Filed 4/26/17 In re N.B. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re N.B. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B276614
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. DK12529)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CASEY C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
2
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael Loren Miller and Karin Borzakian,
Commissioners. Affirmed in part, dismissed in part,
reversed in part.
Darlene Azevedo Kelly, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis,
Assistant County Counsel, David Michael Miller, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Casey C. (father) appeals from jurisdictional findings
declaring his three children dependents under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b),
1 and the
disposition order removing them from his custody. Father
also appeals the court’s decision to deny his request to
represent himself. We reverse the jurisdictional finding
based on allegations concerning father’s mental health
because that finding is not supported by substantial
evidence. We dismiss as nonjusticiable the portion of
father’s appeal challenging the court’s other jurisdictional
findings against him. We affirm the order removing the
children from parental custody under section 361,

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
3
subdivision (c)(1), and the order denying father’s Faretta
motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother2 is a regular user of methamphetamine. By
October 2015, she and father had three children ranging in
age from two months to three years.
The family came to the attention of the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) after a caller reported a child running around
without a parent and police found the three-year-old without
a shirt or shoes, near a busy roadway in an area known for a
high volume of drug use and trafficking. When mother saw
police approaching with her son, she quickly ran into her
home to hide her methamphetamine. Mother admitted to
hiding a methamphetamine pipe in a laundry basket and
having used two days earlier. Police found a glass pipe with
methamphetamine residue in a closet, as well as two other
pipes loaded with methamphetamine in the backyard and
accessible to the children. The police officer reported that
the pipes in the backyard belonged to mother’s roommates,
who appeared to be drug users. Mother was arrested and
her children were detained.
Father was not home when the children were detained,
but he was home the next day when a social worker made an

2 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
4
unannounced visit to the family’s home. He explained he
had left the home two days earlier after an argument with
mother. He claimed the home was in his name, and that he
had been in and out of the home for about a month due to
relationship issues. Father claimed he was aware of
mother’s drug use history and confirmed that the children’s
godparents lived in the home. He denied knowing that
mother or the godparents were using drugs. Both parents
reported that the three-year-old was very agile and had a
history of climbing over the six-foot-high fence in the
backyard.
Mother and father acknowledged arguing, their last
argument taking place a few days earlier. Mother claimed
father is very controlling, and most recently dragged her by
the hair out of the home and locked her out. In a separate
interview, father claimed he had locked mother out because
she had maced him during an argument. Father reported
smoking marijuana regularly, although his marijuana
license expired a few months earlier. He had a number of
drug-related arrests and convictions, but the last arrest was
about four years ago.
The court detained all three children, granted father
monitored visitation, ordered him to submit to random drug
testing, and ordered the Department to provide both parents
with referrals for services, including drug counseling and
domestic violence counseling. The Department asked father
for the names of possible placement options. It later
5
determined that none of the proposed placements were
suitable.
A Department report for a scheduled February 25,
2016 adjudication hearing stated that after testing positive
for marijuana once, father refused to submit to additional
drug testing and missed six test dates. The Department
reported father was uncooperative about participating in
services.
On February 25, 2016, father moved to relieve his
attorney under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118
(Marsden). Father also requested to represent himself under
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). After a
confidential hearing on father’s Marsden motion,
Commissioner Michael Loren Miller denied the motion and
explained to father that his attorney was not to blame for
the delay in hearing his case. Turning to father’s motion for
self-representation, Commissioner Miller attempted to
explain to father the challenges associated with selfrepresentation
in a dependency case:
“[The court:] Now you want to represent yourself.
So the problem is that you have no
clue about the animal that you are
dealing with. This Welfare and
Institutions Code stuff is nutty. I
practiced law for 30 years.
“The father: I know.
6
“The court: And I am struggling, trying to
understand it all.”
The court acknowledged father was frustrated, and
continued:
“[The court:] Now the issue is what am I going to
do. Okay. And it behooves you,
because I take this into consideration,
it behooves you to cooperate. Because
if you don’t, if you are resistant, if you
get your dander up and your panties
all in a bunch, then what happens is
there a failure of communication and
your pride steps in the way, and you
are not going to do the things that I
may require you to do. [¶] And you
have to talk to the social worker,
whether you like it or not. [¶] Okay.
So that is one thing. [¶] Representing
yourself. That is nutty. But if you
represent yourself, I am not giving you
-- I have to treat you like a lawyer.
And you are not trained to be a
lawyer. And you don’t know all the
rules.”
7
The court pointed out that the attorney representing the
Department was a skilled, knowledgeable attorney, and that
neither father nor the commissioner was as knowledgeable.
Father responded:
“The father: You think I exercise my Faretta rights
for nothing, man? And then you are
sitting there, telling me getting my
panties in a bunch. I’m no woman,
man. I don’t wear fucking panties.
Shit. Disrespectful, man.”
The court asked father to relax, and the colloquy continued:
“The father: My bipolar disorder is kicking in.
That is another issue. You all don’t
know about that? You all would if you
had read my file.
“The court: Well, that is going to be one of the
issues that need[s] to be addressed.
“The father: It is going to be addressed. I already
said that the first time before you
kicked me out. It’s all going to get
addressed.
8
“The court: All I am trying to say, man, is look. I
understand your frustration. And I
am not trying to be disrespectful to
you. I am trying to appeal to your
reasonableness and your common
sense. [¶] You trying to go -- you are
a Pop Warner football player trying to
play in the pros. And that’s what this
is.
“The father: Character assassination.
“The court: It is not character assassination.
“The father: It’s intellectual assassination.
“The court: Well, listen. Your intellect is not up to
par to be playing in this arena.
“The father: I understand. You don’t have to
assassinate my character about it.
You can say that.
“The court: I am not --
“The father: You can say that. I understand
language, man. Telling me what my
intellect is and ain’t. It’s -- it’s -- and
9
everything is -- it’s on the negative.
[¶] . . . [¶]
“The court: Okay. But all I am saying is that this
-- I understand what I am doing.
Representing yourself is fraught full of
peril. [¶] How far did you go in high
school? Did you get your high school
degree?
“The father: I went to prison two months before
graduation. I had my scholarship to
go to college and play professional
sports. I could have -- I was almost
about to go play for the Dodgers,
straight out of high school. [¶] I am a
drug dealer. Remember. It’s in my
record. I went to prison when I was 18
years old for conspiracy to sell drugs,
for selling drugs. It’s on record.
“The court: I know. That’s not what I asked.
“The father: [Ms. Lopez] hasn’t read none of that. I
asked her. I said, ‘have you read my
record?’ when she started talking to
me about something simplistic as
marijuana. Have you read -- have you
10
read -- it’s a page somewhere in there
where it’s two pages of my criminal
activities in my lifestyle.
“The court: I know.
“The father: I am quite sure you read it. So you
know where we are. I’ve probably
been in the courtroom as much as her.
I was 18 years old, fighting a
conspiracy case and could have fought
it pro per. Don’t assassinate my
intellect. Do your job, man. [¶] I’m
sorry. It’s going to go how it’s --
“The court: I am going to deny your Faretta
rights.”
Father met with a social worker on March 4, 2016, and
explained his behavior in court by stating he was very upset
with the judge and how he was being spoken to. During the
meeting with the social worker, father was very animated,
flapping his arms, raising his voice, repeatedly standing up,
moving around, and then sitting down. Father told the
social worker he was bipolar.
On April 11, 2016, the Department filed an amended
petition, adding an allegation that on February 25, 2016,
father “exhibited inappropriate behaviors in the Court room
11
in that the father, was flapping his arms, raising his voice
and yelling. The father admitted to having a mental health
diagnosis of Bi-Polar Disorder and is not medication
compliant. The father’s inappropriate behaviors and failure
to address his mental health endangers the children’s
physical health and safety and places the children at risk of
serious harm and danger.”
Father met with the social worker again in June 2016,
and “stated to her he will NOT do anything.” Father refused
to drug test or do any part of his case plan. He did, however,
continue to visit the children every week.
On June 13, 2016, after receiving the Department’s
reports into evidence and hearing argument from counsel,
Commissioner Karin Borzakian found the children were
described by section 300, subdivision (b), sustaining three
counts against mother, based on inadequate supervision,
permitting access to drug paraphernalia, and mother’s
history of drug use. The court sustained one count relating
to domestic violence between mother and father, and the
additional count based on father’s mental health diagnosis
and medication noncompliance. The court dismissed a
separate count related to father’s marijuana use, as well as
counts alleged under subdivisions (a) and (j) of section 300.
It also ordered the children removed from parental custody
under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), finding by clear and
convincing evidence that there was a substantial danger to
the children’s physical health, safety, protection or physical
12
or emotional well-being, and no reasonable means to protect
the children without removal.
DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdictional findings
Father does not challenge the court’s jurisdictional
findings against mother based on her failure to supervise the
children (count b-1) and the dangerous home environment
with drug paraphernalia within access of the young children
(count b-2). Father does contend there was insufficient
evidence to support the court’s jurisdictional findings against
him. The court found that the children are described by
subdivision (b) of section 300, based on risk to the children
due to father’s failure to protect the children from mother’s
drug use (count b-3), the history of domestic violence
between mother and father (count b-5), and father’s bipolar
disorder and medication noncompliance (count b-6).
“‘[A] jurisdictional finding good against one parent is
good against both. More accurately, the minor is a
dependent if the actions of either parent bring [him] within
one of the statutory definitions of a dependent. [Citations.]
This accords with the purpose of a dependency proceeding,
which is to protect the child, rather than prosecute the
parent.’ [Citations.]” (In re X.S. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th
1154, 1161.) “For this reason, an appellate court may
decline to address the evidentiary support for any remaining
13
jurisdictional findings once a single finding has been found
to be supported by the evidence. [Citations.]” (In re I.A.
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492 (I.A.).)
The appellate court does retain discretion to address
the sufficiency of evidence to support specific jurisdictional
findings where jurisdiction over the children would still be
warranted on other grounds. (See In re Briana V. (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 297, 308–311; I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1490–1492.) This discretion may be exercised when the
finding in question “(1) serves as the basis for dispositional
orders that are also challenged on appeal [citation]; (2) could
be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact
the current or future dependency proceedings [citations]; or
(3) ‘could have other consequences for [the appellant],
beyond jurisdiction’ [citation].” (In re Drake M. (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 754, 762–763.)
Father concedes that regardless of the outcome of his
appeal, the court will retain jurisdiction over the three
children based on mother’s conduct. Father asks this court
to exercise its discretion and reverse the jurisdictional
findings against him, arguing that the disposition order is
based on the court’s jurisdictional findings. At disposition,
the court ordered the children to remain removed from
parental custody under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). As
part of reunification services, it ordered father to go to
mental health counseling, comply with any
recommendations of his mental health provider, and take all
prescribed psychotropic medications. The court also ordered
14
father to participate in a 26-week domestic violence
batterer’s intervention program. The Department counters
that because father has not independently challenged the
dispositional orders imposing program requirements, he
cannot argue that he is prejudiced by such requirements.
We decline to exercise our discretion to review the
court’s decision to sustain the counts relating to domestic
violence and failure to protect, as we see no prejudice
relating to those findings. (See I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1492 [“we cannot render any relief to Father that would
have a practical, tangible impact on his position in the
dependency proceeding”].) For the count alleging father’s
bipolar disorder and lack of medication compliance, however,
we find prejudice because the finding serves as the basis for
the order requiring father to take all prescribed psychotropic
medications, and it could impact the current or future
dependency proceedings in a manner that warrants review.
(See In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452.)
Father’s appeal of the jurisdictional finding implicitly
challenges the order requiring him to attend mental health
counseling and take prescribed psychotropic medications, so
we do not require father to independently challenge those
orders as a separate contention on appeal.
We apply the substantial evidence standard of review
when examining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the court’s jurisdictional findings. “[W]e draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and
orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
15
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the
trial court.” (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193
(Heather A.).) The pertinent inquiry is whether substantial
evidence supports the finding, not whether a contrary
finding might have been made. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), provides a basis for
jurisdiction if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical
harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or
her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect
the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child’s
parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the
child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child
has been left . . . .” In order to establish jurisdiction under
subdivision (b) of section 300, there must be evidence of (1)
neglectful conduct by the parent; (2) causation; and (3)
serious physical harm or illness to the minor, or a
substantial risk of such harm or illness. (In re Rocco M.
(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.) Exercise of dependency
court jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), is
proper when a child is “of such tender years that the absence
of adequate supervision and care poses an inherent risk to
[his or her] health and safety.” (Id. at p. 824.)
We find no evidence in the record to support the court’s
decision to sustain count b-6 that father has a mental health
diagnosis of bipolar disorder, is not medication compliant,
16
and that his failure to address his mental health places the
children’s physical health and safety at risk of serious harm.
The only evidence before the court was father’s statement in
court and later to a social worker attributing to bipolar
disorder his acting in an aggravated manner. There was no
evidence in the record that father had ever seen a
psychiatrist, received a formal diagnosis, or had been
prescribed medications. Even if father’s statements were
sufficient evidence of a diagnosed mental illness, nothing in
the record supports the inference that father had been
prescribed medications to treat his mental illness, or that his
failure to take prescribed medications posed a danger to his
children’s safety. Absent such evidence, we must conclude
that the court’s jurisdictional finding that the children were
described by section 300, subdivision (b), based on father’s
failure to address his mental health issues is not supported
by substantial evidence.
B. Removal Order
Father contends the order removing the children from
parental custody was not supported by substantial evidence.
He also contends he would be entitled to custody of his
children under section 361.2 as a non-custodial parent. We
reject both contentions.
17
Substantial evidence supporting removal order
A dispositional order removing a child from parental
custody is also subject to the substantial evidence standard
of review. (In re D.G. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1574.)
Under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), a dependent child may
not be removed from a parent unless the dependency court
finds by clear and convincing evidence “[t]here is or would be
a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if
the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable
means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected
without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . .
physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) “‘The parent need
not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually
harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the
statute is on averting harm to the child.’ [Citation.] The
court may consider a parent’s past conduct as well as present
circumstances. [Citation.]” (In re N.M. (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 159, 169–170.)
There is substantial evidence supporting the court’s
order removing the children from father’s custody. Before
the children were detained, father was frequently absent
despite knowing that mother had a history of drug use and
knowing that the oldest child had a proclivity to climb and
escape from closed areas. In October 2015, the court ordered
father to submit to random drug testing and directed the
Department to provide reunification services. Between
18
November 2015 and June 2016, father visited the children,
but refused to drug test or participate in any services. He
was uncooperative with the Department and exhibited
erratic behavior. The evidence of father’s refusal to
participate in services or drug testing, combined with his
erratic behavior, supports a reasonable inference that
allowing the young children to be placed with father would
create a risk of harm. Even if a different inference might be
drawn from the evidence, we do not second-guess the
dependency court’s determination.
Father also argues the court did not state the facts to
support its determination that reasonable efforts had been
made to prevent and eliminate the need for the children’s
removal. He claims that the court could have issued a
restraining order to prevent domestic violence, removed
mother from the home, required father to submit to a few
random drug tests, and provided in-home services to assist
father in managing the care of the three young children.
Father forfeited this argument because he did not bring the
issue to the trial court’s attention at the time of the court’s
order. A claim of error is forfeited on appeal if it is not
raised in the trial court. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287,
1293.) “The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to
bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they
may be corrected.” (Ibid.) The rationale behind the
forfeiture rule is that it would be “inappropriate to allow a
party not to object to an error of which the party is or should
be aware . . . .” (In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494,
19
501.) At the disposition hearing, father’s counsel did not
point out that the court had failed to state the facts
supporting its conclusion that the Department had made
reasonable efforts to prevent removal. By failing to object,
father forfeited any claim of error relating to the court’s
failure to specify the factual basis for its conclusion.
Placement with non-custodial parent
Father alternatively argues that the court did not
make a detriment finding as required when denying the
placement request of a non-custodial parent seeking custody
under section 361.2.
Section 361.2 contemplates that a parent “with whom
the child was not residing at the time that the events or
conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions
of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child”
may request custody, and “the court shall place the child
with the parent unless it finds that placement with that
parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd.
(a), italics added.) In comparison, subdivision (c)(1) of
section 361 “authorizes a child’s removal ‘from the physical
custody of his or her parents or guardian or guardians with
whom the child resides at the time the petition was
initiated.’ (§ 361, subd. (c)(1), italics added.)” (In re Dakota
J. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 619, 628 (Dakota J.).) In Dakota
J., the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence
20
supported removal of the mother’s three children, but two of
the three were not living with the mother at the time the
petition was initiated, and had not lived with her for five
years. On appeal, the court held that this was error, stating
“it is plain that the statute does not contemplate that a child
could be removed from a parent who is not living with the
child at the relevant time.” (Ibid. fn. omitted; see also In re
Abram L. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, 460 (Abram L.)
[although mother did not appeal the dispositional order, the
court held the children could not be removed from father’s
physical custody under section 361, subdivision (c)(1),
because they were not residing with him when the petition
was initiated].)
Unlike the facts in Dakota J. and Abram L., the facts
are disputed as to whether father was a custodial parent or
not. The Department’s detention report stated that the
family home is in father’s name, and father was at the home
the day after mother was arrested and the children were
detained. He reported being in and out of the home for the
past month due to relationship issues with mother, and
acknowledged leaving the home two days earlier after an
argument with mother. Mother told the Department she
had tried to leave father, but father would not allow her to
take the children. So while the children were technically not
residing with father on the date of their initial detention, we
are not persuaded that father falls within the definition of a
non-custodial parent as described in section 361.2,
subdivision (a). Father’s counsel also forfeited the right to
21
challenge any error by not calling the court’s attention to the
need to make findings required when denying a request
under section 361.2. (See In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
597, 605 [“[f]ailure to object to noncompliance with section
361.2 in the lower court results in forfeiture”].) Particularly
in the circumstances of this case, where the evidence does
not necessarily establish that father was a non-custodial
parent, the importance of calling the court’s attention to the
possibility that a different statute might govern the
children’s placement is self-evident.
Even if the court erred in ordering the children
removed from father under section 361, subdivision (c)(1),
rather than denying placement under section 361.2, the
record before us does not demonstrate a reasonable
probability the result would have been more favorable but
for the error. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59–60;
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 (Watson).)
Assuming father was a non-custodial parent at the time the
children were removed, the record provides sufficient
evidence to support a finding under section 361.2,
subdivision (a), that placement with father would be
detrimental to the children’s safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being. As explained earlier, father’s refusal
to drug test and his history of domestic violence with mother
form a sufficient basis for the court to find that removal was
necessary. In addition, the court possessed authority under
either section 361, subdivision (a), or section 362, subdivision
(a), to make reasonable orders limiting father’s custody
22
rights to protect the children from risk of harm. (In re
Julien H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1089, fn. 8; Dakota J.,
supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 630–632.) Because father
cannot demonstrate prejudicial error, we affirm the court’s
removal order.
C. Order denying father’s motion to represent
himself
Father contends the court committed prejudicial error
when it denied his February 25, 2016 motion to represent
himself.3 We review the court’s decision for abuse of
discretion. (In re A.M. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 914, 923–928
(A.M.) [court has discretion to determine whether to grant or
deny a parent’s request for self-representation].)
“Section 317, subdivision (b) has been interpreted to
give a parent in a juvenile dependency case a statutory right
to self-representation. (In re Angel W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th
1074, 1083 v (Angel W.).) This right is statutory only; a
parent in a juvenile dependency case does not have a
constitutional right to self-representation. (Id. at p. 1082.)”
(A.M., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 923.) “Section 317,
subdivision (b) requires appointment of counsel for an
indigent parent or guardian in a juvenile dependency case

3 The court also conducted a hearing on father’s motion
to relieve his current counsel under Marsden, and denied
that motion. Father does not claim that denial of his
Marsden motion was erroneous.
23
‘unless the court finds that the parent or guardian has made
a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel as provided in
this section.’ A waiver of counsel is valid if the juvenile court
has apprised the parent of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation and the risks and complexities of his or
her particular case. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “The state will only
interfere with an individual’s choice of legal representation
when that choice ‘will result in significant prejudice’ to the
individual ‘or in a disruption of the orderly processes of
justice unreasonable under the circumstances of the
particular case.’ [Citation.]” (In re Jackson W. (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 247, 256.) “Thus, the juvenile court has
discretion to deny the request for self-representation when it
is reasonably probable that granting the request would
impair the child’s right to a prompt resolution of custody
status or unduly disrupt the proceedings.” (A.M., supra, at
pp. 925–926.)
In A.M., the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the father the right to self-representation, in part
because the father had requested a number of continuances
without providing documentation to support his requests
and often made lengthy statements digressing into
irrelevant matters. The father’s counsel even speculated
that if he were to acquiesce to the father’s requests to
present certain arguments, it would take a year of
preparation to handle the case. (A.M., supra, 164
Cal.App.4th at pp. 927–928.) Thus, the evidence showed
that allowing the father to represent himself would cause
24
significant delay and such delay would impair the minor’s
right to a prompt resolution of custody status. (Ibid.)
In our case, father claims the juvenile court abused its
discretion in refusing his request for self-representation
because there was no evidence that he was incapable of
waiving his statutory right to counsel. While the court could
have taken the time to create a more complete record of the
reasons for denying father’s request, the nature of father’s
responses to the court’s questions supports the conclusion
that the court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. The
court advised father that he would be navigating a complex
area of law and would be arguing against an attorney with
significantly more experience. In response, father accused
the court of assassinating his intellect and his character, and
questioning his masculinity. Father also made statements
about being a drug dealer and that his record had two pages
outlining his criminal activities. Portions of the colloquy
between the court and father, when considered together with
the Department’s report describing father’s demeanor about
a week after the February 25, 2015 hearing, support the
conclusion that allowing father to represent himself would
delay and disrupt the proceeding to the detriment of the
children’s right to a prompt resolution. The court did not
abuse its discretion in denying father’s request to represent
himself.
Assuming for the purposes of argument that the court
erred in denying father’s request for self-representation, any
error was harmless. (A.M., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 928
25
[harmless error where father found not credible, was
represented by competent counsel, did not explain what
additional information he could have elicited from witnesses,
and it was not reasonably probable he could have conducted
better cross-examination of witnesses]; Watson, supra, 46
Cal.2d at p. 837.) At the adjudication, father’s counsel did
not present any evidence, but argued there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding of domestic violence. She
pointed out that there was no independent evidence about
whether father had bipolar disorder, and that there was no
nexus between father’s admitted marijuana use and any risk
of harm to the children.
Father argues on appeal that if the court had
permitted him to represent himself, he could have provided
beneficial information to the court, such as information
about his current employment and his financial support of
mother and their children. He also argues that he could
have provided helpful testimony, and suggests that his
decision not to testify suggests that he was not able to
communicate with his attorney. Father provides no evidence
to support this argument and ignores the fact that he had
the right to testify while he was represented. Given this
record, it is not reasonably probable father would have
obtained a more favorable result had he been allowed to
represent himself. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
26
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional finding relating to father’s mental
health condition and non-compliance with medication is
reversed. Casey C.’s appeal of the remaining jurisdictional
findings is dismissed. The dispositional orders are affirmed.
KRIEGLER, J.
We concur:
TURNER, P.J.
KIN, J.

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.