adoptive parents stated that they loved the children and wanted to give them a permanent home.

However, by January 2006, the parents had drastically changed their circumstances, and the children were returned to their care on a family maintenance plan. Father had secured income from VA benefits in the amount of $846 per month and a stable residence. He also had his outstanding warrants discharged, had completed his parenting and anger management classes, had continued to receive counseling services and medication, and was approved to receive Social Security Administration benefits. Mother also had completed a parenting class; obtained appropriate housing; complied with her medication; resolved her outstanding warrants; and resided with Father, who had sufficient income to maintain the home and provide for the children.

At a January 20, 2006, hearing, the juvenile court found that there had been a change of circumstances and vacated the section 366.26 hearing.

In February 2006, the social worker reported that the children had transitioned back into their parents home and appeared healthy and adequately cared for. A.H. and M.S.H. both indicated that they enjoyed being with their parents. M.H. responded well to her fathers directions but did not appear to be bonding with Mother, since Mother did not spend any time with her. Instead, Mother devoted her time volunteering as a receptionist while Father cared for the children. The parents were apparently not living together at this time. Mother stated that she lived next door because the church did not condone their living together while unmarried. Father reported that they had an amicable relationship, but Mother did not sleep there; he allowed her to come over sometimes. It appeared as though Father was frustrated with Mother not taking a motherly role in the care of the children; Father was their primary caregiver. Mother was referred to a parenting class but failed to enroll. On some occasions, the parents had allowed a few friends (some of whom they had known for a very short period) to care for the children. They had referred these friends to be live-scanned; however, those people had failed to follow through with completing the process. It was also reported that Father was experiencing the manic phase of his bipolar disorder; nonetheless, Father remained calm and affable toward the children, and it did not appear as though the children were being neglected.

Nonetheless, three months later, DCS filed a supplemental petition pursuant to section 387, alleging that the parents had allowed unauthorized persons to care for the children; that Father had caused a fire at his apartment due to negligently storing combustible items in the water heater compartment despite several warnings about the dangers involved; and that effective May 17, 2006, the parents were to be evicted due to nonpayment of rent and noncompliance with their lease agreement. In addition, Father had allowed his homeless friends to stay in the home and the adjacent garage, and the police had to be called on numerous occasions due to drunken disturbances and fights between Fathers friends.

On May 19, 2006, the juvenile court found a prima facie case established for detention, and the children were removed from their parents.

The social worker recommended that the section 387 petition be sustained, that reunification services be terminated, and that a section 366.26 hearing be set. Father had failed to follow court orders or the directives of DCS by allowing unauthorized persons to care for the children and responding in a belligerent manner. The social worker observed, and A.H. confirmed, that the parents had frequently allowed questionable individuals to stay in the home and sleep in the childrens rooms or beds. In addition, the family was evicted on May 17, 2006, and the parents reverted back to their old ways, despite being given numerous referrals and assistance. In fact, A.H. and M.S.H. reported that there were times when they had no food and had to ask neighbors for food. They asked if they could be returned to their former foster parents.

At the contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the court found the children came within section 387, ordered them removed from the parents, and placed them in foster care. The court also found that reasonable reunification services had been provided and terminated services. Weekly visitation was ordered, and the parents were ordered to return for the section 366.26 hearing on October 25, 2006.

By September 2006, the children had been placed back in the home of their former foster parents, who remained interested in adopting all three children.

The adoption assessment report indicated that the children were appropriate for adoption, due to their ages and their current caretakers willingness to pursue adoption. A.H. stated that she liked where she was living but that she missed her father. The children had readjusted to being in the home of their former foster parents, were attached to them, and appeared to be doing well. The parents had moved to Arizona and had not visited with the children or inquired about them since August 2006. The social worker recommended suspension of visitation due to the parents lack of interest and to avoid further instability in the childrens lives.

The parents were not present at the section 366.26 hearing on October 25, 2006, and the matter was set contested by their respective counsel. The parents failed to appear for the November 6, 2006, contested hearing, and Fathers counsel requested a continuance to determine the status of Fathers hospitalization. The court granted the request, and the matter was continued to November 15, 2006.

The parents again failed to appear at the November 15, 2006, hearing, and both their counsel requested another continuance. Mothers counsel indicated that Mother had contacted her office at about 8:15 a.m. that day and stated that she was still in Arizona and was not going to be able to attend the hearing because of car trouble. Fathers counsel stated that her office received a phone call at about 9:20 a.m. that day stating that the parents were having car trouble and were unable to attend the hearing. The court denied the continuance requests, stating: This is the second time that there has been a contested hearing set. These parents voluntarily chose to move out of state knowing that they had very limited resources for transportation purposes. There has been adequate notice of the hearing today. The Court sees this as just a further attempt to delay the proceedings. Request for continuance denied.

The court thereafter received the relevant social workers reports into evidence. The parents counsel did not have any affirmative evidence to present but objected to the termination of parental rights and asserted the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights. Counsel for DCS disputed the parents contention of a beneficial relationship and argued that the parents had not visited the children since August 2006, when they moved to Arizona, so the existence of a bond was questionable and was not significant enough to prevent the termination of parental rights.

The juvenile court responded, I am also considering the evidence reports on the issue of the parental bond. It appears that the children as a sibling group are well-bonded together, that the eldest child [A.H.] who is 8, almost 9, understands adoption, wants to remain with her siblings and interestingly has expressed missing contact with her father. There doesnt appear to be any reference to the mother. [] I do think that it is very clear that despite any bond that exists, for a significant period of time the parents have not maintained a parental relationship that is truly a parental relationship. There was nothing more than visiting and any beneficial relationship with the parents is far outweighed by the benefits of permanence of all three of the children in maintaining their placement together with prospective adoptive parents. Based on the social workers reports, [A.H.]s wishes consistent with her age, and the best interests of all three children, the court then found by clear and convincing evidence that it was likely that the children would be adopted and terminated parental rights.

I

DISCUSSION

A. Denial of Request for Continuance

The parents claim the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied their request for a continuance of the contested section 366.26 hearing. We disagree.

Section 352, subdivision (a) provides that continuances shall be granted only on a showing of good cause and that written notice shall be filed at least two days prior to the date set for hearing, together with affidavits or declarations detailing specific facts showing that a continuance is necessary, unless the court for good cause entertains an oral motion for continuance. Moreover, no continuance shall be granted that is contrary to the interest of the minor. In considering the minors interests, the court shall give substantial weight to a minors need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements. ( 352, subd. (a); accord, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.550(a).)

The policy articulated in section 352 has been interpreted as an express discouragement of continuances. [Citation.] The courts denial of a request for continuance will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] Discretion is abused when a decision is arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd and results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citation.] (In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 179-180; accord, In re Ninfa S. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 808, 810-811; In re Emily L. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 734, 743.)

In the present case, the parents failed to comply with (or give a reasonable explanation of why they failed to comply with) the statutory requirement that requests for continuances be in writing and filed at least two court days before the hearing. (See  352, subd. (a).) Their last minute bare, unproven assertion of car trouble was not sufficient showing of good cause warranting a continuance. The parents had been given timely notice of the hearing, which had been continued several times before. As the court pointed out, the parents voluntarily moved out of state knowing that they had very limited resources for transportation purposes. Moreover, delay of the [section 366.26] hearing would have interfered with [the childrens] need for prompt resolution of [their] custody status and [their] right to a permanent placement . . . . (In re Ninfa S., supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 811.) The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it found a failure to show good cause and denied the oral request for a continuance at the section 366.26 hearing. (See In re Karla C., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 179-180; In re Ninfa S., supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 810-811.)

Father also claims that the courts denial of a continuance amounted to a de facto failure to grant a contested hearing, which amounted to a violation of his due process right. He argues that, had a contested hearing been held, he would have presented evidence showing his efforts to maintain regular visitation and contact, as required by the exception to adoption contained in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). We conclude there was no error.

The procedural stage of this proceeding is a relevant consideration here. At the section 366.22 hearing, the court terminates reunification and must order that a hearing be held pursuant to section 366.26 to develop a permanent plan for the minor. The permanency planning hearing under section 366.22 is the parents last hope to avert termination of parental rights. (Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 758.) By the section 366.26 hearing, the focus has switched to the child. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) Hence, In re Johnny M. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 181, upon which Father relies, is irrelevant because that case involved a parents right to a contested 18-month review hearing before termination of reunification services.

The courts focus at the section 366.26 hearing is on planning an alternative to the [childrens] return to mother [and/or] father. (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418.) Once having found that the children here were likely to be adopted, the court is authorized by section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) to terminate parental rights, subject only to six narrow exceptions listed in subdivision (c)(1)(A)-(F). Only one exception is relevant here, subdivision (c)(1)(A): The parents or guardians have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.

A parent does have [the] right to due process at the hearing under section 366.26 which results in the actual termination of parental rights. This requires, in particular circumstances, a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine and controvert the contents of the report. [Citations.] But due process is not synonymous with full-fledged cross-examination rights. [Citation.] Due process is a flexible concept which depends upon the circumstances and a balancing of various factors. [Citation.] The due process right to present evidence is limited to relevant evidence of significant probative value to the issue before the court. [Citations.] Even where cross-examination is involved, the trial court may properly request an offer of proof if an entire line of cross-examination appears to the court to be irrelevant to the issue before the court. [Citations.] (In re Jeanette V. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 811, 816-817.)

Here, as noted the only issue relevant to the parents was whether they maintained regular visitation and contact with the child[ren] and the child[ren] would benefit from continuing the relationship ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)). Mothers counsel asked that the court consider the prior report submitted in this case. Counsel explained, All along the reports have indicated that there is a bond between the children and the parents particularly in January of this year when the parents 388 petition was granted. The social worker indicated that the children have always expressed their desire to return to their parents. They are very closely bonded to their parents. Fathers counsel joined in Mothers counsels comments in asking the court to consider the prior records that have indicated . . . that the parents have a bond with their children.

The court did consider the evidence of the reports on the issue of the parental bond. It was essentially uncontested that the parents had made regular contact with the children and had a bond with them up until August 2006, when they moved to Arizona. Therefore, given the statutory requirements and lack of offers of proof, as a matter of due process, the parents representations were insufficient to warrant a full-fledged contested hearing. (In re Jeanette V., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 817; see also Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1147-1148 [at section 366.3 hearing, after termination of reunification services, no error in denying contested hearing of mothers offer of proof about quality of recent visits and excuses for infrequency of earlier visits].)

Moreover, we note the parents were provided a contested selection and implementation hearing, at which the issue was uncontested. Their counsel were in no way prevented from offering expert evidence at the contested selection and implementation hearing, if any such evidence was available, and to cross-examine the social worker. The hearing had been continued many times; counsel had a full opportunity to develop and present evidence on the parents bond with their children, had it been desired.

Further, even if we find the courts denial of a continuance was tantamount to a denial of the parents due process rights for a contested selection and implementation hearing, on this record, we confidently conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that no different result would have been obtained had the parents request for a continuance been granted. Accordingly, even under the most stringent test of prejudice applicable to a denial of due process, remand for a contested hearing would constitute an idle act, and the juvenile courts error must be seen as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Laura H. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1696.)

B. Beneficial Relationship Exception

The parents also argue that the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the beneficial relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (a)(1)(A) to preclude termination of their parental rights because the parents had a strong bond with the children.

At a section 366.26 hearing, the court determines a permanent plan of care for a dependent child. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 50.) Adoption is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573.) If the court finds that a child may not be returned to his or her parents and is likely to be adopted, it must select adoption as the permanent plan, unless it finds that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the six exceptions set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) through (F). (See In re Jamie R. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

The parental benefit or beneficial relationship exception is set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). (In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1206.) The exception applies where [t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the minor and the minor would benefit from continuing the relationship. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826, quoting 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) The parent has the burden of proving that the exception applies. (Derek W., at p. 826.) The parent must do more than demonstrate frequent and loving contact[,] [citation] an emotional bond with the child, or that parent and child find their visits pleasant. [Citation.] Instead, the parent must show that he or she occupies a parental role in the childs life. (Id. at p. 827.)

The parent must also show that his or her relationship with the child promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parents rights are not terminated. (In re Derek W., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 827, quoting In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)

 . . . The balancing of competing considerations must be performed on a case-by-case basis and take into account many variables, including the age of the child, the portion of the childs life spent in the parents custody, the positive or negative effect of interaction between parent and child, and the childs particular needs. [Citation.] When the benefits from a stable and permanent home provided by adoption outweigh the benefits from a continued parent/child relationship, the court should order adoption. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1349-1350, quoting In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 811.)

Where a biological parent . . . is incapable of functioning in [a parental] role, the child should be given every opportunity to bond with an individual who will assume the role of a parent. [Citation.] Thus, a child should not be deprived of an adoptive parent when the natural parent has maintained a relationship that may be beneficial to some degree but does not meet the childs need for a parent. It would make no sense to forgo adoption in order to preserve parental rights in the absence of a real parental relationship. (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) One court has observed, The benefit exception found in section 366. 26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) may be the most unsuccessfully litigated issue in the history of law. (In re Eileen A. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1255, fn. 5, disapproved on other grounds in In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413-414.)

There must be a compelling reason for applying the parental benefit exception. (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349.) This is a quintessentially discretionary determination. Thus, we review the juvenile courts determination for an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 1351.) Nevertheless, [e]valuating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling. . . .  Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge. The reviewing court should interfere only if [it] find[s] that under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial courts action, no judge could reasonably have made the order that he did. . . . [Citations.] (Ibid.)^[2]

Here, it is certainly undisputed that the parents had satisfactorily demonstrated that they had maintained contact with the children through consistent visitation up until August 2006 when they moved to Arizona, that the visits had gone well, and that the parents were appropriate at the visits. Father and Mother have failed to show, however, that the children would benefit from continuing the relationship. As stated above, the parent must show more than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits. [Citation.] Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. . . . The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. [Citation.] [Citation.] The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the childs life, resulting in a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. [Citations.] (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 953-954, quoting In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) In other words, for the exception to apply, the emotional attachment between the child and parent must be that of parent and child rather than one of being a friendly visitor or friendly nonparent relative, such as an aunt. [Citation.] (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)

In the present matter, there was insufficient evidence that the children would benefit more from continuing their parent-child relationship with the parents than from adoption. There is substantial evidence to support a finding that the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement [with the parents as had been demonstrated when the section 388 petition was granted] did not outweigh the sense of belonging a new [adoptive] family would confer on the children. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Although the children, especially A.H. and M.S.H., may have received some benefit from continuing their relationship with the parents, the court could reasonably conclude that benefit was not sufficiently great when compared to the significant benefit they would receive from a stable, permanent home with adoptive parents. (Ibid.) When the children were returned to parental custody in January 2006, the parents did not truly occupy a parental role and did not provide the children with the basic necessities or meet their needs. Father allowed unauthorized persons to provide child care, to live in their home, to sleep in the childrens beds, and to eat the childrens food. The children, after being returned to parental care, again often went without anything to eat and had to beg neighbors for food, even though they were told not to do so. Additionally, when the family was on the verge of being evicted from their home, the parents did not make any alternative housing arrangements for the children. Mother was totally disconnected from her role as a parent and did not even try to parent her children; she did not even live with them and only visited them occasionally.

Though the children missed their parents and wanted to visit with them after they were removed from their care for a second time, they quickly asked to be returned to their prospective adoptive parents. The children were closely bonded with their prospective adoptive parents and had lived in their home for over one year before they were returned to their parents. After family maintenance failed, the children immediately asked to be placed back with their prospective adoptive parents. We find that the juvenile court reasonably could conclude that any bond that existed between the parents and the children was not sufficiently great to outweigh the benefits of adoption to the children based on the evidence in this case. The children are doing well in their prospective adoptive familys home. There is no evidence that the children would be harmed -- much less greatly harmed (see In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 953) -- by severing their parent-child relationship with Father and Mother.

The juvenile court thus properly found that the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of Fathers and Mothers parental rights did not apply. The court therefore did not err in terminating parental rights.

III

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RICHLI

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P.J.

McKINSTER

J.

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^[1] All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.

^[2] We note that courts have reached different conclusions as to the standard of review that applies to a juvenile courts ruling on exceptions to adoptability under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). In In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 567, the court held that a finding that no exceptional circumstances exist to prevent the termination of parental rights is reviewed under the substantial evidence test. (Id. at pp. 575-576.) In contrast, in In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal. App.4th 1339, the court applied the abuse of discretion standard of review. (Id. at pp. 1351-1352.) For purposes of the present case, it makes no difference which standard applies because, as discussed below, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err under either test.