Filed 12/13/17 In re Nathaniel R. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


In re NATHANIEL R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. H043861
H044022
(Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 115 JD023445)

SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN’S SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E. R.,

Defendant and Appellant.


Appellant E. R. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s finding that proper notice had been given as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA). We find no merit to her challenge and affirm the juvenile court’s September 2016 order.

I. Background
Mother’s nine-year-old son, Nathaniel R., was detained on September 7, 2015 after mother was hospitalized. Mother had more than a dozen prior referrals including three in 2015. The whereabouts of Nathaniel’s alleged father, J. F. (father), whom Nathaniel had never met, were unknown.
On September 8, 2015, the social worker interviewed mother, and mother told the social worker that there was “no Native American ancestry on the maternal side of the family” and that father “does not have Native American ancestry.”
Mother asked that Nathaniel be placed with maternal grandmother, Sandra R., but she “declined to provide contact information.” Nathaniel reported that his grandmother “could be in Mexico,” and that his grandfather “lives in a shelter.” Father was soon located in state prison, where he had been incarcerated since May 2015 for domestic violence convictions.
On September 10, 2015, mother completed and signed an “ICWA-020” form. She checked the box for “I have no Indian ancestry as far as I know.” However, maternal grandfather, Roy R., told the social worker “that he believes there is Cherokee ancestry on the maternal side of the family.”
In September 2015, the social worker sent ICWA notices to the three federally recognized Cherokee tribes, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the Secretary of the Interior. The September notices contained the parents’ names and birth dates, maternal grandmother’s name and birth date, maternal grandfather’s name, birth date and address, maternal great-grandmother’s name, birth date and death date, and maternal great-grandfather’s name and year of death. No information about paternal relatives was included in the September notices. All three Cherokee tribes responded that, based on the information provided, Nathaniel was not eligible for tribal membership.
On October 2, 2015, Sandra R. contacted the social worker and told her that “she cannot support reunification services because she resides several hours away and does not have access to transportation.” Mother told the social worker that she would like Roy R. to be assessed for placement, although he had no residence and lived “in a shelter.” Nathaniel had accused Roy of abusing him, and Roy had not requested placement. Mother also suggested her brother, Steven R., who lived in Salinas, as a possible placement.
On September 23, 2015, the social worker contacted the state prison to arrange to interview father. On October 15, the social worker interviewed father, and he told her that he “may have Native American ancestry but could not provide a name of a tribe.” In November, father completed and signed an ICWA-020 form. He checked the box indicating that he “may have Indian ancestry” through “grandma on Dad’s side” but was “unsure” of the name of the tribe. Father told the social worker that he had been raised by his mother, Rachel R. and his “step-father, Jerry” C. In November, the court found that the ICWA “MAY APPLY” and directed the social worker to provide ICWA notices.
In December 2015, Rachel R. told the social worker that “she does not have Native American ancestry on her side of the family.” She said that “the paternal grandfather, Benjamin F[.] may have Native American ancestry but was unable to identify a tribe.” Rachel R. “was unable to provide contact information or a date of birth for the paternal grandfather.”
In December 2015, the social worker sent ICWA notices to the BIA and the Secretary of the Interior. The December notices provided the information that had been in the September notices and added the names and birth dates of paternal grandmother and the names of paternal grandfather, Benjamin F., and paternal great-grandfather, Luther R. The notices stated that Luther R. died in 1987. Father’s address was not provided on the face of the notices, but his address was listed in the petition that was attached to the notices.
In December 2015, after paternity testing confirmed that father was Nathaniel’s biological father, the court declared father to be the legal father of Nathaniel. At the December 23, 2015 jurisdictional hearing, the court found the petition true and made a finding that ICWA “Notice is Proper.” At the January 2016 disposition hearing, the court removed Nathaniel from parental custody, placed him in foster care, and granted mother reunification services. The court again found “that notice is proper under the Indian Child Welfare Act.”
In June 2016, the court granted mother’s request for substitution of counsel and appointed a new attorney to represent her. On July 18, the court held a hearing to decide whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for mother. The court declined to appoint a guardian ad litem. Mother confirmed that she did not want to represent herself. No other proceedings took place on July 18. At a July 22 hearing, the court granted a continuance. It made no other orders.
On August 22, 2016, mother filed a notice of appeal challenging the court’s orders “to keep jurisdiction and medical and educational rights” of Nathaniel. The August 22 notice of appeal also purported to challenge the court’s dispositional orders, “[a]ll jurisdiction hearings,” unspecified “[o]ther appealable orders relating to dependency,” and the court’s orders at the “July, 18, 2016” hearing.
On September 1, 2016, mother filed another notice of appeal. The September 1 notice of appeal purported to challenge the court’s December 2015 jurisdictional order, its January 2016 dispositional order, “and all court dates thereof beginning 12/23/15.”
The six-month review was originally scheduled for August 19, 2016. At the August 19 hearing, mother’s trial counsel requested a contested hearing. The contested hearing was set for September 19. At the September 19 contested hearing, mother’s trial counsel argued that the case plan had not been providing and would not provide reasonable services to mother. The court found that reasonable services had been offered and provided and that the case plan provided for reasonable services. It continued mother’s reunification services, and granted father, who remained in prison, visitation upon his release from prison. The court again found that ICWA “Notice has been given as required by law.” It did not find that the ICWA applied or did not apply. On September 28, mother filed a notice of appeal challenging the court’s September 19 reasonable services finding.

II. Analysis
The sole issue before us is whether the juvenile court erred in finding at the six-month review hearing that ICWA “Notice has been given as required by law.” Mother claims that the ICWA notices sent by the social worker did not provide “adequate and meaningful information” that the social worker could have acquired had she only inquired. She maintains that the social worker “failed to properly interview Mother’s extended family and Father to gather information required under the ICWA.”
Mother contends that the September notices were inadequate because they did not contain maternal grandmother’s address and information about other maternal relatives that the social worker could have obtained from maternal grandmother. Her contention is that because the social worker spoke to maternal grandmother in October 2015, additional information could have been obtained from her then. Mother argues that the December notices were inadequate because they did not include father’s current and former addresses, they lacked meaningful information about Benjamin F. that the social worker might have been able to obtain from father, and they were not served on father.
“It is essential to provide the Indian tribe with all available information about the child’s ancestors, especially the one with the alleged Indian heritage.” (In re Francisco W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 703, italics added.) If the social worker “has reason to know that an Indian child is or may be involved,” the social worker “must” interview the parents and “ ‘extended family members’ ” “to gather information” necessary to complete the notices. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4).) Federal regulations governing ICWA notices, which set forth the “minimum Federal standards to ensure compliance with ICWA,” require that ICWA notices include, “[i]f known, the names, birthdates, birthplaces, and Tribal enrollment information of other direct lineal ancestors of the child, such as grandparents.” (25 C.F.R. §§ 23.106(a), 23.111(d)(3), italics added.) ICWA notices are required to be sent to the tribes and to the parents. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)(1).)
“One of the purposes of giving notice to the tribe is to enable it to determine whether the minor is an Indian child. [Citation.] Notice is meaningless if no information or insufficient information is presented to the tribe to make that determination. . . . The burden is on the Agency to obtain all possible information about the minor’s potential Indian background and provide that information to the relevant tribe or, if the tribe is unknown, to the BIA. [Citation.]” (In re Louis S. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 622, 630.)
The September notices did not fail to comply with the ICWA’s requirements. The sole information about maternal Indian ancestry was maternal grandfather’s statement “that he believes there is Cherokee ancestry on the maternal side of the family.” Mother, on the other hand, denied that she had any Indian ancestry. There was no indication that maternal grandfather believed that Indian ancestry could be traced through maternal grandmother, and it was apparent that the information about maternal great-grandparents that was included in the notices had come from maternal grandfather and concerned his ancestry. Consequently, the absence of maternal grandmother’s address and further information about her ancestry was not relevant to the possible Indian ancestry that had been identified by maternal grandfather. Nor is there any indication in the record that the social worker had any opportunity to further interview maternal grandmother or had any contact information for her that would have permitted further inquiry. The record reflects only that maternal grandmother contacted the social worker a single time to reject the notion that she could serve as a placement for Nathaniel.
The December notices also satisfied the ICWA’s notice requirements. The sole information that might indicate Indian ancestry was father’s assertion that he “may have Indian ancestry” through “grandma on Dad’s side.” It was not clear whether father was indicating that there might be Indian ancestry through his own mother, paternal grandmother, or that there might be Indian ancestry through his father’s mother, paternal great-grandmother. In any case, paternal grandmother denied that she or anyone on her side of the family had any Indian ancestry, and she had no contact information for paternal grandfather and could not provide his birth date. Nothing in the record indicated that father would have had more information about paternal grandfather, particularly in light of the fact that he had not been raised by paternal grandfather. While the social worker failed to include father’s address on the face of the notice, this omission was immaterial since his address was included in the petition attached to the notice. It was also immaterial that the ICWA notices were not served on father as there was no indication he possessed any additional information that he had not provided previously. We find the social worker’s inquiry to be sufficient and the notices to be adequate under the ICWA.
Mother’s reliance on In re A.G. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1390 (A.G.) is misplaced. In A.G., four of the paternal relatives were involved in the dependency proceedings, but the notices included virtually no information about the paternal relatives. (A.G., at p. 1397.) It was conceded on appeal that the notices were inadequate. (A.G., at p. 1395.) Here, in contrast, none of the paternal relatives were involved in the dependency proceedings other than father. The social worker interviewed father and paternal grandmother, which is clearly how the information about paternal grandfather and paternal great-grandfather was acquired, but father provided no further information and paternal grandmother said she had no further information. Under these circumstances, we can see no violation of the social worker’s duty to inquire about and include in the notices information about paternal relatives.

III. Disposition
In case No. H044022, the juvenile court’s September 2016 order is affirmed. Mother’s appeal in case No. H043861 is dismissed.






_______________________________
Mihara, J.



WE CONCUR:






_____________________________
Elia, Acting P. J.






_____________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, J.













In re Nathaniel R.
H043861, H044022